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Abstract 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to investigate the effects of trainin- on 
reasoning and decision making performance. In Experiment Ia study is reported which 
examined the relationships between performance on a variety of reasoning tasks and 
measures of individual differences. Tasks employed were documented in the literature for 
their differential responding according to heuristic and analytic processes. The reasoning 
tasks to be utilised in the training studies were also validated. In Chapter 4, two statistical 
training studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday 
reasoning problems can be increased after instruction on the Law Of Large Numbers. Bias 
was eliminated, but only on written justifications of their responses. Belief-based 
responding was still utilised when participants were asked for a quick indication of 
argument strength on a rating scale. This demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and 
belief-based responding. A second series of experiments explored the effects of both 
abstract and schema-based training on selection task responding. All the training 
procedures resulted in positive transfer apart from training on the logic of the material 
conditional which facilitated perforinance on arbitrary tasks only. Relationships between 
perforinance on the tasks post-training and cognitive ability indicated that training was 
more effective for higher ability participants. The differential training effects were 
discussed in terrns of complexity of training procedures. The findings overall have 
implications for dual process theories of reasoning. The findings suggest that the 
interaction between training and System I and System 2 tasks/responses is a great deal 
more complicated than the simple analysis that is afforded by dual process accounts. 
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CHAPTER I 
Pragmatic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning and Decision Making 
1.1 General Introduction 
1.1.1 Introduction to the review 
The purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to investigate the extent to which 
heuristic and analytic processes affect performance in human thinking, using instruction 
and training procedures designed to improve reasoning competence. Two serics of 
experiments will be reported in this thesis, which explore the effects of explicit instruction 
on human thinking, using tasks well documented in the literature for their elicitation of 
non-logical and biased responses: law of large numbers reasoning and the selection task. 
Of particular interest in this research are the effects the instruction procedures have on 
biased responding on these tasks and the extent to which training in one domain may 
generalise to other reasoning and decision-making tasks. 
There has been an explosion of reasoning research over the last 30 years and the 
framework used now to test and interpret findings has changed substantially from when it 
began. This review will commence with a brief history of research in reasoning and 
decision-making, to provide the theoretical and conceptual background for the current 
research. 
This xvill be followed by a discussion of a contempory theory of thinking, the Dual Process 
Theory, the development of which has matenalized out of research findings related to bias 
and non-logical responding on a vanetv of reasoning and decision-making task-s. 
Supporters of Dual Process Theories propose that the brain consists of two separate 
systems, one relatcd to analytic thouoht and the other intuitive. It argued that logical and 
rion-logical responscs on reasoning tasks are the result ofthc different reasoning processcs 
within the two systems, the analytic system facilitating logical reasoning and the intuitive 
system cueing non-logical or biased responses. Evidence for this vic%ý will be discussed in 
the context of logical andrion-logical performance on the reasoning and decision-making 
tasks to be used in the experiments reported in this thesis. 
1.1.2 A brief history of the deduction paradigm 
Historically, research in reasoning has been conducted using the deduction paradigm that 
originated from the philosophical and psychological tradition of logicism. The proposal 
was that logic fon-ned the basis for rational thought (Henle, 1962; In Evans, 2002). Piaget, 
a very influential researcher, proposed that according to the theory of formal operations, 
adults develop abstract reasoning based on an inherent mental logic (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958). The deduction paradigm was therefore used to demonstrate the extent to which 
people reasoned logically and became the basis for testing the rationality of people's 
reasoning in psychological laboratories (Evans, 2004; 2002). 
Deductive reasoning is based on logical arguments and one of the most common 
paradigms used for studying deductive reasoning competence is syllogistic reasoning. 
Syllogistic reasoning was first devised by Aristotle and believed to be the basis of all 
rational thought (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). People are presented with a set of 
premises and asked if the conclusion logically follows. See Example 1.1 that illustrates a 
syllogism consisting of two premises and a conclusion. 
Some A are B, 
No B are C, 
Therefore, some A are not C. 
Example 1.1 
The premises must be assumed to be true and reasoning must be based on the premises 
only. Knowledge and prior belief is irrelevant to the task. A logicallY valid argument is 
one in which the conclusion can be shown necessarily to follow from its premises. In other 
words, if all the premises are true then a valid conclusion must be true. 
Evidence from real life situations and in experimental laboratory settings demonstrate how 
people do not always reason in accordance with some normative system of logic. When 
participants are asked to perform reasoning and decision-making tasks many systematic 
errors and biases are produced. Bias has been defined as the systematIc influence of some 
logically irrelevant feature of the task (Evans, 2002; 2004). It is consistently found that 
people ignore relevant infori-nation or attend to irrelevant features of the task. Perfon-nance 
is highly dependent upon the precise content and context in which a logical problem is 
presented (Evans, 1993). 
People were judged as irrational and illogical due to the errors and biases that were elicited 
when performing on logical reasoning tasks (e. g. Wason, 1968; In Evans, 2002). It was 
argued that there was something wrong with people rather than the logic with which they 
were being compared. However these errors and biases are now known to be evidence of 
pragmatic, belief-based or heuristic and other nonlogical causes of responses to tasks. 
Pragmatics are defined as 'aspects of meaning and language use that are dependent on the 
speaker, the addressee and other features of the context and utterance' (Levinson, 1983). In 
other words these are the situational influences of the problem or argument itself Beliefs 
on the other hand are personal and can be defined as any cognitive content held as true to 
the individual. In any given reasoning or judgement situation these two factors interact and 
inferences are drawn from both, which may or may not result in a biased response. 
Researchers in human thinking are taking into account such pragmatic influences and 
belief based responses in order to gain further understanding of the reasoning processes 
3 
themselves (Cheng & Holyoak; Evans & Over, 1996: Evans & Over. 2004, Stanovich. 
1999). 
At the same time that people were being judged as irrational when compared to a 
nonnative logic in reasoning, a highly influential body of research was being conducted in 
decision-making which drew the same conclusions. Early research using the heuristics and 
biases approach (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) concentrated on how incorrect statistical 
reasoning was performed. A variety of studies illustrated how intuitive responses resulted 
in errors and biases which led to the identification of two distinct approaches for 
responding to statistical problems. One was spontaneous, intuitive, effortless and fast, 
whilst the other was deliberate, rule-governed, effortful and slow. It was deemed not 
necessary to study correct statistical reasoning as controlled reasoning which led to correct 
answers was seen as a default case that needed no explaining (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002). However it is now deemed extremely necessary to study correct and incorrect 
responding on the tasks in order to observe the interactions between the two systems and 
in contrast to Tversky and Kahneman, it is the intuitive system that is seen as the default 
system. 
1.1.3 Belief bias in human thinking: the case of syllogistic reasoning 
A useful, illustrative example of a deductive reasoning task that consistently elicits biased 
responding is the syllogism involving realistic content. In abstract form syllogisms are a 
sound measure of deductive reasoning competence. However when realistic content is 
included people find it extremely difficult to dissociate the logic from their beliefs 
resulting in errors. It is a well established finding that people are more likely to accept the 
conclusion to a syllogism if they believe it, irrespective of its logical validity (Evans, 
Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Newstead, Pollard, & Allen, 1992). This has been tenned the 
belief bias effect. 
4 
In this paradigm, participants are presented with four t)pes of syllogism, Valld-Bellevable. 
Valid-Unbelievable, Invalid-Believable and Invalid-Unbelievable and they are asked to 
judge the validity of the conclusions (See Table 1.1 for an example of each taken from 
Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) plus the percentage of acceptance rates of conclusions 
as valid). 
Example Acceptance 
V alid- believable 
No police dogs are vicious. 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious. 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not police dogs. 89% 
Valid-unbelievable 
No nutritional things are inexpensive. 
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional. 5600 
Invalid-believable 
No addictive things are inexpensive. 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes. 7 Po 
In valid-u n believable 
No millionaires are hard workers. 
Some rich people are hard workers. 
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people. 10% 
Table 1.1 Example syllogisms and acceptance rates of conclusions as valid taken 
from Evans et al. (1983) 
Three basic effects have emerged from studies involving manipulation of belief and logic. 
Firstly, logically valid conclusions are more readily accepted than invalid ones, which is in 
line with the logic of the syllogism. Secondly, believable conclusions are more readily 
accepted than unbelievable ones which illustrates the strong effect of belief and thirdly 
there is an interaction between logical validity and believability. In other words, the effects 
of believability are stronger on syllogisms leading to invalid conclusions than on tlio,,, e 
leading to valid conclusions (Evans. Newstead, &, Byme, 1993). 
5 
The findings in the belief-bias literature provide evidence of irrational reasoning 
behaviour. Participants are able to follow the logic by endorsing more valid than invalid 
conclusions but they cannot ignore the beficvability of the conclusions either. To account 
for these findings, Evans and Over (1996; Evans, 1993; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1991) 
developed a theory of rationality based on two kinds of rationality. a personal and an 
impersonal approach. The personal rationality, termed Rationalityl, incorporates the goals 
of the individual and whether the reasoning or behaviour is usually reliable for achieving 
those goals. The impersonal rationality, terined Rationality2, incorporates whethcr a 
non, native system of logic such as propositional logic is being followed. Therefore it is 
possible to appear irrational according to some non-native theory of reasoning but actually 
be completely rational in order to attain some goal or desire. In the real world people rely 
on prior knowledge and experience to achieve a practical goal or make a choice and 
therefore be rational I. In turn this may result in logical errors being made and appear 
irrationaI2. As Evans and Over (1996) pointed out, in the belief bias literature people 
cannot fully follow the instructions to reason logically and ignore prior belief This 
indicates that people's reasoning does not fully involve a conscious process which is 
within their control. This rationality is highly bounded by cognitive constraints. 
Evans, Over, and Manktelow (1993) interpreted the belief bias effect using the rationality I 
approach. They proposed that mechanisms of reasoning have evolved to facilitate the 
achievement of goals in the real world rather than to solve problems in the laboratory and 
that this type of reasoning is highly adaptive. People have large belief systems which they 
use and draw on in order to help them achieve their goals. Conclusions that are consistent 
with pre-existing beliefs are not examined thoroughly because it ývould be advantageous to 
maintain beliefs unless there is a good reason to change them and because to question 
cN-cry current belief would be cognitively costly. However when the evidence contradicts a 
pi-e-cxisting belief people scrutinize it and refute it if possible as to accept it would 
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introduce a contradiction and disrupt the internal consistency of their belief' s% stem. Thus 
for unbelievable conclusions people appear more rational. . -knother related cxplanation of 
the belief bias effect in terms of rationalityl is that of confinnation bias which is the 
tendency to seek out evidence which confirms rather than disconfirms current beliefs. 
Stanovich (1999) also distinguishes between two systems of rationalitý-. Howcver his 
argument impacts directly on the arguments of evolutionary psychologists M the field of 
reasoning; evolutionary adaption and instrumental rationality. For the former, he suggested 
that adaptive optimization is at the level of the genes and for the latter maximisation is at 
the level of the individual. He proposes that an individual's information processing that is 
adaptively optimal could deviate substantially from a non-native model because cognition 
is optimally adapted in an evolutionary sense. Stanovich also proposed that individuals of 
high analytic intelligence may respond in accord with nonnativc rationality but those of 
lower analytic intelligence might be more likely to track evolutionary rationality in 
situations that put the two types of rationality in conflict. 
Due to findings in the literature in relation to the influences of belief and logic on 
reasoning and decision making performance, several researchers developed a two-factor 
theory as an attempt to explain the co-existence of reasoning biases with deductive 
competence (Evans, 1984; Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Sloman, 1996). The 
theory developed on the basis that the pragmatic factors which influence reasoning 
competence appeared to be automatlc and preconscious. In contrast, people are able to 
verbalise the processes they utilise in analytic or deductive reasoning, with no a,, N-areness 
of underlying causes of nonlogical responses (Evans, 2002). In the next section dual 
process accounts of reasoning xvill be reviewed. 
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1.2 Dual Process Theories of Reasoning 
1.2.1 Introduction 
-to 
Dual Process Theories 
In recent years, many researchers have adopted a two-process model of rcasoning to 
explain the heunstic and belief-based influences on reasoning and decision making 
(Epstein, 1994; Evans & Over, 1996; Evans; 2003; Sloman, 1996, Stanovich, 1999). The 
hypothesis is that there are two distinct systems underlying reasoning and decision 
making. System I consists of both innate and domain-specific knowledge acquired through 
learning and System 2 is related to intelligence and analytic reasoning. It is believed that 
belief based and pragmatically cued responses can be interpreted under System I 
processing and logical or analytic responses can be interpreted under System 2. The two 
systems compete with each other for control dependent on the context of the problem or 
argument. Problem content can be manipulated to elicit different types of responses and 
instruction techniques have been shown to reduce pragmatic inferences. The experimental 
evidence for these accounts will be reviewed before a discussion of the tasks to be used in 
the following training studies. 
Dual-process theorists argue that there are two separate cognitive systems underlying 
thinking and reasoning with distinct evolutionary histories (Evans, 2003). The systems 
have been ten-ned implicit/explicit (Reber, 1993), associative/rule-based (Sloman, 1996; 
2002), heunstic/analytic (Evans, 1984; 1989). tacit/explicit (Evans & Over, 1996), 
rational/experiential (Epstein, 1994) and System I/System 2 (Stanovich, 1999). There are 
differentiating factors between the dual-process theories that have been proposed but therc 
are also several main features in which they all agree. System I proccs,, c,,, (using 
Stanovich's (1999) terminology) are rapid, automatic, preconscious, heuristic-based and 
relativelv undemanding of computational capacity. System 2 is controlled, conscious, 
anahlic and related to working memory and measures of general ititelligcnce. System I is 
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comprised of a set of autonomous subsystems which include both innate input modules 
and domain-specific knowledge acquired through learning and experience whilst SYstem 2 
is thought to have evolved uniquely to humans. According to Stanovich, it has evolved as 
a 'long-leash' system with little genetic control, allowing humans to pursue their own 
individual goals rather than to act as slavish vehicles of the genes. It is argued that it is 
System 2 that is sensitive to instruction and permits abstract hypothetical thinking that 
cannot be achieved by System I (Evans, 2003). 
A great deal of evidence in the reasoning and decision-making literature points to the 
existence of these two systems. Take for example the belief bias effects found in 
syllogistic reasoning. This task demonstrates how both logic and belief influence 
responding on a deductive reasoning task. Logical performance is attributed to System 2's 
analytic reasoning processes and the belief-based responses reflect System I's intuitive 
responses. Individuals who are able to respond more logically to the task have been found 
to be higher in cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 1997; Newstead, Handley, Harley, 
Wright, & Farrelly, 2004), which is in accord with the view that general intelligence is 
associated with System 2 thinking. Instructional procedures also seem to have an effect on 
the belief bias effects (Newstead et al., 1992) but we will return to this finding in more 
detail in Chapter 2. Studies of belief bias using neuropsychological techniques have also 
demonstrated that different areas of the brain are utilised dependent on the content of the 
task. Goel and Dolan (2003) showed that belief-laden and belief-neutral content in 
syllogistic reasoning elicited the use of different parts of the brain. 
1.2.2 Dual process accounts of reasoning 
How do individual proponents of dual process theories view the characteristics of the two 
systems? Sloman's associative system's (System 1) computations reflect similarity and 
temporal structure. He proposes the system encodes and processes statistical regularities of 
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its environment, frequencies and correlations amongst the various features of the world. 
His rule-based system (System 2) consists of rules which are abstractions that apply to any 
statements that have a certain well-specified symbolic structure involving logical content 
(Sloman, 2002). Sloman posits that the signal that both systems are operating in a 
reasoning situation is that of simultaneous contradictory belief. This is when a problem 
causes individuals to believe two contradictory responses at the same time. Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1983) example of the conjunction fallacy, Linda-the-bank-teller problem is a 
good illustration of this. Participants are presented with a paragraph describing a 
hypothetical person, Linda: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was 
deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
Participants are then asked to rank order eight statements involving Linda, according to the 
statement's probability. One of these statements was 'Linda is a bank teller' and another 
'Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement'. Tversky and Kahneman 
found that above 80% of participants rated the second statement as most probable, and yet 
these were graduate and medical students who had received statistical training. The 
associative system cues the response based on a judgement of similanty, or 
representativeness in terms of Tversky and Kahneman. The statement about Linda 
describes a person who sounds like a feminist bank-teller and therefore it is easy to 
imagine she is one rather than just a normal bank-teller. Of course logically it is more 
probable that Linda is a normal bank-teller because the probability of Linda being a bank- 
teller and active in the feminist movement cannot be higher than the probability of Linda 
just being a bank teller. 
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In Evans and Over's (1996) dual process model, individuals attain rationality by using the 
two systems. They distinguish between two different types of rationality, Rationality I 
which views an individual's cogni_tive processes as rational if they are useful for achieving 
their goals and Rationality 2 which proposes that people are rational If they are reason or 
make judgements in accord with a normative system such as standard propositional logic. 
Evans and Over propose that the tacit system affects the extent to which a person is 
rational I and the explicit system primarily affects the extent to which a person is rational 
2. Much of their theory stems from Evans' (1984; 1989) original heun stic- analytic 
framework which views the implicit system as being responsible for the relevance 
processes utilised on reasoning and decision-making problems. These are automatic and 
habitual but it has been well illustrated that people can make conscious decisions although 
not always optimal due to the cognitive constraints of the explicit system. The heunstic- 
analytic framework will be discussed in more detail in a later section when we will 
consider different explanations in relation to perfonnance patterns on the selection task. 
According to Stanovich (1999) when faced with any problem System I processes are 
highly contextualized, personalized and socialized. System 2 processes in contrast serve to 
decontextualize and depersonalize problems as this system is better at utilising rules and 
reasoning analytically. Stanovich argues that many infon-nation-processing behaviours are 
carried out automatically in System I and due to the pervasiveness of the primacy effects 
of automatic contextualisation of problems in this system this has been termed the 
fundamental computational bias. Stanovich proposes that differences in cognitive ability 
are found only on problems that strongly engage both reasoning systems and in which the 
reasoning systems cue opposite responses, which incorporates most of the reasoning tasks 
to be discussed in this chapter. Likewise on the Linda-the-bank teller problem discussed 
above, it is the higher ability individuals who can override the System I inferences that 
lead to the conjunction fallacy and reason according to the conjunction rule of probabilit% 
theory (p(A) >= p(A and B)). 
In Stanovich's view it's not just cogniti%, e ability but an indi,. -idual's goals and beliefs that 
have an influence in achieving rationality. But how are these measured? One method is by 
using self-report measures of thinking dispositions. Stanovich (1999) proposed that 
cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions are constructs at different le%, cls of analysis 
in cognition. Thinking dispositions are at the intentional level of analysis and incorporate 
individuals' episternic goals whilst cognitivc capacities refer to the computational 
limitations of an individual. Thus, the rational level of analysis concerns the goals of the 
system, the beliefs relevant to those goals, and the choice of action that is rational given 
the system's goals and beliefs. 
Thinking dispositions are viewed as cognitive styles that are more malleable than cognitive 
ability (Stanovich, 1999) and therefore more teachable. Perkins, Jay, and Tishman (1993) 
for example identify seven broad thinking dispositions which may characterise good 
thinking i. e. to clarify and seek understanding, to be planful and strategic and to seek and 
evaluate reasons. Stanovich proposes that it is crucial to detennine the relative proportion 
of variance in reasoning tasks that may be explained by both thinking dispositions and 
cognitive ability as the extent to which thinking dispositions explain variance In a rational 
thinking skill independent of cognitive capacity would predict that the skill would be more 
teachable. 
Although the two systems are discussed by many reasoning researchers, only one places 
them within the context of a global theory of personality: Cognitivc- Experiential Self- 
Theory (Epstein. 1994. Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Dencs-Raj, & Hem. 
1996-, Pacini &, Epstein, 1999). Cognitivc-Experiential Self-Theory is different from other 
I -) 
approaches such as Stanovich's as it is about individual differences in thinking 
dispositions not ability. Epstein and his associates propose that there are tivo s. vstems. the 
rational and the experiential, that operate in an independent, parallel and interactive 
manner and together contribute to behaviour with relative contributions N'arying from none 
at all to complete dominance by either one of the modes. Pacini and Epstein (1999) report 
associations between their self-report measure of Rational-Expenential infon-nation- 
processing and other personality measures. Rational individuals were more emotionally 
well adjusted, held a positive view of their self and the world, were able to exert self- 
control and control of events, could delay gratification and assume responsibility, be more 
flexible in their thinking style and had liberal values. Experiential individuals related well 
to others, communicated emotions readily, and were more tolerant, trusting, spontaneous 
and open-minded. 
The Rational -Experiential Inventory is an orthogonal measure therefore individuals may 
be high on both scales or just one. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) found that more 
rational individuals as measured by the REI produced more critical reasoning responses 
and fewer reasoning biases than relatively intuitive individuals. They propose that when 
information presented to people is inconsistent with their beliefs, then the rational system 
is engaged leading to more analytic reasoning strategies but when the infon-nation 
presented is consistent with their beliefs, then the experiential system is engaged leading to 
memory-based or heuristic responding. 
One difference between Klaczynski's and Stanovich's dual process accounts is in relation 
to System 2. One of the functions of System 2 is proposed to be analytic reasoning. In 
order to achieve high level abstract reasoning, a person must evaluate arguments and 
evidence in a way that is not contaminated by prior beliefs and knowledge. This ability to 
decontextualise from both the contextual cues of the problem and prior knowledge is 
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viewed as a necessary skill for high level analytic reasoning strategies but it is not clear in 
the literature what factors facilitate this skill. 
Stanovich and West (1997) suggest that even if humans are optimally adapted to their 
environments at the rational level of analysis, there may still be computational limitations 
at the algorithmic level that prevent the full realization of the optimal model. They 
proposed that individuals with greater algorithmic capacity should show an enhanced 
ability to reason independently of prior belief. These individuals are also able to flexibly 
contextualise and decontextualise the problem dependent on what is necessary to resolve 
it. It is proposed that this ability is one of the key aspects of critical thinking. 
In contrast, Klaczynski (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997) argued that whilst cognitive 
ability predicts the sophistication of reasoning responses, thinking dispositions predict 
bias. Hence decontextualised reasoning is governed by thinking dispositions. In the next 
section of this review, the issues and conflicting views about which factors facilitate 
decontextualised. reasoning will be discussed in relation to research perfon-ned by 
Stanovich (Stanovich & West, 1997) and Klaczynski (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 
1997). 
1.2.3 Decontextualised reasoning and decision making 
Stanovich and West (1997) designed an analytic technique, called the Argument 
Evaluation Task, for developing separate indices of a person's reliance on the quality of an 
argument and on their prior personal beliefs about the issue in question. Three hundred and 
forty-nine participants were assessed on their beliefs concerning 23 real social and political 
issues and then asked to evaluate arguments put forward by a fictitious person, on the same 
issues. For example given the statement 'It is more dangerous to travel by air than by car', 
participants had to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement on a scale of I to 
5. 
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Then in a separate testing session participants were given the following instructions 
followed by the test items: 
Instructions: We are interested in your ability to evaluate counter-arguments. First, you will be presented 
with a belief held by an individual named Dale. Following this, you will be presented with Dale's premise or 
justification for holding this particular belief A Critic will then offer a counter-argument to Dale's 
justification for the belief (Assume that the Critic's statement is factually correct. ) Finally, Dale ý%-Ill offer a 
rebuttal to the Critic's counter-argument. (Assume that Dale's rebuttal is also factually correct. ) You are to 
evaluate the strength of Dale's rebuttal to the Critic's counter-argument, regardless of your feeling about the 
original belief or Dale's premise. 
Dale's belief: It is more dangerous to travel by air than by car. 
Dale's premise or justification for belief It is more dangerous to travel by air than by car because air 
accidents are more likely to involve fatalities. 
Critic's counter-argumen : Passengers are 3 times more likely to be killed per mile travelled in a car as 
compared to a plane (assume statement factually correct). 
Dale's rebuttal to Critic's counter-amumen : Because reckless or drunk drivers cause the great majority of all 
automobile accidents (assume statement factually correct), car travel is at least safer than air travel for people 
who wear safety belts and travel with sober and careful drivers. 
Example 1.2 
Participants were then asked to indicate the strength of Dale's rebuttal to the Critic's 
counter- argument from a scale of I (very weak) to 5 (very strong). Individual scores were 
compared to an objective argument quality index to assess how biased they were in their 
responses. The authors found that both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were 
unique predictors of the ability to evaluate arguments independently of prior beliefs. In fact 
their unique variance as predictors exceeded the variance that they had in common with 
each other which emphasizes the distinction between the two factors. 
According to Stanovich (1999) the ability to decontextualise on a variety of reasoning 
tasks is linked indicating that it is a domain-general dispositional trait related to the ability 
to reason independently of prior beliefs. He argues that normative responding on reasoning 
tasks requires some form of decontextualisation. In syllogistic reasoning involving realistic 
content, participants must decontextualise from their knowledge of the Nvorld or beliefs 
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and on his Argument Evaluation Task participants must separate their prior opinion on the 
issue from evaluation of the argument. Stanovich and West (1998a; Stanovich & NVest. 
1998b) conducted a series of studies to investigate the relationships between cognitive 
ability and thinking dispositions measures and performance on a variety of deductive and 
inductive reasoning tasks such as syllogistic reasoning, selection tasks, statistical reasoning 
and his argument evaluation task. Firstly they reported that all the tasks correlate with each 
other which indicates that those participants who respond normatively on one type of task 
tend to respond nonnatively on the other. Secondly they found that cognitive ability and 
thinking dispositions were predictive of reasoning perforinance on all the tasks. Cognitive 
ability was the strongest predictor. They showed that algorithmic limitations explained 
some performance discrepancies but thinking dispositions were able to predict individual 
differences on the tasks even after cognitive ability was partialed out (Stanovich & West, 
1998a). 
An opposing argument is put forward by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997). They 
agree that a crucial component of critical thinking is the ability to decontextualise one's 
reasoning from one's beliefs and goals but they propose that it is 'a metacognitive 
competence not captured by intelligence tests'. Klaczynski et al. found that biases in 
reasoning were best predicted by infonnation-processing style (rational vs. experiential), 
with rational individuals being more likely to have a less biased reasoning style. This is in 
contrast with the view of Stanovich and West (1997) who believe that cognitive capacity 
governs your ability to decontextualise. In their account, individuals with a larger 
cognitive capacity can override the implicit/intuitive system and therefore be less biased. 
Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth found that general ability measures, such as verbal ability 
were dissociated from measures of information processing style. The amount of statistical 
reasoning that an individual engaged in was predicted by cognitive ability but the degree to 
16 
which individuals were biased by belief was not. Thinking style govemed bias 
independent of cognitive ability. 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, and Farrelly (2004) consistently found that ability 
was related to logical perfon-nance in syllogistic reasoning. Individuals of higher ability 
are more able to resist the response cued by believability. They also found that rationality 
as measured by Epstein's Rational - Expen ential Inventory was consistently associated with 
performance on non-conflict syllogisms i. e. ones where belief and logic wcre not in 
conflict, valid believable and invalid unbelievable problems. Newstead et al. suggest that 
the self-report measure of rationality is really measuring a participant's willingness to take 
part in the thinking tasks and the correlations may reflect the fact that people who score 
highly on this scale are taking the tasks more seriously than others. When the problems 
contain no conflict the cues for the correct response are obvious therefore those who take 
the task seriously perfon-n well. They add that when the problems involvc conflict such as 
valid unbelievable and invalid believable ones, then motivation is not enough to respond 
correctly. 
It appears in the literature that there is agreement that decontextuallsation is necessary on a 
variety of reasoning tasks in order to achieve optimum rationality but there is no clear 
consensus as to what facilitates that ability or skill. In summary, Stanovich proposes it is a 
skill dependent on ability and thinking dispositions. In contrast, Klaczynski argues that 
cognitive ability predicts the ability to perform on a task but thinking dispositions predict 
the amount of bias that will affect the performance independently. By using individual 
differences measures and instructional procedures in the research presented as part of this 
thesis, the aim is to investigate the extent to which they mediate the decontextualisation of 
prior kno\vIedge and kcy elements from the context of the problern set. In turn this will 
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provide more understanding of what personal and situational factors are required for 
optimum behaviour. 
Although there are variations between researchers on the processes involved in the two 
systems described under dual process accounts of reasoning, the one commonality between 
them is the view that human thinking can be best understood as resulting from the 
operation of two distinct cognitive systems. In the next section we will review two types of 
reasoning task that have been the focus of considerable work by dual process theorists, law 
of large numbers reasoning and the selection task. These tasks will also be the focus of the 
training studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5. We will briefly review experimental work 
using these tasks and then consider dual process accounts of performance on them. 
1.3 Everyday Critical Reasoning 
1.3.1 Belief-based influences in everyday critical reasoning 
Critical thinking has been defined as 'the ability and willingness to assess claims and make 
objective judgements on the basis of well-supported reasons' (Wade, 1995). This definition 
is advantageous in that it includes motivation as well as cognitive ability as being jointly 
important for effective reasoning and decision making. In other words it is necessary to be 
motivated as well as intelligent in order to self-consciously reflect on what is being thought 
about, deliberately examine the issues involved, ask why and think about reasons. In 
critical reasoning, people intentionally search for explanations and rules and make an effort 
to apply the rules to what they do. When people speculate, study, examine, experiment, ask 
questions, investigate, and/or find fault, they reason critically. This can be applied to all the 
types of reasoning and decision making tasks discussed in this thesis. Everyday reasoning 
problems refer to reasoning and decision making tasks which involve the evaluation of 
problems consisting of realistic content. 
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There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that belief-based influences impact on 
everyday reasoning, both in life in general and in previous research (Holland, Hol)-oak, 
Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). 
_ 
Every day you can see many so called intelligent people who 
argue for their own point of view relentlessly, no matter what arguments are thrown back 
at them. It is argued that these departures from logical arguments are due to pnor 
knowledge and biases which impact on reasoning and decision making behaviours. Nisbett 
and Ross (1980, Chapter 8) describe research findings as far back as the 17 th century 
illustrating people's tendency to cling to preconceived beliefs and theories in the face of 
new evidence that should discredit them. 
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) asked participants to indicate whether or not they believed 
capital punishment to be a deterrent to potential murderers and then presented them with 
two hypothetical studies on the deterrent effects of capital punishment, one which 
supported their position and one which opposed it. Lord et al. found that participants rated 
the study that supported their position as 'more convincing' and 'better conducted' than 
the study that opposed their position. Participants treated supportive evidence carefully, 
whilst opposing evidence was analysed deeply. Participants were asked about their beliefs 
after reading only one of the studies that may or may not have supported their position. 
Lord et al. found that prior belief was strengthened if the study was consistent with their 
view but hardly affected if it was inconsistent with their view. After reading both studies, 
participants were more convinced by their initial belief than before they read them. Nisbett 
and Ross suggest that this work shows that people's responses to new evidence may be at 
times inappropriate. 
Lord et al. 's study does seem to illustrate that different reasoning levels are utilised 
dependent on whether the evidence presented is favourable or not with a person's prior 
beliefs. Supportive evidence serves to strengthen a person's initial belief whereas opposing 
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evidence using the same methods does not much affect belief Confidence in a view is 
reinforced when presented with mixed evidence consisting of equal support for both 
positions indicating that people select the evidence that supports their own point of view. 
The question to be asked at this point is why do people persevere in maintaining beliefs 
and theories? An automatic response to that is because they want to. Many beliefs and 
theories are strongly held therefore when challenged individuals will use whatever 
resources are available to discredit the contradictory evidence and bolster their own 
beliefs. However this is purely a cursory explanation and doesn't explain any of the 
underlying cognitive processes involved in belief-perseverance. One that may shed light 
on part of it is the confirmation bias explanation put forward earlier to explain the belief 
bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. In other words when people are confronted with a 
problem, they search for evidence that confirms prior beliefs or hypotheses over 
disconfinning evidence. Evidence to support the presence of a confinnation bias is 
illustrated in the confirmatory bias model of Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) 
who studied decision making in experts. They proposed that people's inclination to use 
reasons from memory that confirm the focal hypothesis leads to a general tendency toward 
overconfidence. The stronger and more numerous the reasons that are employed, the 
greater the confidence expressed in the selected answer. However, because people 
overlook reasons against the selected answer, they are likely to be overconfident that they 
are correct. 
To account for the higher scrutiny of evidence on belief opposing studies in Lord et al. 's 
experiment, Evans et al. 's selective scrutiny theory of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning 
may be applicable (Evans et al., 1983). For further discussion see Evans (1989). 
Individuals focus on the conclusion and if it is consistent with their beliefs they will then 
accept it but if it in inconsistent with their beliefs then they will examine the logic of the 
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problem to see whether it is valid or not. On critical reasoning problems they will then use 
whatever cognitive resources are available to discredit the evidence. Whichex-cr theor-N, 
appears to be the most appropriate, one clear finding from all the above research is that 
people generally fail to appreciate intuitively the scientific strategy of disconfin-nation or 
falsification therefore leading to the perseverance of incorrect beliefs. 
More recently, Klaczynski and his colleagues have conducted a series of studies 
investigating individual differences in reasoning and bias on problems involving everyday 
content (Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; 
Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997). Using a wide variety of everyday reasoning tasks, 
they have consistently found that when presented with a conclusion that is incongruent 
with an individual's beliefs, more sophisticated reasoning strategies are utilised in order to 
discredit the evidence when compared to belief congruent information. One question to be 
asked was whether people suppress reasoning on belief congruent problems rather than 
engage in deeper processing on threatening problems. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth 
(1997) addressed this by including problems involving conclusions which were neutral to 
an individual's goals and found people's responding on these to be as cursory as on belief 
congruent problems. This led to the conclusion that people are using deeper processing 
strategies on belief threatening problems. 
Klaczynski et al. 's findings can be interpreted using a dual process account. To explain the 
different levels of reasoning strategies utilised dependent on the content of the problems 
Klaczynski and Fauth (1997; Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996) proposed a 
model of self-serving reasoning. They suggested that because belief congruent evidence is 
consistent with their goals, then it is readily assimilated to individuals' belief systems and 
processed with relatively little effort. Therefore only less sophisticated reasoning strategies 
and task related memories are used. This is reflective of System I's intuitive information 
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processing. However, when the evidence is incongruent or threatening to an individual's 
goals, dissonance is created and the individual is compelled to expend considerable effort 
processing the evidence. The additional cognitive expenditure activates more sophisticated 
reasoning strategies that are normally difficult to access but which effectively reduce the 
dissonance. This in contrast is reflective of System 2's analytic reasoning strategies. The 
interaction of the two systems leads to optimum rationality in terms of achieving the goals 
of the individual, or in terms of Evans and Over (1996), attaining rationality 1. 
But what about decontextuallsed reasoning? As discussed before it is believed that it is a 
crucial ability for critical thinking tasks yet it is not being utilised on these problems. 
Klaczynski (1997) suggests that motivation may affect reasoning on everyday problem 
solving due to the individual involvement on a problem which may relate to the amount 
and type of cognitive resources allocated to formulating a solution. Motivational goals 
may distort the objectivity of information processing and lead to skewed reasoning. In 
other words thinking dispositions may predict the bias. For instance, Klaczynski, Gordon, 
and Fauth (1997) posit that individuals possess rough versions of sophisticated critical 
thinking rules but they only display their competence in using them when they are 
activated by a limited range of contextual conditions. One of these critical thinking rules is 
the law of large numbers. 
1.3.2 Belief-based influences on law of large numbers reasoning 
The law of large numbers is proposed to be an intuitive version of a statistical rule which 
people use to solve inferential problems in everyday life. The law of large numbers rule 
states, 'the certainty with which an inference about a population can be drawn increases as 
the size of a sample drawn from that population increases' (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 
1997). It is suggested that these rules are cued by elements of the problem. Nisbett, Krantz, 
Jepson, and Kunda (1983) state three different properties of a problem that makes 
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statistical reasoning more likely. Firstly, the sample space and the sampling process are 
clear in order for it to be easier to see what information is relevant, for example it is clear 
that there is a single trial or many repeated trials as with throwing a dice. Secondly. the 
role of chance in producing events is clear and thirdly the culture specifies statistical 
reasoning as normative for the events. Nisbett et al. propose that these three elements 
operate at an individual level but often simultaneously to increase people's use of 
statistical heuristics on problems that require statistical thinking. 
Previous research has provided evidence that people do use statistical concepts in solving 
problems in certain domains. Jepson, Krantz, and Nisbett (1983) gave participants 
problems involving probabilistic, objective and subjective content. Probabilistic problems 
involved content whereby participants had to draw conclusions about a population from 
sample data that clearly incorporated random variation. Randomness was made explicit by 
stating variation in sample outcomes, including a random generating device in the problem, 
or by stating that a sample was 'random' (see Example 1.3 for examples of each type of 
problem taken from Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986). Objective problems consisted of 
infonnation where participants had to draw conclusions about characteristics of a 
population on the basis of 'objective' sample data but with no explicit information about 
randomness of the data. Subjective problems dealt with judgements about the properties of 
an object or person. 
It was found that problems involving probabilistic content had evoked use of LLN 
reasoning the most. More than half the answers on objective domain problems were 
statistical but statistical answers for subjective domain problems were very low. This is 
surprising as many problems and arguments in real life are subjective. People are often 
found to overlook statistical variables such as sarnple size, correlation, and base rate when 
they solve inductive reasoning problems (Kahneman & Tvcrsky, 1972). 
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Probabilistic: 
Bert H. has a job checking the results of an X-ray scanner of pipeline welds in a pipe factory. Overall, the V 
ray scanner shows that the welding machine makes a perfect weld about 80% of the time. Of 900 welds each day, usually about 680 to 740 are perfect. Bert has noticed that on some days, all of the first 10 welds were 
perfect. However, Bert has also noticed that on such days, the overall number of perfect welds is usually not 
much better for the day as a whole than on days when the first 10 welds show some imperfections. 
Why do you suppose the number of perfect welds is usually not much better on days where the first batch of 
welds was perfect than on other days? 
Objective: 
A talent scout for a professional football team attends two local games with the intention of observing 
carefully the talent and skill of a particular player. The player looks generally excellent. He repeatedly makes 
tackles worthy of the best professional players. However, in one of the games, with his team behind by 2 
goals, the player is fouled while attempting to score and has the opportunity to score on a penalty free kick. 
The player however misses by far. The other team then goes on to score another goal and therefore wins by 3 
to nil. 
The scout reports that the player in question "has excellent skills, and should be recruited. He has a tendency 
to misplay under extreme pressure, but this will probably disappear with more experience and better 
coaching. " 
Comment on the thinking embodied in the scout's opinion that the player (a) "excellent skills" and that the 
player has (b) "a tendency to misplay under extreme pressure. " Does the thinking behind either conclusion 
have any weaknesses? 
Subjective: 
Two New Yorkers were discussing restaurants. Jane said to Ellen, "You know, most people seem to be crazy 
about Chinese food, but I'm not. I've been to about 20 different Chinese Restaurants, across the whole price 
range, and everything from bland Cantonese to spicy Szechwan and I'm really not very fond of any of it. " 
"Oh, " said Ellen, "don't jump to conclusions. I'll bet you've usually gone with a crowd of people, right? " 
"Yes, " admitted Jane, "that's true, I usually go with half a dozen people or more from work, " "Well, people 
that may be it! " said Ellen, "people usually go to Chinese restaurants with a crowd of people they hardly 
know. I know you, you're often tense and a little shy, and you're not likely to be able to relax and savour the 
food under those circumstances. Try going to a Chinese restaurant with just one good friend. I'll bet you'll 
like the food. " 
Comment on Ellen's reasoning. Do you think there is a good chance that if Jane went to a Chinese restaurant 
with one friend, she'd like the food? Why or why not? 
Example 1.3 
Klaczynski et al. (1997) investigated three critical reasoning competencies, the law of 
large numbers, the intuitive analysis of covariance and the ability to detect flaws in 
experimental designs. They ascertained participants' occupational goals in the first testing 
session and then constructed the reasoning problems for the second testing session to 
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involve either goal-enhancing, neutral or goal -threatening evidence (see examples of goal- 
enhancing and goal -threatening conclusions in Example 1.4. ). They found that reasoning 
competence could be predicted by cognitive ability but thinking dispositions were the best 
predictor of reasoning biases, as measured by the Rational Versus Experiential Inventory 
(RVEI, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1995). 
Coal-enhancing - The researchers concluded that the experience of being an accountant results in a greater 
sense of independence and of inner strength than does being an architect. 
Goal-threatening - Dr. R. concluded that accountants are involved in more sexual harassment than are 
people who are members of other occupations. 
Example 1.4 
The RVEI is a 59-item questionnaire designed to assess the extent to which individuals 
rely on rational versus experiential inforination processing. Klaczynski et al proposed that 
rational processors are better able to reason beyond the boundaries set by their pre-existing 
theories or beliefs, thus are able to process goal enhancing information more objectively. 
In other words, they are able to reason more logically or analytically, without prior beliefs 
or knowledge affecting their judgment. In sum, decontextualised reasoning is predicted by 
thinking dispositions on these tasks. This is in opposition to Stanovich and West's (1997; 
Stanovich, 1999) argument that thinking dispositions and cognitive ability are both 
predictors of the ability to reason independently of beliefs. 
A strong conclusion to be made from the findings in the everyday reasoning literature is 
that the type of rationality people seem to be achieving is Evans and Over's rationalityl, 
rationality of purpose. Participants in these studies are making preconscious moment-to- 
moment changes in their response strategies dependent on the direction of belief in the 
argument. Some individuals are able to view all the problems more objectively but overall 
it is the automatic response to contextualise the problem or in Stanovich's terms the 
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tundamental computational bias which prc%, ails on belief-consistent evidence. When the 
evidence is contrary to beliefs then people are motivated to ovemde the computational 
bias of System I leading to more analytic reasoning strategies. 
1.4 The Selection Task 
1.4.1 Introduction to the selection task 
The task to be reviewed in the next section is one that has been the most investigated by 
researchers in the field of reasoning since it was first reported by Wason (1966), the 
selection task. The selection task was designed as a measure of deductive reasoning 
competence but it has been argued by many that it is not a good method of measuring 
reasoning processes (Evans, 2002; Sperber & Girotto, 2002; Girotto, Kemmelmeier, 
Sperber, & van der Henst, 2001). However, for researchers examining heuristic and 
analytic reasoning and decision making processes, selection task presentations involving a 
variety of manipulations offer much insight on the different levels of infori-nation 
processing individuals have available for use. 
Perfon-nance on the indicative selection task has been investigated widely as a method for 
studying deductive reasoning. The task set is one of hypothesis testing, although it requires 
deductive reasoning based on the logic of conditionals (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). 
In the standard forrn of the task, participants are presented with four cards lying on a table 
and are informed that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. They 
are then given a conditional statement, 'If there is an A on one side of the card, then there 
is a3 on the other side ofthe card' which corresponds to a conditional of the forrn 'if p 
then q'. On the top side of the cards, participants can see A, D, 3 and 7 which coi-rcspond 
to p, not p, q and not q respectively (sce Example 1 -5). 
Participants are then requestcd to 
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choose the cards that need to be turned over in order to decide whether the statement is 
true or false. 
Each of the boxes below represents a card lying on a table. Each one of the cards has a letter on one side and 
a number on the other side. 
The rule is: "If a card has an A on its letter side, then it has an 3 on its number side. " 
As you can see, two of the cards are letter-side up, and two of the cards are number-side up. Your task is to 
decide which card or cards must be turned over in order to find out whether the rule is true or false. 
A 3 
Example 1.5 
Under a normative analysis, the logically correct answer is to turn over the A and 7 cards 
as the statement can only be falsified by finding a card that has an A on one side but does 
not have a3 on the other. In other words, the p and not q cards must be chosen. There is no 
point choosing the D card (not p) as it is irrelevant what is on the other side of this card, 
unless the rule is interpreted as a biconditional because the rule has no implications for 
cards with letters other than A. The 3 card (q) doesn't need to be chosen either as there 
may or may not be an A on the other side. The rule does not state that there must be an A 
on the other side of the 3 therefore the rule would not be contradicted. 
In this abstract forrn, the majority of people get the selection task problem wrong. In fact 
only up to approximately 10% of the general population resolve it correctly (Evans, 
Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). The most common responses are the p card alone or the p and 
q cards (the two cards named in the rule). There have been a number of explanations put 
forward as to why there is such a low solution rate. Stanovich and West (1998a; 1998b) 
propose that it is only individuals of extremely high cognitive ability that are able to sol\, e 
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the task correctly. However, this view may be over simplified and will be discussed further 
later on in this chapter. Researchers in the field have used different procedural variations 
in an attempt to increase correct responding such as changing the instructions from testing 
whether the rule is true or false to seeing whether the rule has been violated (Griggs, 
1984), an instruction commonly used in thematic versions of the selection task which will 
be discussed later in the chapter. Solution rates were not increased by this or by changing 
the wording of the statement such as 'Every p is a q' or altering the presentation of the 
cards to rule out the ambiguous reference to the 'other sides' of the cards (Evans & Over, 
2004). 
The review will continue with the standard fonn of the task, the indicative selection task, 
which will then be followed by a review of thematic forms of the task, namely the deontic 
selection task. 
1.4.2 Pragmatic and analytic influences on the indicative task 
As well as studying why such a low number of the general population resolve the 
indicative selection task correctly, it is just as interesting to reasoning researchers to 
investigate why the majority of people respond with ap only or p and q response. P/q 
responders have been found to be lower in ability than correct responders (Stanovich & 
West, 1998a). Wason's (1966) original explanation was that participants responding p/q 
were exhibiting a confirmation bias. In other words, participants were attempting to find 
evidence which confonns with the rule rather than disconfirms it (Evans, 1989). This 
proposal has now been rejected by most researchers in favour of the 'matching bias' 
explanation first put forward by Evans and Lynch (1973) who demonstrated that by 
including negations in the conditional rule 'if p then not q', participants choose the 
logically correct response. For instance, given the rule 'If there is an A on one side of the 
card, then there is not a3 on the other side of the card', under a confirmation bias 
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explanation, participants would now select the A and the 7 cards. However, if participants 
are 'matching' they should choose A and 3 as the rule will be falsified if they appear on 
the same card. Most participants when given the rule in the form 'if p then not q' select the 
matching cards p and q and therefore appear to solve the task correctly. 
The typical responses and individual differences on the indicative selection task have 
prompted several important theoretical explanations in the reasoning literature. The first 
one to be reviewed here is Evans' (1984; 1989) heuristic-analytic account. Evans (1984) 
proposed a general theoretical framework within which to view pragmatic and analytic 
reasoning behaviours before the development of the modem dual process theory. He 
distinguished between two types of thought processes, heuristic and analytic. Heuristic 
processes (System 1) are preconscious and their function is to direct attention to problem 
information making it appear relevant. Information that is not deemed relevant is not 
processed any further. Relevant infonnation is then subjected to analytic processing 
(System 2). 
Evans argued that the selection task was a special case in which analytic processes played 
no role in the choice of cards that were determined purely by relevance. Analytic processes 
influenced reasoning on other tasks but they served only to rationalize choices on the 
selection task. In the case of matching bias on the indicative selection task, linguistically 
cued heuristic processing directs attention to the cards named in the rule. Evans termed 
these the if-heuristic and the not-heuristic, more recently, the matching-heunstic. The if- 
heuristic was based on the linguistic usage of if which is used to facilitate hypothetical 
thinking about a possible state of affairs specified by the antecedent. He proposed that the 
matching-heuristic reflects the use of negation in natural language, which is to deny 
presuppositions rather than to assert new information. Therefore, given the statements "the 
letter is A" and the "letter is not A", both are about the letter A and it is A that appears 
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relevant. Therefore the letter (or number) referred to in the conditional forms the topic of 
discourse whether negated or not. Thus matching cards seem more relevant than 
mismatching cards (Evans & Over, 2004). Analytic processing is applied only to the 
information that is represented as relevant. However, a limitation of Evans' heuristic- 
analytic theory was that it did not specify how deductive processing, the anal,, iic 
component, was achieved. 
According to Stanovich (1999) it is only individuals with very high ability that are able to 
resist or suppress the strong linguistic cues to respond p/q. Following Evans' (1984; 1989) 
heuristic-analytic framework, Stanovich (1999) proposed that the p/q response on the 
abstract version is cued by preconscious linguistic heuristics. Participants who give this 
response have been found to be lower in ability than participants who give the correct 
p/not q response. In other words, individuals of lower ability are linguistically cued by 
System I to name the cards stated in the rule. P/not q responders on the other hand are 
assumed to be reasoning analytically. They have much higher ability scores which 
indicates that to inhibit the heuristic response an individual must have less computational 
limitations. System 2 processes can override the automatic cues of System I for 
individuals higher in cognitive ability. Stanovich argues that it is these individuals that can 
override the ftindamental computational bias of System 1. It is proposed that these 
individuals of higher ability are able to decontextualise the key elements from the problem 
content. 
More recently, Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright and Farrelly (2004) demonstrated that 
when presented with more than one indicative selection task, low ability participants did 
not recognise that there were any similarities between the tasks and thus responded 
differently to them. More able participants were able to identify the similarities between 
the different problems and therefore respond the same on each, usually the items named in 
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the rule. However, only the very high ability participants were able to resist invited 
inferences such as biconditional interpretations of the conditional rule and give the correct 
response. 
Newstead et al. (2004) found in two out of their three studies that correct responders on the 
abstract selection task were not associated with higher ability scores. They suggest a two- 
stage theory of decontextualisation in order to attain correct responding on this task. Firstly 
the conditional rule must be decontextualised. from the scenario which will lead to 
consistent responding, usually p/q. Then invited inferences i. e. the assumption that 
conditionals are biconditionals must be resisted. Newstead et al. found that participants in 
two of their studies only achieved the first level. These participants were of higher ability 
and responded consistently on the abstract task. Overall their participants were not high 
ability scorers but further evidence for their two stage model was provided in their final 
experiment. The participants were overall higher in ability than participants in the other 
two experiments and as would be predicted by Stanovich, individuals with the highest 
scores were more able to solve the task correctlY. However, those who responded 
consistently on the abstract tasks after correct responders were partialed out were also 
higher in ability than inconsistent responders. 
In contrast to the low percentage of correct responding on the indicative selection task, a 
version of the selection task that has consistently obtained higher correct response rates is 
the deontic version of the selection task. Correct solutions on the indicative task have 
consistently been related to intelligence, however ability differences on the deontic task 
have often been found to be attenuated (Stanovich & West, 1998a). This version of the 
selection task is rich in content and contextual cues which have been found to facilitate 
correct responding. A review of the findings related to how these pragmatic cues may 
affect responding will be given in the following section. 
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1.4.3 Pragmatic influences on the deontic tasks 
Thematic versions of the selection task have been studied since the early 19-o's. 
Onginally it was thought that by including thematic or realistic content, facilitation ot 
logical reasoning would occur. Wason and Shapiro (1971) reported that participants chose 
the p/not q cards 63% of the time after being presented with the conditional rule 'E%-er% 
time I go to Manchester I travel by train'. At first this finding seemed to be reliable; 
however this was soon found not to be the case (Manktelow & Evans, 1979, Griggs & 
Cox, 1982). One finding that has been reliable involves the use of deontic conditionals. 
Deontic conditionals express rules to regulate or guide behaviour. They express obligation 
or permission statements about what 'must' be done or 'should' be done. A famous 
example in the literature is the Drinking Age Problem (Griggs & Cox, 1982). See Tablc 
1.2 for the conditional rule and card choices. It has been found that most people choose the 
correct response of drinking beer and under age people corresponding to the p/not q cards. 
Permission Rule Cards 
"if people are drinking beer then they must be over Drinking beer (p) 
18 years of age" Not drinking beer (not p) 
21 years of age (q) 
16 years of age (not q) 
Table 1.2 The Drinking Age Rule and response choices 
It could be argued that it is familiarity with the rule that facilitates reasoning but other 
deontic tasks have been used involving content that people are not familiar with that still 
result in high solution rates. For example, the Sears problem involves the rule 'if a 
purchase exceeds S30, the receipt must be approved by the departmental manager'. 
Participants ýire presented xvith the four options and most select p not q demonstrating 
facilitation eflects even though participants are not familiar with the rule (Evans, 1 QS9). 
For deontic conditionals to facilitate reasoning there are a number of conditions that need 
to be met, including the presence of a scenario or context, familiarity with the conditional, 
its rationale as a 
_rule 
for guiding behaviour is- clear and an instruction to seek N, iolators is 
included (Evans & Over, 2004). Unlike the findings with indicative selection tasks there is 
little difference in cognitive ability between solvers and non-solvers on the deontic 
selection task (Stanovich & West, 1998a) which suggests that analytic reasoning is not 
necessary on this type of task. Under Evans' (1984; 1989) heuristic-analytic framework, it 
is proposed that on deontic tasks card choices are still determined by relevance but instead 
of linguistically cued as with the indicative selection task, card choices are now 
pragmatically cued. Heuristic cues on the deontic task lead to the correct choices being 
made therefore analytic reasoning is not necessary for correct responding. 
To account for the facilitated performance on certain thematic versions of the selection 
task, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory. These 
abstract schemas are domain-sensitive clusters of rules acquired from everyday-life 
experiences. Each schema consists of a set of production rules that will deten-nine 
reasoning behaviour if the schema is triggered. Cheng and Holyoak argue that the 
'permission' schema is relevant for the selection task -a situation in which some action 
'A' may be taken only if some precondition 'B' is satisfied - and the permission schema 
fits most thematic selection tasks that have obtained reliable facilitation effects. They 
propose that the rules of the permission schema lead to the same conclusion as 
propositional logic therefore the correct answer is given if the schema is cued (Manktelow 
and Over (1991) argue that the rule is actually a conditional obligation). Cheng and 
Holyoak tested participants by presenting them with a selection task problem involving 
abstract content at the same time attempting to cue the permission schema. They found 
facilitation effects that had not been found previously on an abstract version of the task. 
33 
Support for pragmatic reasoning schemas, has been provided by Griggs and Cox (1993) 
who replicated the previous results and found that factors that impact performance on the 
schema versions, for example, explicit negatives on the not-p and not-q cards do not 
influence performance on the standard abstract task. This was taken for evidence in 
support of pragmatic reasoning schemas. However Noveck and O'Brien (1996) 
demonstrated that the permission rule coupled with the abstract content was only partly 
responsible for the facilitation effects. Enriched task features were also responsible for the 
facilitation effects. They also tested the 'obligation' schema rule with abstract content but 
found it failed to facilitate task solution. Noveck and O'Brien argue that pragmatic 
reasoning schema theory involves only two domain-specific schemas so far, permission 
and obligation, and the permission schema appears more reliable but only when used in 
conjunction with other task features. Pollard and Evans (1987) also demonstrated that 
presenting the permission rule on the drinking age problem but omitting the minimal 
police officer scenario decreased the facilitation. 
A second theory that addresses the question of which content feature facilitates 
performance on thematic versions of the selection task is Social Contract Theory 
(Cosmides, 1989). Rather than acquired knowledge as in pragmatic reasoning schemas 
Cosmides proposes that the understanding exhibited in deontic selection tasks is a product 
of innate thought processes termed Darwinian algorithms. The algorithms consist of 
domain-specific mechanisms and the original one proposed was for detecting 'cheaters' on 
social contracts. According to Cosmides, understanding of the rules of social exchange has 
been essential for human survival and people readily detect the possibility of cheaters as 
people are innately sensitive to them. Given the rule: 'if you take a benefit, then you pay a 
cost', Cosmides argues that everyone understands if you don't pay a cost then you are 
cheating. Her explanation for facilitation on deontic tasks is that the contents fit the 
benefit-cost structure in the cheater-detection module. It is argued that her theory is not 
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general enough and does not explicitly distinguish between authorities who lay down the 
rules and the actors who follow them so as not to be called 'cheaters'. It also does not 
explain why people are so keen to identify cheaters in the first place (Manktelo-w & Over, 
1991). Manktelow and Over claim that for a theory of conditional reasoning, subjective 
utilities and probabilities must be considered. Following this Manktelow, Sutherland and 
Over (1995) demonstrated that probabilistic factors and utility judgements play an 
important role in deontic thought and suggest that the underlying representations for this 
type of reasoning are best captured by mental models. 
Oaksford and Chater (1994; 1996) criticise both schema theory and social contract theory 
for their domain-specificity and argue they are not general enough to account for reasoning 
perfonnance on anything other than the deontic tasks. Oaksford and Chater propose that 
under a rational analysis, behaviour on the selection task can be viewed as optimizing the 
expected amount of information gained by turning each card. They see the selection task 
as an inductive not a deductive reasoning problem. The purpose of a rational analysis is to 
show that behaviour is optimally adapted to the environment and they demonstrate that the 
matching response (p/q) is because the expected information gain from the q card is 
greater than that from the non-q card. When solving the deontic version, participants 
choose cards to maximise expected utility. 
The final account of reasoning on the selection task to be reviewed in this chapter is 
Sperber, Cara, and Girotto's (1995) theory of relevance. In contrast with the domain- 
specific theories discussed above, this is also a domain-general account of reasoning 
affected by content and context of the problem. Relevance in this theory is determined by 
two principles. Firstly information is more relevant if there is greater cognitive effect 
resulting from processing it, and secondly, it is less relevant if greater effort is required to 
process the information. Sperber et al. propose that there are three levels of increasing 
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depth and effort by which people process conditionals. The first, level a, is simpiv k1odus 
Ponens, there is always aq with a p. The second level b is when the conditional is read as 
meaning that there are some p cases and q cases and level c explicitly represents the 
conditional as ruling out cases of p and not-q. Level c requires the most cognltl,,, e effort 
and is the one attained the least on the indicative version. In fact, Sperber et al argue that 
the indicative version of the selection task usually does not induce representations deeper 
than level b therefore leading to the matching response p/q. Deontic versions on the other 
hand can induce deeper processing in which cases of p and not-q are represented as 
violations, especially when violation instructions are used. Pragmatic information cues 
participants to the correct response. 
The notion that heuristic cues determine relevance is similar to Evans' (1984; 1989) 
heuristic-analytic framework. However Sperber et al. extend this further by arguing that 
participants' poor perfonnance on the selection task is best explained by considering that 
the process of linguistic comprehension provides participants with intuitions of relevance 
which are highly content and context-dependent. Participants trust their intuitions of 
relevance and select cards accordingly (Girotto, Kernmelmeier, Sperber, & van der Henst, 
2001). Sperber et al. also do not accept the distinction between heuristic and analytic 
processes and propose that all levels of representation and process in cognition are guided 
by relevance (Evans & Over, 1996). 
Whichever theory is being supported, one of the clearest arguments is that the indicative 
selection task and the deontic task are two different problems, even though the correct 
response may be the same. Deontic terrns such as 'must' or 'should' change the nature of 
the task into a decision making one and many researchers are approaching it as such i. e. 
Manktelow & Over (199 1), Oaksford & Chater (1994), Evans & Over (1996). Evans and 
Over (1996; 2004) argue that deontic thought must be seen as an instance of hypothetical 
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thought and related much more deeply to expected benefits and costs. Like Sperber, 
relevance still guides the processes in deontic reasoning but it is the benefits gained or the 
costs avoided which are deemed relevant to achieve the goals. For example given the 
conditional 'if you tidy your room, you may go to the party' a person , vould make a 
judgement based on the benefits to be gained from tidying the room. Deontic selection 
tasks include a scenario which infonns the participant of the relevant authority that has set 
the rule e. g. in the Drinking age rule it is a policeman. The context of the scenario may 
suggest the costs to be avoided or the benefits to be gained by following the rule and 
participants are requested to find the violations of the rule. Most people are able to do this 
because of experience with rules in real life. Due to experience of such rules people 
respond correctly on deontic tasks without the need for much analytic reasoning. 
Under a dual process account the correct response (p/not q) is made available by the 
operation of rapid pragmatic System I processes, without the need for conscious analytic 
reasoning. According to Stanovich & West (1998a) there are no differences in ability 
between solvers and non-solvers of the deontic selection task. Heuristic processors on the 
abstract version of the selection task remain heuristic processors on the deontic version, but 
are pragmatically cued (rather than linguistically cued as on the abstract version) to the 
correct response. Those who reasoned analytically on the abstract version (high ability) 
reason analytically on the deontic version and also reach the correct solution. Therefore 
any differences in ability are eliminated. 
1.5 Conclusion for the Review 
In Chapter 1, the review has illustrated how prior knowledge and pragmatics influence 
performance on a wide variety of reasoning tasks. By applying a dual process framework 
and investigating the roles of individual difference factors such as intelligence and 
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thinking styles when responding on these tasks, we can see which factors mediatc dit't'erent 
types of responses. 
It has also been demonstrated how important it is to clecontextualise reasoning from belict's 
in order to respond normatively compared to some logical s,,,, stem. Law oflarge numbers 
reasoning and correct responding on the indicative selection task are proposed to be related 
to System 2 under dual process accounts of reasoning. One way of encouraging the 
intervention of System 2 is by instruction or training, therefore in Chapter 2a review of' 
the training and transfer of reasoning skills literature will be presented, illustrating, the 
valuable insights that training and instruction paradigms havc to offer on reasoning 
processes utillsed on a vanety of tasks. By using training and instruction techniques on 
everyday reasoning problems and selection tasks it will be possible to investigate the effect 
of direct manipulation of System 2 analytic processes on belief-based System I responses. 
Chapter 3 presents an individual differences expenment which was designed to investigate 
the relationships between perfon-nance on reasoning and decision-making tasks that have 
been discussed in this chapter, with the aim of identifying which tasks and measures to 
utillse in the subsequent studies. In Chapter 4 two experiments are reported which 
investigate the effects of statistical training, namely training in the law of large numbers, 
on cntical reasoning perfonnance and bias. The third expenmental chapter, Chapter 
presents three experiments aimed to investigate the effects of training in conditional logic 
and pragmatic reasoning schemas on conditional reasoning perfon-nance. Finally, Chapter 
6 contains a general discussion in terms of the theoretical implications for the findings 
reported here and recommendations for future research. 
38 
CHAPTER2 
Training and Transfer in Reasoning and Decision Making t") 
2.1 General Introduction 
2.1.1 Why training? 
One of the principal aims of this thesis is to explore the effects of training and instruction 
on reasoning and decision making performance. The revicw in Chapter I illustrated that 
people are influenced in their reasoning by a whole range of non-logical factors. Scvcral 
factors that affect optimum performance on everyday reasoning and deductivc reasoning 
tasks were discussed. In sum, it is necessary to take into account people's goals and beliefs 
in relation to the context of the problem or argument as -ývcll as knowledge of the 
normative system that they may be using. In psychological experiments, people havc often 
been Judged as 'irrational' because they have not been reasoning in accord with some 
logical system. However, it is now recognised that the biases that are elicited may be due 
to knowledge and beliefs that the participants bring with them to the laboratory settings. 
Dual process theories of reasoning were also discussed in Chapter 1. Under a dual process 
account there are two systems of reasoning. System I processes are pre-conscious, 
automatic, rapid, consist of domain-specific knowledge and only the final products are 
posted in consciousness. System 2 processes are thought to be distinctly human, conscious, 
analytic and tied to constructs such as working memory and intelligence. It is argued that 
perforinance on reasoning tasks demonstrates the co-existence of two anatomically distinct 
areas of the brain related to logic and belief competing for control dependent on the 
context ofthe problem. 
It is gencrally agreed that the abilitv to dccontextualise ils a skill neccssary for optimum 
rc-sponding on most of the tasks discussed. However there is disagrccincilt in the literature 
as to the processes or constructs necessary for this reasoning ability. StanovIch and West 
(1997; Stanovich, 1999) proposed that the ability to decontextuallse was related to 
intelligence and thinking dispositions. In contrast, Klaczynski argued that intelligence only 
predicted the sophistication of reasoning and thinking dispositions were related to the 
ability to decontextualise. 
Our interest here is the extent to which training mediates the influence of heuristic and 
analytic reasoning processes. Let's return to the example of belief bias in syllogistic 
reasoning. Is there a way a person who is responding due to believability of the conclusion 
can be instructed or trained to be more objective, or to override those belief-based 
responses? In terms of dual processes, a person's responses are being cued by System I's 
heuristic influences, but can they be instructed to utilise System 2's analytic processes? In 
other words can they be taught to utilise a logical or normative system, and ignore their 
prior beliefs and knowledge, i. e. to decontextualise? 
It is proposed that System 2 is sensitive to explicit instruction (Evans & Over, 1996; 
Evans, 2003). However, the dual process systems are proposed to be independent therefore 
the training effects on System 2 may not impact on System I responses at all. There are 
questions that we need to answer, such as, if people can override or suppress responses 
cued by System 1, what abilities facilitate this i. e. intelligence, thinking dispositions, or 
both? By giving training will people make more use of their explicit analytic reasoning 
system and if so will their reasoning be less influenced by beliefs? And are there only 
certain individuals susceptible to training or instruction in the first place? 
This review will start with a discussion of the findings in relation to instructional 
procedures utilised to reduce belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. These findings have been 
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interpreted under a dual process account of reasoning. That is logical and belief-based 
responses being associated with System 2 and System I processes respectively. 
2.1.2 The effects of instruction on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning 
Findings in relation to the belief bias effect resulting from syllogistic reasoning involving 
thematic content have demonstrated that the manipulation of instruction leads to a 
reduction in belief-based responding (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992, Evans, 
Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen (1992, Experiment 
5) compared responses between two groups of participants. One received a standard set of 
instructions and the other group a set of augmented instructions which stressed that 
participants should accept conclusions only if they necessarily followed from the premises, 
not if they were only possible conclusions (see Example 2.1 for complete instructional set). 
Augmented Instructions 
This experiment is designed to find out how people solve logical problems. In the booklet which 
you have been given there are 6 logical reasoning problems. Your task is to decide whether the conclusion 
given below each problem follows logically from the information given in that problem. You must assume 
that all the information which you are given is true; this is very important. If, and only if, you judge that a 
given conclusion logically follows from the information given you should write "YES" in the space below 
the conclusion on that page. If you think that the given conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
information given you should write "NO". (Please note that according to the rules of deductive reasoning, 
you can only endorse a conclusion if it definitely follows from the information given. A conclusion that is 
merely possible, but not necessitated by the premises is not acceptable. Thus, if you judge that the 
information given is insufficient and you are not absolutely sure that the conclusion follows you must reject it 
and answer "NO". ) Please take you time and be certain that you have the logically correct answer before 
stating it. If you have any questions, please ask them now as the experimenter cannot answer any questions 
once you have begun the experiment. 
Please keep the instructions in front of you in case you need to refer to them later on. 
(REMEMBER, IF AND ONLY IF YOU JUDGE THAT A GIVEN CONCLUSION LOGICALLY 
FOLLOWS FROM THE INFORMATION GIVEN SHOULD YOU ANSWER "YES", OTHERWISE 
"NO". ) 
Please do not turn back and forth from one problem to another once you have started. You must not 
make notes or draw diagrams of any kind to help you in this task. Thank you very much for participating. 
Example 2.1 Augmented instructions taken from Newstead et al. (1992, Experiment 
5) 
Newstead et al. found that the interaction between logic and belief disappeared under the 
instructions which stressed logical validity. This was followed up by Evans, Newstead, 
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Allen, and Pollard (1994) who conducted a series of studies to investigate whcther beliet 
bias in syllogistic reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in 
principles of reasoning. They found that the belief bias was maintained despite the use of' 
the same augmented instructions which emphasised the principle of logical necessity. 
There was no impact on logical responding either. They concluded that the augmented 
instructions were not sufficient to suppress endorsement of fallacious conclusions unless 
the conclusions were apnori unbelievable. 
Evans et al. (1994) noted that there was a much lower acceptance of invalid-bclievable 
conclusions in their study than in a previous one (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). 
Therefore, under the assumption that bias may be reduced on the invalld-bellevable 
conclusion by augmented instruction with the emphasis placed on the concept of necessity, 
albeit a weak finding, Evans et al. (1994) tried a different instructional manipulation. These 
instructions strongly emphasised the structure of the syllogism, explained the logical 
meaning of "SOME" and repeatedly emphasised the need to base responses only on the 
infon-nation given. The emphasis on the concept of logical necessity was omitted (see 
Example 2.2 for instructions). Evans et al. proposed that the effect of elaborating the 
instructions might be quite general, inducing the participant to adopt a more cautious 
attitude which in turn could be of interest in relation to debiasing in reasoning generally. 
Evans et al. concluded that the bias may be reduced but not eliminated by the elaboration 
of logical principles and does not require a specific emphasis on the principle of logical 
necessity. In particular, they reported a reduction in the acceptance of invalid-believable 
arguments which they explained using a mental models approach. That is the search tor 
countcr-cxamples may be facilitated by elaborated verbal instructions. No differences were 
found on the logic indices after the elaborated instruction procedure. 
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Instructions 
The experiment is designed to find out how people solve logical problems. In the booklet which you have been given there are 4 logical reasoning problems. You task is to decide whether or not the conclusion 
given does or does not logically follow from the information which is given above. The information take-ý the forin of two statements (premises) which can be expressed symbolically as follows: 
ALL B ARE A, 
SOME C ARE B. 
As you can see, the two premises tell us something about the relationship between three terms: A, B 
and C. The term B never appears in the conclusion, since the conclusion is a statement about the relationship 
between A and C, or vice versa. The conclusion to the above example is, therefore, "SOME A ARE C". 
Since this is a problem requiring logical analysis, you should interpret the word "SOME" in its 
strictly logical sense; meaning AT LEAST ONE AND POSSIBLE ALL. So the statement "SOME B ARE 
C" does not necessarily also mean that "SOME B ARE NOT C". 
In the booklet you will find four different logical problems. They are the same type of problem as 
the example problem which is shown above; however, the terms used will not be letters of the alphabet, but 
real words instead. Your task is to write down, below the conclusion given, "YES" if you judge that the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the information given, or "NO" if you judge that the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from the information given. 
You are reminded that you must base your decision on the information given in the two premises- 
and this information only. You must assume that all the information which you are given is true-this is very 
important. If and only if, you judge that a specific conclusion logically follows from the information given 
you should write "YES"; the conclusion given may not always be the correct one. 
Please take your time and be certain that you have made the logically correct decision before stating 
it. 
If you have any questions, please ask them now, as the experimenter cannot answer any questions 
once you have begun the experiment. 
Please keep these instructions in front of you in case you need to refer to them later on. 
REMEMBER, YOUR DECISION SHOULD BE BASED SOLELY UPON WHAT CAN BE 
DEDUCED WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY FROM THE TWO PREMISES - AND THIS 
INFORMATION ONLY. 
Please do not turn back and forth from one problem to another once you have started. You must not 
make notes or draw diagrams of any kind to aid you in this task. 
Example 2.2 Instructions taken from Evans, Newstead, Allen, And Pollard (1994; 
Experiment 3) 
These findings in relation to the effects of instruction on belief bias provide evidence that 
people have some degree of conscious System 2 control over their logical reasoning 
processes. People who nonnally respond to the believability of the evidence are able to 
override or inhibit the System I response to some extent and follow the logic of the 
argument instead. However, it must be emphasised that the bias was not eliminated but 
only reduced which demonstrates the pervasiveness of System I's belief-based processing. 
The effects of belief in syllogistic reasoning are in accord with perforinance on the 
everyday reasoning problems discussed in Chapter 1. When people are given a problem 
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that is consistent with their beliefs they process the information at a verIv cursory level and 
accept the conclusion without searching for the flaws in the argument. Only when the 
evidence is inconsistent with prior knowledge do people engage in any analytic reasoning. 
One of the purposes of this research is to investigate whether the instructional effects found 
in syllogistic reasoning can be replicated on different types of problems where prior 
knowledge and beliefs may cue different responses. 
The next section in this chapter will discuss training in critical thinking. First there will be 
a brief introduction to training in critical reasoning in general. This will be followed by a 
review of the training studies conducted to date in relation to statistical reasoning and 
conditional reasoning using the selection task which will provide the rationale for the 
training studies to be reported in this thesis. 
2.2 Training in Critical Thinking 
2.2.1 General introduction to training in critical thinking 
According to Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith (1985) it is possible to teach critical thinking 
as a general skill. Traditionally, a great deal of the literature on training in reasoning and 
critical thinking has evolved out of the educational domain and has concentrated on 
identifying different approaches to studying, in addition to training techniques designed to 
foster critical thinking perfon-nance on problems outside the domain of training (Wade, 
1995; Wolfe, 1995; Doolittle, 1995; Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Jakoubek, 1995). Perkins 
and Grotzer (1997) reviewed several training interventions designed to improve 'intelligent 
behaviour' through direct teaching of reasoning and problem solving strategies or 
metacognitive strategies such as discussion of ideas and inductive reasoning. They posit 
that the key to successful interventions includes the consideration of strategies (problem 
solving, reasoning etc. ), the monitoring and management of one's thinking or 
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metacognition in other words, thinking dispositions and transfer. McMillan (1987) 
reviewed 27 different studies that Investigated the effects of instructional methods, courses, 
programs and general experiences on changes in college students' critical thinking. What 
was clear from his review was that critical thinking does improve whilst attending college 
but there can be no firm conclusions about what factors affect the change and there is no 
consensus in the literature as to what specific measurements to make. It is necessary to 
obtain additional infonnation about the development of chtical thinking skills, such as the 
generality or domain specificity of skills, the influence of prior belief and individual 
differences in ability and skills. In turn, this will lead to researchers in the field of thinking 
and reasoning having more understanding of the cognitive processes involved. 
Lehman and Nisbett (1990; Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988) investigated the effects of 
different undergraduate courses on a variety of reasoning tasks, namely on statistical and 
methodological reasoning and on reasoning about problems in the logic of the conditional. 
Their research was motivated by the concept of formal discipline formulated by Plato. This 
is the notion that reasoning can be improved by teaching the rules within a particular 
domain which can then be generalised outside the bounds of that domain. In their original 
study, in support of the formal discipline position, Lehman et al. (1988) found that 
graduate training in the probabilistic sciences (medicine and psychology) improved 
statistical and methodological reasoning. Training in these and law (defined as a 
nonscience) improved conditional reasoning, and training in chemistry (a deterministic 
science) resulted in no improvement on any of the types of reasoning examined. They 
argued that the improvements were due to the rule systems taught by the different courses. 
In their longitudinal study, Lehman and Nisbett (1990) replicated most of the results with 
psychology and social sciences undergraduates having improved statistical and 
methodological reasoning whilst the natural sciences and humanities undergraduates 
showed some improvement on these but mostly on conditional reasoning. Undergraduate 
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training in psychology and the social sciences resulted in no improvement in conditional 
reasoning. Lehman and Nisbett conclude in support of the Formalist view that highk, 
general inferential rules can be taught and the quality of reasoning improved. 
According to Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, and Rieser (1986) it is important that people have 
access to domain-specific knowledge and general metacognitive knowledge for effective 
transfer. They discuss the point that training studies that result in failure of transfer involve 
individuals being taught to use strategies but not how to understand why they were useful 
and when to use them (Brown, Campione, & Day, 1981). An emphasis on executive or 
metacognitive processes can result in an improvement in thinking. Consistent with this 
view, Stanovich (1999) suggested that unlike cognitive capacity which is fixed, thinking 
styles are malleable and therefore teachable. 
In accord with Stanovich's proposal, Klaczynski and Gordon (1996) provided participants 
with instructions aimed to motivate them to be more accurate. They found that overall 
perforinance was increased but bias was not reduced. However, it does not matter how 
flexible or rational people are in their thinking style, or to what extent training or 
instruction procedures aim to foster better critical thinking styles, people still need to be 
provided with the tools with which to reason. In the following section, a discussion of the 
training studies conducted to date in relation to statistical reasoning, namely the Law of 
Large Numbers will be provided. These studies have been very effective in increasing the 
amount of statistical reasoning utilised on a variety of everyday reasoning problems. 
2.2.2 Training and transfer effects in statistical reasoning 
Research had been conducted looking into intuitive rule systems for a long time before the 
modem dual process theories that have been discussed so far were proposed. The law of 
large numbers is proposed to be an intuitive version of a statistical rule which people use to 
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solve inferential problems in everyday life. The rule states, 'the certainty "vith which an 
inference about a population can be drawn increases as the size of a sample drawn from 
that population increases' (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997). It is suggested that these 
rules are cued by elements of the problem such as explicit information on sampling 
(Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson and Kunda, 1983) and the more cues that are present in the 
problem the more likely people are to utilise statistical heuristics on problems that require 
statistical thinking. 
Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) conducted a series of experiments looking specifically at 
the law of large numbers. They proposed that if this inferential rule system was abstract, 
then people's statistical reasoning on everyday events would be improved after training on 
the rule system. In turn, according to the fon-nalist view of reasoning, use of the rule would 
transfer across to other domains. In a series of experiments, participants were either trained 
in the LLN rule system which consisted of a description of the concept of sampling and the 
law of large numbers; given examples training which consisted of three problems in a 
given domain followed by an explanation of how to solve the problem in LLN terms; or 
Full training which consisted of Rules training followed by Examples training (see 
Example 2.3 for the rules training script). 
Rules Training 
We are very interested in studying how people go about explaining and predicting events under conditions of 
very limited information about the events. It seems to us to be important to study how people explain and 
predict under these conditions because they occur very frequently in the real world. Indeed, we often have to 
make important decisions based on such explanations and predictions, either because there is too little time to 
get additional information or because it is simply unavailable. 
Experts that study human inference have found that some common-sense principles are helpful in explaining 
and predicting events, especially under conditions of limited information. One such Principle of probability 
that is particularly helpful is called the Law of Large Numbers. In this study, we will teach you the Law of 
Large Numbers by introducing you to the probabilistic terms and ideas associated with this principle, and 
then provide examples to illustrate how the Law of Large Numbers can be used to explain and predict events 
in the real world. 
Imagine an urn that is filled with gumballs. Let's say that the urn contains a very large number of gumballs - 
thousands, millions, or larger. The gumballs in this urn are known collectively as the populatio . 
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Example 2.3 Rules Training continued: 
Let's say that there are two types of gumballs in the urn - red gumballs and blue gumballs. When %%e do this. 
we can now say that the population has two categories or groups, namely - red gumballs and blue gumballs. 
Now let's say that in this population of red and blue gumballs there are 70% blue gumballs and 30% red 
gumballs. If that is the case, then we know more than that the population has two groups (red and blue): we 
now know the proportion of the gumballs in the blue group (70%) and the proportion of the gumballs in the 
red group (30%). This is known as the population distribution (other examples of distributions are 60% red 
and 40% blue, or 85% blue and 15% red, etc., but in every distribution, the sum of the proportions must be 100%. 
Let's summarise what we've covered so far: 
-A populatio is the entire set of objects we are interested in (all of the gumballs in the urn). 
- Groups refer to the types of objects in the population (red and white). 
- Distribution refers to the proportion of objects in each group (70% white and 30% red in this example. 
One of the major goals of statistics is to find out something about a population. More specifically, we want to 
find out what the population distribution is. One way that we might do this would be to actually examine all 
of the objects in the population and count up the number of objects in each group. In our example, we would 
empty the entire urn and count the number of red gumballs and the number of blue gumballs. Using this 
method, we could find out exactly what the population distribution of red and blue gumballs was. But, there 
is a very serious problem with counting all of the objects in the population: populations, in general, are very 
large. If we were to count all of the objects in our gumball population, it would take more time and effort 
than would be practical (imagine counting a million gumballs! ) 
OK - so counting the entire population is impractical. What do we do instead to find out what the population 
distribution is? 
What we do instead is to take a sample of the population. A sample is a subset of the population. We can take 
a sample of any size - if we pick 5 gumballs, we say that the sample size is 5; if we take 60 gumballs for our 
sample, we say that the sample size is 60, and so on. 
When we take a sample from the population, we will get a sample distribution. The sample distribution is the 
proportion of objects in each group for the sample, just as the population distribution is the proportion of 
objects in each group for the population. For example, if we take a sample of 10 gumballs, we might get 6 
reds and 4 blues. In this case, our sample distribution would be 60% red and 40% blue. We also might have 
happened to get 9 blues and I red, in which case the sample distribution would be 90% blue and 10% red. 
The important point here is that samples are estimates of populations. Since it is often impractical or 
sometimes impossible to examine the entire population, we instead have to draw sample to estimate what the 
population is like. 
Some samples will have sample distributions that are closer to the population distribution than others. For 
instance, in our gumball example, a sample of 9 reds and I blue would be a very poor estimate of the 
population, while a sample of 8 blues and 2 reds would be a pretty good estimate of the population. The 
critical question is: "at determines how likely it is that samples will give good estimates of the population? 
The answer is simple: if the samples are chosen haphazardly, or randonily (by, for example, mixing the urn 
and reaching into the urn blindfolded and scooping out the needed number of gumballs OR by mixing the 
contents of a gumball machine and letting the gumballs out one by one), then there is only one factor - 
sample size. 
This brings us to the Law of Large Numbers: as the size of a random sample increases, the sample 
distribution is more and more likely to get closer and closer to the population distribution. In other words, the 
larger the sample, the better it is as an estimate of the population. 
Example 2.3 Fong, Krantz, And Nisbett's (1986) Rules training on the law of large 
numbers 
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After reading this description, a demonstration was performed by the experimenter using a 
large glass um filled with blue and red gumballs. The script was designed to adhere closely 
to the description that had just been read to maximise participants' understanding of the 
concepts they had just read about. Each of the concepts introduced in the description , vas 
highlighted in the demonstration, for instance the population distribution of the gumballs in 
the urn was 70% blue and 30% red. 
All the main concepts were reintroduced and then the experimenter drew four samples of 
size 1, then four of size 4 and then four of size 25, returning the gumballs to the um after 
each one. Each sample was summarized on a blackboard, monitoring the deviation 
between each sample and the population. Participants were infon-ned that in accordance 
with the law of large numbers, the average deviation of a sample from the population 
would decrease as the sample size increased. Therefore the larger samples taken would 
deviate less from the population than the smaller samples. 
Participants in the full training condition were then presented with three examples one of 
which is illustrated in Example 2.4. Each example involved a problem consisting of 
objective infort-nation in which participants had to draw conclusions about characteristics 
of a population on the basis of objective sample data, which contained no explicit 
information about randomness of the data (Jepson, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983). Participants 
were requested to consider each one before turning the page to read an analysis of it in 
terms of the law of large numbers. 
Participants were then given everyday reasoning problems consisting of probabilistic, 
objective and subjective information as described in Chapter 1. Probabilistic problems 
involve content whereby participants had to draw conclusions about a population from 
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sample data that clearly incorporated random variation and subjective problems dealt with 
judgements about the properties of an object or person. 
Objective Problem 
Susan is the artistic director for a ballet company. One of her jobs is auditioning and selecting new members 
of the company. She says the following of her experience: "Every year we hire 10-20 young people on a I- 
year contract on the basis of their performance at the audition. Usually we're extremely excited about the 
potential of 2 or 3 of these young people -a young woman who does a brilliant series of turns or a young 
man who does several leaps that make you hold your breath. Unfortunately, most of these young people turn 
out to be only somewhat better than the rest. I believe many of these extraordinarily talented young people 
are frightened of success. They get into the company and see the tremendous effort and anxiety involved in 
becoming a star and they get cold feet. They'd rather lead a less demanding life as an ordinary member of the 
corps de ballet. " 
Comment on Susan's reasoning. Why do you suppose that Susan usually has to revise downward her opinion 
of dancers that she initially thought were brilliant? 
Analysis 
We can analyse this problem using the laws of large numbers by thinking of each ballet dancer as possessing 
a population of ballet movements. Susan is interested in excellence, so we can divide the members of each 
population into two categories: 'brilliant movements' and 'nonbrilliant, or other movements'. We can think of 
the population distribution as the percentage or proportion in each category. For many dancers, the 
population distribution is actually 0% brilliant and 100% other; these dancers simply lack the talent to 
perform brilliant movement. For many other dancers, there is a small or moderate percentage of 'brilliant 
movement' gumballs in their urn. A true ballet star would therefore have a population distribution with a 
greater percentage of 'brilliant' movements than an ordinary member of the corps de ballet. 
By conducting auditions, Susan is observing sample of each dancer's population distribution. An audition, 
however, is a very small sample of a dancer's movements. We know from the law of large numbers that small 
samples are very unreliable estimates of the population. When a dancer performs some brilliant moves during 
an audition, it is often because the dancer has happened to draw a couple of the 'lucky gumballs' that day: it 
does not prove that the population distribution for that dancer consists of a large percentage of 'brilliant 
movements'. It is reasonable to think that there are really very few dancers that have population distributions 
with a large percentage of brilliant movements; and so when Susan sees a dancer performing brilliantly at 
audition, the chances are it is just a lucky draw from a dancer who is capable of performing some, but not 
necessarily a great number of 'brilliant movements'. Therefore, when Susan hires such dancers and evaluates 
them after seeing a much larger sample of their movements, it is not surprising that she finds that many of 
these dancers that were brilliant at audition turn out to be only somewhat better than the rest. 
Example 2.4 Objective problem taken from Fong, Krantz, And Nisbett's Law of 
Large Numbers Training 
Fong et al. found that both formal rule training and examples training improved statistical 
reasoning and enhanced the quality of the reasoning for problems across all three domains. 
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The full training was found to have an additional effect. The studies did indeed provide 
evidence for the domain-independence of training. Participants who were given example.,, 
only training using problems from the objective domain were able to utilise the statistical 
principles across all three problem domains on testing. Further evidence was provided in 
their second experiment when they gave examples training to their participants in one of 
the three domains, objective, subjective or probabilistic, and found that the training 
significantly increased use of statistical reasoning regardless of the domain of training. 
From the results it may be concluded that participants are able to map the LLN rules thcy 
have learrit onto a pre-existing set of abstract intuitive rules that may then be used on 
problems in different domains to the one that they have been taught. The fact that examples 
training alone resulted in no domai n-speci fi city effects suggests that learning based on 
specific problem types may be abstracted to a degree sufficient for use on widely different 
problem types. These findings are consistent with a dual process account of reasoning on 
everyday problems. People can learn to follow rules explicitly and respond normatively 
(Evans & Over, 1996). In other words, people can learn to be more rational in terms of a 
nonnative system of reasoning. 
Fong and Nisbett (1991) addressed a couple of questions that were raised following this 
series of studies. Firstly, it could be argued that the domains used in the original study were 
too broad and there were no domain-independence effects of training at all. Secondly, it 
was possible that details of the training examples are still held in a participant's memory 
for a short while after training. Fong and Nisbett added in a two week delay between 
training and testing and used more tightly defined domains. Participants received a short 
introduction to the LLN pnnciple followed by three examples in the domain of either 
sports or ability testing. Each example , vas again followed by an answer in tenns of LLN. 
Use of the statistical pnnciples was still improved after a two week delay, however domain 
SI)CCIficity of training was obscrvcd. There was a loss of training effects ovcr the delay in 
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the untrained domain but these participants still applied the LLN heuristic more than 
participants from the untrained Control group. Fong and Nisbett argued that examples 
training served in part to provide a set of coding rules that link the inferential rule system 
more tightly to events in the trained domain. The training should transfer to other domains 
but especially in those persons who have formed the coding rules. Kosonen and Winne 
(1995) provided support for these findings and the Formalist view that given effective 
instruction in abstract, formal rules of reasoning, students can transfer those rules across 
domains. 
The question is can people transfer rules of conditional logic in the same way? Can people 
be instructed in the rules leading to use of those rules on subsequent problems consisting of 
different content? The next section will review the literature on training and transfer effects 
in conditional reasoning using the selection task. 
2.2.3 Training and transfer effects on selection task reasoning 
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver (1986) explored the question of whether people have 
intuitive rules for conditional logic as they seem to for the law of large numbers. Cheng et 
al. (1986, Exp. 1) gave their participants logic training in the material conditional. The 
training was manipulated in that participants were given either training on abstract 
principles of standard logic, or examples of selection task problems involving realistic 
content followed by an explanation of the correct response, or both combined (see 
Appendix 2A for details of training). They found that the rule training alone was 
ineffective and they proposed that this was because individuals have no ability to apply it 
to concrete problems. They also found examples training alone to be ineffective and 
suggested that individuals have no intuitive grasp of the rule they are being shown how to 
apply. However, training in standard logic, when coupled with training on examples of 
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selection task problems, led to improved performance on subsequent selection task 
problems involving both arbitrary and deontic content. 
Cheng et al. proposed that abstract pnnclples coupled with examples served to elucidate 
the mapping between abstract principles and concrete instances. They suggested that 
knowledge of abstract rules of logic and ability to apply them are two separate skills and 
typically college students have not yet acquired either of them. This is very different from 
Fong et al. who found that rules training alone and examples training alone were effective 
in increasing use of LLN, and the effects of both together were additivc. Thus providing 
further evidence for the existence of intuitive heuristics for LLN reasoning, but not for the 
material conditional. 
A problem with the findings from this experiment was that the examples used as part of the 
logic training were not abstract. They involved real life content which may have facilitated 
reasoning on subsequent thematic selection task problems. In fact one of the examples was 
deontic, the Sears problem. This is one of the confounds that will be addressed directly in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
It could be argued that one set of instructions was not enough to facilitate logical 
reasoning. Cheng et al. provided participants with a semester long logic course which 
covered topics in propositional logic. However no significant improvement was found in 
the number of problems solved correctly. Evans and Over (1996) reported that they wcre 
not surprised that the results were negative. They argue that the selection task was not a 
good tool for investigating whether training in logical principles and attendance at logic 
courses would facilitate general deductive reasoning competence. According to Evans' 
(1984ý 1989) heuristic-analýlic theory \, cr\, few people would get past a relevance 
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judgement on a selection task consisting of arbitrarv content. 
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But is there a way that individuals can be encouraged to reason more explicitly on these 
problems? The evidence in the belief bias literature discussed before demonstrates that 
certain instructional manipulations can reduce the belief bias effects in syllogistic 
reasoning. It is possible that there is a way to facilitate analytic reasoning on arbitrary 
selection task problems, thus overriding or inhibiting the implicit responses. This is not 
relevant for deontic tasks as the correct response is cued pragmatically anyway; hence it is 
not necessary to override the response cued by System 1. However, it should be possible to 
facilitate the improvement of deontic reasoning also as the correct analytic response on the 
arbitrary task is the same as the correct one on the deontic task. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that people reason using 'pragmatic reasoning 
schemas', clusters of rules that are acquired through experience. Each schema is abstract 
but domain-sensitive. Two examples of these are the 'permission' and 'obligation' 
schemas. As with LLN reasoning, it was proposed that it should be easy to evoke the use 
of pragmatic reasoning schernas by presenting individuals with problems consisting of 
semantic cues designed to trigger them. 
In Cheng et al. 's Experiment 3 they investigated the hypothesis that if people normally 
solve problems using pragmatic reasoning schemas then it should be possible to improve 
people's deductive reasoning by training them on them. This would also then lend support 
to Fong et al. 's suggestion that abstract training in naturally occurring rule systems can be 
effective in encouraging people to use them. The obligation training consisted of details of 
the nature of obligations in abstract format and the procedures necessary for checking if a 
violation of the obligation has occurred. An example of an obligation statement presented 
in the if-then conditional form was given (see Example 2.5 for the full script). 
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Obligation Schema Training 
As you know, an obligation arises whenever it is the case that certain circumstances or situations create an 
obligation to perform some action. Obligations can often be stated in an "If... then " form. For example, the following regulation specifies an obligation: "If a student is a psychology major, then the student must take 
an introductory psychology course. " More generally, if we call the initial situation I and the action C. an 
obligation has the form, "If I arises, then C must be done. " In our first example, I is - being a psychoioP, 
major, " and C is "taking an introductory psychology course. " 
In order to assess whether an obligation is being satisfied, we need to consider the four possible situations 
that might arise. These are 
1.1 occurs. 
2.1 doesn't occur. 
3. C is done. 
4. C is not done. 
Corresponding to each of these possible situations is a rule related to the fulfilment of the obligation. These 
rules are the following: 
If I occurs, then it is obligatory to do C. Clearly, if I arises then failure to take the required action would 
constitute a violation of the obligation. To use our example, if a student is a psychology major, then that 
student must take an introductory psychology course. 
2. If I does not occur, then the obligation does not arise. Consequently, C need not be done, although the 
person may do C anyway. For example, if a student is not a psychology major the student is not obliged 
to take an introductory psychology course. It may be permissible, however, for an English major to take 
an introductory psychology course. But in any case, the basic obligation is simply irrelevant if the 
student is not a psychology major. 
3. If C is done, then the obligation is certainly not violated, regardless of whether or not I has occurred. If I 
did occur, then the obligation is satisfied. If I didn't occur, then the obligation didn't even arise (Rule 2). 
For example, if we know a student has taken an introductory psychology course, we can be sure the 
obligation has not been violated: Either the student was a psychology major, and hence fulfilled the 
obligation, or the student was not a psychology major, in which case the obligation didn't arise. 
4. If C has not been done, then I must not have occurred. This is because if I had occurred, then the failure 
to do C would constitute a violation of the obligation. Thus, if a student has not taken an introductory 
psychology course, the student must not be a psychology major, or else the obligation will have been 
violated. 
If you understand the above four rules, you should find it very easy to assess whether or not an obligation is 
being met. Note that there are only two situations in which it is possible for an obligation to be violated: 
When I occurs (and C is not done) (Rule 1), and when C is not done (and I occurs) (Rule 4). In the other two 
situations the obligation can't be violated. These are the cases in which I doesn't occur (in which case the 
obligation doesn't arise) (Rule 2), and in which C is done (in which case the obligation will have been met if 
it arose) (Rule 3). 
You may wish to reread these instructions carefully in order to be sure you understand the rules for 
evaluating obligations. You will then be able to apply what you learned to the test problems. The test 
problems will include both obligations and other similar types of regularities. You will find it easy to solve 
these problems if you carefully apply Rules 1-4. 
Example 2.5 Obligation Schema training taken from Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and 
Oliver (1986), Experiment 3 
Participants were given four arbitrary problems and four obligation problems for the test. 
They reported that obligation schema training was effective in producing a better 
performance on obligation problems. Cheng et al. also found that the benefit of obligation 
training extended to two of the arbitrary problems. When they investigated this further they 
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found that response patterns under each condition on two of the problems resembled those 
of obligation problems. They concluded that some participants might have interpreted the 
two arbitrary problems as obligation situations after training. The two that it is suggested 
were possibly interpreted as obligations were; 'if a bolt of cloth has any red threads in it, 
then it must be stamped with a triangle' and 'if a house was built before 1979, then it has a 
fireplace'. It could be argued that both these tasks are highly thematic, full of semantic 
content and much more likely to be understood as deontic conditionals rather than ones 
that are purely arbitrary in content. 
Therefore, Cheng et al. proposed that they had found support for the pragmatic reasoning 
schema hypothesis on two counts. Firstly, participants made significantly fewer errors on 
obligation problems than on arbitrary problems. Secondly, training in a pragmatic 
reasoning schema encourages use of that schema for problems that compel a semantic 
interpretation consistent with the schema and also, may refine participants' understanding 
of situations that are potentially interpretable in terms of the schema. They also found that 
training improved performance on two arbitrary problems. Cheng et al. suggest that this is 
because the procedure used provided participants with infori-nation as to which cases 
constituted violations in addition to simply orienting them toward checking violations. As 
these are consistent with the material conditional then they can be applied to arbitrary 
problems also. 
2.2.4 Cross domain transfer 
Providing support for Cheng et al. 's findings, Berry (1983) found thematic to arbitrary 
transfer effects when participants were given minimal explanations of thematic problems 
in an initial set and were instructed to verbalise the reasoning behind their answers to each 
problem. Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989) failed to replicate this finding when they 
conducted a series of experiments to observe the transfer effects between thematic and 
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arbitrary selection task problems. Participants were presented with either five arbitrarv or 
five thematic tasks initially. If they were in the explanation condition, they were read in- 
depth explanations of the correct and incorrect selections immediately after they completed 
each of the first five problems (see Example 2.6 for examples of arbitrary and thematic 
problems plus explanations). Performance was then measured on a set of four arbitrary 
tasks. Klaczynski et al. found that the explanations did facilitate transfer but only from 
arbitrary to arbitrary tasks. No transfer occurred from thematic to arbitrary tasks. 
Arbitrary Example 
Your task on the following problem is to determine whether or not this rule is in effect: 
"If 112 is on one side of a card, then Helium must be on the other side of the card. " 
This rule may or may not be in effect. 
The four cards you have in front of you each has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card, 
there is a fraction, and on the other side of each card, there is a chemical element. For two of these cards, you 
can see the fraction on one side of the card, but you cannot see the chemical element on the other side of the 
card. Fro the other two cards, you can see the chemical element on one side of the card, but you cannot see 
the fraction on the other side of the card. 
Your task is to indicate the card or cards you would need to turn over to see whether this rule is in effect For 
which of these four cards would the information on the other side of the card help you test whether or not this 
rule is in effect? 
Be sure to select all those cards that you need in order to make your decision, but only those cards that you 
definitely need.. 
(a) 
1/2 
(C) 
helium oxygen 3/4 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the '1/2' and the 'Oxygen' cards. The rule states that if there is a 1/2 on 
one side of a card, then Helium must be on the other side of that card. 
The '1/2' card must be turned over because the truth of the rule is determined by the chemical element on the 
other side of this card. If the element on the other side of this card is any element other than helium, then the 
rule cannot be true. Likewise, the 'Oxygen' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, Oxygen 
cannot be on the other side of a card that has I i2 on it. If a card with Oxygen on one side has 1/2 on the other 
side of it, the rule cannot be in effect. In order to see if the 'Oxygen' card has 1/2 on the other side of it, one 
must turn this card over. 
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Example 2.6 Arbitrary and Thematic training examples continued: 
The '3/4' card does not have to be turned over because any chemical could be on the other side of this card 
and the rule could still be in effect; that is, the chemical that appears on the other side of this card does not 
affect the truth of the rule, so the information on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Helium' card 
does not have to be turned over either. Because the rule is not reversible, a card with Helium on one side does 
not have to have 1/2 on the other side of it; either 1/2 or 14 could be on the other side of this card and the 
rule could still be in effect. 
Thematic Example 
Imagine you are a police officer, on duty, walking through a local bar. It is your job to ensure that the local 
drinking laws are in effect in this bar. One such law is: 
"If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be at least 19 years old. " 
The rule may or may not be in effect. 
The four cards you have in front of you each represents one of the people drinking at the bar. There are two 
pieces of information about a person on a card: a person's age is on one side of a card, and what the person is 
drinking is on the other side of the card. For two of the people, you can see their age but you cannot see what 
they are drinking. For the other two people, you can see what they are drinking, but you cannot see their age. 
Your task is to decide what additional information you would need in order to decide whether or not the 
drinking law is in effect. For which of these four people would the information on the other side of the card 
help you decide whether or not the bar is observing the law? 
Be sure to select all those cards that you need in order to make your decision, but only those cards that you 
definitely need. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
22 years 
old 
Drinking 
coke 
16 years 
old 
Drinking 
beer 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Drinking Beer' and the '16 years old' cards. The law states that is 
a person is drinking beer, then that person must be at least 19 years old. The 'drinking beer' card must be 
turned over because the truth of the law is determined by whether or not that person is over 19 years old. If 
the age on the other side of this card is under 19, then the law cannot be in effect. Likewise, the '16 years old' 
card must be turned over because, according to the law, this person cannot be drinking beer. If a person who 
is 16 years old is drinking beer, then the law cannot be in effect. In order to see if the 16-year-old person is 
drinking beer, one must turn this card over. 
The 'drinking coke' card does not have to be turned over because any age could be on the other side of this 
card and the law could still be in effect; that is, the age of a person drinking coke does not affect the truth of 
the law, so the inforination on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The '21 years old' card does not have 
to be turned over either. Because the law is not reversible, a person who is 21 does not have to be drinking 
beer; either drinking beer or drinking coke could be on the other side of this card and the law could still be in 
effect. 
Example 2.6 Arbitrary and thematic selection task training examples followed by in- 
depth explanations of the correct and incorrect responses taken from Klaczynski, 
Gelfand and Reese (1989) 
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Klaczynski et al. developed a contextual similarity hypothesis to account for the effects. 
According to this, the context of a problem consists of related elements from past 
experience or from the problem itself, thus similar problems share elements. The greater 
the number of shared elements, the greater the similarity between problems. The greater 
the similarity the more likely there will be transfer between problems. It was proposed that 
the elements in the arbitrary problems only differ in the words used for p, not p, q and not 
q, therefore are very similar resulting in transfer. In contrast, the elements in the thematic 
problems are tied to past experiences and are dissimilar to each other. Transfer is less 
likely to occur from thematic to other thematic problems or to other arbitrary problems. 
In their second experiment, Klaczynski et al. tested the contextual similarity hypothesis 
however it failed to provide any supporting evidence. Participants failed to transfer 
between similar thematic pairs as they did dissimilar ones. Klaczynski et al. replicated their 
first experiment but included thematic problems as well as arbitrary problems as their test 
items and found that transfer occurred within problem types i. e. arbitrary to arbitrary, 
thematic to thematic, but transfer between problem types was unidirectional. That is 
transfer occurred from arbitrary to thematic problems only, not the other way round. 
Support for these findings has been provided by Bassok and Holyoak (1989) who found 
training on algebra and physics problems transferred to problems within the same problem 
type but transfer across domains was again unidirectional. Transfer occurred only from 
algebra to physics, not the other way round. 
Klaczynski et al. (1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993) proposed that when given trainIng in 
an abstract domain, the rules are relatively general because there is no concrete knowledge 
base onto which the rules can be mapped. Therefore, once the rule is induced, transfer may 
occur to different problem types that are perceived as instantiations of the general category 
of problems to which the rule applies. Training in a domain-specific rule however may 
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lead to the rule being utilised on other problems from the same domain as one-to-one 
mapping of the elements between problems is more readily perceived. Transfer to 
problems-in other domains does not occur as the rule is tied to a specific domain. In terms 
of Cheng et al. 's logic training, the rules are relatively general therefore should transfer to 
arbitrary and deontic problems. According to Klaczynski and Laipple, because the logic 
training is likely to be consistent with the rules of the deontic problems, the training may 
be directly mapped onto and activate the schemas which may then be applied to other 
problems. Training in a domain-specific schema however should result in activation of that 
schema which will facilitate the solution of further problems within that domain with little 
or no transfer to problems from other domains. However, Cheng et al. did find some 
transfer from their obligation schema training to arbitrary problems but no transfer from 
their logic training (when examples were excluded) which is in the opposite direction to 
Klaczynski's proposals. 
It was proposed by Klaczynski (1993) that transfer of rules among permission and arbitrary 
problems may be viewed as an aspect of more general learning processes. He specified two 
types of learning. During the training phase participants may have used inductive 
reasoning to abstract common elements from the explanations and to construct the rules. 
However a different mechanism is involved for transfer. That is learning to apply 
previously acquired information to new domains. This involves noticing the similarities 
between the problems, retrieving the rule learned and mapping this onto the test items. 
As part of this research, it is necessary to investigate the inconsistencies in the previous 
research. To summanse, Cheng et al. found transfer effects after obligation schema 
training but Klaczynski et al. argue that transfer did not occur from domain-specific 
training. Under a dual process account we could argue that explicit training impacts on 
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System 2 therefore training on a domain-specific System I process such as obligation 
schemas, will not transfer to other types of problems. 
Is it an aspect of the training itself that is causing these discrepancies. or the Items ffic 
participants are tested on? It may be both or neither. It is possible that individual 
differences in ability or cognitive style may provide the answer or at least some of it. In the 
following section a review of the individual differences research in relation to training and 
transfer of reasoning ability will be given. This may provide more insight into the 
processes involved in successful (and unsuccessful) reasoning transfer in addition to 
further evidence for dual process theories. 
2.2.5 Individual differences and transfer 
Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) investigated the role of intelligence when transferring 
domain-independent and domain-specific knowledge to target domain-independent and 
domain-specific problems. They reported strong relationships with ability when 
transferrmg knowledge from permission problems to other permission schema problems 
and it was proposed that individuals with higher ability were able to perceive the 
underlying structural similarities between different problems and therefore apply the same 
rules to each. It is these individuals that can decontextualise a problem from its thematic 
content therefore resulting in positive transfer. Klaczynski and Laipple found only weak 
relationships with ability when transferring from abstract problems. They proposed that the 
training leads to the induction of a domain-independent rule which may be more easily 
applied to target problems. 
This appears inconsistent with Stanovich's (1999) proposal that it is the participants of 
higher ability that are able to engage in analytic reasoning on the indicative sclection task. 
It is these individuals that are able to ovcrride or inhibit the heuristic response. However, in 
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Klaczynski and Laipple's study participants were not tested for abilitv and reasoning 
perfonnance relationships prior to training which is the relationship that Stanovich 
proposes. Klaczynski and Laipple are proposing that irrespective of ability, participants 
acquire the domain-independent rule which they can then utillse on subsequent problems 
from other domains. In contrast, to acquire and transfer a domain-specific rule, participants 
must be of higher ability. 
As discussed before, thinking styles may also have a role to play in receptiveness to 
training. Houd6 and Moutier (1996; 1999) conducted a series of studies aimed to 
investigate the influence of training on heuristic responding directly. Based on Evans' 
(1989) proposal that heuristic processes are involved in pre-attentional selection of certain 
features of a problem that are deemed relevant by the participant, they posited that people 
are 'inefficient inhibitors' which is why they are susceptible to making the biased 
responses such as matching bias (p/q responding on the indicative selection task). Houd6 
and Moutier (1996) used an experimental procedure where participants learnt to inhibit the 
matching bias response on the selection task. Participants were presented with the Wason 
selection task in the letter and number form and asked to state which cards had to be turned 
over to verify the rule "If there is an A on one side of a card, then there is a3 on the other. " 
After responding the participant was given an analysis of the problem and the trap it 
involved in order to make the reason for their failure clear (see Example 2.7 for details of 
script). 
They found that the inhibition training increased logically correct responding and 
decreased the matching bias response. However these findings were not robust as the effect 
disappeared when the participants were tested eight days after training. Houd6 and Moutier 
also reported that over half the participants still failed to inhibit the matching response after 
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training and suggested that there may be individual differences in receptiveness to the 
training. 
Inhibition Training 
'In this problem, the source of the error lies in a habit we all have of concentrating on cards with the letter or 
number mentioned in the rule (the experimenter points to cards A and 3, and to the place where theý, are 
mentioned in the rule) and not paying attention to the other cards. This can have a very misleading effect on 
us: we think this makes things easier when in fact we'refalling into a trap! This is probably what you did. ' 
The experimenter goes on to say: 
'Thus, the goal here is (1) to notfall into the trap of the two cards A and 3 mentioned in the rule, and (2) to 
consider all of the cards, A, D, 3,7, one be one by imagining the number or the letter it might have on the 
other side to see whether these cards can make the rule false... To help you understand, let's consider the 
different answers and eliminate the wrong ones - the ones that make youfall into the trap - to find the fight 
answer. ' 
The experimenter then goes through the responses A, D, 7, A-3, and A-7 informing the participant why they 
might be falling into the trap and what they need to do (i. e. inhibit the response to name the cards in the rule 
and imagine what is on the other side of the cards not named in the rule). A box is used by the experimenter 
to depict the repertoire of schemes that may be used. The different responses are represented on cards (A, A- 
3 and A-7) which can be slid into the box to illustrate the inhibition and the activation processes. 
The training ended when the participant was able to produce correct explanations for wrong answers A and 
A-3. The experimenter concludes by saying; 
'So in this problem, you should not let yourself be misled by the cards with a letter or number mentioned in 
the rule (the experimenter points first to cards A and 3, and then to the place where they are mentioned in the 
rule), which makes you neglect the other cards. You might think this makes things easier but in fact youfall 
into a trap! ' 
Example 2.7 Inhibition training details taken from Houdi and Moutier (1996) 
Houd6 and Moutier (1999) replicated their previous findings and reported that 
receptiveness to training was related to a field-independent cognitive style. That is an 
nil ability to perceive an element separate from its geometric content and to adopt an analytic 
attitude in problem-solving. Participants reported to have a field-dependent cognitive style 
were not receptive to the training. These findings are consistent with Stanovich's and 
Klaczynski's proposals that thinking styles are important when investigating reasoning and 
decision-making behaviours. They propose that it is people with more open-minded and 
rational thinking styles that are able to decontextualise elements from thematic content. 
63 
Going with the notion that thinking styles are malleable therefore more susceptiblc to 
training, then it is these individuals that are more receptive to training. 
Houd6 and Moutier (1999) also studied the functional neuroanatomy of the biased-to- 
logical shift in the same set of participants performing the same task after cognitive 
inhibition training. They conducted a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan study to 
determine what brain regions were activated before and after training. A microgenetic 
change in the cortical anatomy of reasoning shifted from the posterior part of the brain in 
the pre-test to a prefrontal network on the post-test. They concluded that inhibition is the 
cognitive mechanism that can redirect attention. Houd6 and Moutier argue that these 
findings are interesting for two reasons. Firstly the brain regions activated on the pre-test 
when matching bias was in effect are known to be involved in the semantic processing of 
shapes and colours and in the visuo-spatial processing of information. This they propose 
corresponds to the dual origin of the perceptual matching bias - visuo-spatial and lexico- 
semantic: visuo-spatial selection of the two shapes mentioned in the rule. Secondly, the 
brain regions activated on the post-test belong to a prefrontal network involved in working 
memory. What is different about these studies compared to the others discussed so far is 
that the training did not involve repetition of the task or logical training but purely 
matching-bias inhibition. 
2.3 Summary and Conclusions 
2.3.1 Summary of findings in relation to training studies 
The literature reviewed in this chapter illustrates several conflicting findings. Experiencc 
and training in an intuitive rule of reasoning such as the law of large numbers does result in 
positive transfer to other problems involving realistic content. However domain-specificity 
of training effccts are found after a delay. Training in the material conditional does not 
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transfer or even increase correct responding on the indicative selection task unless 
examples are included as part of the training procedure. However this could be due to the 
selection task not being an effective measure of deductive reasoning. People arc guided in 
their responses by pre-conscious heuristics of relevance which results in biased responses. 
Evans (1989) proposed that few people get past a relevance judgement on the selection 
task, but in line with the findings in syllogistic reasoning, there must be a way to increase 
normative responding on this task. 
Cheng et al. 's pragmatic reasoning schema training did appear to facilitate reasoning on 
tasks involving different content but it is necessary to explore this further due to the 
realistic test items that were used in their study. On the other hand, Klaczynski and 
associates reported that schema training only transferred to other problems in the same 
domain and only for individuals of high ability. It is possible that individual differences in 
thinking styles may predict people's susceptibility to such training as in Houde and 
Moutier's inhibition training. Or the ability to understand and transfer the training may be 
due to intelligence as proposed by Stanovich and Klaczynski. This research aims to explore 
all these aspects. 
The following section will provide a rationale for the studies reported in this thesis. 
General predictions in relation to the training and tasks to be used will be made in terrns of 
current dual process theories of thinking. 
2.3.2 Rationale for training studies 
Most of the training studies presented in this chapter have illustrated the positive effects of 
verbal instruction on reasoning processes. The effects of belief were reduced in syllogistic 
reasoning after the elaboration of logical principles, although logical responding was not 
increased; rule-based training in statistical reasoning led to an increased use of the rule on 
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problems involving different content and structure; Cheng et al. 's logic training (full 
training including explanation of the rules plus examples) increased correct responding on 
subsequent selection tasks as did their obligation schema training; Houd6 and Moutier's 
studies reduced the matching bias response on the selection task; and Klaczynski et al. 's 
examples training facilitated the increase of correct responding on different problems. 
Albeit that there are discrepancies and conflicting findings between all these studies, they 
do support the conjecture that instruction is effective in eliciting explicit thinking (Evans & 
Over, 1996; Evans, 2003). 
One purpose of this research is to find the source of these discrepancies discussed so far 
and to consider in detail the predictions that arise from a dual process framework. The 
question is what would dual process theories predict? Dual process theorists agree that 
System 2 is sensitive to instruction but in what way does that affect the reasoning 
processes, in both systems? Surely that would depend to some extent on the type of 
reasoning being performed i. e. statistical or deductive. As discussed in Chapter I and here 
in this chapter, it has been proposed that the law of large numbers is an intuitive rule 
system that individuals acquire through experience in a domain-specific manner. People 
have been shown to use the rule when the context of the problem suggests it, or when 
motivated to do so in order to maintain beliefs. Thus people may be seen as rationall, or 
rational in terms of their individual goals or beliefs. Fong et al. 's statistical training studies 
provide evidence that people can learn to conform with a rule leading to an increase in 
their rationality2 (Evans & Over, 1996). 
The research on the effects of statistical training has consistently shown that use of LLN 
reasoning can be increased on a variety of problems. What would happen if participants 
received everyday reasoning problems that involved evidence that leads to 
belief- 
motivated reasoning as in Klaczynski et al. 's studies, after they had received LLN training? 
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A series of studies will be reported in Chapter 4 which approaches this question directly. 
The previous research suggests that LLN reasoning would be increased but beliefs are, in 
dual process terms, a System I process. People respond automatically or anal,, Ilcal]N- 
dependent on whether the inforination is consistent or inconsistent with their prior beliefs. 
The aim is to investigate the extent to which training affects responding on everyday 
reasoning problems designed to elicit belief-based responses. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
when presented with problems involving information that is unbelievable participants 
utilise a more sophisticated reasoning strategy to refute the evidence. However when the 
infon-nation is believable, people tend not to analyse the evidence too deeply. By giving 
participants statistical training the aim is to observe whether use of statistical reasoning 
will be increased, and whether the training will impact on bias. It is possible that the effects 
of belief are too strong to override. At the same time the studies aim to replicate the 
findings of Fong et al. (1986) that training in an intuitive rule system improves use of the 
rule for problems in the same domain and transfers to other problems involving different 
types of content. One prediction that falls out ftom the instruction effects on belief bias and 
from Evans and Over (1996) is that statistical reasoning will be improved, and the effect of 
belief may be reduced, but it will not be eliminated. 
The selection task has long been viewed as a measure of deductive competence. People 
have been judged as irrational when compared to some logical system, for not applying 
analytic reasoning strategies resulting in the correct response on the arbitrary version of the 
task. Responses on both arbitrary and deontic forms of the selection task are thought to be 
cued by relevance, either linguistically on the arbitrary version or pragmatically on the 
deontic version. By looking at the task this way, it may be easier to judge whether explicit 
training has any effect on these processes and how, therefore resulting in increased 
rationalityl 
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In Chapter 5a series of studies are reported which aim to clarify the effects of different 
training techniques on the selection task. There are discrepancies in the previous research 
that have been discussed in these two introductory chapters which are necessary to explore. 
Findings reported so far leave it unclear whether the conflicting results are due to the 
training procedures themselves, the test items used or individual difference factors such as 
intelligence or thinking dispositions. Both Cheng et al. and Klaczynski et al. found transfer 
effects after schema training although slightly conflicting ones. However their training was 
completely different. Cheng et al. found some transfer from obligation to arbitrary 
problems but Klaczynski et al. argue that the transfer between domains is only 
unidirectional, from arbitrary to thematic. The aim here is to resolve some of these 
conflicting results in the literature, but again what would be predicted under a dual process 
account? 
Klaczynski et al. (1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993) would predict that abstract training 
(both theirs and Cheng et al's logical rules) would transfer to problems involving either 
arbitrary or deontic content. There would be no relationship with ability as a general rule 
would be formed during training which would help in solving subsequent tasks from 
whichever domain. After domain-specific training though, transfer would only occur to 
other problems from the same domain and the individuals who are able to do so would be 
higher in ability. These individuals would be able to recognise the structural similarities 
resulting in one-to-one mapping of the elements. 
Further predictions will be made in relation to the individual training experiments in the 
relevant chapters. As previously discussed, all the reasoning and judgement tasks to be 
used have been shown to elicit both logical and non-logical responses. Usually these tasks 
are investigated separately, either in the reasoning literature or the decision making 
literature. By exploring performance on all of them as part of this thesis it is possible to 
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examine the relationships between them and at the same time determine the cxtent to 
which performance on each draws on System 2 resources. 
In the following chapter, an individual differences study will be reported. Stanovich 
proposed that the ability to decontextualise on a variety of critical thinking tasks is linked 
(Stanovich & West, 1998b; Stanovich, 1999). It is necessary to investigate this proposal in 
relation to the tasks to be used in the training studies and in relation to measures of 
individual differences in cognitive ability and thinking styles. Performance on these tasks 
also provide evidence for the two processes of thinking and decision making as discussed 
in these two introductory chapters. The study was conducted in order to replicate the 
findings reported in the literature and to identify the tasks to be used in the following 
training experiments. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Individual Differences in Reasoning and Bias 
3.1 Introduction to Experiment I 
In Chapter Ia review of the different reasoning tasks was presented, which illustrated how 
prior knowledge and beliefs can influence perfort-nance on a wide vanet-v of reasoning 
problems well documented in the literature for the biases and errors that they elicit. It was 
also demonstrated that by applying a dual process framework, a way of conceptuallsing the 
heuristic and analytic processes that govern reasoning competence is provided. The 
experimental research presented in this chapter has two functions. Firstly, to examine the 
relationships between statistical and deductive reasoning, identifying any similarities or 
differences between them, and to investigate their relationships with cognitivc ability. 
Secondly, to develop law of large numbers reasoning and selection task materials and 
ensure that they have the appropriate properties for the training studies that follow in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
This introduction will provide a brief overview of the different arguments proposed in 
relation to rational responding on a vanety of cntical reasoning tasks, particularly in ten-ns 
of decontextualised reasoning and the different findings in the literature as to which 
individual differences variables predict this critical thinking skill. Under a dual process 
account of reasoning, decontextualised reasoning is an ability associated with System 2's 
analytical thinking strategies. By gaining further evidence of the factors which may 
facilitate this skill, more knowledge of the System 2 processes which govern reasoning 
competence xvill also be obtained. This will be followed by the rationale and predictions 
for Experiment 1. 
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3.1.1 Individual differences and decontextualised reasoning 
Traditionally, research in reasoning and dec'slon-makIng has Investigated per-forinance 
using between groups designs to examine the different effects of vanous experimental 
manipulations. More recently individual differences research has been conducted in order 
to identify factors which facilitate and inhibit reasoning perfon-nance on a varietv oftasks 
(Stanovich & West, 1998a; 1998b; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Newstead, 
Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). This research has provided e,,,, Idencc in 
relation to the underlying processes which mediate reasoning competence in an individual, 
but at the same time has contributed to the development of modem dual process theories. 
For instance Stanovich and West (1998a; 1998b) have consistently found that only 
individuals of high ability are able to reason deductively on the arbitrary vcrsion of the 
selection task. Stanovich and West argued that it is these people that can override or inhibit 
the fundamental computational bias of System I which cue the heunstic (p/q) response. 
System 2, the analytic system is related to intelligence therefore it is the higher ability 
individuals that can decontextualise the elements of the problem from the scenano and 
reason deductively. Cognitive ability differences are attenuated on deontic problems as it is 
not necessary to decontextualise from the scenario to achieve the correct solution. Both 
systems cue the same correct response. 
Newstead et al. agreed that very high ability participants were more able to solve the 
arbitrary selection task but they proposed a different explanation which incorporated a two- 
stage theory of decontextualisation. They suggested that the conditional rule must be 
abstracted from the scenario first which xvill lead to consistent responding, usually p/q. 
Secondly, they proposed that invited inferences such as the assumption that conditionals 
are biconditionals must be resisted in order to attain the correct response. Ncwstead ct a]. 
found that participants who attained the first level %N, crc still of higher abiliv, when 
compared to inconsistent respondcrs on the task. 
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Decontextualised reasoning has been identified as a key ability in critical thinking, 
necessary for optimum responding on most of the tasks discussed in this thesis. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, according to Stanovich (1999) the ability to decontextualise on a 
variety of reasoning tasks is linked which indicates that it is a domain-general dispositional 
trait related to the ability to reason independently of phor beliefs. Stanovich and West 
(1998b) conducted a series of studies to investigate the relationships between cognitive 
ability and thinking dispositions measures and performance on a variety of critical 
reasoning tasks. They employed tasks which they suggested involved separating prior 
knowledge or beliefs from the logic of the problem in order to achieve the normative 
response: syllogistic reasoning tasks, selection tasks, statistical reasoning and the 
Argument Evaluation Test (Stanovich & West, 1997). Under a dual process account these 
tasks induce conflict between the two systems of logic and belief. 
The syllogistic reasoning tasks they used consisted of conclusions that contradicted world 
knowledge when the syllogism was valid and were consistent with world knowledge when 
the syllogism was invalid. In dual process terms there would then be conflict between the 
systems of logic and belief when attempting these problems. In order to achieve the correct 
response an individual would have to decontextualise their knowledge of the world from 
the logical fonnat of the task. The selection tasks involved content which was real-life but 
arbitrary and as discussed in Chapter 1, correct solution rates on these tasks are usually less 
than 10%. The few people who solve this task correctly must resist the linguistic cues to 
test only the items named in the rule (Stanovich, 1999). 
The statistical reasoning problems used by Stanovich and West (1998b) involved making 
an inductive inference in a simulation of a real-life decision. The information that was 
presented relevant to the decision was conflicting. One type was statistical and the other 
was a concrete case or personal experience that pointed in the opposite direction. Several 
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of these statistical problems were adapted from Fong et al. 's (1986) studies. Judgement on 
these tasks has been found to be overly influenced by vivid but unrepresentational personal 
evidence and to be under influenced by more representative and diagnostic, but pallid, 
statistical evidence (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). According to Stanovich (1999) the participant 
must look beyond the vividness and immediacy of the testimonial evidence in order to 
realise that the abstract statistical information has greater validity. 
Stanovich and West's (1997) Argument Evaluation Test was also discussed in Chapter 1. 
This task assesses an individual's ability to evaluate the quality of an argument 
independent of their feelings and personal biases about the proposition at issue. To perform 
well on this task, participants have to separate their prior opinion on the issue from the 
evaluation of the argument. 
Stanovich and West (I 998b) reported that all the tasks correlated with each other which 
indicated that those participants who respond non-natively on one type of task tended to 
respond normatively on the other. In other words, departures from normative responding 
were not due to non-systematic performance errors but were due to systematic limitations 
in processing. This is important evidence for dual process theories of reasoning as it would 
indicate that analytic responding on all these tasks is being facilitated by the same system. 
However, there is conflicting evidence as to which individual difference factors facilitate 
this ability and to what extent (Newstead et al., 2004; Stanovich, 1999; Klaczynski, 1997). 
Stanovich and West (1998b) found that cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were 
predictive of reasoning performance on all the tasks. Cognitive ability was the strongest 
unique predictor. However they showed that thinking dispositions were able to predict 
individual differences on the tasks even after cognitive ability was partialed out. They 
proposed that individuals with greater algorithmic capacity should show an enhanced 
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ability to reason independently of pnor belief. These individuals are also able to flexibb., 
contextualise and decontextualise the problem dependent on what is necessary to resolve it. 
However thinking dispositions incorporate an individual's goals and beliefs therefore 
reasoning behaviour is also partly dependent on this intentional level of processing. 
Conflicting findings were reported by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997). They agree 
that decontextualised reasoning is a crucial component of critical thinking but they 
proposed that cognitive ability was not associated with it. Klaczynski and Gordon (1996) 
reported that adolescents used sophisticated reasoning strategies only when such strategies 
led to conclusions which were consistent with their existing beliefs. Klaczynski, Gordon, 
and Fauth (1997) expanded on this and investigated the extent to which individual 
differences in cognitive ability and infonnation-processing style were related to the 
capacity to reason using three critical thinking competencies: the law of large numbers, 
intuitive analyses of covariance, and dissection of hypothetical experiments for flaws. 
Over a series of studies, participants were presented with critical reasoning problems 
designed to elicit the utilisation of the three competencies that were enhancing, threatening 
or neutral to each individual's occupational goal. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth proposed 
that the cognitive mechanism responsible for reasoning biases involved the amount of 
information processing effort individuals exerted in processing goal-relevant information. 
Goal-enhancing information is readily assimilated to pre-existing belief systems and is 
processed at a relatively cursory level. Goal-threatening information on the other hand 
activates more sophisticated reasoning strategies in order to refute the evidence. 
Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth found that general ability measures, such as verbal ability, 
were dissociated from measures of information processing style, and although they 
predicted the amount of statistical reasoning that an individual engaged in, they did not 
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predict the degree to which individuals were biased by belief Reasoning biases N% ere 
associated with individual differences in rational processing as measured by Epstein et al. 's 
(Epstein, Pacim, & Heier, 1996) Rational - Expen enti al ln--ý, entory. They concluded that 
decontextualized reasoning was a function of an array of personal dispositions distinct 
from intelligence. 
Stanovich and West suggested that one of the reasons that they found stronger 
relationships between cognitive ability and the tendency to e-ý,, aluate evidence independent 
of prior beliefs, compared to Klaczynski et al. for example, is that the tasks they used 
resulted in different indices. Klaczynski et al. 's index is a direct measure of belief bias 
whereas Stanovich and West's is a measure of the ability to reason in situations in which 
prior beliefs may be interfering. They suggested that their measure combines context-free 
reasoning ability with the ability to ignore belief bias. By using the tasks from both bodies 
of literature in this study any relationships between them can be explored. 
3.1.2 Aims of Experiment I 
This study has three main aims. Firstly to examine the relationships between the reasoning 
and decision making tasks. By employing a vanety of tasks, we can explore Stanovich's 
proposal that non-native responding on different problems is related. Secondly, we can also 
investigate the relationships between perfon-nance on the tasks and measures of cognitive 
ability and thinking dispositions in an attempt to test the different claims made by 
Stanovich and Klaczynski. Stanovich claims that ability predicts decontextuallsed 
reasoning whereas Klaczynski argues that it is a skill predicted by thinking dispositions. 
By employing tasks and measures utilised in both bodies of research, direct comparisons 
can be made. 
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The third aim is to develop the law of large numbers and selection task materials for the 
following training experiments. In order to investigate the effects of training on reasoning. 
it is necessary to have an understanding of the norinative response on the task participants 
are being trained on, the biased responses that typically occur and the underlying processes 
which facilitate or mediate the different types of response. The tasks chosen for this 
individual differences study are all documented in the literature for their elicitation of 
differential responding according to analytic and heuristic processes as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Gaining further knowledge of the processes underlying reasoning competence 
will assist in the development of effective critical thinking training. 
Findings in relation to performance and errors on the following tasks have been interpreted 
under dual process accounts of reasoning. Klaczynski's everyday reasoning experiments 
involving manipulation of beliefs have elicited two different types of responding cued by 
logic and belief on LLN problems and experiment evaluation problems. Performance 
patterns on arbitrary and deontic selection tasks have been described under the two 
systems, supported by individual differences in cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. 
The belief bias effects found in syllogistic reasoning involving real world content and 
performance on Stanovich and West's Argument Evaluation Test have also provided more 
evidence for two processes of thinking as discussed in Chapter 1. This study aims to 
evaluate dual process theories in the context of both formal and everyday reasoning tasks 
which will then allow further investigation into the relationships between normative and 
biased responding on each of the tasks. 
The research reported in Chapters 4 and 5 examines training in two domains: statistical or 
law of large numbers reasoning, and selection task reasoning. Individuals generally invoke 
the LLN principle only under supportive conditions such as when cues are present in the 
problem (Fong et al., 1986). Klaczynski's (Klaczynski, 1997; Klacyznski, Gordon, & 
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Fauth, 1997) studies have consistently found that participants are more likely to use the 
LLN principle when evidence within the problem is threatening or inconsistent with their 
goals or beliefs. Klaczynski also found that ability predicted the amount of statistical 
reasoning an individual engaged in but thinking styles predicted the amount of bias 
independently. However Stanovich and West argue that cognitive ability and thinking 
dispositions both predict performance on the task. In Experiment I Nve replicate 
Klaczynski's studies and investigate the extent to which these individual differences 
variables influence differential responding on these everyday reasoning problems in order 
to understand how training may impact on reasoning perfon-nance. 
The second group of training studies will focus on reasoning on selection task problems. 
The low solution rates on tasks involving arbitrary content has been consistently found for 
the last thirty years. The facilitation effects of deontic content have also been much 
explored and have led to context-dependent theories of reasoning such as pragmatic 
reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) and social contract theory (Cosmides, 1989). 
Again it is necessary to know what factors facilitate optimum responding on these tasks 
and the individual difference variables that may mediate an individual's performance, in 
order to understand how different training procedures may impact. 
A second issue is that Klaczynski and Stanovich, whilst both finding a relationship 
between thinking styles and reasoning, employed different measures of disposition in their 
studies. Both thinking dispositions measures will be tested. Firstly the Thinking 
Dispositions Questionnaire (Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998b) which was found to be a 
unique predictor of the ability to evaluate arguments in the face of prior belief High scores 
on a thinking disposition composite score derived from the scale reflects the tendency for 
more flexible, open-minded thinking styles. Associations were found between scores on 
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the TDQ and cognitive ability indicating that the two constructs are linked. Flo%ýcer 
Newstead et al. (2004) failed to find any such associations. 
Secondly, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Hei I evidence for the reliability i er (1996) provided I 
and validity of a self-report measure of individual differences in intuiwc-expenential and 
anal yti cal -rational thinking, the Rational - Expen enti al Inventory which has subsequently 
been used as a measure in studies of bias in statistical reasoning and argumentation. 
Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth (1997) reported that more rational individuals as measured 
by the REI were less biased in their reasoning style. It must be noted that rationality as 
measured by the REI corresponds to Evans and Over's (1996; Evans, Over, & MaiMelow, 
1993) Rationality 2, not total rationality. Klaczynski et al. found no relationship between 
responses on the REI and ability. However Newstead et al. found a correlation between 
rationality and ability but this was not replicated in any of their other studies. Evidence for 
the reliability of the shortened version of the Rational - Expen enti a] Inventory (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999) using a British population has been provided by Handley, Newstead, and 
Wright (2000) who also demonstrated a dissociation between information processing style 
and measures of general intelligence. By using both measures in a within subjects design it 
will clarify some of the differences evident in the previous research, such as the 
relationships with cognitive ability and reasoning tasks. 
3.1.3 Predictions 
I There are several hypotheses to be examined. This study is an extension of Stanovich and 
West's (1998b) who found that non-native responding on a variety of critical reasoning 
tasks was linked. Similar tasks be used but in addition everyday reasoning problems 
designed to evoke belief-based responses will be included. If non-native responding on all 
the tasks is related then this should extend to these tasks also. Bias on the e-, cryday 
reasoning problems can also be computed tlicreforc it xvill be possible to investigate 
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whether bias on these tasks is related to bias in syllogistic reasoning, selection task 
performance and on the AET. If as Stanovich and West suggested the departure from 
non-native responding is due to systematic limitations in processing and not random 
perfon-nance errors then these biases should also be related. 
Individual differences will be explored in relation to performance on the critical reasoning 
tasks. According to Stanovich and West (1997; 1998b) both cognitive ability and thinking 
dispositions predict reasoning performance, with ability accounting for the larger 
proportion of the variance followed by thinking style. Taking this viewpoint then both 
measures will correlate with perfon-nance on the reasoning tasks in this study. However 
cognitive ability will have the strongest relationships. On the other hand, Klaczynski 
(1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997) found that ability and thinking styles were not 
associated with each other. They found that biases in reasoning were predicted by 
inform ati on-processi ng style and ability measures predicted only the amount of statistical 
reasoning the individuals engaged in. In accordance with this view, ability and thinking 
styles measures will not be associated with each other. Ability measures will be associated 
with reasoning performance and thinking styles measures will be associated with bias, 
more rational individuals being able to inhibit biased responses. Stanovicb and West 
suggested that one of the reasons that they find stronger relationships between cognitivc 
ability and reasoning independently of prior belief than Klaczynski is that the different 
reasoning tasks used were measuring different effects. By using both Klaczynski's and 
Stanovich's tasks the relationships between the two tasks may be examined. 
E\, eryday reasoning tasks designed to evoke LLN reasoning will be presented to the 
participants in this study. The aim is to replicate the findings of Klaczynski and his 
associates which illustrate that when presented with arguments that are inconsistent with an 
isticated reasoning stratc-gy' individual's goals or befict's. the individual will use more sophl II ics 
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to refute the evidence. However when the evidence is consistent %, 6th prior beliefs or goals 
then the reasoning utilised is cursory. Experiment Evaluation problems will also be used in 
which participants have to detect the flaws in hypothetical experiments. Again the 
problems will be designed to elicit belief-motivated responses. 
On selection task performance, high ability scores will be related to correct responding on 
the arbitrary task. There will be no ability differences between solvers and non-solvers on 
the deontic tasks as according to Stanovich and West (1998a; 1998b-, 1999) the correct 
answer is pragmatically and analytically cued. However, any association between ability 
and performance on the deontic tasks may also be due to analytic responding (Newstead et 
al., 2004). 
3.2 Method 
Design 
This is a correlational study designed to investigate the relationships between information 
processing styles as measured by Pacini and Epstein's (1999) 40-itern version of the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory and Stanovich and West's (1998b) Thinking Disposition 
Questionnaire; cognitive ability, statistical and experiment evaluation reasoning 
(Klaczynski et al. ), Stanovich's Argument Evaluation Test, syllogistic reasoning and 
selection task perfonnance. 
Participants 
A total of fifty participants took part in the study, thirty-eight female (mean age 20.95) and 
twelve male (mean age 22.17). Average age of the total sample was 21.24 (St. Dev. = 
3.06). They were all undergraduates from the University of Plymouth, studying a variety of 
subjects taking part for course credit or cash payment. 
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Materials 
Ration al- Expe rien tial Inventory 
The rational part of the scale was originally based on the Need for Cognition scale which 
was developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). This is described b, N, them as 'the tendenc\ 
to for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking'. The cxpenential scale was 
constructed to reflect the i ntul ti ve-proces sing counterpart of the Need for Cognition scale 
and was developed by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) and named the Faith in 
Intuition scale. Epstein et al. have reported that the factor structure is robust and the two 
scales correlate only minimally with each other (. 07) -ývhich supports the claim that the two 
processing styles are independent of each other and operate in parallel. 
More recently, the inventory has been redesigned and shortened to a 40-item questionnaire 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999) with 20-items on the Rational scale and 20-Items on the 
Experiential scale. This updated version of the Rational- Experienti al Inventory has been 
reported to have a robust factor structure, very reliable subscales (. 73 - . 90, Handley, 
Newstead, & Wright, 2000) and highly significant test-retest correlations of . 60 - . 88 
(Handley et al. ). Within each scale there are two subscales, ability and engagement. 
Rational Ability refers to the confidence and ability with which one carries out a logical 
task, for example 'I have no problems thinking things through carefully'. Rational 
Engagement refers to the reliance and enjoyment one has in doing a logical thinking task, 
for example 'I enjoy thinking in abstract terins'. On the other hand, Experiential Ability 
refers to the confidence and ability one has in using their intuition, for instance 'When it 
comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings', whilst Experiential 
Engagement refers to the reliance on and enjoyment one has in using their intuitIon, for 
example 'I l1kc to rely on my intuitions'. There are ten items per subscale (sce Appendix 
A]. I for the full scale). 
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The response format for all the items II is on a five-point rating scale that ranges from 
'definitely not true of myself' to 'definitely true of myself'. Half of the items are positive 
in direction and the other half are negative. Negative items are reverse scored. Overall 
Rationality and Experientiality scores are obtained by summing the participants' scores on 
the corresponding ability and engagement scales. 
Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire 
Participants were required to complete a 30-item questionnaire used by Stanovich and 
West (1998b, Experiment 1) consisting of items from a number of subscales as follows. 
The response format was on a 5-point scale (I=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree). See 
Appendix A 1.2 for the full questionnaire. 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale - consists of ten items that tap the disposition 
toward reflectivity, willingness to consider evidence contradictory to beliefs, and tolerance 
for ambiguity combined with a willingness to postpone closure. Design of the items was 
influenced by a variety of sources in the critical thinking literature but mostly from the 
work of Baron (1985,1988), who has emphasized the concept of actively open-minded 
thinking through the cultivation of reflectiveness rather than impulsivity, the seeking and 
processing of information that disconfirms one's belief, and the willingness to change 
one's beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. Examples of some of the items include: 
'If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. ' and 'People should 
always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs'. 
Counterfactual Thinking Scale - consists of only two items devised by Stanovich and West 
(1998b) designed to tap counterfactual thinking. They were; 'My beliefs would not have 
been very different if I had been raised by a different set of parents' and 'Even if my 
environment (family, neighbourhood, schools) had been different, I probably would have 
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the same religious views. ' Both items were reverse scored so that higher scores indicate 
counterfactual thinking. 
Absolutism - Stanovich and West adapted this scale from the Scale of Intellectual 
Development (SID) developed by Erwin (1981,1983). Nine items were chosen which were 
designed to tap into the early stages of intellectual development and which are 
characterized by an absolutist orientation e. g. 'It is better to simply believe in a religion 
than to be confused by doubts about it' and 'right and wrong never change'. 
Dogmatism - this subscale consisted of three items such as: 'Of all the different 
philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct'. 
Paranormal Beliefs - there were six items on the paranormal beliefs subscale, two 
concerned with belief in astrology and four concerned the belief in the concept of luck. For 
example: 'It is advisable to consult your horoscope daily' and 'The number 13 is unlucky'. 
Thinking Dispositions Composite Score -A thinking dispositions composite score (TDC) 
was formed by summing the scores on the AOT and Counterfactual Thinking scales and 
then subtracting the sum of the scores on the Absolutism, Dogmatism, and Paranormal 
scales. Thus high scores on the TDC indicate open-mindedness, cognitive flexibility and a 
sceptical attitude. Low scores indicate cognitive rigidity and lack of scepticism (Stanovich 
& West, 1998b). 
Cognitive Ability 
In previous research, SAT scores have been used as a measure but as these are not 
available for the student population in the United Kingdom, the AH4-Group test of General 
Intelligence was administered (Heim, 1967). This test is designed for use with a cross 
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section of the adult population. Test-retest reliability has been reported at 0.919 with 
retesting after one month. The test consists of two parts, each containing 65 items. Part one 
is composed of both verbal and numerical problems, part two is comprised of problems in 
diagrammatic form. Correlations between scores on Part One and scores on Part Two have 
been reported to range between 0.60 to 0.81 (Heim, 1967) and in this study the correlation 
was 0.56 (p<. 001, two-tailed). Each section is timed and must be completed in 10 minutes. 
Argument Evaluation Test (Stanovich & West., 1997) 
The AET is a two-part measure including 23 items (see Appendix A 1.3 for the full AET). 
For this study the items were modified for a British population and further items were 
added so the measure consisted of 25 items. The first part contains 25 propositions relating 
to real social and political issues of which people hold varying and possibly strong beliefs. 
Participants indicate their degree of agreement in each statement e. g. 'It is more dangerous 
to travel by air than by car' in order to ascertain participants' prior beliefs on each issue. 
The second part consists of a set of instructions which introduce the participants to a 
fictitious individual called 'James' whose arguments they have to evaluate. There are 25 
items which correspond to the propositions in the first part of the AET. Each argument 
starts with James stating a belief about an issue followed by a justification for his belief A 
critic then presents an argument to counter this justification which the participants are 
informed to assume is correct. Finally James makes another rebuttal to the critic's 
argument which the participants are also informed to assume is correct. The participants 
are asked to evaluate the strength of James's rebuttal to the critic's argument. They are 
reminded to focus on the quality of James's rebuttal and to ignore whether or not they 
agreed or disagreed with Jarnes's original belief Participants are asked to rate on a scale of 
1-5 (very weak, weak, neither weak or strong, strong and very strong respectively) the 
strength of the rebuttal. 
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Participants' performance on the Argument Evaluation Test is calculated against an 
objective measure of argument quality. Stanovich and West (1997) used eight expert raters 
to evaluate the twenty-three items on their test and their median score for each item was 
used as the objective score to be compared against. They achieved a median correlation 
between the judgements of 0.74. In other words, the scores reflected the strength of the 
argument rebuttal without prior beliefs affecting any judgement. But as this measure had 
been anglicised, one of the original items had been removed and three new items had been 
added, anew objective index was required. 
Four full-time members of staff at the University of Plymouth, all highly qualified in the 
field of human reasoning and decision making, one philosopher and the principal 
researcher rated the arguments. The median correlation between the six experts was 0.65 
(see Appendix AIA for ftill correlation table). The medians of the scores for each item 
were compared to the medians used by Stanovich and West on the twenty-two items that 
remained and were found to correlate at 0.78. Therefore the revised median scores served 
as the objective index of argument quality (argument quality variable) and were then used 
for the regression analyses that follow. 
The median scores for the participants on the twenty-five items ranged from I to 5. Six 
rebuttals received a median score of I, four a median score of 1.5, four a score of 2, four a 
score of 4, three a score of 4.5 and four received a median rebuttal score of 5. A correlation 
between the sample's mean prior belief scores and the objective argument quality index 
was not significant at . 37 (p<. 05, one-tailed). The absence of a correlation shows 
that the 
items have been constructed so that objectively strong and weak arguments are equally 
associated with the prior beliefs that participants are thought to endorse. The correlation 
between the sample's mean prior belief scores and mean rebuttal scores for each item was 
significant at . 68 (p<0.001), which 
illustrates that people are influenced by their beliefs 
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when judging the rebuttal quality. The correlation between mean rebuttal scores and 
objective argument quality was significant at . 80, which indicates that the participants were 
also greatly influenced by objectivity. 
Separate regression analyses were run on each participant's responses to observe individual 
differences in participants' relative reliance on objective argument quality and prior belief 
In other words, a separate multiple regression equation was constructed for each 
participant. The participant's evaluations of argument/rebuttal quality served as the 
criterion variable in each of the 50 separate regression analyses. The 25 evaluation scores 
were regressed simultaneously on both the 25 argument quality scores and the 25 prior 
belief scores. The regressions resulted in two beta weights for each participant, one for 
objective argument quality and one for prior belief The fon-ner beta weight is the primary 
indicator of the ability to evaluate arguments independent of one's beliefs. 
The beta weights for objective argument quality and prior beliefs correlated negatively at - 
30 (p<. 05) which would indicate two separate predictors of argument quality. The mean 
beta weight for prior beliefs as a predictor was . 273 (SD=. 209) with a minimum 
beta 
weight of -. 29 and a maximum of . 645. Sixteen out of the 
fifty beta weights achieved 
significance (Stanovich and West reported a mean of . 151, st. 
dev. . 218). The mean was 
significantly different from zero (p<. 05, one-tailed). Only five out of the fifty participants 
had beta weights less than zero. 
The mean beta weight for objective argument quality as a predictor was . 370 (SD=. 229) 
with a minimum beta weight of -. 12 and a maximum of . 764. Twenty-six of the 
beta 
weights achieved significance (Stanovich and West reported a mean of . 330, st. 
dev. . 222, 
349 participants). Again the mean was significantly different from zero (p<. Ol, one-tailed). 
Only three out of fifty participants had beta weights less than zero. 
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On inspection of the data there are individual differences in the reliance of prior belief's and 
objective argument quality when evaluating arguments. The next stage of the analysis was 
to split the participants in half using the beta weight scores for objective argument quallo. 
as this is viewed as the pnmary measure of the participant's ability to reason independently 
of their own beliefs. A median split of the sample resulted in 25 participants with a mean 
beta weight score of . 561 for objective argument quality (ten-ned HIARG because of their 
high reliance on objective argument quality) and 25 participants with a low mean beta 
weight score of . 178 for objective argument quality (termed LOARG because of their low 
reliance on objective argument quality). The difference in beta weights was highly 
significant, t(24)=-10.62, p<0.001. 
The mean beta weight for prior belief in the HIARG group was . 213 which was 
significantly lower than the mean beta weight for the LOARG group at . 334, t(24)=2.25, 
p<. 05. This indicates that the median split reliably partitioned the sample into a group of 
participants who relied more on objective argument quality for argument evaluation 
decisions (HIARG) and a group who relied more on their prior beliefs (LOARG). 
Statistical Reasoning 
The problems used to assess participants' understanding of law of large numbers werc 
adapted from Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997; see also Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; 
Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986). In part one of this study, participants were asked to 
indicate their occupational goal. In part two, participants were presented with nine 
problems designed to elicit law of large numbers reasoning. These consisted of three 
different problem types: goal -threatening problems involved arguments which , ý'ere 
threatening to a participant's occupational goal, goal-enhancing problems involvcd 
arguments , 6ich wcre complimentary, and goal-neutral problems involved arguments 
87 
related to a different occupational goal. See Appendix Al. 5 for the instructions and the 
nine LLN problems. 
Within each problem type there were three structures of problem. The first type of problem 
involved a hypothetical argument in which an actor makes a generalisati I 'on from a single 
instance or from a very small sample of observations. The second type involved arguments 
based on both large and small samples. One actor draws a conclusion based on a small 
sample and personal experience and the second actor draws a contradictory conclusion 
from a larger sample of evidence. The third type of problem involved a hypothetical actor 
drawing a hasty conclusion from a small sample. Table 3.1 presents an example of each 
structure of problem involving arguments which are either neutral, enhancing or 
threatening to a person's occupational goal. 
Two forms of the problem were constructed where evidence that was goal -threatening in 
one form became goal-enhancing in the other, and vice versa for the second form. 
Participants were presented with the same problems except for the occupation involved and 
the problem form. The nine problems were presented in a random order for each 
participant, the only constraint being that no two problems of the same type were presented 
consecutively. 
Participants indicated on a 9-point scale how strong they thought the conclusion was based 
on the evidence used (I =extremely weak, 9=extremely strong). They were also asked to 
indicate on a 9-point scale how convinced they were by the argument (I=extremely 
unconvinced, 9=extremely convinced). Total scores on each rating scale were calculated 
separately for goal-enhancing, goal -threatening and neutral problems. Scores on each 
rating scale could range from 3 to 27, for each problem type. Klaczynski et al. referred to 
these as the 'evidence evaluation' and 'persuasiveness' ratings, respectively. 
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Structure 1: Goal-neutral 
Amy is thinking about being a chemist, and her friend Jill is trying to talk her Into It. Jill's argument Is- "Look, my father was a chemist, and after 20 years of being a chemist, he's still energetic, trying to do his best, and is very happy. It's a greatjob to do. You canjust take one look at my dad and you'll know that he's 
gotagreatjob. " 
Structure 2: Goal-enhancing 
Lisa and Roy are having an argument over whether exploration geologists are more likely to get divorced 
than other people. Roy claims the marriages of exploration geologists are much less satisfying than those of 
other people and frequently end in divorce, but Lisa believes that exploration geologists' marriages are ver-N happy. 
Roy: 
I've been working as a lawyer for over 15 years, and handle people's divorces all the time. During all that 
time, I've seen hundreds of couples in bad marriages that wind up in divorce and they've been from just about 
every occupation you can imagine, but most of those divorces by far have involved exploration geologists, 
more than any other occupation. I've seen enough to know that a marriage is pretty likely be unhappy, 
unsatisfying, and to split up when an exploration geologist's involved. 
Lisa: 
You're wrong and you know it! Two of my sisters are exploration geologists, remember? I talk to them 
every day and they're always talking about how happy they are in their marriages. In fact, I know several 
people who are exploration geologists and they have the most satisfying marriages I've know of I've seen it 
for myself, you haven't! If you've seen the exploration geologists I've seen, it's pretty easy to figure out that 
exploration geologists are a good bet to have life-long marriages. 
Structure 3: Goal-threatening 
John works for a London testing company. His company has been hired to measure the lQs or intelligence of 
Ministry of Defence employees. John himself has been asked to give an IQ test to 10 people who are MOD 
employees. Two people were secretaries, two were doctors, 2 were custodians, 2 were architects, and 2 were 
dentists. He uses the best IQ test available, one that is respected across the country. After he had tested each 
person once, he put his findings in a table: 
Person: jQ: 
Secretaries 98 and 101 
Custodians 90 and 97 
Doctors 115 and 117 
Architects 106 and III 
Dentists 102 and 108 
Because a person with average intelligence should have an IQ of around 100 and because IQs below are low, 
especially for most professions, John concludes that custodians are much less intelligent than the other 
groups of people he tested. 
Table 3.1 Examples of the three structures of argument involving either neutral, 
enhancing or threatening conclusions taken from Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth 
(1997) 
The participants were then requested to write explanations of why they believed the 
arguments were weak or strong in no more than two or three sentences. These explanations 
were scored using a 3-point system developed by Fong et al. A score of zero was given if 
the response contained no indication of statistical reasoning; there was no mention of 
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sample size, random variability, or the role of probability; for example, 'I believe Jill 
because she has seen it with her own eyes and hasn't just read it out of the newspapers'. A 
_score 
of I was given when the participant referred to the la", of large numbers, but 
vaguely, for example, 'It's good at concluding what Jill thinks about her dad, but is not 
weak or strong about chemists in general because there are no other chemists being 
described'. In this case the participant implied that he or she was using statistical 
reasoning, but was not explicit about the statistical basis of his or her reasoning. If a 
participant scored 2 for a response, it meant the LLN principle was clearly applied in the 
explanation. For example, 'Jill's argument is pretty bad because she used just one person. 
If you make that kind of generalization, it ought to be based on hundreds or maybe 
thousands of people'. 
For each problem type, scores were collapsed and added together to produce three total 
reasoning scores that range from 0-6. A random sample of 30 out of the 50 participants' 
responses were scored by two independent judges and the researcher, and based on the 
responses of 30 participants (270 problems) total agreement was achieved for 84%. The 
principal researcher scored the remaining 20 participants' items. Items were collapsed 
across problem type (neutral, enhancing and threatening to a participant's occupational 
goal). 
Bias scores -A bias score was computed for reasoning on the LLN problems by 
subtracting scores on the goal-enhancing problems from scores on the goal -threatening 
problems. Positive differences would indicate goal-biased reasoning. Biases in rating 
scores were then calculated by subtracting ratings on goal-threatening problems from those 
on the goal-enhancing problems. Again the larger the difference, the greater the bias. 
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Experiment Evaluation Task 
Nine problems were constructed based on those used by Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth 
(1997). As for the LLN problems, there were three types of problem, one of each was goal- 
enhancing, one goal-neutral and one goal -threatening. Two forms of each problem were 
created so a problem that was goal-enhancing in one form was goal-threatening in the 
other. 
The scenario for each problem consisted of a brief description of the hypothetical 
individuals who participated, their occupations (including the participant's occupation), the 
methods used to conduct the research, and the findings and conclusions drawn from the 
research. Within each problem there were three structures which differed in the threat to 
internal validity built into the scenario. See Appendix A1.6 for the instructions and nine 
problems. 
Structure one problems involved descriptions of psuedo-experimental research in which 
the primary independent variable was confounded with another variable. Structure two 
problems described research comparing the participant's occupation with other 
occupations on some variable of interest, however a selection confound was built into the 
research, such that the occupational groups were selected from very different populations. 
In Structure three problems, the construct validity of the dependent variable was suspect. 
Table 3.2 presents an example of each structure of experiment within each problem type. 
Participants were informed prior to the presentation of the experiment evaluation problems 
that they would be presented with several summaries of actual psychological and 
sociological research. They were told that the research involved participants from several 
dozen occupations, one of which was their intended occupation. It was ftirther explained 
that many of the findings that pertained to other occupations had been deleted from the 
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summaries and that only inforination relevant to the participant's occupation and a few 
other, randomly selected, occupations would be presented. 
Structure 1: Neutral 
Professor Y. wanted to find out whether individuals who worked in any one occupation were more or less 
socially skilled than individuals who worked in another. She randomly selected 40 dentists, 40 doctors and 40 teachers from all over the United Kingdom and invited them to a conference and dinner together. The 
teachers couldn't make it on the same day therefore their conference/dinner was held two weeks later. At the 
conferences and dinners, individuals were watched by trained researchers to observe their behaviours. For 
example, introducing themselves and introducing others. On collation of all the data, Professor Y. found that 
dentists showed the most social behaviours, closely followed by doctors, but with significantly less social behaviours were the teachers. In reporting her firidings, Professor Y. concluded that dentists are more socially 
skilled individuals than doctors or teachers. 
Structure 2: Enhancing 
Two well-known researchers have conducted several studies on the relationship between one's occupation 
and the tendency to conform to authority. The occupations of being a teacher and being an accountant were 
compared in one study. In this study, 50 teachers were contacted locally and agreed to be in the study. At the 
time of the study, accountants were hard to locate and contact. Thus, the researchers recruited 50 accountants 
from a conference on leadership that was taking place in a nearby city. Next, each person was brought to the 
researchers' laboratory. At the laboratory, both the accountants and the teachers were given several orders to 
complete menial tasks. For example, they were ordered to grade the papers of several dozen undergraduates. 
At the completion of the experiment, the researchers found that the teachers were far more likely to obey the 
commands than were the accountants. The accountants were much more likely to question the commands and 
to refuse. The researchers concluded that the experience of being an accountant results in a greater sense of 
independence and of inner strength than does being a teacher. 
Structure 3: Threatening 
A leading psychologist from a University Hospital conducted a study to look at overall satisfaction with life 
in individuals from different occupations. For the research she compared teachers, nurses, secretaries, 
accountants and waiters/waitresses. Sixty people were recruited from each occupation and for a fortnight they 
were each required to note down in a diary each positive thought that they had, day or night. At the end of the 
study period the results were collated and it was found that overall teachers had an average of 7.1 positive 
thoughts a day, nurses and waiters/waitresses had an average of 6.0 positive thoughts a day, secretaries had 
an average of 8.2 positive thoughts a day and accountants had an average of only 2.0 positive thoughts a day. 
From these results the psychologist noted that accountants had significantly less positive thoughts each day 
than teachers, nurses, secretaries or waiters/waitresses. She concluded that this indicated that accountants 
were overall much more dissatisfied with their lives than individuals from any of the other occupations. 
Table 3.2 Examples of each structure of problem involving either neutral, enhancing 
or threatening conclusions taken from Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) 
Following each problem, participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how strong 
the researcher's conclusion was (I=extremely weak, 9=extremely strong), and how valld 
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the experiment was (I =extremely invalid, 9=extremely valid). Total scores on each rating 
scale were calculated separately for goal-enhancIng, goal-threatenIng and neutral 
problems. Scores on each rating scale could range from 3 to 27, for each problem tNpe. 
These will be referred to the as the 'conclusion strength' and 'experiment validity' ratings, 
respectively. 
Following this participants were asked to write an explanation of why they thought the 
research was weak/strong and valid/invalid in no more than two or three sentences. As 
with the LLN problems, participants received the same problems apart from form and 
occupational goals. No two problems of the same type were presented consecutively. 
The scoring system for the experiment evaluation problems was the same as used by 
Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth and was again based on a3 point scale. A score of 0 was 
given if the participant gave no indication that any threat to the validity of the experiment 
existed. That is the participant believes that the experiment is validly conducted or rejects 
the experimental evidence by simply asserting that it is true or false. For example, 'This is 
good research. The researchers had a good hypothesis and the research shows that they 
were right'. A participant scored I if he or she indicated their awareness of the confound 
built into an experiment but did not indicate that the existence of this confound made it 
impossible to make a straightforward interpretation of the findings. For example, 'This 
might not be true because they attended the conference on different days'. Finally a score 
of 2 was awarded when a participant indicated that the experimental confound made it 
impossible to interpret the findings of and draw conclusions from the research. For 
example, 'the experiment is invalid as the different occupations do not attend the 
conference on the same day. It therefore does not test what it set out to test'. Responses for 
a subset of 30 participants (270 problems) were coded by two independent coders and the 
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principal researcher and the total agreement achieved was 87%. The principal researcher 
coded the items for the remaining 20 participants. 
Bias scores -A bias score was computed for reasoning on the experiment evaluation 
problems by subtracting scores on the goal-consistent problems from scores on the goal- 
inconsistent problems. Positive differences would indicate goal-biased reasoning. Biases in 
rating scores were then calculated by subtracting ratings on goal-threatening problems 
from those on the goal-enhancing problems. In accord with the LLN ratings, the larger the 
difference the greater the bias. 
Belief Bias SyRogisms 
Two forms of syllogism were used for this task: 
Form 1: No A are B, 
Some C are B, 
Therefore, 
Some C are not A. 
Form 2: Some A are B, 
No C are B, 
Therefore, 
Some A are not C. 
These two forms have been widely used in studies of belief bias (e. g. Evans, Barston & 
Pollard, 1983). Within each form, eight syllogisms with realistic content were employed, 
four with Empirical content and four with Definitional content. An example of each 
is 
shown in Table 3.3 (see Appendix A 1.7 for full set). 
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Empirical Definitional 
No police dogs are vicious, Some mice are timid. 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious, No tigers are timid, 
Therefore, Therefore, 
Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs. Some mice are not tigers. 
Table 3.3 Examples of syllogisms involving Empirical and Definitional content 
The syllogisms within each fon-n and content led to 4 Valid Believable, 4 Valid 
Unbelievable, 4 Invalid Believable and 4 Invalid Unbelievable conclusions therefore 
making sixteen items in all. 
Participants were given unlimited time to complete the syllogisms. The instructions NN, crc 
taken from Evans, Newstead, Allen, and Pollard (1994; Experiment 1) with the augmented 
instructions omitted. 
Two separate indices were computed for logical responding and belief-based responding. 
Logic was computed by subtracting perfon-nance on the invalid syllogisms from the valid 
syllogisms and Belief was computed by subtracting performance on unbelievable problems 
from the believable ones. 
Selection Tasks 
Four selection task problems were completed by participants, two involving arbitrary rules 
and two consisting of deontic content. The first one was the abstract version of the Wason 
selection task (Wason, 1966) using letters and numbers (A, K, 8 and 5), and the second an 
arbitrary version of the Destination problem ('If Glasgow is on one side of the ticket, then 
train is on the other side of the ticket'). The version of instructions 'test whether the rule is 
truc or falsc' was used as this doesn't appear to facilitate perfon-nance as other versions 
have been shown to (Stanovich & West, 1998a). See Appendix A 1.8 for all four \ crsions. 
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The two deontic versions were an anglicised version of the Sears problem in which Sears 
becomes Debenhams (any sale over E30 must be appro,,, ed by the manager. %Ir Jones') and 
an elaborate version of the Drinking-age problem with full scenano (Klaczvnski & 
Laipple, 1993). For these tasks, 'violation' instructions were used to optimise facilitation. 
All the reasoning problems were adapted from Stanovich and West (1998a) and all were 
accompanied by a graphic choice. The order of the four alternatives that represented the 
choices p, not-p, q and not-q was different for each problem. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in small groups of four to twelve. Testing took place in two 
sessions of one hour, approximately one week apart. This Nvas to negate any effects of 
fatigue. In addition the nature of the study required participants to indicate beliefs and 
attitudes which may cue responses to the everyday reasoning problems and Stanovich's 
Argument Evaluation Test. In the first testing session, participants first completed the 
AH4-Group test of intelligence. As this was the only timed component of the study, 
participants were then free to complete the remaining tasks in session one at their own pace 
but in the order presented (see Appendix 3A-3H for materials). First they were asked to 
complete the Rational Experiential Inventory followed by Stano-vich's Thinking 
Disposition Questionnaire and the first part of the Argument Evaluation Test. Their future 
occupational goal was ascertained by a series of questions which were embedded in the 
middle of the questionnaires. Participants were then required to continue with the selection 
tasks which were presented in the order of Wason, Destination, Sears and then Drinking 
Age. Finally, the sixteen syllogisms were presented in random order. Demographic 
infori-nation on age, gender and qualifications attained Nvere also obtained. 
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In the second testing session, participants completed the law of large numbers problems 
followed by the Argument Evaluation Test and then the experiment c%, aluatioii problcins. 
At the e_nd of this session participants were thanked and debriefed. 
3.3 Results 
There were three main aims of this study which will be investigated in the following order: 
firstly, Stanovich's proposal that normative responding on the reasoning tasks is related. 
Logical performance on each of the reasoning and decision making tasks will be compared. 
Secondly, we wanted to investigate the relationships between individual differences 
measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability with perfon-nance on the reasoning 
tasks. Finally we needed to validate the materials for the training studies which follow in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for perfon-nance on each of the reasoning tasks. 
In syllogistic reasoning, participants achieved higher scores on problems involving no 
conflict between logic and belief, that is valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable 
conclusions than problems involving conflict, that is valid-unbelievable and invalid- 
believable conclusions. Table 3.4 also displays the mean score for performance on the law 
of large numbers reasoning problems. A bias score was computed by taking the LLN score 
on problems which were goal-enhancing from the score on problems which were goal- 
threatening as illustrated. The mean score overall on the experiment evaluation problems is 
also shown. Again a bias score was computed by subtracting the scores on the goal- 
enhancing problems from the scores on the goal-threatening problems. Finally the mcan 
scores on Stanovich's Argument Evaluation Test are shown, more specifically, the mean 
indiccs for pnor beliet'and for objective argument quality (see Method section for details 
ot'how the indices were calculated). 
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The selection tasks were scored by allocating a score of one for a correct card selection 
and minus one for an incorrect card selection. In other words, for p and not-q responses a 
score of one was given for each, and for not-p and q responses a score of -1 was given. For 
example, if the answer p/not-q was given then the total score was 2 for that item. Tasks 
involving deontic content yielded higher indices than ones consisting of arbitrary content 
as expected. 
Tasks Indices Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Syllogistic reasoning Conflict 4.52 1.00 8.00 1.53 
No conflict 5.68 1.00 8.00 1.65 
LLN reasoning LLN 6.40 0.00 13.00 2.61 
LLN bias 0.20 4.00 3.00 1.54 
Experiment evaluation Exp. Evaluation 7.76 0.00 18.00 3.71 
reasoning EE bias 0.30 4.00 4.00 1.84 
Argument Evaluation Test Prior Belief 0.27 -0.29 0.64 0.21 
Objective argument 0.37 -0.12 0.76 0.23 
Selection Tasks Arbitrary 1.42 -2.00 4.00 1.71 
Deontic 2.90 0.00 4.00 1.43 
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for performance on the reasoning tasks 
3.3.1 Normative responding on the tasks 
Stanovich has shown that perfonnance on a variety of critical thinking tasks is linked. 
According to Stanovich and West (I 998b) individuals who give the nonnative response on 
one task tend to give the normative response on another. Note that for the following 
analyses only correlations are reported as the power of the study was too weak, due to the 
low number of participants, for more sophisticated investigation such as Factor Analysis. 
The first correlational analysis examined is illustrated in Table 3.5 which presents the 
correlations between performance on all of the tasks. Performance on the arbitrary versions 
of the selection task correlated with performance on the deontic versions and evidence 
evaluation reasoning (. 44, p<. 01 and . 33, p<. 05 two-tailed respectively). 
Performance on 
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the syllogistic reasoning problems involving conflict betiveen logic and beliet'was related 
to law of large numbers reasoning (. 36, p<. 05 two-tailed), experiment evaluation reasoning 
(. 37, p<. 05 two-tailed) and the objective argument quality index on the argunlent 
evaluation task (. 30, p<. 05 two-tailed). Scores on the objective argument quality index 
were also associated with expenment evaluation reasoning (44. p<. 01 vxo-tailed) and 
perfon-nance on the deontic problems (. 27, p<. l two-tailed). In other words, participants 
who were more objective on Stanovich's argument evaluation test were better at 
performing on syllogistic reasoning problems where logic and belief were in conflict, %N-crc 
better at finding the design flaws in hypothetical experiments, and were better at deontic 
reasoning tasks. There was an association between perforinance on the deontic selection 
tasks and the non conflict problems in syllogistic reasoning (. 31, p<. 05 two-tailed) which 
implies that the correct responses on both these tasks may be cued pragmatically as wc1l as 
analytically. Surprisingly, logical performance on the deontic tasks is strongly linked to 
normative responding on the other tasks. Whist the correlations are positive the 
correlations are weaker for the arbitrary selection task. 
Selection tasks 
Syllogistic Everyday 
reasoning reasoning AET 
Arbitrary Deontic Conflict No conflict LLN EE Objectivity_ 
Arbitrary 
Deontic 0.44*** 
Conflict 0.21 0.33** 
No conflict 0.23 0.3 1 ** 0.23 
LLN 0.11 0.38*** 0.36** 0.15 
Experiment Evaluation 0.33** 0.31 ** 0.37** 0.05 0.15 
Objectivity 0.17 0.27* 0.30** -0.08 0.23 0.44*** 
*p- 
. 1, 
**p<. 05, ***p<. Ol two-tailed 
Table 3.5 Correlations between performance on each of the reasoning tasks (N=50) 
It was expectcd that belief based responses on the tasks, i. e. the evidence evaluation task. 
LLN task. belief indices in syllogistic reasoning. hcunstic responding on the arbitrarv 
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selection tasks and Stanovich's measure of prior belief on the argument evaluation task. 
would have been related with each other but no correlations attained significance (see 
Table 3.6 for correlations). 
Belief Lin bias EE Bias Prior belief Arbitrary 
(p q) 
Belief 
LLN bias 0.10 
Experiment evaluation bias -0.25 -0.12 
Prior belief indices 0.20 0.09 -0.13 
Arbitrary (p/q) -0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 
Table 3.6 Correlations between biased responses on the tasks (N=50) 
Table 3.7 presents the pattern of correlations between perfon-nance on problems involvitig 
conflict between logic and belief, and problems involving no conflict. Performance on law 
of large numbers reasoning and experiment evaluation tasks consisting of conclusions 
which are inconsistent with beliefs was related to tasks consisting of conclusions which are 
consistent with beliefs (. 28, p<. 05 and . 39, p<. 01 two-tailed for LLN and experiment 
evaluation respectively). 
Syllogistic Law of Large Numbers Experiment Evaluation 
Conflict No conflict Threatening Enhancing Threatening Enhancing 
Syllogistic Conflict 
No conflict 0.23 
LLN Threatening 0.20 0.15 
Enhancing 0.30** 0.07 0.28** 
F. FI rhreatening 0.45**** 0.14 0.10 0.17 
Enhancing 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.39*** 
*p<. 1, * *p<. 05, ** *p<. O 1, *** *p<. 00 I (two-tailed) 
Table 3.7 Correlations between problems involving conflict and no conflict 
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There is a strong association between performance on goal -threatenin g experiment 
evaluation problems and conflict problems in syllogistic reasoning (. 45. p,. 001, two- 
tailed). The relationship between conflict and no conflict problems in syllogistic reasonin, L! 
just failed to reach significance. 
3.3.2 Individual differences and normative responding 
Another purpose of this study was to observe the relationships between thinking 
dispositions, cognitive ability and perfon-nance on the above reasoning tasks. Before 
investigating these relationships, there will be a brief overview of the psychometnc 
findings in relation to the two thinking styles measures, the Rational-Expenential 
Inventory and Stanovich's Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire. 
3.3.2.1 Ration al-Experiential Inventory 
The Cronbach alpha coefficient calculated for the REI was very high at . 86. As may be 
seen in parentheses in Table 3.8 the internal reliabilities of the subscales of the REI are 
comparable with previous studies. See Pacim and Epstein (1999) who reported reliability 
coefficients of . 90 and . 87 for the Rationality and Experientiality scales respectively, and 
also high reliability coefficients for the four subscales, RA, RE, EA and EE (. 77 to . 81). 
Similar results were also reported by Handley, Newstead and Wright (2000). There was no 
correlation between the Rationality and Experientiality scales, which supports Epstein's 
(1994) claim that the two scales are independent of each other and indicative of Vvo 
independent information processing styles. 
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Rational 
Total 
Rational 
Ability 
Rational 
Engagement 
Experiential 
Total 
Experiential 
Ability 
Experient I al 
I ni!, iý! cment Rational (. 87) 
. 
87*** 
. 
86*** 
. 
02 
. 
13 -. 07 Total 
Rational (. 84) 
. 50*** -. 09 . 0- -. 20 Ability 
Rational (. 80) 
. 13 1 . 
09 
Engagement 
Experiential (. 89) 
. 
91*** 
Total 
Experiential 
. 
'3*** 
Ability 
Experiential 
Engagement 
*p<. 05 **p<. Ol ***p-. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 3.8 Intercorrelations and Reliabilities of the REI Scales. (N = 50) 
3.3.2.2 Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire 
The Cronbach alpha coefficient for the scale was only moderate at . 53. Overall the REI has 
a higher internal consistency and appears a more reliable measure than the TDQ as found 
by Newstead et al. (2004). Table 3.9 displays the mean scores on each of the subscales. 
Also included is Stanovich and West's (1998) Thinking Dispositions Composite score 
which was calculated by subtracting the scores on three of the subscales (dogmatism, 
absolutism and paranon-nal belief) from the scores on the other subscales (counterfactual 
thinking and actively open-minded thinking). 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. De%. 
Actively open-minded thinking 41.90 33 49 4.14 
Paranormal beliefs 11.00 6 24 5.18 
Counterfactual thinking 7.02 2 10 2.21 
Dogmatism 7.24 3 11 1.78 
Absolutism 23.52 14 35 4.79 
Thinking Disposition Composite 7.16 -18 27 11.90 
Table 3.9 Means and standard deviations for subscales of the Thinking Disposition 
Questionnaire 
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3.3.2.3 Individual Differences and performance on the tasks 
Of particular interest at this point are the associations between performance on all the tasks 
and cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Table 3.10 presents the correlations 
between the two measures of thinking styles, cognitive ability and performance on the 
reasoning tasks. 
Scores AH4 total rationality expenentiality tdc 
Selection tasks Arbitrary 0.27* 0.22 0.14 0.26* 
Deontic 0.25* 0.16 0.21 0.19 
Syllogisms Conflict 0.18 0.33** -0.18 0.25* 
No conflict 0.20 0.18 -0.17 0.40*** 
Law of Large LLN -0.02 0.20 0.02 0.13 
Numbers Lln bias 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.03 
Evidence evaluation bias -0.15 -0.14 0.21 -0.42*** 
Persuasiveness bias -0.16 -0.11 0.03 -0.36** 
Experiment Experiment Evaluation 0.38*** 0.02 -0.13 0.13 
Evaluation EE bias 0.19 0.38*** -0.03 0.26* 
Conclusion strength bias 0.13 0.34** -0.03 0.17 
Experiment Validity bias 0.18 0.42*** -0.00 0.24* 
Argument Prior Belief -0.06 0.02 0.19 -0.15 
Evaluation Test Objective Argument Score 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.26* 
*p<. 1, **p<. 05, ***p<. Ol two-tailed 
Table 3.10 Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions and performance on the reasoning 
tasks and bias (N=50) 
Performance on both arbitrary and deontic versions of the selection task were marginally 
associated with cognitive ability (. 27 arbitrary; . 25 
deontic, both p<. l two-tailed). 
Perforinance on the arbitrary tasks was also related to the Thinking Disposition Composite 
score (. 26, p<. l two-tailed) as predicted by Stanovich. On the syllogistic reasoning tasks, 
performance on the conflict problems (valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable) was related 
to rationality as measured by the REI (. 33, p<. 05 two-tailed) and the TDC (. 25, p<. I two- 
tailed). In other words, participants who reported themselves to be more able and enjoy 
engaging in such tasks and were more open-minded, were better at correctly endorsing the 
problems where logic and belief are in conflict. Perforinance on problems which involved 
no conflict (valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable) was related to Stanovich's Thinking 
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Disposition Composite score (. 40, p<. 01 two-tailed). The correct endorsement of problems 
in which logic and belief are not in conflict was related to actively open-minded and 
flexible thinking styles. This finding is incongruent with Newstead et al. 's findings where 
they consistently found that the rationality scale correlated with nonconflict problems and 
only ability was associated with conflict items. 
There were no associations found between law of large numbers reasoning and cognitive 
n, k ability or thinking dispositions. Bias on the experiment evaluation rating scale was 
negatively associated with Stanovich's Thinking Disposition Composite score (-. 42, p<. Ol 
two-tailed). In other words, the more objective and flexible in the thinking style the less 
biased a person was when rating argument strength. A negative association between 
persuasiveness ratings and the Thinking Dispositions Composite score (-. 36, p<. 05 two- 
tailed) was also found. In other words, the more objective and flexible in your thinking 
style the less likely you are to find the arguments convincing. Klaczynski also found that 
thinking style predicted bias in ratings. Again no associations were found between bias and 
nil, 
. "ility. 
Performance on the experiment evaluation problems was found to be related to cognitive 
ability (. 38, p<. 01 two-tailed), and the computed bias score was related to rationality (. 38, 
p<. O I two-tailed). Therefore the higher ability participants identified more problems in the 
hypothetical research, but participants who reported themselves to be of a more rational 
thinking style were actually more biased which is in direct contrast to what was predicted. 
The correlations presented in Table 3.10 also illustrate associations between the rationality 
scale and bias in ratings on both the conclusion strength and experiment validity scales 
(. 34, P<. 05 and . 42, p<. 01 two-tailed, respectively). These relationships with 
bias are also 
in the opposite direction to what was expected. 
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There was only one relationship found between the objective argument quality indices 
resulting from perfon-nance on Stanovich and West's Argument Evaluation Test, and the 
TDC. Participants who reported themselves to be more open-minded flexible thinkers 
relied more on objectivity when responding on the AET. 
3.3.3 Materials validation 
The second aim of this study was to develop the materials for the following training 
studies. We needed to replicate findings in the literature in relation to logical and non- 
logical response patterns in statistical, evidence evaluation, syllogistic and selection task 
reasoning. 
3.3.3.1 Statistical Reasoning 
The three-point system developed by Fong et al. (1986; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; 
Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997) was used to code LLN 
reasoning (see Method section for coding and reliability). Items were collapsed across 
problem type (goal-enhancing, goal-threatening and goal-neutral) and means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3.11. Reasoning items that included arguments 
threatening to a participant's goals evoked the most LLN reasoning as expected followed 
by items that involved goal-enhancing arguments. The use of LLN reasoning was lowest 
on the neutral items. A repeated measures Anova with problem type as the independent 
variable reached significance (F(2,98) =3.03, MSE = 3.73, p=0.05). An LSD post-hoc 
comparison showed that the only significant difference was between LLN reasoning on the 
neutral items compared to LLN reasoning on the threatening items (p<. 05). There was no 
difference between goal -threatening and goal-enhancing problems. In other words, more 
sophisticated reasoning strategies are utilised on items that contain conclusions that are 
incongruent with one's beliefs as reported by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997), but 
only compared to neutral content. 
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Mean Minimum Maximum Std-de% 
Neutral 1.84 0 1 20 
Goal -threatening 2.38 0 . 6 1.38 
Goal-enhancing 2.18 0 5 1.1 - 
Table 3.11. Means and Standard Deviations for LLN reasoning on the three problem 
types (N=50) 
3.3.3.2 Experiment evaluation reasoning 
The 3-point scoring system developed by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) was used 
to score the Experiment Evaluation problems. Items were then collapsed across problem 
type (Goal-neutral, enhancing and threatening). Table 3.12 presents the nicans and 
standard deviations under each problem type. Mean scores are higher on problems 
involving goal -threatening conclusions as expected. That is participants appear to use more 
sophisticated reasoning strategies on these problems as in LLN reasoning problems. 
However, a repeated measures Anova with problem type as the independent variable failed 
to reach significance (F(2,98) = 2.24, MSE = 3.40, p-. 05). 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Neutral 2.34 0.00 6.00 1.48 
Goal-threatening 2.86 0.00 6.00 1.84 
Goal-enhancing 2.56 0.00 6.00 1.41 
Table 3.12 Means and standard deviations for experiment evaluation reasoning 
across the 3 problem types (N=50). 
It appears that we were not entirely successful at influencing the sophistication of 
reasoning strategies by manipulating occupational goals. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this that are considered in the general discussion. 
3.3.3.3 Syllogistic reasoning 
Table 3.13 illustrates the mean number of conclusions accepted (as a percentage) as a 
function of logic and beliet'. More items NN, crc endorsed for the valid items than invalid 
items; more bellcvable items wci-c endorsed than unbelievable items. 
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Believable Unbelievable 
Valid 80 ýN4 
Invalid 71 38 
Table 3.13 Percentage of Syllogistic conclusions endorsed as a function of belief and 
logic. 
An 2x2 Anova (logic x belief) was perfonned which yielded a main effcct of logic (F(l, 
49)= 39.01, MSE = 60.50, p<0.001). That is participants endorsed more valid than invalid 
conclusions. The Anova also yielded a main effect of belief, that is they endorsed rnore 
believable than unbelievable conclusions (F(l, 49)= 17.29, MSE = 16.82, p<0.001). The 
interaction between the two vanables was also significant (F(I, 49) = 30.54, MSE = 25.92, 
p<. 001). In other words, when the conclusion is believablc, participants are morc likciv to 
endorse it whether it is valid or not. When the conclusion is unbelicvable, they will endorse 
it if it is valid but not when it is invalid. 
A correlation was perfon-ned on the two indices of logic and belief (see Method section for 
how these indices are constructed) and it failed to reach signIficance (. 08, p>. 05) which, in 
support of Klaczynski, implies that the two are independent of each other. 
3.3.3.4 Selection tasks 
The pattern of correct responses corresponds to previous studies but with a high percentage 
of participants obtaining the correct response at 24% for the Wason selection task, 38% for 
the Destination problem, 56% for the Debenhams problem and 80% correct for the 
Drinking age task. The difference between performance on the deontic problems and 
perfon-nance on the non deontic problems was significant (t(49) = -6.22, p<. 001) 
illustrating the large facilitation effects of deontic problems. 
Table 3.14 pi-csents the correlations between the selection tasks. The highest correlations 
are between the two abstract versions at . 
48 and the two deontic versions at . 
47 (both 
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p<. 001, two-tailed). Therefore the strongest correlations are between tasks in the same 
domain. 
Wason Destination Debenhams Drinking age 
Wason . 48*** . 29* . 18 Destination . 42** . 39** Debenhams . 47*** Drink 
*p<. 05 **p, ý. 01 ***p-. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 3.14 Correlations between selection tasks (N=50) 
3.4 Discussion 
The main aims of this study were to investigate Stanovich and West's (1998b) proposal 
that norinative responding on a variety of critical thinking tasks was linked, to explore the 
relationships between performance on the tasks and individual differences in cognItIVc 
ability and thinking dispositions, and to replicate perforinance patterns which have been 
argued in the literature to have been influenced by heuristic and analytic factors. The 
purpose of the study was also to develop the tasks and individual differences measures that 
will be used in the following training experiments. 
There was some evidence to suggest that performance on the tasks was related. Individuals 
who utilised more analytic reasoning strategies on the experiment evaluation problems, 
that is individuals who identified the design flaws, were more able to reason analytically 
on the arbitrary selection tasks and achieve the correct response, achieved a higher number 
of correct responses on syllogistic reasoning problems involving conflict between 
logic 
and belict', and relied more on objectivity when cvaluating arguments. Participants who 
relied more on objectivity also perfon-ned better on syllogisms involving conflict and were 
niore able to solve deontic reasoning problems. Law of large numbers reasoning was 
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associated with perfon-nance on conflict problems only. Further relationships bet, %veen the 
tasks were expected however the absence of a correlation is not conclusive. Due to the low 
number of participants in this study, this is more likely to be a function of low statistical 
power. It must be noted that in Stanovich's work the sample sizes are invariably in the 
hundreds. 
No associations between the biases elicited on the different tasks were found. In accord 
with Stanovich and West's proposals that departures from normative responses on the 
critical thinking tasks were due to systematic limitations in processing, it was predicted 
that biases elicited on the tasks would be associated with each other. However the 
prediction was not supported. In addition to low power there are a number of possible 
explanations for this. Under a dual process account of reasoning, biased responses are cued 
by System I processes. These processes are highly contextualised and domain-specific 
therefore it would not be expected that bias on different tasks was related. Each task would 
elicit bias from different domains. 
Next we investigated the relationships between perforinance on the tasks and individual 
differences in cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Stanovich proposed that 
cognitive ability and thinking dispositions predict decontextualised reasoning perfon-nance 
in critical thinking, whereas Klaczynski et al. argued that the two factors are independent. 
They reported that cognitive ability predicted sophistication of reasoning responses but 
decontextualised reasoning was predicted by the thinking styles measure of rationality. 
Two separate thinking styles measures were utilised: Stanovich and West's (1998b) 
Thinking Disposition Questionnaire and Epstein's (1994) Rational-Experiential Inventory 
both of which have been found to be reliable self-report measures here and in previous 
studies (Newstead et al., 2004; Handley et al., 2000). 
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The findings were by no means clear-cut and are difficult to interpret. Cognitive abilltv 
was associated with performance on the experiment evaluation problems and selection task 
performance. In other words, participants who identified more design fla. 'vs in the 
hypothetical expenments were higher in ability. The relationship between arbitrary task 
performance and ability was as predicted by Stanovich (1999). He proposed that it is the 
higher ability participants that are able to resist the heuristic (p "q) response on these tasks. 
The correlation with deontic tasks was almost of the same magnitude which could be due 
to the analytic responders on this task (Newstead et al., 2004). Both Newstead et al. (2004) 
and Klaczynski (2001) have found associations between ability and performance on 
deontic reasoning tasks. 
Participants who reported that they were more rational as measured by the REI xvcre better 
at perfonning on syllogistic reasoning tasks involving conflict between logic and belief 
However a surprising result was the correlations between biased responding on the 
experiment evaluation problems and rationality (and Stanovich's TDC). Participants who 
enjoy engaging in such logical reasoning tasks and report that they are open-minded 
flexible thinkers were more biased in their responses and in their ratings of the experiment 
strength and validity. A key problem with a self-report measure is that people may often 
opt for the more socially desirable response. Therefore people may like to think that they 
are more able and enjoy engaging in logical tasks, especially when they are in an 
experimental setting and know they are about to perform on reasoning problems. 
Stanovich and West's Thinking Disposition Composite score yielded several associations. 
Responses on the TDC were associated with performance on syllogistic problems 
involving conflict and no conflict bctween logic and belief In other words participants 
who reported that they were more open-minded, flexible thinkers were more able to reason 
successfully on problems where logic and belief cue the same response and where they 
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cued conflicting results. TDC responses were also associated with arbitrary selection task 
performance as would be predicted by Stanovich. These participants also relied more on 
objectivity when responding on Stanovich's AET. Responses on the TDC were also 
negatively related to bias on the rating scales for law of large numbers reasoning problems. 
More open-minded participants were less biased when evaluating the strength and the 
persuasiveness of the arguments, which is consistent with Klaczynsk"s (1997; Klaczynski, 
Gordon, and Fauth, 1997) findings. 
One of the main problems with these measures is that they are self-report questionnaires: 
they require participants to reflect on their own behaviours and feelings. The question is 
whether or not this is a valid way of measuring information processing styles as 
participants are being asked to think about how they think which is a metacognitive 
awareness that individuals may not have. However, Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth and 
Klaczynski (1997) have found associations between information processing styles and 
biases in reasoning. Additionally, Pacini and Epstein (1994) have shown relationships 
between the latest version of the REI and aspects of personality. Therefore several studies 
have already provided evidence for the validity of such a measure. 
One outstanding issue is that any associations that have been found with reasoning are on 
the Rational scale. There is no evidence yet to date of any significant relationships between 
the Experiential scale and any other measures of individual differences. It would also be 
expected that experientiality would be associated with heuristic responding on reasoning 
tasks. If it were a measure of the tendency to rely on System I processing then it would be 
expected that it would be associated with performance on deontic selection tasks or goal- 
consistent critical thinking tasks. The results here are supportive of Newstead et al. 's 
conjecture that the experiential scale is not a measure of System I thinking. It does appear 
that you cannot measure unconscious processes using a self-report questionnaire. 
Klaczynski's statistical reasoning and experiment evaluation reasoning performancc 
findings were partially replicated, but not very convincingly. Participants changed their 
strategies dependent on whether the conclusion presented was enhancing, threatening or 
neutral to an individual's occupational goal. More sophisticated reasoning strategies were 
utilised on problems involving goal-threatening conclusions than goal-enhancing or neutral 
conclusions but the effects were either very small or not significant. In Klaczynski's terms, 
individuals are cognitive misers who expend little effort processing non-threatening 
evidence and information. When the evidence is threatening to an individual's goal or 
belief, then dissonance is created and the individual has to expend greater processing effort 
to reduce it. Strategies such as the law of large numbers, which are usually difficult to 
access, are activated by the additional cognitive expenditure. When the evidence is not 
threatening, because it is consistent with the individual's goals or beliefs, it is easily 
assimilated to pre-existing belief systems and processed with relatively little effort. 
Therefore less sophisticated heuristic strategies are utilised (Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997). 
However, we failed to convincingly replicate these findings. One explanation is that the 
occupational goal manipulation was less effective for our population than for the American 
population in Klaczynski's studies. Most of the participants in this study were first year 
psychology undergraduates. The occupations that they indicated as their goal may not have 
been an ambition they felt that passionate about or may have just been a momentary desire. 
In which case they would not have been so driven to defend their beliefs about the goal in 
question and also may not have had much of a belief system about that occupation to 
defend in the first place. 
Cognitive ability was not found to be associated with law of large numbers reasoning 
performance; however it was associated with more sophisticated reasoning strategies on 
the experiment evaluation problems. In other words, individuals with higher ability are 
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more able to detect the flaws in the hypothetical research. Klaczynski (1997) found that 
cognitive competence was present in his participants but use of it was selective. Only when 
challenged by the situation did they produce algorithmic solutions to problems i. e. theor,. - 
threatening arguments. According to Klaczynski, the biases elicited by the different 
problems are not due to ability but due to thinking styles. There is some support for that 
here as the more open-minded, flexible thinkers, as measured by the TDC are less biased 
when rating the strength and persuasiveness of the statistical reasoning arguments. 
However, participants who report to be more rational and open-minded are also more 
biased in their responding on the experiment evaluation problems. 
Klaczynski has replicated his findings using different measures, music theones 
questionnaires (Klaczynski, 1997) and occupational goals (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 
1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997) therefore it is possible that the measure does not elicit 
the same strength of belief here as it does in the United States. To obtain stronger effects it 
may be necessary to design a different set of materials based on the ones used in this study 
which will elicit more strongly held implicit beliefs such as stereotypes. Another reason for 
failing to find larger significant differences between reasoning strategies on these measures 
is that participants in this study were asked to complete a variety of tasks over the two 
sessions which may have resulted in fatigue. Therefore participants were not performing at 
their optimum level when requested to write explanations for the eighteen problems in the 
two everyday reasoning tasks. 
This study provided support for the reliability and validity of Stanovich and West's (1997) 
Argument Evaluation Test. The task successfully identified two different _groups of 
participants: one group who relied more on objective argument quality for argument 
evaluation decisions and the other who relied more on their pnor beliefs. No associations 
\vcre found bct\N, eeii objective argument quality and ability as Stanovich and \Vcst 
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reported. However objectivity was related to resolution of conflict problems in sý Ilogistic 
reasoning, the identification of design flaws in hypothetical experiments, and performance 
on deontic selection task problems. These findings provide support for Stanovich and 
West's proposal that the AET is a measure of the ability to reason in situations in which 
prior beliefs may be interfering. Again a more power-ftil study might have resulted in 
stronger associations being found. 
The typical effects from the syllogistic reasoning literature were found. More valid 
conclusions were endorsed than invalid and more believable conclusions were endorsed 
than unbelievable, irrespective of their logical validity (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983, 
Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). No associations were found with cogniti%'c 
ability and only a couple with thinking styles. More specifically, participants who report 
themselves to be open-minded rational thinkers appear to be more able to correctly solvc 
problems where belief and validity are in conflict i. e. valid unbelievable and invalid 
believable items and where they are not in conflict i. e. valid believable and invalid 
unbelievable items. This is slightly in contrast with Newstead et al. (2004) who found 
ability was related to perfon-nance on conflict problems and thinking style was associated 
with performance on nonconflict problems. The relationship here with conflict problems 
was only small and as Newstead et al. proposed the rationality scale is really a measure of 
willingness to engage in thinking tasks. Therefore it is possible that the participants in this 
study were more motivated. However there was no relationship with cognitive ability to 
support Newstead et al. 
The pattern of results on perforinance on the selection tasks was consistent with previous 
findings in the literature. Regardless of the theory being proposed, pragmatic reasoning 
schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). a Bayesian model of optimal data selection (Oaksford 
&. Chatcr, 1994) or social contracts (Cosmides, 1989) performance on the selection tasks 
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was facilitated by deontic content compared to performance on the abstract versions. 
Consistent with Stanovich and West's (1998a; 1998b) findings, there was a small 
association between cognitive ability and correct responding on the abstract versions. 
The tasks used were the same as those used by Newstead et al. who found only moderate 
test-retest reliability correlations on accuracy for the abstract and deontic tasks (. 62 and . 34 
respectively, overall . 38) suggesting random variation in performance on the selection 
tasks. For the next study involving selection tasks additional problems of each type will be 
used in order to obtain more reliable data. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The first aim of this study was to study the relationships between performance on all the 
reasoning and decision making tasks. Stanovich (I 998b) claimed that non-native 
responding on a range of critical thinking tasks was related. The pattern of correlations 
illustrated in this study provides some evidence to support this even though the sample 
used was small for an individual differences study. 
A second purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between performance on 
the tasks and measures of individual differences in thinking styles and cognitive ability. 
Stanovich proposed that thinking dispositions and ability predict performance on critical 
reasoning tasks. In contrast, Klaczynski argued that ability predicts sophistication of 
reasoning responses and bias is predicted by thinking style. The correlations reported here 
are not strong enough to support either argument. There were very few associations with 
ability and the thinking styles measures Yielded a few relationships with both logical and 
biased perfonnance patterns on the tasks. 
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One of the main aims of this study was to develop the materials for use in the experiments 
reported in the following chapters. Most of the robust effects reported in the literature have 
been found, even with a relatively small number of participants. Klaczynski's findings in 
relation to belief-based responding on everyday reasoning and experiment evaluation 
problems were only partially replicated. These findings were not as strong as expected 
therefore it is necessary to attempt to replicate them using a different set of materials. The 
aim of the next series of experiments reported in this thesis is to investigate the effects of 
training and instruction on the different types of responses elicited by the belief-motivated 
reasoning tasks. A clearer distinction may be found between heuristic and analytic 
responding on these tasks if problems involving more strongly held beliefs such as social 
stereotypes are utilised. Therefore new materials based on the ones used in this study will 
be designed. 
Selection task perfon-nance was as expected. Problems consisting of arbitrary content 
yielded a much lower solution rate than problems consisting of deontic content. The 
relationships with ability were small however by employing a higher number of selection 
tasks of each type for the training experiments will provide a more reliable measure of 
pragmatic and analytic selection task responding. In line with the training study on belief- 
motivated reasoning, in Chapter 5 the aim is to investigate the impact of training on the 
different types of responding in selection task reasoning. It will only be possible to 
interpret findings under a dual process account if there are clear distinctions between 
responses under the two systems. 
In the next chapter a series of studies are reported which explore the effects of training in 
the concept of the law of large numbers on a variety of everyday reasoning tasks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Effects of Training in Statistical Principles on Reasoning and Bias 
4.1- Introduction to Experiment 2 
The purpose of the experiments reported in this chapter is to examine the effects of training 
in statistical principles on law of large numbers reasoning and bias. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, there has been a great deal of research conducted into the pra&qiiatic and 
analytic influences on reasoning performance. It is becoming more widely recognised that 
theoretical accounts of reasoning and decision making must explain the influences of both 
analytic and heuristic processes on people's responses. There have also been a variety ot 
training studies, as discussed in Chapter 2, designed to investigate transfer of knowledge 
and skills deemed necessary for optimum performance on reasoning and decision making 
tasks. Apart from the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning studies, most of these studies have 
concentrated on the improvement of analytic processes only and failed to observe the 
effects these training manipulations may have on belief-based processes. In the two 
experiments reported here, the aim is to investigate the extent to which training in an 
inferential rule system, the law of large numbers' impacts on reasoning performance. 
Further, to examine the extent to which it impacts on the belief-based and analytic 
processes which influence everyday reasoning competence. 
This research brings together two bodies of research: the statistical training studies 
conducted by Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986; Fong & Nisbett, 1991) and more recently 
Klaczynski's work explonng individual differences in statistical reasoning and bias across 
the lifespan (Maczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996, 
Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). The cxpcnmcnts 
have been designed to cxamine the effects of cxplicit, rule-based training and instruction 
oil belicf-based and analytic masoning processes utilised on everyday lnfCi-cntial problems. 
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A key ability that a person requires for effective critical thinking is the ability to evaluate 
evidence independently from their goals and beliefs (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997). 
Klaczynski and colleagues have conducted a number of studies investigating the 
relationships between critical reasoning, intellectual ability and information-proccssitig 
styles (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; 
Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1986). Klaczynski, Gordon, 
and Fauth identified three critical thinking competencies that people may utillse. These 
were law of large numbers reasoning, 'intuitive analyses of co%, anance' (the ability to 
cognitively control for third variable effects that may underlie observed relationships) and 
the ability to dissect hypothetical exper-iments for flaws. Klaczynski et al. found that 
participants utilised more sophisticated reasoning strategies in all three types of problems 
when information presented to them was contrary to their beliefs. When the information 
was consistent with their beliefs it was processed in a relatively cursory , ý'ay. 
It has been shown repeatedly that when presented with evidence that is contrary to a 
person's beliefs, more sophisticated reasoning strategies will be utillsed to discredit the 
evidence (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Klaczynski and Fauth (1997) gave participants 
nine everyday reasoning problems designed to elicit law of large numbers reasoning and 
nine experiment evaluation problems. Three involved evidence or arguments that were 
enhancing to the participant's occupational goal, three were threatening and three neutral. 
In support of previous research, problems that involved evidence which was threatening to 
their goals elicited more sophisticated reasoning strategies. In the case of LLN problems 
people utillsed LLN reasoning and for the experiment evaluation problems people searched 
for the confounds which would make the experiment invalid. Klaczynski et al. concluded 
that strategies are changed to suit the goal of the indi-vidual at an intnnsic level and the 
biases participants are displaying are self-serving. 
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Why do problems involving infori-nation or conclusions that are incongruent with one's 
beliefs elicit more sophisticated reasoning strategies than problems involving congruent or 
neutral information? There are several explanations that have been proposed to account for 
such findings over the years. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) introduced the 'availability 
heuristic' to account for biased responding on judgement and probability tasks. It was 
argued that the ease with which examples could be 'brought to mind' influenced 
responding. Some things are brought to mind easier than others resulting in reasoning bias. 
Tversky and Kahneman also presented data that illustrated that bias arises from selective 
encoding and retrieval of evidence which supports a prior belief, therefore leading to 
maintenance of false theories or self-serving reasoning biases (Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997). 
Related to this is the notion of 'confinnation bias', which is the tendency for people to seek 
inforination that is consistent with their beliefs or theories and to avoid the collection of 
potentially falsifying evidence. Evans (1989) viewed confinnation bias not as a 
motivational bias that maintained belief structures but as a result of cognitive failures and 
referred to it as a 'positivity bias'. Positivity bias was seen to reflect the operation of pre- 
conscious processes which direct attention to positive rather than negative infon-nation. 
According to Evans (1989) the major cause of bias in human reasoning and judgement are 
factors which induce people to process the problem information in a selective manner. If 
logically relevant information is excluded during problem representation or logically 
irrelevant information is included then bias will result. 
Support for this has also been found in the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning literature. 
The Selective Scrutiny account of belief bias claims that people focus on the conclusion 
and only engage in logical processing if this is unbelievable. Representational heuristics 
precede logical analysis and cause the analysis to be applied to certain aspects of the 
problem content, therefore resulting in a lack of logical analysis on problems involving 
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believable conclusions (Newstead, Pollard, E,,, ans, & Allen, 1992). Oakhill, Johnson-Laird. 
and Garnham (1989) propose a mental model theory of belief bias and claim that when the 
conclusion_ conflicts with belief, participants are motivated to search for counter-examples. 
This still doesn't answer why people use such strategies. Nisbctt and Ross (1980) suggest 
that people tend to persevere in their beliefs well beyond the point at which logical and 
evidential considerations can sustain them. They suggest that this belief perseverance 
seems to occur sometimes because people have an emotional commitment to the belief. a 
proposal supported by Klaczynski (1997) who reported on the self-serving nature of 
reasoning biases in adolescents. 
In ten-ns of describing the belief and analytic influences on these tasks, Klaczynski, 
Gordon, and Fauth (1997) propose a depth of processing explanation for the moment-to- 
moment shifts in reasoning behaviour. Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory is a dual- 
process theory which claims that reasoning involves using two parallel, independent 
systems; the rational and the experiential systems. It is suggested that reasoning is an 
interaction between the two and in the case of being presented with evidence that is 
contrary to belief, an individual's analytic system (rational system) is triggered which 
results in information being processed at a deeper level. This involves more cognitive 
expenditure but results in the activation of more sophisticated reasoning strategies such as 
the law of large numbers, therefore allowing the individual to refute the evidence that is 
inconsistent with their beliefs. When the evidence is consistent with the beliefs of the 
individual, then the information is processed at a shallow level by the experiential system. 
The evidence is assimilated to the already pre-existing beliefs and the conclusion accepted 
with little or no cognitive expenditure. In their view, sophistication of reasoning responses 
is related to ability. However, degree of bias is related to thinkiný; style. The aim ot'thesc 
experiments is to investigate whether individuals can be taught or instructed to utillse tile 
same strategies on all the problems, regardless of the direction of bel1cf-laden content. 
120 
As we have seen, Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) conducted a senes of expenments to 
investigate law of large numbers reasom n riments, participants were ing. In a se 'es of expe i 
either trained in the LLN rule system which consisted of a description of the concept of 
sampling and the law of large numbers; given examples training which consisted of three 
problems in a given domain i. e. probabilistic, objective or subjective. followed by an 
explanation of how to solve the problem in LLN terins; or Full training which consisted of 
Rules training followed by Examples training. Participants were then givcii e\-cr\, da,,, 
reasoning problems in the probabilistic, objective and subjective domains. Previously it 
had been found that problems involving probabilistic content ewked LLN reasoning the 
most (Krantz & Nisbett, 1983). 
Fong et al. found that both the rule training and examples training improved statistical 
reasoning and enhanced the quality of the reasoning for problems across all three domains. 
The rule training plus examples was found to have an additional effect. The studies did 
indeed provide evidence for the domain-independence of training. Participants who were 
given examples only training using problems from the objective domain were able to 
utilise the statistical principles across all three problem domains on testing. Further 
evidence was provided in their following experiment (Exp. 2) when they trained their 
participants in one of the three domains and found that the training significantly increased 
use of statistical reasoning regardless of the domain of training. From the results Fong et 
al. concluded that participants were able to map the LLN rules they had learnt onto a pre- 
existing set of abstract intuitive rules that they then used on problems in different domains 
to the one that they had been taught. 
It could be argued that the domains used in the original study were too broad and there 
wcre no domain-independence effects of training at all. Fong and Nisbett (1991) used the 
more tightly defined domains of sports and ability testing and found use of statistical 
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principles was still improved after a two-week delay, however domain specificity of 
training was observed. There was a loss of training effects over the delay in the untrained 
domain (either sports or ability testing) but these participants still applied the LLN 
heunstic more than participants from the untrained control group. 
One of the key questions that the present research would like to address is would training 
in an inferential rule system transfer to problems involving belief-laden content? Is there a 
way of getting people to utilise their analytic systems on the belief-consistent as well as 
belief-inconsistent evidence? According to dual process theories, belief-based influences 
on reasoning are not the result of conscious thinking but System I processes. These pre- 
conscious processes cue belief-based responses which impact on reasoning and decision 
making behaviours automatically. However it is System 2, the analytic system that is 
sensitive to instruction and explicit training. Instructing people on the rule may give them 
the analytic strategies they need to override the 'fundamental computational bias' 
(Stanovich, 1999) of System 1. According to the research performed on belief bias in 
syllogistic reasoning reviewed in Chapter 2, belief bias may be reduced but not eliminated 
by the manipulation of instructional procedures (Newstead et al., 1992; Evans, Newstead, 
Allen, & Pollard, 1994). This research did however illustrate that people do have some 
degree of conscious control over their logical reasoning processes. 
4.1.1 Rationale for Experiment 2 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to observe the effects of explicit training in statistical 
principles on reasoning and bias. This is the first time that this training has been tested on 
belief-laden materials. Belief bias was reduced by instructional manipulation in the 
deductive reasoning literature (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Newstead, 
Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). Evans et al. found that the bias was reduced by 
emPhasIsIng the structure of the syllogism, explaining the logIcal meaning of 'SOME' and 
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also emphasising the need to base responses only on the information given. In particular, 
they reported a reduction in the acceptance of invalid-bellevable arguments. 
Belief bias effects are noted by the much higher acceptance rates of believable rather than 
unbelievable conclusions. The belief bias effect is more marked on invalid problems. That 
is people will readily endorse it as valid due to its believabilitý'. This is in line xith 
participants' perfon-nance on the everyday reasoning problems. When they are given a 
problem that is consistent with their beliefs they process the infori-nation at a verv cursory 
level and accept the conclusion without searching for the flaws in the argument. 
The findings in relation to perforrnance after the instructional manipulation have been 
interpreted under a dual process account. This account attributes System 2 and I processes 
to the logical and belief-based processes respectively that are influencing the task (Evans, 
2003). Instruction was found to reduce bias on these tasks and with the assumption that 
System 2 processing inhibited the automatic System I processes. 
By bringing together the two major bodies of research, Fong et al. 's training studies and 
Klaczynski's individual differences research, it will be possible to investigate whether the 
same pattern of findings may be obtained on a different type of reasoning task. Participants 
will be presented with everyday reasoning problems as used by Fong et al. (1986), plus 
experiment evaluation and law of large numbers reasoning problems involving belief-laden 
content such as those used by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997). Participants in the 
training condition will be given training on the concept of the law of large numbers. 
It is predicted that in the absence of training, more law of large numbers reasoning will be 
utilised on problerns consisting of probabilistic content, followed bv those involving 
olýjecti, %-c content. Sulýjectlvc problems xvill elicit the least LLN reasoning. On problems 
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involving belief-laden content, participants who receive no training , Nill utilise more 
sophisticated reasoning strategies on problems consisting of evidence or conclusions which 
are inconsistent with a person's beliefs. Law of large numbers reasoning will be utilised 
more on statistical reasoning problems and more validity confounds will be identified in 
the experiment evaluation problems. 
The predictions in relation to the problems involving belief manipulations after training are 
not so clear. Taking the findings in the belief bias literature, bias may be reduced after 
training. Training will impact on System 2 and a function of this will be to override or 
inhibit the belief-based responses cued by System 1. However, according to Klaczynski, 
the effects of belief and the level of LLN reasoning are independent and associated with 
different systems. Training (if it has any effect at all using these materials) will impact on 
the amount of statistical reasoning utilised but it will have no impact on the bias. Hence 
System 2 instruction may impact only on the level of LLN reasoning, but not belief. 
Prior to Experiment 2, a small-scale pilot study was conducted to ascertain typical, 
untypical and neutral character traits or behaviours for different professions and 
occupations. In their studies, Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth ascertained participants' 
occupational goals and utilised them in the everyday reasoning problems to attain goal- 
biased reasoning. This resulted in a very lengthy and complicated process of finding out 
each participant's goal in one experimental session and then rewording each problem to 
suit each individual for the next. In Experiment I of this thesis, Klaczynski et al. 's 
methodology was repeated; however the manipulation failed to find strong effects on the 
goal -threaten i ng materials. 
For the following statistical training studies a new set of materials are required which 
strongly engage both belief-based and analytic reasoning strategies. In dual process tenns, 
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belief-consistent arguments are processed at a cursory level by System I and belief- 
inconsistent arguments are processed using more sophisticated strategies by Slystern 2. 
Using such materials would enable us to investigate the extent to which the training 
impacts on both types of reasoning processes. Also, new materials would possibly make 
the experimental procedure easier. In addition if Klaczynski et al. 's results were replicated 
using novel problems, it would demonstrate the generalisability of their findings. 
4.2 PILOT STUDY 
4.2.1 Method 
Design 
Participants were administered a questionnaire involving thirty-four different professions 
and occupations. The aim was to determine typical, untypical and neutral character traits 
for the different occupations that could be utilised in the everyday reasoning and 
experiment evaluation problems in Experiment 2. 
Participants 
18 participants from the University of Plymouth, undergraduates and postgraduates, took 
part in the pilot study. 
Materials 
The inventory consisted of 34 familiar occupations and professions. Following each 
occupation was a list of six traits or behaviours that may or may not be typical of people in 
that profession (see Example 4.1 below for an example of an item). Participants were 
required to indicate on a scale of I to 5 (1 being very untypical, 5 being very typical) how 
typical they rated each trait/behaviour for each particular occupation (See Appendix A2.1 
for full inventory). 
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Occupation Traits Untypical Typical 
Nurses are caring 1 2 3 4 5 
aggressive 1 2 3 4 15 
thoughtful 1 2 3 4 5 
intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 
lazy 1 2 3 4 5 
healthv 1 2 3 4 5 
Example 4.1 Example of an item taken from the occupation/traits inventory 
Procedure 
Participants completed the inventory within their own time limits. 
4.2.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics were obtained for the scores on each trait/beha,,, Iour related to each 
occupation. The mean scores were then sorted with the highest mean score first and the 
lowest mean score for a trait last (see Appendix A2.2). The six highest and six lowest 
character traits (most typical and least typical related to professions) could then be 
identified. Six neutral traits (neither typical nor untypical) were also identified. A repeated 
measures ANOVA (typical x untypical x neutral) was perfon-ned which illustrated that the 
mean ratings for each set of professions/traits were significantly different from each other 
(at F(2,34) = 327.526, MSE = 42.5067, p<. 001-, all p less than . 
001). These items were 
then used to design the Law of Large Numbers problems and the Experiment Evaluation 
problems in Expenment 2. See Appendix A2.3 for the descriptive statistics of the items 
identified. 
4.3 Method - Experiment 2 
Design 
The experiment was designed to partly replicate Fong, Krantz and Nisbett (1986,1991) 
and extend on the work of Klaczynski (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Klaczynski, 1997; 
Klac/, N, ilski & Fauth, 1997; Klaczviiski. Gordon & Fauth, 1997). A between subjects 
(lesign was used involving t%%,, o conditions, Control and Training. The Control grouP 
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received no training whereas the participants under the Training condition received Fong et 
al. 's full training. That is training on the concept of the law of large numbers f6flowed b-v 
examples of everyday reasoning problems. Each example was followed by a full 
explanation of the answer in tenns of LLN reasoning. 
Participants 
The participants were 60 undergraduates from the University of Plymouth, 51 female and 9 
male (mean age 22.1, stdev. 5.84) who were taking part for course accreditation. Groups of 
participants were randomly allocated to each condition, resulting in 30 taking part under 
each one (mean age Control group = 24.63, stdev. 7.36; Training group = 19.56, stdev. 
1.4). 
Materials 
Instructions: 
The instructions for both conditions were taken from Fong et al. (1986). The instructions 
for the Control group read: - 
We are interested in studying how people go about explaining and predicting events under 
conditions of very limited information about the events. It seems to us to be important to study hoNs 
people explain and predict under these conditions because they occur very frequentlý in the real world. 
Indeed, we often have to make important decisions based on such explanations and predictions, either 
because there is too little time to get additional information or because it is simply unavailable. 
On the pages that follow, there are a number of problems that we would like you to consider. 
As you will see, they represent a wide range of real-life situations. We would like you to think carefully 
about each problem, and then write down answers that are sensible to you. 
These were presented prior to the Test Materials booklet. Participants in the Training 
condition were presented with the first paragraph of the above prior to the training itself 
The second paragraph was presented prior to the test materials, and ended in the sentence, 
"In many of the problems, you may find that the Law of Large Numbers is helpful. " 
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Full Training 
The training started with the first paragraph of the instructions described above, folio%% ed 
by a paragraph introducing the law of large numbers: 
Experts who study human inference have found that principles of probability are helpful in 
explaining and predicting a great manN I events, especially under conditions of limited information. One 
such principle of probability that is particularly helpful is called the Law of Large Numbers. 
Following this participants read a two-page description of the concept of sampling and the 
law of large numbers using examples of red and white beads in a jar, 30% red and 70% 
white. The beads in the jar represented the population, the proportion of red and white 
beads the population distribution and a selection of beads from the jar a sample. After the 
concept of sampling was explained (see Appendix A2.4 for full text plus demonstration 
script and training examples), the law of large numbers was presented: 
As the size of a random sample increases, the sample distribution is more likely to get closer 
and closer to the population distribution. In other words, the larger the sample, the better it is as an 
estimate of the population. 
Participants were given time to finish reading the description and then the experimenter 
gave a demonstration of the law of large numbers, using a jar containing red and white 
beads with the same population distribution as that of the written description - 70% white, 
30% red. The experimenter stated the main concepts again (see Appendix A2.4 for full 
spoken script) and then proceeded to draw samples from the jar, four of size 1, four of size 
4 and four of size 25, to demonstrate that the average deviation of a sample from the 
population would decrease as the sample size increases as the law of large numbers 
predicts. The expenmenter and the participants summarised each sample on a table, 
keeping track of the dc\-Iation between each sample and the population. 
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Following the demonstration the participants 1-vere iven a set of three example problems 9 
with an answer following each one that provided an analysis of it in tenns of the law of 
large numbers. The examples were introduced by the following paragraph: 
One reason that the law of large numbers is important to learn is that it applies not only to 
jars and beads. The basic principles involved in the law of large numbers applý whenever you make a 
generalisation or an inference from observing a sample of objects, actions or behaviours. To give . ou 
an idea of how broad the law of large numbers is, we have, in this booklet, presented three situations in 
which the law of large numbers applies. Each situation is analysed in terms of the law of large 
numbers. 
The three example problems were taken from Fong et al. and consisted of a Structure I 
problem (generalising from a small sample), Structure 2 (regression - Structure 3 in Fong 
et al. ) and Structure 3 (large sample vs. theory without supporting data - Structure 5 in 
Fong et al. ), and were presented in that order. All three problems were objective in type. 
Fong et al. found that training on objective example problems improved performance on 
both probabilistic and subjective problems as much as it improved performance on the 
objective problems. 
Participants were asked to read each one and then consider it for a few minutes before 
turning the page to read the law of large numbers answer (See Appendix A2.4 for the three 
example problems and their law of large numbers answers). The format of the answers was 
constant across each structure and included the following characteristics (Fong et al., 
1986): 
1. A statement about the goal of the problem. 
2. Identification of the sample or samples and their distributions in the problem. 
3. Explanation of ho,, N, the law of large numbers could be applied to the problem. This 
identified the population distribution(s) and explained the relationship between the 
sample(s) and the population(s). 
4. 'rhe conclusion that could be drawn from the application of the law of large numbers. 
I'll) 
Test Materials: 
Twenty seven problems were used in total. nine La, ýv of Large Numbers and nine 
Experiment Evaluation problems adapted from Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997). and 
nine problems taken from Fong et al. (1986). 
Law of Large Numbers Problems: 
As in Experiment 1, hypothetical individuals presented arguments and evidence that were 
either consistent or inconsistent with participants' beliefs, but instead of personal 
occupational goals, occupations and typical or untypical personall its were used (see ty tra 
Pilot Study). Belief-consistent problems involved arguments for a positive correlation 
between an occupation and a typical personality trait (e. g. firemen are bravc), whereas 
belief-inconsistent problems involved arguments for a correlation between an occupation 
and an untypical personality trait (e. g. firemen are co, -vards). Within each problem 
structure, there were three problem types, consistent (typical), inconsistent (untypical) and 
neutral (neither typical nor untypical). See Example 4.2 for an example of an argument 
resulting in a conclusion which involves a correlation between an occupation and an 
untypical personality trait, a belief-inconsistent problem (all problems are presented in 
Appendix A2.5). 
An editorial in a local newspaper recently criticised the occupation of being an Aerobics instructor. 
The journalist's argument was: 
I've got a friend who's an aerobic instructor and I wouldn't want anyone I know to copy her lifestyle. 
She is so unhealthy. She drinks and smokes and actually never takes any real exercise herself, she just 
tells others how to do so! I know her flatmates and they say she never stops eating as well, not healthý 
food either, fry ups and chocolate are normal. Nly conclusion? I don't think there's a more unhealth-, 
group of people than Aerobics instructors' 
Example 4.2 An example of a la's-, - of large numbers reasoning problem involving a 
belief-inconsistent argument 
Fhe nine problems consisted of 3 structures as in Expeni-nent 1. Structure I problems 
involve hypothctical argunici-its in which an individual draws a conclusion from a single 
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instance or from a very small sample of observations. Structure 2 problems in-,., ol%, e 
presenting two hypothetical arguments. One individual's conclusion is based on a small 
sample and personal experience; a second individual draws a contradictory conclusion 
from a larger database. Structure 3 problems involve a hypothetical individual drawing a 
hasty conclusion from a small sample and from an outcome that was clearly deviant from 
what should have been expected. 
'Persuasiveness' and 'Evidence Evaluation' Scales: 
Following each problem, participants indicated on two 9-point scales how convinced they 
were by the argument (I =not at all convinced; 9=very convinced) and how strong they 
thought the conclusion was based on the evidence used (I =very weak; 9=very strong). 
These were then referred to as the 'persuasiveness' and 'evidence evaluation' ratings 
respectively. Total scores on each rating scale were calculated separately for befief- 
consistent, belief-inconsistent and belief-neutral problems. Scores could then range from 3 
to 27 for each problem type. Participants were then required to write explanations of why 
the conclusions were convincing/not convincing and strong/not strong. 
Coding of explanations: 
These explanations were coded using the 3-point system used in Experiment 1, developed 
by Fong et al. A score of '0' was given if the response contained no indication of statistical 
reasoning. There was no mention of sample size, random variability, or the role of 
probability. For example, 'My fiiend is an aerobics instructor and she's healthy'. A score 
of '1' indicated that the participant referred to the law of large numbers, but vaguely. For 
instance, 'but that's just one aerobic instructor'. The participant implied that he or she was 
using statistical reasoning, but was not explicit about the statistical basis of his or her 
reasoning. If a participant scored '2' for a response, it meant that the LLN principle was 
clearly applied in the explanation, for example, 'the conclusion is a bad one as not all 
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aerobics instructors are unhealthy, the journalist is only talkin-L, about one instructor. If he 
was to look at a larger sample of aerobics instructors, he may be able to report a more 
convincing argument'. For each problem type, scores were collapsed and added to-, -, ether to 
produce three total reasoning scores that range from 0-6. 
The principal researcher and a second coder who was blind to condition and problem types 
independently coded all items for the 60 partici I ipants. Total agreement was achieved on 
98% of the items. Agreement on the remaining 2% was achieved after discussion. 
Experiment Evaluation Problems: 
Participants were informed prior to the presentation of the experiment cvaluation problems 
that they would be presented with several summaries of actual psychological and 
sociological research. Nine scenarios were developed, each containing a brief descnption 
of the hypothetical individuals who participated, their occupations, the methods used to 
conduct the research, and the findings and conclusions drawn from the research. The 
conclusions were belief-consistent, belief-inconsistent or belief-neutral as in Experiment I 
but involving occupations and typical or untypical personality traits. See Example 4.3 for 
an example of an experiment evaluation problem consisting of a belief-inconsistent 
conclusion (see Appendix A2.6 for all the problems within each problem type). 
Dr. 11. is a researcher who is interested in finding out how capable people in different occupations are 
of holding pleasant conversations with strangers. Dr. 11. is especially interested in finding out how 
builders, teachers, solicitors and shop assistants are in dealing with strangers because people in these 
professions must deal with strangers on a daily basis. To observe their conversations, Dr. 11. watched a 
large number of builders having a conversation with Jim, one of Dr. 11's laboratory assistants. Next he 
watched the teachers, solicitors and shop assistants having a conversation N%ith Amy, another one of Iiis 
research assistants. Dr. 11. noted that teachers, solicitors and shop assistants overall made more 
inappropriate hand gestures, more body contact with the other person and more wandering eye 
movements than the builders. lie concluded as part of his journal article that builders were more 
politicallý correct than an) of the other participants from other occupations. 
Example 4.3 An example of an experiment evaluation reasoning problem involving a 
belief-inconsistent argument 
131 
The three problem structures described in Experiment I (Klaczynski et al., 1997) were 
utilised again. Structure I problems involved descrIptions of pseudo -expen mental research 
in which the primary independent variable was confounded with 
_another 
variable. 
Structure 2 problems described research comparing the occupations, however, a selection 
confound was built into the research such that the occupational groups were selected from 
very different populations. In Structure 3 problems, the construct validity of the dependent 
variable was suspect. Within each problem structure there were three problems, one belief- 
consistent (typical personality traits correlated with occupation), one belief-inconsistent 
(untypical personality traits correlated with occupation), and one belief-neutral problem 
(neither typical nor untypical personality traits correlated with occupation). 
'Conclusion strength'and 'Experiment validity' Scales: 
Following each problem, participants rated the strength of the researcher's conclusion on a 
9-point scale (I=extremely weak, 9=extremely strong), and the validity of the experiment 
(I=extremely invalid, 9=extremely valid). These were then known as the 'Conclusion 
strength' and 'Experiment validity' scales respectively. Then participants wrote 
explanations of why they believed the experiment to be weak/strong and invalid/valid. 
Scores on the two scales were collapsed across problem type and ranged between 3 and 27 
for each. 
Coding of explanations: 
The coding system for the experiment evaluation problems was used in Experiment I and 
was based on a3 point scale as used by Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997). A score of 
'0' was given if the participant gave no indication that any threat to the validity of the 
experiment existed. For example, 'A lot of builders are more politically correct these days. 
There are rules now and they don't want to lose their jobs'. In other words the participant 
believed that the experiment was validly conducted or rejects the experimental evidence by 
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simply asserting that it is true or false. A participant scored '1' if he or she indicated their 
awareness of the confound built into an experiment but did not indicate that the existence 
of this confound made it impossible to make a straightforward interpretation of the 
findings. For instance, 'the builders spoke to a different person which may have influenced 
the results a little'. Finally a score of '2' was awarded when a participant indicated that the 
experimental confound made it impossible to interpret the findings of and draw 
conclusions from the research, e. g. 'The builders spoke to a male whereas the other 
professions spoke to a female so the builders were bound to appear more politically 
correct. This does not mean they are. This experiment is invalid. Everyone needs to speak 
to the same person for the findings to be valid'. 
All items for the 60 participants were coded by the principal researcher and a second coder 
who was blind to condition and problem types independently. Total agreement was 
achieved on 95% of the items. Agreement on the remaining 5% was obtained after 
discussion. 
Fong et al. 's Everyday Reasoning Problems: 
The nine problems were taken directly from Fong et al. (1986, Experiment 1) and consisted 
of three types as discussed in the introduction, probabilistic, objective and subjective. For 
the probabilistic problems, participants were asked to draw conclusions about the 
characteristics of a population from sample data generated in a way that clearly 
incorporated random variation. Randomness was made explicit in some way. In objective 
problems, participants had to draw conclusions about characteristics of a population on the 
basis of 'objective' sample data but with no explicit cue about randomness of the data. For 
subjective problems participants drew conclusions from subjective characteristics of a 
population from 'subjective' sample data. 
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Within each problem type, three problem structures were used (Fong et al. used six). 
Structure One problems required participants to draw conclusions from a single small 
sample. Structure Two (Fong's structure three) problems required participants to explain 
why an outcome selected because of its extreme deviation was not maintained in a 
subsequent sample. Structure Three (Fong's structure five) pitted a large sample against a 
plausible theory that was not founded on data. Therefore, resulting in 9 problems with 
problem type crossed with problem structure (see Appendix A2.7 for all problems). 
All 27 test problems were presented in random order for each participant, with the 
constraint that no two problems with the same structure appeared successively. 
Coding of explanations: 
The 3-point coding system developed by Fong et al. was used (see LLN coding). The 
principal researcher and another coder who was blind to condition and problem types 
independently coded all items for the 60 participants. Total agreement was achieved on 
96% of the items. Agreement on the remaining 4% was obtained after discussion. 
Procedure 
Participants took part in the experiment in groups of 2 to 6. The Control group were 
presented with the instructions as above and then told to proceed through the test material 
booklet. 
Participants in the Training group were required to attend two sessions. In session one they 
received full training (as described above) and in session two, approximately one week 
later, they completed the test materials booklet. The training session took 40 minutes and 
the participants were allowed up to I hour 30 minutes to complete the test materials 
booklet. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Law of Large Numbers reasoning 
The first analysis to be presented will focus on the bellef-laden law of large numbers 
reasoning problems. As described in the method secti responses on the nine "on. subjects' 
LLN problems were coded using the 3-point system devised onginall-v by Fong et al. 
(1986). A code of '0' was given for responses that contained no mention of statistical 
concepts, whereas a '1' or '2' was given for responses that involved statistical notions, '1' 
for a poor statistical response, '2' for a good statistical response. Scores were then 
collapsed across the three problem types, Neutral (problems with conclusions that were 
neither typical nor untypical of a person's prior beliefs), Consistent (problerns with 
conclusions that were typical of a person's prior beliefs) and Inconsistent (problems with 
conclusions that were untypical of a person's prior beliefs). 
As may be seen in Table 4.1 the level of statistical responding was higher for the 
participants that received training on the LLN principle on all three types of problems. It is 
also evident that law of large numbers reasoning is higher on responses involving belief- 
inconsistent conclusions than on belief-neutral or belief-consistent problems. 
LLN St. dev. LLN St. dev. LLN St. dev 
Neutral Consistent Inconsistent 
control 1.27 0.91 1.53 1.07 2.33 1.15 
training 3.30 1.39 3.00 1.39 3.37 1.35 
Table 4.1 Mean scores for La-, N, of Large Numbers Reasoning on each type of problem 
under each condition (N =60: max. score = 6) 
A2 (Condition) x3 (Problem Tqie) mixed ANOVA was performed with training as a 
betN%, ccn-subjccts factor and problem týpe as a within-subject factor. Main effects of 
Condition (F(I, 58) ý 39.54, MSE =- 102.76, p<. 001) and Problem TNpe (F(2.116) = 6.94. 
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MSE = 6.62, p<. Ol) illustrate that participants utilise more sophisticated reasoning 
techniques on all problems after training and LLN is utilised on problems that in-volve 
conclusions which are inconsistent with pnor belief. An LSD follow-up test revealed 
reasoning scores on problems involving inconsistent information to be higher than scores 
on consistent or neutral problems (both p< . 01). The ANOVA also yielded a significant 
interaction between Condition and Problem Type (F(2,116) = 3.96, MSE = 3.77, p-. 05. see 
Figure 4.1 for graph of the interaction). 
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Figure 4.1 Interaction bet-ween Condition and Problem Type 
Neutral 
F-I consistent 
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As may be seen in Figure 4.1, LLN reasoning is utilised more for inconsistent problems 
than either consistent or neutral problems in the Control condition (F(l, 58) = 8.9, MSE = 
9.6, p<. Ol and F(1,58) = 17.72, MSE = 17.07, p<. 0001 respectively), whereas Nvith training 
use of LLN reasoning is improved greatly on all three problern types. There are no 
137 
-19 
differences in sophistication of responses between any of the problem tvpes (F(I. 5ý, ý') = 
1.63, MSE = 1.35, p>. I between neutral and consistent; F(l, 58) =1.89, MSE =2.02. p>. I 
between consistent and inconsistent; F(l, 58) =0.07, MSE = 0.07, p>. l In other words. 
when presented with problems or arguments that are inconsistent with one's prior beliet's. 
one will utilise a more sophisticated reasoning style to argue with, whereas if the 
infori-nation is consistent or neutral to one's beliefs then it is much less likely to be evoked. 
However, with training in statistical principles, statistical reasoning is more likely to be 
used whatever the problem type. 
4.4.1.1 'Evidence Evaluation' and 'Persuasiveness Scales' 
Following each problem, participants indicated on two 9-point scales how weak or strong 
they thought the conclusions were, based on the evidence used (I =extremely weak, 9= 
extremely strong) and how convinced they were by the argument (I=Extremely 
unconvinced, 9=Extremely convinced). Total scores were collapsed across problem type, 
Neutral, Consistent and Inconsistent, which resulted in two rating scales, the 'evidence 
evaluation' and 'persuasiveness' scales respectively. Scores on each rating scale ranged 
from 3 to 27 for each problem type. Table 4.2 displays the means and standard deviations 
for each scale for each problem type for all participants. For the 'evidence evaluation' 
scale, the conclusions were rated as stronger for problems that were neutral and consistent 
with a person's beliefs. 
Scale Problem Type Control Training 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Evidence Neutral 12.53 2.73 14.53 3.14 
Evaluation Consistent 14.10 3.90 13.33 3.92 
Inconsistent 8.77 3.77 9.40 3.09 
Persuasiveness Neutral 11.97 2. Q4 13.37 2.52 
Consistent 13.57 3.87 12.80 3.28 
Inconsistent 8.07 3.43 8.53 2.55 
Table 4.2 Means and Standard Deviations on the 'Evidence Evaluation' and 
'Persuasiveness' scales under both conditions (N=30 per condition). 
I 18 
A2 (Condition) x3 (Problem Type) mixed ANOVA with Training as a between subjects 
variable and Problem Type as within subjects found no effect of condition (F(l, 58) = 1.02. 
MSE = 20.67. p>. 05) on the evidence evaluation scale. A main effect of Problem Type, 
F(2,116) = 54.20, MSE = 421.21, p<. 001, can be accounted for by the low strength of 
conclusion ratings by participants on problems that were Inconsistent (p<. 001 when 
compared to Consistent and Neutral problems). That is, the problems which contain 
conclusions which are inconsistent with a person's beliefs and elicit more LLN reasoning 
are perceived as weaker arguments than the ones that contain conclusions which are 
consistent or neutral to a person's belief system. 
The ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction between condition and problem type 
(F(2,116) = 3.28, MSE = 25.37, p<. 05). Follow-up analyses revealed that after training, 
participants rated the arguments as stronger on neutral items (at F(l, 58) = 6.95, MSE = 
60.00, p<. 05). Training did not effect the ratings on consistent and inconsistent items (F(l, 
58) = 0.35, MSE = 5.40, p>. I and at F(l, 58) = 0.5, MSE = 6.02, p>. I respectively). 
A2 (Condition) x3 (Problem Type) mixed ANOVA was performed on the ratings on the 
persuasiveness scale. No effect of training was found (F(l, 58) = 0.45, MSE =6.05, p>. 1). 
Participants rated the Inconsistent problems as less convincing than Consistent or Neutral 
problems (F(2,116) = 53.69, MSE = 431.82, p<. 001; a follow-up analysis found 
differences between Inconsistent and Consistent and Neutral to be significant at p<. 001 for 
both). The interaction failed to attain significance (F(2,116) = 2.20, MSE = 17.72, p>. 1). 
4.4.2 Experiment Evaluation Reasoning 
Responses on the experiment evaluation problems were scored according to the 3-point 
coding system as described in the Method section. As with the LLN problems, scores were 
then collapsed across the three problem types, Neutral, Consistent and Inconsistent. 
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It may be seen in Table 4.3 that there is no apparent difference in qualit., ", of experiment 
evaluation responses dependent on whether the participants received training or not, but it 
does appear as in LLN reasoning, that more sophisticated reasoning is used on problems 
involving bel lef- Inconsistent conclusions. A2 (Condition) x2 (Problem type) ANOVA 
was performed with Condition as a between- subjects factor and Problem Type as a Within- 
subjects factor. There was no effect of training on experiment evaluation reasoning 
58) = 0.5 1, MSE = 1.80, p>. 1) but there was a significant difference between the problem 
types in levels of sophistication of reasoning (F(2,116) = 68.12, MSF = 98.15, p<0.001) 
and an LSD follow-up analysis shows that the three problem types elicit significantly 
different levels of reasoning. Belief- Inconsistent problems elicit the most sophisticated 
reasoning style, followed by Belief-Neutral problems and finally Belief-Consistent 
problems (all p<0.001). In other words, as with LLN reasoning, problems with conclusions 
that are inconsistent with ones beliefs will elicit a deeper reasoning strategy than problems 
with either consistent or neutral conclusions. No interaction was obtained between 
Condition and Problem Type (F(2,116) = 2.74, MSE = 3.95, p>. 05). 
Neutral Consistent Inconsistent 
control 2.93 (1.68) 1.13 (1,07) 3.53 (1.87) 
training 2.17 (1.18) 1.06 (1.05) 3.76 (1.69) 
Table 4.3 Mean scores for Argument Evaluation Reasoning on each type of problem 
under each condition (N=60: Standard deviations shown in brackets) 
4.4.2.1 Inappropriate use of LLN reasoning 
Also of interest was whether participants in the Training condition would use law of large 
numbers reasoning inappropriately. The experiment evaluation problerns were not 
designed to elicit LLN reasoning therefore any use of this reasoning strategy would he 
incorrcct. 
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Fong et al. found no overuse of the LLN principle in their study. They included -false 
alarm' problems to explore whether their training promoted the overuse of LLN on 
problems where it was not appropriate. Fong et al. concluded that their training did not 
lead to widespread overuse of the law of large numbers and indeed trained participants are 
able to use the law discriminately. In this experiment inappropriate use was scored on 
items when the participant stated that the sample size was too small. Overall, for 
participants who received training, inappropriate use of LLN was noted on only 9% of the 
problems totally. However nearly 50% of the participants used it on at least one problem 
erroneously compared to the control group who did not refer to sample size on a single 
occasion. 
4.4.2.2 'Conclusion strength' and 'Experiment Validity' Scales 
Following each problem, participants were asked to indicate on two 9-point scales how 
strong they thought the researcher's conclusion was (1= extremely weak, 9= extremely 
strong), and how valid they thought the experiment was (1= extremely invalid, 9= 
extremely valid). Total scores were collapsed across problem type, Neutral, Consistent and 
Inconsistent, which resulted in two rating scales, the 'conclusion strength' and 'experiment 
validity' scales respectively. Scores on each rating scale ranged from 3 to 27 for each 
problem type. 
It can be seen in Table 4.4 that the evidence involving conclusions which are inconsistent 
with belief are judged as weaker that either belief-neutral or belief-consistent problems. A 
2 (Condition) x3 (Problem type) ANOVA revealed that there was a significant effect of 
Problem Type (F(2,116) = 44.32, MSE = 395.40, p<0.001) but not Condition (F(l, 58) = 
2.80, MSE = 115.2, p>. 1). The interaction between condition and problem type also failed 
to attain significance (at F(2,116) = 1.73, MSE = 15.4, p>. 1). An LSD follow-up analysis 
revealed that all three problem types elicited significantly different mean rating scores 
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from each other (p<0.001), with belief-consistent problems having the 'strongest 
evaluation' ratings, belief-neutral the next and bell ef-incons'stent problems having the 
4weakest evaluation'- ratings. This Is consistent with the findings on the LLN problems. 
Table 4.4 also displays the mean ratings on the 'experiment validity' scale for each 
problem type. Again the lowest scores appear to be for the Belief-incons'stent problems 
and the 2 (Condition) x3 (Problem type) ANOVA performed showed that there was a 
main effect of Problem Type and Condition (F(2,116) = 47.23, MSE = 284.30, p<. 001 and 
F(1,58) = 11.55, MSE = 341.70, p<. 01 respectively), with 'validity' scores being higher for 
participants in the Training condition. A follow-up analysis on the effect of Problem Type 
found significant differences between scores on all three (p<. 001 for all). 
Scale Problem Type Control Training 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Conclusion Neutral 10.50 4.70 13.27 4.42 
Strength Consistent 14.50 4.22 15.60 4.47 
Inconsistent 9.50 4.26 10.43 4.54 
Experiment Neutral 9.87 4.12 13.90 3.49 
Validity Consistent 12.87 3.88 15.57 3.43 
Inconsistent 9.10 3.57 10.63 3.82 
Table 4.4 Mean ratings on the 'Conclusion strength' and 'Experiment validity' 
scales for each problem type under each condition. 
An interaction between Condition and Problem Type was also found, F(2,116) = 3.90, 
MSE = 23.50, p<. 05, see Figure 4.2. This shows that training on LLN principle 
significantly increased validity ratings for Neutral and belief-consistent problems (at F(l, 
58) = 16.77, MSE = 244.02, p<. 001; and F(l, 58) = 8.14, MSE = 109.35, P<. Ol 
respectively) but not for belief-inconsistent problems (F(l, 58) = 2.58, MSE = 35.27, 
p>. I). In other words, participants who received training rated belief-neutral and belief- 
consistent problems as even more valid, but validity ratings were not much higher for 
belief-inconsistent problems after training than for the Control group. This suggests that 
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participants rated the validity of the experiments as generally hi igher after training, perhaps 
because all of the problems involved large samples which they then Judged as more 
important after training or because the training led the participants to focus on the sample 
size, for instance, larger sample therefore more valid. 
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Figure 4.2 Interaction between Condition and Problem Type on the 'Experiment 
Validity' scale. 
4.4.3 Law of Large Numbers reasoning - Fong type problems 
Participants' responses on the nine problems were scored using the 3-point system 
described in the Method section. Scores were then collapsed across the three problem 
types, probabilistic, objective and subjective. Unlike the other LLN problems, these 
problems did not consist of any manipulation of belief 
Table 4.5 displays the mean scores for LLN reasoning on each type of problem under each 
condition. Probabilistic reasoning elicited the most LLN reasoning in the control condition 
as expected. After training on the law of large numbers, LLN reasoning was improved on 
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all the tasks. A2 (Condition) x3 (Problem type) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
second factor revealed a main effect of condition (at F(1,58) = -16.40. %ISE - 7/4.76, 
P<. 001). 
Objective Probabilistic Subjective 
Control 0.77 (0.93) 2.23 (1.50) 0.57 (0.90) 
1 raining 2.40 (1.71) 3.50 (1.48) 1.9 (1.36) 
Table 4.5 Mean scores for LLN reasoning on each type of problem under each 
condition (N=60: Standard deviations shown in brackets) 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Problem type (at F(2,116) = 39.92, NISE = 
52.32, p<. 001). An LSD follow-up analysis showed that LLN reasoning ývas significantly 
higher on probabilistic problems than either objective or subjective problems (p< . 001), 
and use of the LLN principle was higher on objective problems than subjective (p<. 05). In 
other words, problems consisting of probabilistic type information elicited a more 
sophisticated reasoning style, followed by objective information as expected. The absence 
of any interaction between problem type and condition illustrates that training impacts on 
all three types of problem equally (F(2,116) = 1.28, MSE = 1.67, p>. 1). 
4.5 Discussion -Experiment 2 
In summary, after training on the law of large numbers, use of statistical principles was 
increased on all the problems designed to elicit belief-based responses and Fong et al. 's 
everyday reasoning problems involving probabilistic, objective and subjectIvc content. 
even after a one-\\, eek delay. Klaczynski's findings were replicated in this expenment. 
Arguments or experiments involving belief-inconsistent conclusions elic ted niorc 
sophisticated reasoning strategies than either belict-neutral or belicf-consistent 
colicluslolls. On law of largc numbers problems, partcpants utll,,,, cd the LLN principle 
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and on experiment evaluation problems participants identified more flaws in the 
hypothetical research. Training had no effect on experiment evaluation reasoning. 
The effects of training on the everyday reasoning problems designed to elicit belief-based 
responses were surprising. Participants were able to utilise the LLN principle on all 
problems, whether they were neutral, consistent or inconsistent with their beliefs. It was 
predicted that the effects of bias may be reduced as in the syllogistic reasoning literature 
(Evans et al., 1994). In accord with the belief bias literature, Stanovich (personal 
communication, October 2004) proposed that training in rule-based strategies would 
attenuate but not eliminate biases. In dual process terms, instruction would increase System 
2 function which would inhibit System I responses. In contrast Klaczynski suggested 
(personal communication, November 2004) that the training may not even transfer to 
problems involving belief-laden content at all. He argues that the two systems are 
independent and instruction may increase LLN reasoning but would have no impact on the 
belief-based responses at all. However the results reported in this experiment illustrate the 
elimination of bias after training on the concept of the law of large numbers. 
The influence of belief itself was still present in the argument ratings. Examination of the 
ratings after each problem demonstrated that training did not eliminate the influence of 
beliefs on ratings related to the persuasiveness of the argument and the strength of the 
conclusion based on the evidence. Participants still rated the evidence which was 
inconsistent with beliefs as weaker or less convincing than both consistent and neutral 
evidence. This illustrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based influences 
between the ratings and the written justifications, as demonstrated by the fact that 
individuals can utilise the LLN principle on belief-consistent and inconsistent problems 
after training, hence utilising System 2 processes. However, evidence for the influence of 
beliefs is still present in the ratings of the arguments. 
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There were no effects of training on the experiment evaluation problems which was as 
expected. However, more sophisticated reasoning strategies were used on the problems 
involving belief-inconsistent conclusions. In other words, participants were more likely to 
search for and identify confounds in the experimental design which would invalidate the 
studies when the evidence was contrary to beliefs. Again, when the evidence was 
consistent or neutral to a person's beliefs then the conclusion was much more likely to be 
accepted with little or no argument. 
Participants rated belief-inconsistent conclusions on the experiment evaluation problems as 
weaker and the evidence less valid than belief-consistent or neutral conclusions and 
evidence. These findings again replicate those of Klaczynski and associates. However after 
LLN training validity ratings on belief-consistent and neutral problems were increased. 
This appears to be an overgeneralization of the LLN training. It is possible that the training 
redirected participants' attention to the wrong components of these problems. They only 
paid cursory attention to these problems in the first place because they involved 
conclusions that were consistent or neutral to their beliefs, they recognised that the sample 
sizes were pretty large; hence they concluded that the expenments must be more valid. 
From the findings reported here and those reported in the literature, people do appear to 
have use of an intuitive general, domain independent rule that states 'the larger the sample 
the better'. Without training in the inferential rule system, people utilise the implicit rule 
automatically on problems designed to elicit the rule e. g. probabilistic problems and belief- 
inconsistent problems. Given training on the rule system, participants are then able to use 
explicit principles on a range of different problems outside the domain of training. 
Experiment 3 had two aims. Firstly to replicate these findings. Secondly, if explicit training 
on the concept of the law of large numbers could increase rational System 2 processing, 
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was there a different explicit instructional approach that could result in inhibition ut 
System I and therefore less biased responding? 
4.6 Introduction and Rationale for Experiment 3 
In the previous experiment it was demonstrated that training in statistical principles led to 
more sophisticated reasoning strategies on a variety of everyday reasoning problerns. 
Consequently the effect of bias in participants' responses was also eliminated. The aim of 
this experiment was to replicate the main findings of Experiment 2 using the sarne 
methodology, and to extend on it by including a second instructional condition. If System 2 
processing can be improved by fon-nal training in the law of large numbers which 
indirectly leads to the elimination of bias, can it be improved by an instruction technique 
designed to encourage participants to disassociate from their beliefs'? 
Both Klaczynski and Gordon (1986) and Stanovich (1999) argue that motivational style is 
a predictor of decontextualised reasoning. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) proposed 
that decontextualised reasoning is a metacognitive competence independent of intelligence. 
They found that bias was predicted by information processing style. Individuals with a 
more rational thinking style were less biased in their reasoning. These individuals ýý'ere 
able to decontextualise the key elements from the content of the problem. Stanovich (1999; 
Stanovich & West, 1997) argued that both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were 
predictors of decontextualised reasoning; ability at the computational level of analysis and 
thinking dispositions at the intentional level of analysis. It was proposed that individuals 
with higher ability Nvere able to flexibly contextualise and decontextualise as neccssarý, 
It is proposed that in contrast to ability which is fixed, thinking styles are malleable 
thereforc more teachable. In which case using instruction procedures to motivate people to 
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improve perfon-nance should have some effect. Houd6 and Moutler (1999) proposed that 
motivational styles were an important factor in training. They found that it was individuals 
with a more field-independent cognitive style that were more susceptible to inhibition 
training on the selection task. These individuals were more able to perceive an element 
separate from its geometric content and to adopt an analytic attitude in problem solving. 
Klaczynski and Gordon (1986) investigated whether the motivation to construct 'correct' 
solutions could improve performance and/or decrease biases. They gave participants 
4accuracy motivation' instructions. These informed participants that if they were to give 
confusing, thoughtless or inaccurate responses, they would be contacted the following 
week. They would then be required to meet with the experimenters to justify and clarify 
their responses. Overall perforinance was increased after these instructions. Bias, however 
was not reduced. Thus it appeared that the motivation to defend beliefs was stronger than 
the motivation to be accurate. 
One of the aims of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether an instructional manipulation 
designed to foster cognitive decontextualisation would decrease biased responding on the 
everyday reasoning tasks. The instructions were designed using the Complex Instructions 
in the belief bias literature as a model (Evans et al. (1994) see Example 2.2. Chapter 2), 
with the emphasis placed on the assumption of truth in the problems and disassociation 
from what is believed to be true. If cognitive motivation is an important factor in 
decontextualised. reasoning, then instructions to disengage from beliefs should have an 
effect. However, if belief-based responses are intuitive, automatic responses, participants 
may not be able to inhibit thern. 
It was predicted that the findings of Experiment 2 would be replicated. Perfon-nance under 
the Control and the Training conditions would be consistent with performance in the 
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previous expenment. For participants in the Complex Instruction condition, blas in 
responding will be reduced on the LLN and Exper-iment Evaluation problems as the 
instructions aim to foster decontextualised reasoning strategies. 
4.7 Method 
Design 
This experiment was designed to both replicate the findings of Experiment 2 and cxtend on 
the findings by including another condition. It had a between subjects design involving 
three conditions, a Control group that just received minimal instructions and a full training 
group (both as in Experiment 2), and a Complex instruction group which had not been used 
previously. The instructions (see below), were designed using the Complex Instructions in 
the belief bias literature as a model (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). These 
instructions served to reduce, though not eliminate, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. All 
participants received a test booklet consisting of law of large numbers problems and 
experiment evaluation problems as used in Experiment 2. 
Participants 
The participants were 90 undergraduates (81 females, 9 males) from the University of 
Plymouth, taking part for course credit, randomly allocated to each group resulting in 30 
per experimental condition. 
Materials 
Instructions: 
-Participants in the Control group wcre presented with the instructions described in 
Expcnment 2 followed by the test booklet. 
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-Participants in the Full training condition were givcn the full wn instructions fOllowed tten 
by the demonstration then the example problems as in Experiment 2, followed b,,,, the test 
booklet. 
Complex Instruction Condition 
The Complex instructions had not been used previously and were designed to observe 
whether an instructional manipulation may elicit the use of more sophisticated reasoning 
strategies (see Table 4.6 for the full script). 
The Complex instructions script was partly designed using the instructions from the bellet 
bias in syllogistic reasoning research conducted by Evans, Newstead, Allen, and Pollard 
(1994, Experiment 3) as a framework. Evans et al. found that their Complex instructions 
decreased bias (though didn't eradicate it altogether) in syllogistic reasoning. Their 
instructions involved a short description of the syllogistic reasoning task, emphasised the 
use of deductive logic and asked participants to assume that the inforination given in the 
syllogisms was true. The instructions used for this study gave a short description of the 
types of problems in the test booklet but also emphasised to participants the assumption 
that all the infon-nation given is true and that responses must be based on this and not on 
what they believe to be true, see Table 4.6 below for full script. It was hoped that these 
instructions would elicit the use of analytic reasoning (System 2 responding), therefore 
inhibiting pre-conscious belief-based responding (System I responding). 
Complex Instructions 
This experiment is designed to find out ho", people solve and evaluate problems involving real-life 
content. 
In this booklet that you have been given there are 2 different types of problems -I týpe consists of 
reasoning problems that you may come across yourself in everydaN life. You %Nill be presented N%ith a 
short scenario to read and then Nou ýNill be asked to indicate on a scale, based on the evidence used, 
how weak or strong you think the conclusion is and on another scale how convinced ýou are 1)) the 
argument. You -, Nill then be asked to cornment on the thinking in the argument in no more than 2 or 3 
%entences, explaining N-. h) ýou think the conclusion is good or bad, weak or strong and cow-incing or 
not coil vinci 11". 
I ý() 
Table 4.6 Continued: 
Since these problems require rational analysis, Nou should base your answers on the content of the 
scenarios, not on what you believe to be true. If, and only if, you judge that a conclusion folio%-. s from 
the information given should-you rate it as strong and convincing. The conclusion giNen may not 
always be the same as what you believe. 
The second type of problem involves summaries of actual research which N-ou ý%ill be asked to 
comment on. After reading a summary you will be asked to rate the strength of the researchers 
conclusion and the validity of the experiment on two scales. You are then required to explain ý%hý )ou 
think the researcher's conclusion was weak or strong and why you think the experiment Ný as . alid or 
invalid. 
Again, you are asked to analyse the research based on the content of the summaries, not on what you 
believe to be true. If, and only if, you judge that the researchers conclusion folloýNs from the suniniary 
presented should you rate it as strong and valid. The conclusion given may not always be the same as 
what you believe. 
Please take your time and be certain that you have made the logically correct decision before stating it. 
If you have any questions, please ask them now, as the experimenter cannot answer any questions once 
you have begun the experiment. Please keep these instructions in front of you in case vou need to refer 
to them later on. 
YOU ARE REMINDED THAT YOU NIUST BASE ALL YOUR RESPONSES ON TIIF 
INFORMATION GIVEN IN THE ARGUMENT SCENARIOS AND RESE, -kRCII SUNWNIARIFS - 
AND THIS INFORMATION ONLY. YOU NIUST ASSUME THAT ALL THF1 INFORMAHON 
WHICH YOU ARE GIVEN IS TRUE - THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT. DO NOT BASE YOUR 
RESPONSES ON WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE TRUE. 
Please do not turn back and forth from one problem to another once you have started. You may now 
continue to work through the booklet. 
Table 4.6 Complex Instructions used in Experiment 3 
Test Materials: 
Eighteen problems involving a belief manipulation were used in total, nine Lax of Large 
Numbers and nine Experimental Evaluation problems as used in Expenment 2. 
Coding 
The same 3 point coding systems used in Experiment 2 were utillsed in this experiment. 
See Experiment 2's Method section for details. 
For law of large numbers reasoning, total agreement was obtained betwcen the principal 
rcscarcher and the independent coder, blind to condition and prob1cm type, on 94% of tlic 
IýI 
problems. For experiment evaluation reasoning, total agreement was obtained on 90'1,6 of 
the problems. Any disagreements were discussed and agreed upon. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to experimental conditions in groups of 2 to 6. The 
Control group were given their instructions and test booklet and were given an hour to 
complete the tasks. The Complex instruction group were given their instruction sheet and 
asked to take their time in reading it. They were then given the test booklet but reminded to 
refer to the instructions periodically. The Full Training group were asked to read the full 
instructions and were then given the demonstration by the experimenter. Following this 
they were asked to complete the example problems. On completion they were asked to 
continue through the test booklet. No delay was included between training and testing as in 
Experiment 2 due to the large effects even after a delay. Without a delay the instruction 
and training conditions could be directly compared. Participants in the Full Training 
condition were given 11/2 hours to complete the whole experiment. 
On completion of the experiment, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
4.8 Results 
4.8.1 Law of Large Numbers reasoning 
Items were scored as described for Experiment 2. Means and standard deviations are 
illustrated in Table 4.7. Note that the scores after training are higher in this experiment 
than in the previous expefiment. This is probably due to the lack of delay between training 
and testing. Problems consisting of conclusions that Nvere inconsistent with a person's 
beliet's vield the highest scores, which is consistent with the previous findings that 
individuals utilise a morc sophisticated reasoning strategy on thesc problems. It is also 
I ý-) 
evident that higher LLN scores are attained after training on the concept of statistical 
reasoning as also found previously. A3 (Condition) x3 (Problem type) ANOV. -% 
conducted on the data resulted in a significant effect of condition (F(2,87) = 35.90, MSE 
159.60, p<. 001). An LSD follow-up confirmed that participants in the Training condition 
attained higher LLN scores than either the Control group or the Instruction group (p<. 001 
for each). A significant effect of Problem Type was also found (F(2,174) = 13.09, MSE = 
18.98, p< . 001) with Inconsistent problems yielding higher LLN scores than either 
Consistent problems or Neutral problems (p<. Ol and . 001 respectively), again as expected. 
Higher scores were obtained on the Consistent problems than the Neutral ones (p<. 05). 
Neutral Consistent Inconsistent 
Control 1.53 (1.50) 1.87 (1.67) 3.00 (1.64) 
Instruction 1.83 (1.46) 2.23 (1.69) 2.93 (1.63) 
Training 4.37 (1.45) 4.70 (1.58) 4.53 (1.41) 
Table 4.7 Mean LLN score on the three problem types under each condition (N=30 
per condition. Standard deviations shown in brackets). 
The significant interaction obtained between Condition and Problem Type is shown in 
Figure 4.3 (F(4,174) = 3.06, MSE = 4.44, p<. 05). The graph serves to illustrate that LLN 
reasoning is elicited when participants are given problems that involve conclusions that are 
inconsistent with their beliefs under the Control and the Instruction conditions, but after 
training participants utilise statistical principles to the same extent on each of the problem 
types. Under the Control condition, scores on Inconsistent problems were significantly 
higher than scores on Consistent and Neutral problems (F(l, 87) = 11.98, MSE = 19.27, 
p<. 001; F(l, 87) = 23.96, MSE = 32.27, p<. 001 respectively). In other words, when 
presented with problems or arguments that are inconsistent with prior beliefs, participants 
utilise a more sophisticated reasoning style to argue with, whereas if the Information is 
consistent or neutral to beliefs then it is much less likely to be evoked. 
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Under the instruction condition there are no effects of instruction on use of statistical 
reasoning and planned compansons reveal that any increase was not sIgnIficant (F(l, 87) 
0.62, MSE = 1.35, p>. 4; F(l, 87) = 0.74, MSE = 2.02, p>. 3 belief-neutral and belief- 
consistent respectively). 
After training on the LLN prmciple, scores on all the problem types were greatly increased. 
There are no differences in levels of sophistication of responding on the different problern 
types (F(l, 87) = 1.19, MSE = 1.67, p>. 2 between neutral and consistent problerns, F(l, 
87) = 0.26, MSE = 0.42, p>. 6 between consIstent and Incons'stent problems, F(l, 87) = 
0.3 1, MSE = 0.42, p>. 5 between neutral and inconsistent problems). Training in statistical 
principles leads to more sophisticated reasoning strategies on all three problem types. 
6.0 
5.5 
5.0 
4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
Control Instruction Training 
Condition 
E] Neutral 
F--j consistent 
F--j inconsistent 
Figure 4.3. Interaction betvveen Condition and Problem Type on LLN reasoning. 
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4.8.1.1 'Evidence Evaluation' and 'Persuasiveness Scales' 
Following each problem, as in Experiment 2, participants indicated on two 9-point scales 
based on the evidence presented, how weak or strong they thought the conclusions ýN'ere, 
(I=extremely weak, 9= extremely strong), and how convinced they were by the argument 
(I=Extremely unconvinced, 9=Extremely convinced). Total scores were collapsed across 
problem type, Neutral, Consistent and Inconsistent, which resulted in the two rating scales, 
the 'evidence evaluation' and 'persuasiveness' scales respectively. Scores on each rating 
scale ranged from 3 to 27 for each problem type, see Table 4.8 for the means on both 
scales. 
Scale Problem 
Type 
Control 
Mean St. d. 
Instruction 
Mean St. d. 
Training 
Mean St. d. 
Evidence Neutral 12.63 3.37 14.90 3.23 12.33 3.60 
Evaluation Consistent 15.03 5.17 16.67 3.59 11.80 4.00 
Inconsistent 8.93 4.23 11.40 4.30 7.03 2.76 
Persuasiveness Neutral 11.47 3.21 13.57 3.57 11.77 3.87 
Consistent 14.20 5.06 15.70 3.05 12.00 4.68 
Inconsistent 7.57 3.27 10.40 3.55 7.23 3.10 
Table 4.8 Mean 'Evidence Evaluation' and 'Persuasiveness' ratings for the three problem 
types under each condition 
It may be seen in Table 4.8 that participants rated the belief-inconsistent arguments the 
weakest and the least convincing under each condition. A3 (condition) x3 (problem type) 
mixed ANOVA conducted on the evidence evaluation ratings resulted in a main effect of 
condition (F(2,87) = 13.63, MSE = 348.83, p<. 001). An LSD follow-up showed that 
participants under the Training condition rated the arguments as weaker than participants 
in either the Control or Instruction condition (p<. 05 and . 001 respectively) and the 
participants in the Instruction group rated the arguments as stronger than participants in the 
Control group (p<. 01). It appears that the LLN training may alert participants to the 
weakness of the arguments. However asking participants to assume the information is true 
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in the instruction condition may lead participants to have less doubt in the e-V'idence leading 
them to rate the arguments as strong. 
The ANOVA also resulted in a main effect of Problem Type (F(2,174) = 74.53, MSE = 
716.23, p<. 001) with participants rating problems involving belief-consistent information 
as stronger than either inconsistent or neutral problems (p< . 001 and . 01 respectively) and 
problems involving neutral content as stronger than problems involving inconsistent 
content. No significant interaction between Condition and Problem Type was obtained 
(F(4,174) = 1.98, MSE = 19.05, p>. 05). 
A3 (Condition) x3 (Problem type) mixed ANOVA performed on responses on the 
persuasiveness scale, resulted in a main effect of Condition (F(2,87) = 8.32, MSE = 
202.48, p<. 001) and an LSD follow-up test revealed there was no significant difference 
between the Training group and the Control group (p=. 31). Participants in the Instruction 
group rated the arguments as more convincing than participants in the Control group and 
the Training group (p<. Ol and p<. 001 respectively). This is consistent with the findings on 
the evidence evaluation scale where participants rate the arguments as stronger after 
instruction to dissociate from beliefs. 
The ANOVA also yielded a significant main effect of problem type (F(2,174) = 80.29, 
MSE = 732.43, p<. 001) and the follow-up analysis revealed that Inconsistent problems 
were rated as significantly less convincing than Consistent and neutral problems (p<. 001 
for both). Neutral problems were rated as significantly less convincing than Consistent 
problems (p< . 001). No significant interaction 
between Condition and Problem type was 
obtained (F(4,174) = 1.70, MSE = 15.48, p>. 1). 
There are two key findings here in relation to the rating scales. Firstly when asked to 
evaluate the strength of the conclusion based on the evidence presented, participants are 
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strongly influenced by their beliefs, even when they are given training that provides them 
with the skills necessary to objectively evaluate the evidence. However they are not 
influenced by beliefs when they are subsequently asked to provide a written evaluation ot 
the argument, as shown by the earlier analysis of levels of LLN reasoning after training. 
Therefore the training is eliminating the effects of belief on how they Justify their 
evaluations, but it is not influencing their ratings of the evidence. Secondk, when 
participants are under instruction to dissociate from beliefs, participants rate the evidence 
strength and persuasiveness as higher than either of the other conditions. It is as it' the 
instructions to 'assume the information is true' removes the reason for evaluating the 
evidence strength or persuasiveness as low. Participants are assuming that the information 
is true therefore it is strong, rather than that the evidence itself is inaccurate. Howevcr the 
relative influence of belief is not changed after instruction. We will return to both of these 
findings in the general discussion that follows. 
4.8.2 Experiment Evaluation Reasoning 
Items were coded using the 3-point coding system as descnbed for the previous 
experiment. Scores were collapsed across problem type and the mean expenment 
evaluation scores under each condition may be observed in Table 4.9. 
Neutral Consistent Inconsistent 
Control 2.83 (1.37) 1.77 (1.45) 4.07 (1.20) 
Instruction 2.97 (1.85) 1.73 (1.46) 3.53 (1.98) 
Training_ 2.43 (1.38) 1.50 (1.61) 3.20 (1.86 
Table 4.9 Mean Experiment Evaluation Scores for each problem type under each 
condition (N=30 per condition. Standard deviations shown in brackets). 
A3 (Condition) x3 (Problem TNpe) mixed ANOVA showed there was no main effcct of 
condition (F(2, , '-, 7) = 1.32, MSE = 6.25, p>. I). The ANOVA revcaled a main ctfcct of 
Problem I)pc (F(2.174) = 58.74, MSE = 84.47, p< . 
001). A follow-up analysis shows 
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problems involving belief-inconsistent conclusions elicit significantly higher scores than 
both problems consisting of belief-consistent or belief-neutral conclusions and belief- 
consistent problems yield significantly lower scores than the belief-neutral problems (all 
p<. 001). These results are all in the expected direction and replicate Experiment 2. There 
was no interaction between Condition and Problem Type (F(4,174) = 0.85, MSE = 1.21, 
p>. 1). 
These findings show that when participants are given problems that involve conclusions 
that are inconsistent with their beliefs, they are likely to work harder at finding the flaws in 
the evidence than when given problems involving conclusions that are consistent with what 
they believe. If the conclusion is consistent with their beliefs, then the participants will 
readily accept the evidence. Training on statistical concepts or instruction to disassociate 
from belief does not have any effect on responses. 
4.8.2.1 Overuse of LLN reasoning 
Fong et al. concluded that training did not lead to widespread overuse of the law of large 
numbers and indeed found that participants were sophisticated in avoiding the improper 
use of the law of large numbers. Participants overuse the LLN principle after training by 
stating that the sample size is too small therefore the experiment is invalid. On analysis of 
individual responses in this experiment, Inappropriate use of statistical principles was 
utilised on nearly 11% of items overall and 60% of participants stated that the sample was 
too small on at least one item. Participants in the Control condition did not utilise law of 
large numbers reasoning on these items. This would lead to the conclusion then that there 
is some overuse of the law of large numbers on experiment evaluation problems. 
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4.8.2.2 'Conclusion strength' and 'Experiment validity' scales 
Following each problem, participants were asked to indicate on two 9-poInt scales hoýv 
strong they thought the researcher's conclusion was (I = extremely %veak, 9= extremely 
valid), and how valid they thought the expenment was (I = extremely invalid, 9= 
extremely valid). Total scores were collapsed across problem type, Typical. Untypical and 
Neutral. This resulted in two rating scales, the 'conclusion strength' and 'expenment 
validity' scales respectively (see Table 4.10). Scores were collapsed across problem typc 
and ranged from 3 to 27 for each. 
It can be seen in Table 4.10 that problems involving conclusions that are belief-consistent 
are rated as a lot stronger that problems involving conclusions that are belicf-inconsistent. 
Participants in the Control condition appear to rate the experiments as slightly weaker than 
those in the Training and Instruction conditions. A (3 (Condition) x3 (Problem Type) 
ANOVA resulted in a main effect of Problem Type (F(2,174) = 79.70, MSE = 690.78, 
p<. 001), and the follow-up analysis revealed that belief-consistent problems were 
perceived as stronger than both belief-inconsistent and neutral problems (p<. 001 for each). 
Belief-neutral problems were viewed as stronger than Belief-inconsistent ones (p< . 01). In 
other words, when presented with problems involving conclusions that are inconsistent 
with their prior beliefs, participants will rate them as involving weaker evidence than the 
other problems involving conclusions which are consistent with or neutral to their beliet's. 
A main effect of Condition was also obtained (F(2,87) = 3.19, MSE = 107.7, p<. 05) and 
the follow-up revealed that participants in the Control condition rated the evidence as 
slightly weaker than participants in the other two Training and Instruction conditions (p< 
05 for both). No interaction between training and problem t,, pe was obtained (at F(4.174) 
= 1.86, MS 11 = 16.10, p>. I). 
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For the 'Experiment validity' scale, participants rate belief-inconsistent problems as less 
valid than belief-consistent problems and participants in the Control group rate all the 
problems as slightly less valid 
_than 
participants in the other two conditions. The 3 
(Condition) x3 (Problem type) mixed ANOVA yielded a main effect of training condition 
(at F(2,87) = 4.76, MSE = 136.58, p<. 05). An LSD follow-up found that participants 
under the Training condition rated the problems as more valid than participants in the 
control group (p<. 01). 
Scale Problem 
Type 
Control 
Mean St. d. 
Instruction 
Mean St. d. 
Training 
Mean St. d. 
Conclusion Neutral 10.27 4.26 12.37 3.51 13.57 4.20 
Strength Consistent 15.53 4.56 16.67 3.87 16.30 3.79 
Inconsistent 9.53 4.04 11.97 4.78 11.17 3.98 
Experiment Neutral 10.13 3.54 11.77 3.75 13.53 3.73 
Validity Consistent 13.97 4.31 15.00 3.37 16.33 3.73 
Inconsistent 9.30 4.17 9.50 3.59 10.87 4.49 
Table 4.10 Mean scores on the 'Conclusion strength' and 'Experiment validity' 
Scales 
The ANOVA also yielded a main effect of problem type (F(2,174) = 76.93, MSE = 
625.01, p<. 001). As expected, participants rate the evidence on Inconsistent problems as 
less valid than either Consistent or Neutral problems (p< . 001 
for each). In other words, if 
individuals disagree with the conclusion they rate the evidence as less valid than if the 
conclusion is consistent or neutral with their beliefs. No interaction between condition and 
problem type was obtained (at F(4,174) = 0.87, MSE = 7.11, p>. 4) 
4.9 Discussion -Experiment 3 
The findings of Experiment 2 were replicated in this experiment. Training on the concept 
of the law of large numbers led to use of the statistical principles on problems designed to 
elicit belief-based responses resulting in the elimination of bias. The instructional 
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manipulation to motivate participants to dissociate from beliefs had no eflect on 
participants' responses on any of the problem types compared to the control grOup. 
Once again, this experiment has demonstrated that training in statistical principles 
increases the sophistication of reasoning responses on problems involving belief- 
consistent, belief-inconsistent and neutral content. The influence of belief was eliminated 
in terms of the effect on sophistication of LLN reasoning demonstrated in responses. 
However evidence from the rating scales illustrates that the influence of belicf was still 
present. Belief-consistent arguments were still viewed as stronger and more convincing 
than belief-inconsistent arguments, again showing a dissociation between the two response 
measures. These findings will be discussed further in the general discussion. 
The instructional procedure utilised in this experiment failed to improve reasoning on 
either LLN problems or experiment evaluation problems. Evans, Newstead, Allen, and 
Pollard (1994) found a reduction in belief-based responding after an instruction procedure 
which emphasised the structure of the syllogism, explained the logical meaning of 'SOME' 
and also emphasised the need to base responses only on the infori-nation given. In this 
experiment, there was no explanation of the law of large numbers, the rule to utilise on the 
LLN problems, or any information about experimental confounds built into the instruction 
set. Taking the findings from the LLN training, it appears that people need to be given the 
rule to follow, and simply instructing them to ignore beliefs is not sufficient. According to 
Sloman (personal communication, September 2004) people need to be cued to use a rule, 
so bias will be reduced only to the extent that the cue is effective. In the instructional 
condition there were no cues for either type of problem. 
It is clear here and in Experiment 2 that law of large numbers reasoning is utilised on 
bciief-inconsistent probIcnis in the absence of training or a cue. The content of the problem 
I ()I 
triggers more sophisticated reasoning strategies. It is possible that the instructional 
manipulation was not strong enough to facilitate decontextualised reasoning. In the 
syllogistic reasoning literature the beliefs used are very general and the training focuses on 
logical necessity which is important for deductive arguments. In the experiments reported 
in this chapter stereotypes are used which are strongly held beliefs. Klaczynski and Gordon 
(1996) reported that the motivation to defend beliefs remained strong even when their 
participants were infon-ned that they would be called back for an interview if their 
responses were inaccurate. The power of the instructional set may not have been strong 
enough to engage participants' analytic reasoning systems to override the influence of 
beliefs. However participants rated the evidence as stronger and more persuasive after 
these instructions, possibly because they are assuming that the information is true and this 
removes one reason to provide a more negative evaluation of the evidence. This at least 
suggests that participants are responding to the instructions, albeit in a different way to 
what was expccted. 
In the absence of training, belief-inconsistent problems elicited more sophisticated 
reasoning strategies than both belief-consistent and neutral problems as in Experiment 2. In 
contrast to the previous experiment, training led to weaker argument ratings on all the 
problem types. That is training may have alerted participants to the weakness of the 
arguments. However, participants still rated arguments which were consistent with their 
beliefs as stronger than the other arguments. 
On the experimental evaluation problems, problems that involved evidence that was 
inconsistent with beliefs yielded weaker and less valid evidence ratings than consistent or 
neutral evidence. In accord with the previous experiment, after law of large numbers 
training participants rated evidence on all the problems as more valid. In Experiment 2 
participants rated the evidence as more valid on belief-consistent and neutral problems 
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after training and in this experiment all problems were rated as more valid. whether the 
evidence was consistent, inconsistent or neutral with beliefs. The control group also rated 
the strength of the experiments as weaker. This is ftirther evidence that Ind'%-'duals are 
possibly redirecting their attention after training on the law of large numbers to the wrong 
components of the problem. They are looking at sample sizes and concluding that they are 
valid because the sample sizes are quite large. 
The following section will provide a general discussion of the findings in relation to both 
experiments reported in this chapter. 
4.10 General Discussion 
The findings from the two experiments reported in this chapter provide some support for 
previous findings in the literature, but also provide evidence that contrasts with the 
predictions made from dual process theories of reasoning. The aim of the research was to 
investigate the effects of training on both belief-based and analytic processes used in 
reasoning. Explicit training on the law of large numbers led to the elimination of biased 
responding, and the utilisation of more sophisticated reasoning strategies on problems that 
would nonnally be processed in a relatively cursory way. Secondly the studies replicated 
and extended on the findings of Fong et al. (1986; 1991) that training on the LLN principle 
increases use of statistical reasoning on everyday problems involving different content and 
structure from the examples used in training, even after a delay. Instructions aimed to 
foster decontextualised reasoning were found to have no effect. Finally, the results 
replicated and extended on the work of Klaczynski (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & 
Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski et al., 1997; ) by illustrating that 
problems involving manipulations of belief elicit different reasoning strategies dependent 
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on whether the problem consists of evidence which is consistent or inconsistent with 
beliefs. 
The key finding that training on the law of large numbers increases use of the rule and 
eliminates bias is a surprising one. This is not fully consistent with any dual process 
account of reasoning. Whilst it would be clamed that the training may attenuate or reduce 
the bias, all of the accounts associate belief bias with System I so explicit instruction is 
unlikely to eliminate the influence of belief (Stanovich, personal communication, Octobcr 
2004; Sloman, personal communication, September 2004; Evans, Ncwstead, Allen, & 
Pollard, 1994). Analytic responding was increased dramatically on all problem types, 
whether they were consistent, inconsistent or neutral to a person's beliefs resulting in an 
absence of bias. 
According to Klaczynski's account of belief effects on these problems, heuristic and 
analytic responding are independent of each other. Hence training on an explicit rule would 
not impact on System I's intuitive system. Klaczynski and Gordon (1996) proposed 
training should increase the sophistication of reasoning responses on all problems; 
however the difference between responses on belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent 
arguments should remain the same. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) argued that 
analytic responding was related to measures of intelligence and biases were related to 
thinking styles. In Klaczynski's view, higher ability participants would acquire the law of 
large numbers rule more rapidly but they would not be able to utilise it on problems 
designed to elicit belief-based responses. Klaczynski predicted that rule training would not 
attenuate the influence of belief on everyday reasoning problems consisting of belief-laden 
arguments (personal communication, November 2004). 
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However in contrast to Klaczynski, training increases analytic responding overall and it 
also reduces the impact of beliefs. The findings show that given training in a rule such as 
the law of large numbers, people are able to utilise the rule effectively, independently of 
the influences of beliefs, in generating verbal evaluations of the strength and 
persuasiveness of the argument. 
Interestingly, the effects of beliefs are still present in the rating scales. The first rating scale 
asked for an evaluation of the strength of the conclusion based on the evidence presented, 
an evaluation that can be objectively made based upon the characteristics of the samples 
being discussed. After training the influence of beliefs on this scale is as strong as the 
influence of beliefs in the control group. This is startling, given that there is no influence of 
belief on the written justification for these responses. It appears that asking for a simple 
evaluation of an argument (such as the rating scale) is more susceptible to the influence of 
System I processes. Whereas asking people to generate a written evaluation activates the 
analytic System 2 processes that make available the LLN principles that have been taught. 
The second rating scale asks about persuasiveness of the argument and it could be argued 
that it is quite rational to be less persuaded by a conclusion that is inconsistent with beliefs. 
One piece of evidence that is incongruent with beliefs that may often be based on many 
pieces of evidence, should not in a Bayesian sense impact drastically in changing or 
persuading us to change our view. If you take a Bayesian approach to the evaluation of 
evidence then the prior probability of a hypothesis is critically important in determining 
how to evaluate that evidence and how that impacts on your beliefs. In the case of these 
problems, the prior probability is the prior belief that you have in the claim, e. g. that nurses 
are caring. You may have a high degree of belief in that claim and according to Bayes 
theorem discovering one piece of evidence that is inconsistent with your belief will have a 
minimal impact on terms of changing that belief This is particularly the case if it is based 
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on much pnor evidence. This type of analysis only applies to the persuasiveness scales 
because according to Bayes it would be irrational to be persuaded based on one piece of 
evidence only. However the conclusion strength asked participants to rate how strollg' thev 
thought the conclusion was based on the evidence used, and in this case pnor belief should 
not be relevant in determining judgement as the response should be based on just the 
evidence presented. 
So why are these results so dramatic considering the predictions that were made? This is 
the first time that law of large numbers training has been tested on everyday reasoning 
problems involving belief manipulations. The law of large numbers is proposed to be an 
intuitive inferential rule system; a rule of thumb that all people possess and can use in 
everyday reasoning. There is evidence to suggest that LLN reasoning is implicit and also 
dependent on knowledge of the problem content. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda 
(1983) gave participants everyday problems in two domains, sports and acting, which the 
participants had varied prior experience of They found that participants with experience in 
a certain domain were more likely to choose a statistical explanation for the problem 
whereas if they had no experience they chose a detenninistic response. This suggested that 
people do acquire statistical rules in a domain-specific manner. Support for the conjecture 
that fortnal rules for reasoning are induced through experience has been provided by the 
findings that undergraduates and teenagers use statistical rules to solve problems (Kosonen 
& Winne, 1995). They do so infrequently and with low levels of sophistication but after 
formal training on the LLN principle they are able to apply them to different problem 
fon-nats. 
Further support for the view that general instruction in abstract principles improves 
statistical reasoning is provided by a senes of studies which observed the effects of 
undergraduate training on reasoning (Lchman & 'Nisbett, 1990; Lehman, Lempert, & 
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Nisbett, 1988). Lehman and Nisbett reported that undergraduate training in the social 
sciences resulted in up to 70% improvement in statistical-methodologi I g. The cal reasonin- 
key finding that training in statistical principles increased the use of LLN reasoning in the 
domain of training and transfers across into other domains has Important Implications for 
dual process account of reasoning. People acquire an intuitive version of the LLN rule 
tacitly and domain-specifically yet after explicit formal training people wcre able to utilise 
the rule on different everyday reasoning problems. 
What is it about the training that facilitates this domain general reasoning" According to 
Fong et al. people are able to map the LLN rules they have learnt onto pre-existing abstract 
intuitive rules that they can then use on problems in different domains to the one they havc 
been taught. The results here are consistent with that explanation and indeed add more 
leverage to It as the effects of training were still very strong after a one week delay 
between training and testing. Fong and Nisbett (1991) found some domain specificity of 
training with a two week delay but participants who received training still utilised LLN 
reasoning more on problems in the other domain than participants in the control group. 
However, the above findings do not explain why LLN training eliminates belief bias. They 
focus more on the question of how training increases use of the LLN Principle overall. It is 
possible that people are utillsing the rule on the belief motivated arguments as they would 
on any everyday reasoning problem. The process of using the rule may elicit cognitive 
decontextualisation on these tasks. Participants have been cued to use the rule which 
triggers System 2's analytic reasoning strategies. They then read through the problem and 
identify the small sample size as being a problem, regardless of the conclusion and the 
direction of belief Hence when asked for a wi-itten cx-aluation of the evidence participants 
utilise the rule. Ho\N, c\-cr, when they are asked to rate the argument's strength and 
pci-suasivcness. their System I processes automatically cue the bellcf-influenced response. 
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A simple instruction to rate an argument's strength or persuasIveness does not engage 
System 2's analytic thinking processes. 
The alternative explanation is that the reasoning utilised after training is purely superficial 
and participants in these experiments are simply transferring by analogy. One claim against 
Fong et al. 's original (1986) study was that the domains used were too narrow therefore the 
training was not transferring to very different types of problems. Fong and Nisbett (1991) 
addressed the issue by using broader domains and in these studies the problems used for 
testing were completely different from the ones used in the training. The examples used in 
the training in the two experiments reported here were taken from Fong et al. 's objective 
domain problems but the test items were of a completely different structure and content 
involving manipulations of belief Fong and Nisbett proposed that the strong domain 
independent training effects found when tested immediately after training are due to 
analogical transfer from the examples used. They explained their domain-speci fi city of 
training effects after a two-week delay as being due to recall for the abstract principle not 
memory for details of the training examples. 
One argument against the analogy explanation is that both the experiments reported here 
support the findings of Fong et al. (1986) that there was only minimal overuse of the LLN 
principle on problems that were not designed to elicit statistical reasoning. In fact, some 
overuse of the rule is evidence in itself for a rule-based account of reasoning. According to 
Smith, Langston, and Nisbett (1992) when acquiring a new rule, it may be overextended 
and used inappropriately. This is based on a finding in psycholinguistics studies of how 
children master the regular past-tense form of English verbs. The rule is to add 'ed' to the 
verb to form the past tense but children tend to overextend the rule to irregular forins e. g. 
'give-ed'. Fong et al. included 'false alann' problems in their study which didn't require a 
statistical response and concluded that after training, participants were able to use the LLN 
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principle selectively and quite sophisticatedly. Participants only sometimes applied it to 
cases where it was inappropriate. 
No participants in either of the two experiments reported here utillsed LLN reasoning 
consistently on the nine experiment evaluation problems although there was some 
'overextension' of the rule noted after LLN training. This leads to the conclusion that 
individuals were not just learning the rule and applying it to everv problem, but were 
distinguishing between the types of problems and using the rule appropriately. It must be 
taken into consideration though that the reminder to use LLN reasoning on the statistical 
problems may have cued participants not to utillse the pnnciple on the expenment 
evaluation problems. 
A second finding which conflicts with the analogy argument is that participants in the 
training condition in both expenments rated expenment evaluation problems as more valid. 
It appears that the statistIcal trainIng may have red, rected people's attentlon to the wrong 
elements on the problem. In Expenment 2 after training participants' validity ratings 
increased on belief-consistent and neutral problems. They only pay cursory attention to 
these problems anyway so statistical training provided a cue for them to identify the 
sample as a potential flaw. Participants must have identified that the samples were large 
and concluded that the experiment was valid. In Experiment 3, validity ratings increased 
on all problem types in experiment evaluation reasoning. However, participants still 
identified the design flaws on belief-inconsistent problems so levels of reasoning 
sophistication on these problems did not change after training. In other words, participants 
Nvere still motivated to find more design flaws on contrary to belief evidence c-ven when 
they had concluded it was a more valid expenment, probably due to the large sample. 
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Reeves and Weisberg (1993) also argued against the analogy explanation as they proposed 
that the recall procedure used by Fong & Nisbett to assess subjects' menlory for the 
exemplars may have led to an underestimation of the amount of exernplar-specific 
knowledge remembered by the participants. They suggested that a recognition task might 
have shown that memory for the details of the training exemplars was better than theý were 
led to believe. Reeves and Weisberg argued that the pattern of results obtained by Fong 
and Nisbett did not support their claims. They claimed that participants referred back to 
details of examples for help in mapping an abstract principle or formula to a new problem. 
The findings here are more supportive of Fong and Nisbett's claims as the examples used 
in training were so different from the ones used in testing. 
The finding that instruction had no effect in decreasing bias on either the LLN problems or 
the experimental evaluation problems was not completely surprising. Klaczynsk, and 
Gordon (1996) found that motivation instructions to facilitate more accurate responding 
had no effect in reducing bias on belief-based problems. It appears that people cannot 
dissociate from their beliefs consciously and they need more than just motivational 
instruction. The evidence so far indicates that they need infort-nation on the logical rule 
they must follow. Evans, Newstead, Allen, and Pollard (1994) found a reduction in belief- 
based responding after an instruction procedure which emphasised the structure of the 
syllogism and explained the logical meaning of 'some'. In Experiment 3, there was no 
explanation of the law of large numbers, the rule to utilise on the LLN problems, or any 
information about experimental confounds built into the instruction set. According to 
Sloman (personal communication, September 2004) people need to be cued to use a rule, 
so bias will be reduced only to the extent that the cue is effective. In the instruction 
condition, there were no cues for either type of problem. This provides further evidencc 
that reasoning after LLN training is purely superficial. Participants are provided with the 
rule which they utilise on an), otlicr problem where it is applicable. 
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However, more law of large numbers reasoning and more sophisticated experiment 
evaluation are utilised on belief-inconsistent problems under the instruction and the control 
conditions. There was no cue present but the content of the problem triggered more 
sophisticated reasoning strategies. It is possible that the instructional manipulation was not 
strong enough to facilitate decontextualised reasoning. However there is evidence from 
Experiment 3 that the instructions are engaging System 2 in some way. Participants rate 
the evidence strength and persuasiveness as higher which leads us to the conclusion that 
the instructions are providing them with a reason not to evaluate the evidence strength as 
low. For instance the instruction to assume the truth of the evidence may be giving 
participants a reason not to question the truth or accuracy of the evidence. Klaczynski and 
Gordon reported that the motivation to defend beliefs remains strong even when their 
participants were informed that they would be called back for an interview if their 
responses were inaccurate. 
What does seem apparent from the previous research and from these two experiments is 
that we do have some degree of conscious control over our reasoning processes i. e. there 
are effects of training. The moment-to-moment shifts in reasoning strategies dependent on 
the content of the problem reported in these two experiments indicated the different 
reasoning processes being utilised. Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) are proponents 
of the depth of processing explanation and they suggested that goal-enhancing information 
was readily assimilated to preexisting belief systems and was processed at a relatively 
cursory level. On the other hand, goal-threatening evidence activated more sophisticated 
reasoning tactics and was processed at a deeper level. Klaczynski et al. proposed that these 
strategies serve to maintain or preserve pre-existing beliefs. The results from the two 
experiments reported here support this view. 
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The finding that certain problems elicit use of sophisticated reasoning strategies is not a 
new one (Nisbett et al., 1983; Jepson et al., 1983). Kahneman and Tversky (1972) argued 
that people don't take account of sample size on intuitive statistical judgement tasks, 
however the results here and in previous studies consistently illustrate that people can and 
do utilise statistical reasoning when certain elements in the problem cue the appropriate 
response, or when they are trained on the LLN principle. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
revised their argument by proposing that people may understand statistical rules but 
frequently fail to apply them on everyday problems. To a certain extent this appears to be 
true. When given everyday reasoning problems in the subjective or objective domain, 
individuals are very poor at responding using statistical reasoning but when given 
problems in the probabilistic domain, statistical responses are high. People require the 
explicit cues about randomness and variability in the problem to guide their response 
(Jepson et al., 1983). 
4.11 Conclusions 
By integrating the two bodies of research, the law of large numbers training and the 
individual differences in everyday reasoning studies, it has been possible to observe the 
interaction of analytic and belief-based processes. Manipulations of belief within everyday 
reasoning problems illustrate how individuals' strategies change dependent on whether 
System I or System 2 processes are engaged. The training effects reflect the interactive 
relationship between the two systems. Under this account, explicit instruction served to 
trigger the rational System 2 processes which override the implicit System I processes 
leading to the elimination of biased responding and an increase in analytical reasoning. 
It is evident from the findings reported that reasoning after training is not superficial. 
Participants in Experiment 2 utilised the rule provided in the training one week later. They 
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were also able to utilise the rule selectively with only minimal overuse of the rule on 
different problem types. However, when asked to rate the arguments they indicated their 
response based on their true beliefs. This demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and 
heuristic responding on these tasks. When asked to provide a written justification of their 
reasoning, System 2 processes were engaged and analytic responses given that 'ývere not 
influenced by beliefs. In contrast, when asked to simply rate the argument strength or 
persuasiveness, participants' responses were cued by System I belief-based processes, and 
showed no influence of training on responses. 
The fact that instructions aimed to foster meta cognitive strategies of decontextualisation 
did not affect reasoning performance at all demonstrates the pervasiveness of beliefs. 
Evidence in the literature to date illustrates that people find it extremely difficult to 
separate themselves from their prior knowledge. Giving people the tool with which to 
reason appears to be a much more effective technique for improving reasoning 
performance on everyday reasoning problems. 
It is difficult to provide an explanation of the findings here based on the predictions made 
by dual process theories of reasoning as the patterns of results were complex and 
inconsistent with any of the specific predictions derived from them. One small comfort for 
these accounts is the dissociation between LLN reasoning and absence of belief effects 
found in written justifications and the presence of belief effects in the ratings. 
Supporters of dual process theories argue about the role general intelligence and thinking 
styles have in relation to System 2 processes. Stanovich claims that general intelligence 
and thinking dispositions are closely related to System 2 functioning (Stanovich & West, 
2000; Stanovich, 1999). However Klaczynski argues that analytical reasoning is a function 
of general ability but thinking styles predict bias cued by System 1. Future research should 
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include cognitive ability and thinking dispositions measures to investigate the effects of 
training or instruction on the responses cued by the belief-based and anaMic systems when 
solving everyday reasoning problems. 
In the following chapter a series of experiments will be reported which examine the effects 
of training on a different type of reasoning problem, the selection task. There is much 
evidence to suggest that both heuristic and analytic factors influence responding on this 
task also. The aim is investigate whether the effects of training found in this experiment, 
specifically in the context of dual process accounts, can be extended to other problem 
types. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Effects of Training on the Selection Task 
5.1 General Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents three experiments designed to investigate the effects of training on the 
selection task. In Chapter 4 the findings of the two experiments presented illustrated how 
training on the concept of the law of large numbers increased the quality of reasoning 
across a variety of problem types. We examined the question of how training moderates 
the effect of beliefs on behaviour. Experiments 2 and 3 illustrated how people's logical 
perfon-nance can be increased independently from these effects of belief After training in 
statistical principles, analytic responding was increased dramatically on all problem types, 
whether they were consistent, inconsistent or neutral to a person's beliefs resulting in an 
absence of bias. However, the influence of belief was still present illustrated by the 
responses on the evidence evaluation and persuasiveness rating scales. Arguments were 
still viewed as weaker or less convincing if they were contrary to a person's beliefs. In dual 
process terins, explicit instruction served to trigger the rational System 2 processes which 
override the implicit System I processes leading to the elimination of biased responding 
and an increase in analytical reasoning, but only when participants were required to justify 
their response in a written forin. 
The tasks used in the experiments presented in this chapter are very different from the 
cvcrVday critical reasoning problems used in Chapter 4. Like the critical reasoning 
problems, the selection task is a useftil tool for investigating pragmatic and analNlic 
influences on corrcct and incorrect responding. As discussed in the literature review in 
Chapter 1, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that correct responding on the 
deontic selection task is cued pragg-matically. However the correct response on the arbiti-arv 
or nidicativc task is obtained with analýiic reasoning only. Under a dual process account, 
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System I cues correct responding on the deontic task but these cues lead to incorrect 
responding on the indicative task. System 2 processes on the other hand also lead to correct 
responding on the deontic task, but if these analytic processes are utilised on the arbitrarv 
task then they are more likely to lead to the correct answer also. 
5.1.1 Introduction to Experiment 4 
The aim of the experiments presented in this chapter is to see whether training techniques 
have any effect on responding on the different types of selection task. In Chapter 2 the 
training studies conducted to date were reviewed. The rest of the introduction in this 
chapter will concentrate on a more in depth analysis of the training perfori-ned and findings 
reported in relation to the studies presented here. The introduction will end with a detailed 
rationale for experiment 4. 
Experiment 4 was designed to partly replicate and expand on a series of experiments 
conducted by Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) looking at the effects of training 
on deductive reasoning. As discussed in Chapter 2, they tested two opposing views on how 
people reason by giving participants training and observing the transfer effects. In one 
experiment Cheng et al. gave participants logic training in the material conditional and as 
with Fong's statistical training study, the training was manipulated in that participants were 
given either training on abstract principles of standard logic, examples of selection task 
problems followed by an explanation of the correct response or both combined (see 
Chapter 2 for details of training). They found that training in standard logic, when coupled 
with training on examples of selection task problems, led to improved performancc on 
subsequent selection task problems. Cheng et al. proposed that abstract principles coupled 
%N, Ith examples serve to elucidate the mapping between abstract principles and concrete 
instances. They found that the rule training alone was ineffective and they proposcd that 
this was because individuals have no ability to apply it to concrcte problems. They also 
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found examples training alone to be ineffective and suggest that individuals have no 
intuitive grasp of the rule they are being shown how to apply. This is very different from 
Fong et al. who found that rules training alone and examples training alone were effective 
in increasing use of LLN, and the effects of both together were additive. 
Cheng et al. 's rules training consisted of a seven-page booklet containing an in-depth 
explanation of the logic of conditional statements followed by an inference exercise. 
Following this participants were given two example problems which involved thematic 
content. One was the 'Sears' problem; "If the check is $30 or over, then it has to be 
approved by the section manager" and the second one was "If the painting is cubist, then it 
is a Picasso". Both conditional statements were embedded in a scenario. Participants were 
then presented with an explanation of the correct answer for each one written in tenns of 
the abstract rules that they had just leamed. It could be argued that Cheng et al. 's logic 
training was not purely abstract at all. By using examples problems such as this it would be 
difficult to propose that abstract training in the material conditional transfers to problems 
in other domains. The training materials could have facilitated transfer because the 
examples used were thematic in nature. 
Eight selection task problems were used to test the training effects: two consisting of 
arbitrary content, two converse bias, two permission and two arbitrary biconditional 
problems (see Table 5.1 for the tasks and response choices). The two arbitrary problems 
were not related to prior knowledge but the converse-bias problems were more realistic 
and participants' prior knowledge was expected to encourage assumption of the converse 
(if q then p). The permission problems were expected to be interpretable as a permission 
schema and therefore elicit responses consistent with the logic of the conditional. Finally 
the biconditional tasks also consisted of arbitrary content but the problems stated explicitly 
that the converse of a conditional rule was also true. It was expected that the arbitrary 
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content of the biconditional. problems would block application of any pragmatic reasoning 
schema and that performance on these problems would be poor. 
Problem Type Rule Choices (p, not-p, q, not-q) 
Arbitrary If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it has aA 
W on the other side B 
4 
7 
If a bird on this island has a purple spot Bird A has a purple spot underneath 
underneath each wing, then it builds nests on each wing 
the ground Bird B does not have any purple spots 
Bird C builds nests on the ground 
Bird D builds nests in trees 
Converse bias If a washing label has 'silk' on one side, then Silk 
it has 'dry clean only' on the other side Cotton 
Dry clean only 
Machine wash in warm water 
If two objects carry like electrical charges, Two objects that carry like electrical 
then they will repel each other charges 
Two objects that carry opposite charges 
Two repelling objects 
Two objects that do not repel 
Permission If a passenger wishes to enter the country, Entering 
then he or she must have had an inoculation Transit 
against cholera Inoculated against cholera and hepatitis 
Inoculated against typhoid 
If a customer is drinking an alcoholic Customer A is drinking a beer 
beverage, then he or she must be over twenty- Customer B is drinking tea 
one Customer C is certainly over 50 
Customer D looks less than 18 
Biconditional If a card has a circle on one side, then it has (Picture of a circle) 
the word 'red' on the other, and conversely, if (Picture of a triangle) 
it has the word 'red' on one side, then it has a Red 
circle on the other Purple 
If a turtle crosses a road, then the flag by the A turtle is crossing a road 
palace flies, and conversely, if the flag by the No turtle is crossing any road 
palace flies, then a turtle crosses a road The flag by the palace is flying 
The flag by the palace is not flying 
Table 5.1 The rules and corresponding choices in the selection task problems used by 
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver (1986) 
Cheng et al. found that the training significantly decreased three types of errors on the 
selection tasks: failure to select p, failure to select not q and erroneous selection of q (see 
Table 5.2 for the percentage of errors in selection task perfon-nance as a function of 
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training however training did not transfer to the solution of biconditional problems. Chen, -, 
et a]. suggested that if participants had an intuitive appreciation of the material conditional, 
it might be expected that any advantage gained by tral II would result ining on the conditional 
in some degree of improved understandi III ing of biconclitional problems. 
Type of error 
Training condition p Not-q q Afot-p At least one 
error 
Rules & examples 5 27 28 8 39 
Rules only 14 48 33 7 65 
Examples only 10 45 37 12 62 
Control 18 51 44 14 75 
Table 5.2 Percentage errors on selection task performance as a function of training 
condition taken from Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver (1986) 
The experimental design and analysis was not sensitive enough to identify the different 
effects of logic training on arbitrary and deontic selection task problems independently. 
Only two problems of each type were used which may not be very reliable. Newstead, 
Handley, Harley, Wright, and Farrelly (2004) found only moderate test-retest reliability 
correlations on accuracy for the two abstract and two deontic tasks they used (. 62 and . 34 
respectively, overall . 38) suggesting random variation in performance on selection tasks. 
Also Cheng et al. presented no data to show the impact of training directly on each 
problem type. One of the aims of Experiment 4 was to investigate the effects of training on 
both arbitrary and deontic tasks independently. In addition we must address the issue of 
Cheng et al. 's logic training which was not entirely abstract. By ensuring the training is 
completely abstract and the selection task problems which are used for testing the effects 
of training are clearly defined, it will be possible to examine the effects of this training on 
the different types of selection task more clearly. 
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In another experiment Cheng et al. gave their participants obligation schema training 
(Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; exp. 3). As discussed In Chapters I and 2, It Is 
proposed that people reason using 'pragmatic reasoning schemas', clusters of rules that are 
acquired through experience (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985). As with LLN reasoning, it 
should be easy to evoke the use of pragmatic reasoning schemas by presenting individuals 
with problems consisting of semantic cues designed to trigger them. 
In accord with Fong et al. 's suggestion that abstract training in naturally occurring rule 
systems can be effective in encouraging people to use them, Cheng et al. proposed that if 
people normally solve problems using pragmatic reasoning schemas then it should be 
possible to improve people's deductive reasoning by training them on them. The obligation 
training consisted of details of the nature of obligations in abstract forinat and the 
procedures necessary for checking if a violation of the obligation has occurred. An 
example of an obligation statement presented in the if-then conditional form was given. 
Then the procedures for assessing obligations were described in tenns of four rules, one for 
each of the four possible situations that might arise that can be mapped onto p, not p, q and 
not q (See Chapter 2, Example 2.5 for the full Obligation training script). Two ways that 
they suggested that schema training could improve performance were firstly by providing 
participants with more general mapping rules for interpreting situations in terms of the 
obligation schema and secondly by providing checking procedures consistent with the 
material conditional that may be applied to other problem types such as those involving 
arbitrary content. 
To establish that it wasn't the checking procedures themselves that resulted in improved 
reasoning on obligation schema problems, Cheng et al. included a Contingency training 
condition which involved training participants in the use of checking procedures for 
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contingencies involving the relation between one event or its absence and another event or 
its absence (see Table 5.3 for Contingency training). 
Contingencies 
A contingency arises whenever it is the case that a certain condition implies some necessary consequence. Contingencies can be stated in an "If .... then" form. For example, the following statement specIfies a 
contingency: "If a mushroom is red, then it is edible. " Another example would be "If a student is a 
psychology major, then the student must take an introductory psychology course. " More generally, if N%-e call 
the initial condition I and the consequence C, a universal contingency has the form, "If I, then C- In our first 
example, I is "red mushroom" and C is "edible. " In the second example, I is "being a psychology major, " and 
C is "taking an introductory psychology course. " 
In order to assess whether a contingency in fact holds, we need to consider the four possible 
situations that might arise. These are 
1.1 is obtained 
2.1 is not obtained 
3. C is obtained 
4. C is not obtained 
Corresponding to each of these possible situations is a rule related to the truth of the contingency. These rules 
are the following: 
1. If I is obtained, then C must be obtained. Clearly, if I is obtained then for C not to obtain would 
show that the contingency doesn't hold. To use our examples, if a mushroom is red, then it must be edible or 
else the contingency is false: and if a student is a psychology major, then the student must take an 
introductory psychology course. 
2. If I is not obtained, then the contingency is not tested. C need not obtain, although it may. For 
example, if a mushroom is not red, it need not be edible, although it may be (perhaps brown mushrooms are 
also edible). Similarly, if a student is not a psychology major the student need not take an introductory 
psychology course. It may be possible however, for an English major to take an introductory psychology 
course. But in any case, the basic contingency is simply irrelevant if the student is not a psychology major. 
3. If C is obtained, then the contingency is certainly not falsified, regardless of whether or not I 
obtains. If I didi occur, then the contingency is satisfied. If I is not obtained, then the contingency wasn't 
even tested (Rule 2). For example, if we know a certain mushroom is edible, we can be sure the contingency 
was not falsified regardless of the mushroom's colour. Either the mushroom is red, and the contingency is 
satisfied, or it is not red, in which case the contingency was not tested. Similarly, if we know a student has 
taken an introductory psychology course, we can be sure the contingency has not been falsified: Either the 
student was a psychology major, and hence satisfied the contingency, or the student was not a psychology 
major, in which case the contingency wasn't tested. 
4. If C is not obtained, then I must not obtain or else the contingency is falsified. This is because if I 
had occurred, then the failure to obtain C would falsify the contingency. Then is a mushroom is not edible, it 
must not be red or else the contingency is false. A nd is a student has not taken an introductory psychology 
course, the student must not be a psychology major, or else again the contingency will be falsified. 
If you understand the above four rules, you should find it easy to assess whether or not a 
contingency is being satisfied. Note that there are only two situations in which it is possible for a contingency 
to be falsified: When I is obtained (and C is not obtained) (Rule 1), and when C is not obtained (and I is 
obtained) (Rule 4). In the other two situations the contingency can't be falsified. These are the cases in which 
I does not obtain (in which case the contingency will have been satisfied it it was tested) (Rule 3). 
You may wish to reread these instructions careftilly in order to be sure you understand the rules for 
evaluating contingencies. You will then be able to apply what you learned to the test problems, which will 
include a variety of such contingencies. You will firid it easy to solve these problems if you careftill apply 
Rules 1-4. 
Table 5.3 Contingency Training taken from Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver 
(1986; Exp. 3) 
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They expected that teaching participants correct checking procedures in an abstract fomi 
would aid the solution of arbitrary problems only and have little effect on obligation 
problems. 
- 
nis was due to the fact that_these semantically interpretable problems would be 
understood in terms of a reasoning schema that maps onto the conditional therefore 
checking procedures would be redundant. If not these problems would be understood in 
terms of a reasoning schema that does not map onto the conditional therefore would have 
its own checking procedures that would override the arbitrary procedures. 
Participants were given four arbitrary problems and four obligation problems for the test. 
Cheng et al. reported that obligation schema training improved performance on obligation 
problems more than contingency training or a control group who received no training. Also 
as Cheng et al. expected, contingency training resulted in no improvement on problems 
consisting of obligation content but it did facilitate some improvement on the arbitrary 
problems. Cheng et al. also found that the benefit of obligation training extended to two of 
the arbitrary problems and when they investigated this further they found that response 
patterns under each condition on two of the problems resembled those of obligation 
problems. They concluded that some participants might have interpreted the two arbitrary 
problems as obligation situations after training. 
Cheng et al. reported which two arbitrary test problems may have been interpreted as 
obligation schema problems however on examination of them it is not surprising. The two 
that it is suggested were possibly interpreted as obligations were; 'if a bolt of cloth has any 
red threads in it, then it must be stamped with a triangle' and 'if a house was built before 
1979, then it has a fireplace'. It could be argued that both these tasks are highly thematic 
and much more likely to be understood as deontic conditionals rather than ones that are 
purely arbitrary in content. Therefore it is not clear from Cheng et al. 's findings whether 
training in an obligation schema does transfer to arbitrary problems. 
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Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993) would probably 
propose that transfer did not occur from obligation schema training to arbitrary tasks. 
Klaczynski, Gelfand, & Reese (1989) conducted a series of experiments to observe the 
transfer effects between thematic and arbitrary selection task problems. They found that 
transfer occurred within problem types i. e. arbitrary to arbitrary, thematic to thematic, but 
transfer between problem types was unidirectional. That is transfer occurred from arbitrarN, 
to thematic problems only. Klaczynski et al. (1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993) proposed 
that when given training in an abstract domain, the rules are relatively general because 
there is no concrete knowledge base onto which the rules can be mapped. Therefore, once 
the rule is induced, transfer may occur to different problem types that are perceived as 
instantiations of the general category of problems to which the rule applies. According to 
Klaczynski and Laipple, because Cheng et al. 's rules training is likely to be consistent with 
the rules of the deontic problems, the training may be directly mapped onto and activate 
the schemas which may then be applied to other problems. 
However, Klaczynski et al. found no transfer from permission schema problems to 
arbitrary tasks. They proposed that training in a domain-specific rule may lead to the rule 
being utilised on other problems from the same domain as one-to-one mapping of the 
elements between problems is more readily perceived, but transfer to problems in other 
domains will not occur as the rule is tied to a specific domain. The training should result in 
activation of that schema which will facilitate the solution of further problems within that 
domain with little or no transfer to problems from other domains. 
Ansberg and Shields (2003) provided support for Klaczynski et al. 's findings by showing 
that feedback in the form of domain-specific explanation did not promote transfer from 
permission problems to arbitrary problems. However when participants were required to 
perform problem comparisons and read strategy instructions during practice the solution 
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procedures did transfer to arbitrary problems. They proposed that this kind of training 
emphasised the deep structure of the problems by teaching solvers to identif,, the important 
problem elements, regardless of the context. This is in contrast ý%ith the problem-specific 
instruction procedure which emphasised the surface structure of the pennission problenis 
only. 
In terms of dual process theories it is System 2 that is sensitive to instruction. System 2 is 
associated with intelligence and analytic reasoning therefore under this view explicit 
training could transfer to other types of problems where the same elements of the problem 
may be mapped on and lead to the same conclusion, for instance from deontic obligation 
schemas to arbitrary tasks, but only for individuals who have the ability to decontextualisc 
the key elements from the context. Findings in relation to cognitive ability and thinking 
dispositions, and claims made by Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) may help in our 
understanding of the conflicting findings reported so far. 
It is proposed that intelligence is fixed and thinking styles are malleable and it is the more 
open-minded flexible thinkers that are more sensitive to training (Stanovich, 1999). 
According to Stanovich (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998b), individuals of a 
higher ability are able to flexibly contextualise and clecontextualise infori-nation dependent 
on the demands of the task. To transfer between problem types individuals must be able to 
separate elements in the problems from the scenanos they are embedded in and map them 
onto other problems. This may be easier from abstract training or arbitrary problems as the 
elements are not so embedded in the first place. 
Klaczvnski and Laipple (1993) investigated the role of intelligence when transferring 
domain-indepcndent, arbitrary and domain-specific, deontic knowledge to target dornain- 
indepencicnt and specific problems. They found only weak relationships with ability when 
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transferring from domain-independent problems as the rule ma,., be more easily applied to 
target problems. They reported strong relationships with ability when transfemng 
knowledge from dom. ain-specific problems and they suggested that individuals with higher 
ability are able to perceive the underlying structural similarities bctween different 
problems and therefore apply the same rules to each. It must be noted that Klaczynsk, 
reported no transfer from permission schema training to problems from other domains. 
Stanovich (1999) also proposes that it is high ability individuals that are able to inhibit 
System I (p/q) responding on the arbitrary selection task. It is these individuals that are 
able to override the default responses from System 1, the fundamental computational bias. 
Evidence in support of this has been provided by Houd6 and Moutier (1996; 1999) who 
illustrated that inhibition training successfully led to inhibition of the heuristic response. In 
addition the area of the brain being utilised after training was in fact related to working 
memory, which is an indicator of System 2 processing. 
Stanovich (1999), Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997) and Houd6 et al. (1999) all 
provide evidence to show that thinking styles are also an important part of System 2 
analytical thinking. Stanovich proposes that they are linked to cognitive ability and both 
together predict decontextualised reasoning. In contrast Klaczynski et a]. argue that 
decontextualised reasoning is completely separate from intelligence. Intelligence predicts 
quality of reasoning but bias is predicted by thinking styles. By including individual 
difference measures in this expenment, it will be possible to investigate their mediating 
effects on selection task reasoning and to observe how they affect sensitivity to training. 
5.1.2 Rationale for Experiment 4 
Fxperiment 4 was designed to coniparc Cheng et al. 's rules plus examples training and 
obligation sclicma training. Chcng ct al. looked at these training techniques m two scparate 
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experiments. By investigating both in the same study, direct comparisons benween both 
types of training can be made. The main aim of the experiment is to observe the effects of 
explicit training in 'domain-general' rules and 'domain -dependent' schemas on subsequent 
selection task problems involving arbitrary and deontic content. Clearly defined selection 
tasks that consist of arbitrary and deontic content will be employed to test the differential 
training effects. 
The findings in relation to the previous training studies are not clear. According to Cheng 
et al. 's findings, it is proposed that abstract logic training serves to improve overall 
performance on selection tasks. Firstly their abstract training was not entirely abstract. 
Both of the examples that were used involved thematic content and could be interpreted as 
deontic problems. In order to make claims about cross domain transfer from an abstract 
training procedure, then all the training must involve abstract content. The examples used 
in Experiment 4's training were therefore changed to problems consisting of arbitrary 
content. 
The obligation training was also slightly adapted to produce a procedure that was more 
equal in length and structure to the rule-based training. Namely, two obligation selection 
task problems were given after the details on obligation training, each followed by full 
explanations of the correct and incorrect responses written in the satne terms as the initial 
training. Cheng et al. reported that the obligation training may have refined participants' 
understanding of situations that are potentially interpretable in terms of the schema. They 
based this claim on the evidence that obligation schema training transferred to two 
arbitrary problems. However the two problems in question were highly thematic and could 
have been interpreted as obligations quite easily. The arbitrary test problems in Experiment 
4 have been used in previous experiments and have been shown to elicit patterns of 
response consistent with abstract selection task problems. By replicating the training and 
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including more reliable test problems, II ible to more reliably test the transfer it is poss' 
effects, at the same time enabling the clarification of the conflicting arguments between 
Cheng et al. and Klaczynski et al. To recap, according to Cheng et al. transfer docs occur 
from domain-specific schema training but according to Klaczynski. et al. transfer does not 
occur. 
Another aim of this experiment is to investigate the mediating effects of individual 
differences in cognitive ability and thinking styles. Cheng et al. did not include individual 
differences measures in their studies therefore by using them in this expenment it may 
again help explain some of the conflicting findings they had with Klaczynski et al. 
Klaczynski and Laipple proposed that the ability to transfer from schema-based training is 
related to abilitY therefore it is possible that the transfer effects found from Cheng et al. 's 
obligation training were due to very higb ability participants. By including cognitive ability 
and thinking styles measures it will be possible to explore the relationships that these 
factors have with the ability to reason successfully on these tasks before training, and also 
the ability to transfer knowledge after training. 
Under dual process accounts there are two different predictions to be made in relation to 
perfon-nance after the abstract logic training. Evans (1989) argued that few people get past 
a relevance judgement on the selection task and suggests that it is doubtful that verbal 
instruction in relation to underlying logical principles can remove biases as they are 
implicit. In other words, explicit verbal instruction would have an impact on verbal and 
explicit thought processes, not implicit ones. However Klaczynski et al. (1989; Klaczynski 
& Laipple, 1993) would predict that a domain-independent rule would be induced from the 
training that would then be applied to both the arbitrary and deontic problems. 
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Evans may make the same prediction about the effects of obligation schema training as for 
the logic training. On the other hand, if the training can refine people's understanding ot 
situations in terrns of the schema as Cheng et al. proposed, then there . vill be improved 
reasoning performance on permission problems and arbitrary problems also. fiowcver. 
according to Klaczynski et al. the training should improve reasoning on problems designed 
to elicit the obligation schema only. 
In terms of the individual differences measures, Sloman (personal communication, 
September 2004) would predict that only the high ability participants would be able to 
transfer from both types of training as it is those individuals that are able to understand the 
training. Stanovich would predict that correlations between individual differences in ability 
and performance would attenuate after training (personal communication, October 2004) 
and Klaczynskj et al. (1993) would agree with this but only for the logic training. In their 
view, because obligation schema training is domain-specific, only individuals of higher 
ability will recognise the structural similarities between the different problems resulting in 
positive transfer to other domain-specific problems. 
Stanovich (1999), Houd6 et al. (1999) and Klaczynski et al. (1997) would agree that 
thinking dispositions are predictive of people's receptiveness to training. It would be 
expected that these participants would be more "rational" in their style of thinking as 
measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) therefore be 
more able to engage in sophisticated thinking. it would also be expected that these 
participants would score more highly on Stanovich's Thinking Disposition Questionnaire 
(see Chapter 3) indicating the availability of a larger repertoire of reasoning styles that the,, - 
can use to flexibly reason with depending on the context of the problem. 
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5.2 Method 
Design 
The experiment - had a between subjects pre-test/post-test design consisting of two 
conditions based on Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986), Rules plus examples 
training (adapted from Cheng et al. (1986: Experiment 1)) and Obligation Schema training 
(adapted from Experiment 3). The dependent variables were eight selection task problems 
(four arbitrary, four deontic) and eight conditional reasoning problems. The two training 
conditions had not been directly compared before. 
Participants 
Sixty participants, 35 female and 25 male undergraduate and postgraduate students from 
the University of Plymouth were randomly allocated to one of the two training conditions 
(obligation group, 14 females and 16 males; rules group, 21 females and 9 males. ). The 
mean age of the sample was 24.2 years (obligation group 24.03, rules group 24.37). 
Materials 
Rules plus Examples Training 
This training condition was adapted from Cheng et al. 's Experiment I (See Appendix A4.1 
for complete script). In their experiment they had three training conditions (plus control), 
Rule Training, which constituted a booklet consisting of an explanation about conditional 
statements, followed by an inference exercise. Examples training which consisted of two 
thematic selection task problems with immediate feedback on performance, and Rules plus 
Examples training, which were the two previous conditions added together. 
The Rule training consisted of an explanation of the equivalence between a conditional 
statement and its contrapositive, as well as an explanation of the two common fallacies of 
yl The contrapositive was explained i affinning the consequent and den ing the antecedent. I in 
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part by the use of a truth table, in part by Euler diagrams that used concentric circles to 
show the relations between a conditional statement and its contrapositive, and in pail by an 
illustrative conditional statement. For this experiment, the section on Euler diagrams was 
omitted. 
Participants were then given an inference exercise consisting of three conditional 
statements involving realistic content. They had to select statements that could be validly 
inferred from each of three given conditional statements. The statements were all In the 
form of if p then q. For example, if the cube is plastic, then the sphere is metallic. The 
randomly ordered possible inferences were in the following forms: if not-p then not-q 
(invalid) if the cube is not plastic, then the sphere is not metallic, if not-q then not-p (valid) 
if the sphere is not metallic, then the cube is not plastic, and if q then p (invalid) if the 
sphere is metallic, then the cube is plastic. Participants made their selection and the correct 
answer was given on the following page. 
Participants were then presented with two selection task problems. In Cheng et al. 's study 
the examples involved thematic content. For this study they were changed to arbitrary 
selection tasks in order that the condition was completely abstract. Following each 
problem, participants were given a ftill explanation of the correct and incorrect card 
choices in tenns of p, q, not p and not q. 
Obligation Schema plus Examples Training 
This training condition was adapted from Cheng et al. 's Experiment 3 (See Appendix A4.2 
for complete script). Their obligation training consisted of a two-page booklet detailing the 
nature of obligations and the procedures necessary for checking if a violation of the 
obligation had occurred. An example of an obligation statement presented in the if-then 
conditional form was given. The procedures for assessing obligations were described in 
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terms of four rules, one for each of the four possible situations that might anse - situations 
that can be mapped onto p, not-p, q, and not-q. In other words situations whcre p occurs. 
does not occur, q is done, and q is not done. 
For this experiment two examples were also included which were designed to elicit the 
obligation schema. Participants were asked to complete each problem before checking the 
answer on the following page. A full explanation detailed the correct and incorrect card 
choices that could be made to check if there has been a violation of the obligation rule. 
Examples weren't used in the original study but in order that direct comparisons with the 
other training condition could be made, they were included here. 
Selection Task Problems 
Sixteen selection task problems were used in total, 8 abstract, 4 obligation and 4 
pennission. Eight problems were used as the pre-test and eight after training as the post- 
test. The problems that constituted the pre-test for half of the participants, became the post- 
test problems for the other half, and the post-test problems became the pre-test. There was 
no difference between forms I and 2 on the arbitrary tasks prior to training (t(58) = 0.00, 
p=l) but there was a significant difference between the two forins on the deontic tasks at 
t(58) = -2.06, p<. 05. All were presented in random order. 
The eight abstract problems consisted of the original letter and number task (Wason, 
1966), the destination problem used in Experiment I and others adapted from Klacz,, -nski 
and Laipple (1993). All Nvere designed in order that responses would not be affected by 
prior knowledge or belief Participants were given the rule then asked xhich card or cards 
fliev would need to turn ovcr to see whether the rule is true or false. Response orders were 
varied betwecti problems (see Table 5.4 for the conditional statements and response 
choiccs). 
II)l 
Form Conditional statement Response 
Form I "if the letter A is on one side of a card, then the number 7 must be on the other side of the A (p) 
card. " D (not p) 
7 (q) 
3 (not q) "If Triangle is on one side of a card, then Dog must be on the other side of the card. " Triangle (p) 
square (not p) 
dog (q) 
cat (not q) "if Yellow is on one side of a card, then Oak must be on the other side. " yelloýk (p) 
green (not p) 
oak (q) 
beech (not q) 
"if Coffee is on one side of a card, then Goldfish must be on the other side of the card. " coffee (p) 
tea (not p) 
goldfish (q) 
hamster (not q) 
Form 2 "If Glasgow is on one side of a card, then Train must be on the other side of the card. " Glasgow (p) 
Edinburgh (not p) 
train (q) 
bus(notq) 
"If Salty is on one side of a card, then Pistachio nut must be on the other side of the card. " salty (p) 
sour (not p) 
pistachio nut (q) 
walnut (not q) 
"If Table is on one side of a card, then Daisy must be on the other side of the card. " table (p) 
chair (not p) 
daisy (q) 
buttercup (not q) 
"If Trousers is on one side of a card, then French must be on the other side of the card. " trousers (p) 
skirt (not p) 
French (q) 
Italian (not q) 
Table 5.4 Conditional Statements and Response Choices for the Arbitrary Selection 
Task Problems 
The four obligation selection task problems described situations in which the occurrence of 
some condition A incurs the necessity of taking some action B. Three problems were 
adapted from Cheng et al. (Experiment 3) and one was created by the author. The four 
permission selection task problems contained rules describing an action that could occur if 
a precondition had been met. Three of these had been created by the author and one was 
the drinking-age problem from Experiment 1. For both types of problems participants were 
asked to indicate which card or cards they would need to turn over to decide whether or not 
the rule was being violated (see Table 5.5 for the conditional statements and response 
options). Again, response orders were varied between problems. 
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Problem type and Form Conditional statement Response 
Obligation - Form I "if a urithium miner gets lung cancer, then Miner B has lung cancer (p) 
the company must pay the miner a sickness Miner D does not ha %eI ung cancer (not p) 
pension. " Miner A is receiving a sickness pension (q) 
Miner C is not receiving a sickness pension (not q) "if a steel support is intended for the roof, Support A is intended for the roof (p) 
then it must be rustproof Support B is intended for the foundation (not p) 
Support C is rustproof (q) - 
Support D is not rustproof (not q) Obligation - Form 2 "if a person is driving a car, then that person Driving a car (p) 
must wear a seatbelt. " Not driving a car (not p) 
Seatbelt wom (q) 
Seatbelt not wom (not q) 
"if one works for the Armed Forces, then Person B does work for the Armed Forces (p) 
one must vote in the elections. " Person A does not work for the Armed Forces (not p) 
Person C voted (q) 
Per-son D did not vote (not q) 
Permission - Form I "if a person is travelling to the United States United States of America (p) 
of America, then that person must have a France (not p) 
visa. " Passport and a Visa (q) 
Passport and no Visa (not q) 
"If a person is drinking beer, then that person Drinking beer (p) 
must be at least 18 years old. " Drinking Coke (not p) 
18 years of age (q) 
16 years of age (not q) 
Permission - Fon-n 2 "if a student is withdrawing books from the Books on loan (p) 
library, then they must have a valid Identity Books not on loan (not p) 
card" Valid Identity card (q) 
Invalid Identity card (not q) 
"If a person purchases cigarettes or tobacco, Bought cigarettes (p) 
then they must be 16 years or over in age. " Didn't buy cigarettes (not p) 
17 years of age (q) 
15 years of age (not q) 
Table 5.5 Conditional Statements and Response Options for the Deontic Selection 
Task Problems 
Conditional Reasoning Problems 
Sixteen conditional reasoning problems were used in total, eight pre-test and eight post- 
test. Prior to each test booklet, participants were given a set of instructions (see Appendix 
A4.3 for the instructions and the problems) asking them to decide which of the three 
conclusions that followed the premises were valid, i. e. those which logically have to follow 
given that the premises are true. All the logical problems involved abstract content, two 
designed to draw modus ponens inferences, two modus tollens, two denial of the 
antecedent and two affirmation of the consequent. The three options were q, not q and 
'impossible to tell' for the MP and NIT inferences; and p, not p and 'impossible to tell' for 
the AC and DA inferences. All the problems were presented in random sequence. 
The items were scored on whether participants had obtained the logically correct response, 
which involved q for MP, not p for MT, and 'impossible to tell' for the AC and DA 
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inferences. Conditional reasoning problems were included to in,. estigate whether the rules 
of standard logic training or obligation schema training would transfer to a set of 
conditional reasoning items. 
Cognitive Ability 
The AI-14-Group test of General Intelligence was administered (Helm, 1967) as used in 
Experiment 1. The test consists of two parts, each containing 65 items. Part one is 
comprised of both verbal and numerical problems, part two is composed of problems in 
diagrammatic fon-n. Correlations between scores on Part One and scores on Part Tývo have 
been reported to range between 0.60 to 0.81 (Heim, 1967) and in Experiment I the 
correlation was 0.56. Each section is timed and must be completed in 10 minutes. 
Thinking Dispositions 
The Rational-Experiential Inventory and Stanovich's Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire 
were used. See Experiment I for details. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to six. They were given a booklet which 
contained all the test materials and training to work through. First they completed the 
timed component of the test, the AH4, after which they worked through the rest of the 
booklet in their own time. They completed the pre-test conditional reasoning problems 
followed by the eight selection tasks. Participants were then requested to read through the 
training matenals and make sure they understood before progressing to the remainder of 
the booklet. Following the training, participants completed the Rational - Expenential 
Inventorv and Stanovich's Thinking Disposition Questionnaire before completing the target 
selection task and conditional reasoning problems. The whole task took an hour to 
collipictc. 
IQ4 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Selection task responding under each training condition 
Responses on the selection task problems were scored as I for a p, not q (correct) response 
and 0 for any other (incorrect) answer. Due to the unequal number of tasks under each 
problem type: two obligation problems, two permission problems and four arbitrarv 
problems, the mean proportion of correct answers was computed for each problem type. 
Table 5.6 illustrates the mean pre and post training scores on the two tasks designed to 
evoke an obligation schema, the two tasks designed to evoke a pennission schema and the 
four tasks consisting of arbitrary content. On initial observation the pre training scores on 
the obligation and pen-nission problems do not differ much but a t-test confin-ned there was 
a significant difference between the two at t(59) = -2.82, p<. Ol with permission schema 
problems yielding a higher number of correct answers than obligation schema problems. 
Obligation training Rules training 
Problems Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test 
Obligation 
. 
48 
. 
75 
. 
50 
. 
52 
Permission 
. 
65 
. 
80 . 60 . 
58 
Arbitrary 
. 
07 
. 
21 
. 13 . 
39 
Table 5.6 Mean proportion of correct answers on the pre-test and the post-test for 
the selection tasks (N=30 per training group) 
Illustrated in Table 5.6 are the scores on the selection tasks pre and post training. Pre-test 
scores on both the deontic tasks are higher than pre-test scores on the arbitrary tasks which 
is supportive of Cheng et al. 's reasoning schema hypothesis and all the other findings in 
the selection task literature (see Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993). The deontic problems 
were designed to evoke the use of the permission and obligation schemas resulting in more 
correct respoilses on these problcms. A t-test showed the difference between scorcs on the 
obligation and arbitrary problerns to be significant (t(59) = 7.26, p- and the 
I C) s 
difference between scores on the permission and arbitrary problems to be significant (t(59) 
= 9.03, p<. 001). A2x3x2 (Condition x Problem Type x Pre-Post test scores) ANOVA 
was performed on the data with Condition as between subjects and Problem type and pre- 
post test scores as within subjects variables. The ANOVA failed to find a main effect of 
condition (F(l, 58) = p>. 1), but there was a main effect of pre to post training scores (F(l, 
58) = 8.85, MSE = 1.70, p<. 01). No significant interaction between training condition and 
pre to post training scores was obtained (F(l, 58) 1.24. MSE = 0.24, non-signi fi cant). 
There was a main effect of problem type (F(2,116) 68.11, MSE = 6.94, p<. 001) and an 
interaction between training condition and problem type (F(2,116) = 5.77, MSE = 0.59, 
p<. 01). An interaction between problem type and pre to post training scores failed to reach 
significance (F(2,116) = 2.44, MSE = 0.14, non-significant). 
The ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between Condition, problem type and pre- 
post test scores (F(2,116) = 4.53, MSE = 0.26, p<. 05). This interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. Participants achieved higher scores for each problem type after obligation 
training. In the rules training condition higher scores were achieved for the arbitrary 
problems only (F(l, 58) = 13.85, MSE = 1.00, p<. 001). The difference pre to post training 
on the obligation and permission problems was not significant (p>. I for both). A series of 
planned comparisons revealed that under the obligation schema training the difference pre 
to post scores for the obligation problems was significant (F(l, 58) = 6.65, MSE = 1.07, 
p<. 05), for the permission problems the difference was significant (F(l, 58) = 4.44, MSE = 
0.34, p<. 05), and for the arbitrary problems the difference was significant (F(l, 58) = 4.67, 
MSE = 0.34, p<. 05). In sum, under obligation schema training performance was improved 
for arbitrary and deontic tasks and under rules training performance was improved for 
arbitrary problems only. There was no transfer to obligation or permission problems after 
rules training. 
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Figure 5.1 Graph illustrating 3-way interaction between Condition, Problem type 
and pre and post training scores (N = 30 per training group) 
5.3.2 Changes in response patterns 
The pattern of responding on the obligation and permission problems was the same after 
both types of training therefore they were collapsed into one problem type, deontic 
problems, for further analysis. The following analysis was an attempt to investigate the 
changes in response patterns dependent on the type of training. In other words, an 
investigation into how the different types of training affected responding directly. As the 
most common responses on the arbitrary selection tasks in the absence of training are p and 
p/q, these patterns were the ones explored (see Table 5.7 for means). Participants' 
performance before and after training on the two problem types, deontic and arbitrary were 
scored for p responses only. A2x2x2 (Condition x Problem Type x Pre/Post scores) 
ANOVA was perfonned. The ANOVA failed to find an effect of condition (F(l, 58) = 
3.3 1, MSE = 11.70, p>. 05) although it did find a main effect of problem type (F(l, 58) = 
8.80, MSE = 14.50, p<. Ol) with a higher rate of p responding on arbitrary problems than 
deontic problenis overall. 
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Obligation training Rules training 
pre post pre post 
P responses Dcolitic 0.77 0.27 0.20 0. 
Arbitrary 1.50 1.13 0.60 0.53 
P/q responses Deontic 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.70 
arbitrary 1.70 1.60 2.23 1.07 
Table 5.7 Mean p and p/q responses before and after training 
There was no main effect of pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 0.90, MSE = 1.20, p>. 05). The 
interaction between condition and problem type failed to reach significance (F(l, 58) = 
3.46, MSE = 5.70, p>. 05) however the interaction between condition and pre to post scores 
was marginally significant (at F(l, 58) = 3.83, MSE = 5.10, p=. 05). Figure 5.2 illustrates 
that in the obligation training condition participants' p responding decreases (F(l, 58) = 
4.22, MSE = 5.63, p<. 05) however under rules training p responding increases, although 
not sig-nificantly (F(l, 58) = 0.50, MSE = 0.67, p>. 1). 
2.0 
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1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
M c 
0 1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
00 
0.2 
obligation rules 
F--] pre-scores 
E3 Post-scores 
TRAINING 
Figure 5.2 Interaction bet-ween condition and pre to post scores on p responding 
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The interaction between problem type and pre to post scores also failed to reach 
significance (F(l, 58) = 0.72, MSE = 0.34, p>. I) as did the 3-, A, a,,, interaction between 
condition, problem type and pre to post scores (F(1,58) = 2-57ý %ISE = 1.20, p>. 1). 
Participants' performance on the two types of selection task problems were then scored for 
p/q responses before and after training. Another 2x2x2 (condition x problem type x 
pre/post scores) ANOVA was performed to investigate changes in responding dependent 
on training type. No main effect of condition was obtained (F(I. 58) = 1.32. MSE = 6.02, 
p>. I) but there was a main effect of problem type (F(l, 58) = 38.41, MSE = 81.67, 
p<. 0001) with higher p/q response rates on arbitrary problems than deontic. There was also 
a significant main effect of pre to post training (F(l, 58) = 7.8 1, MSE = 8.07, p<. O 1) with 
p/q responses being decreased after training. The condition by problem type interaction 
failed to attain significance (F(l, 58) = 2.83, MSE = 6.02, p>. 05) however both the 
condition by pre to post training and the problem type by pre to post training interaction 
were significant (F(l, 58) = 5.82, MSE = 6.02, p<. 05 and F(l, 58) = 7.52, MSE = 4.27, 
p<. Ol respectively). In addition the 3-way interaction illustrated in Figure 5.3 attained 
significance (F(l, 58) = 4.96, MSE = 2.82, p<. 05). 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the 3-way interaction between condition, problem type and pre to post 
p/q responding scores. Under the obligation training condition levels of p/q responding 
didn't change much for either type of problem type. Under the rules training there is not 
much change on the deontic problems but p/q responding on the arbitrary problems 
decreases significantly (F(l, 58) = 13.56, MSE = 14.01, p<. 001). It is possible that rules 
training directs people who non-nally select p/q on the arbitrary tasks to avoid the in%, crse 
responsc (if p then q, therefore if q then p). This does not affect the deontic problems 
bccausc 1) Ll responses Nvcrc low pnor to training anyWay. 
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Figure 5.3 3-way interaction between condition, problem type and pre to post p/q 
responding scores 
5.3.3 Cognitive ability 
Correlations were perforined on the data to observe whether there were any associations 
between performance on the reasoning tasks and cognitive ability (see Table 5.8). The 
mean proportion of correct items per problem type was used for the analysis. Pnor to both 
types of training there were no significant correlations between performance on either the 
deontic or arbitrary tasks and the AH4 test of Intelligence. This is inconsistent with the 
findings reported in Expenment I of this thesis and also diverges from the typical 
relationship between ability and perfon-nance on the arbitrary tasks reported by Stanovich. 
After obligation training there were no correlations between either of the deontic tasks and 
ability but there was between perfon-nance on the arbitrary tasks and ability (. 53, p<. Ol 
two-tailed). After rules training, perfon-nance on all the tasks was related to ability (. 50, 
p<. Ol (two-tailed) for obligation problem; . 
41 and . 
40, p<. 05 (two-tailed) for pen-nission 
and arbitrary problems respectively). In sum, after training on the obligation schema 
perforniance on the deontic problenis was not related to intelligence however perfomiancc 
oil the arbitrary problerns was. In contrast. perforrnance on both problem types was related 
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to ability after rules training. This indicates that the training is more effective on these 
problems for individuals of higher ability. 
Obligation training Rules training 
A114 total AH4 total 
Pre Post Pre Post 
Deontic 
. 
27 
. 
23 
. 
27 
. 
46* 
Arbitrary 
. 
32 
. 
53** 
. 
19 40 
*p<. 05, **p<. Oi, ***p-. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 5.8 Correlations between reasoning tasks and ability 
5.3.4 Thinking Styles 
A correlational analysis was perfon-ned on the subscales of the rational-expenential 
inventory. As a moderate correlation was found between the Rational Ability and Rational 
Engagement subscales (. 39, p<. Ol) and a highly significant correlation betwccn the 
Expenential Ability and Expenential Engagement subscales (. 74, p<. 001), the four 
subscales were collapsed into two, the Rational and Experiential subscales respectively. 
Obligation training Rules training 
Rationality Experiential TDC Rationality Experiential TDC 
pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post 
deontic 0.23 0.32 -0.09 -0.18 0.47* 0.59** 0.26 0.37 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.22 
arbitrary 0.13 0.34 0.24 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.25 
*p--. 05 **p<. Ol ***p<. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 5.9 Correlations between performance on the tasks pre and post training and 
thinking style scales under each condition 
Scores on the rationality, experiential and Stanovich's thinking disposition composite 
subscales were correlated with scores on the AH, 4 measure of intelligence and the only 
association found was between the rationality subscale of the REI and ability at . 41) 
(p<. 00 I). Of particular interest were the relationships between perfon-nance on each of the 
selection task prob1cm types and the indices of rationality, cxpenentiality and Stanovich's 
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thinking disposition composite score. Table 5.9 displays the correlations under each 
condition. 
In the obligation training condition there were no associations except for between the 
thinking disposition composite score and performance on the deontic type problems prior 
to training (. 47, p<. 05) and after training (. 59, p<. 01). In the rules condition there were no 
significant relationships between performance on any of the tasks and measures of thinking 
styles. In other words, perfon-nance on the deontic tasks was related to more open-minded, 
flexible thinking styles both before and after obligation schema training, but these 
relationships were not present under rules training. There were no significant relationships 
between perfon-nance on the arbitrary problems and thinking styles measures in either 
training condition. 
5.3.5 Conditional reasoning 
Of interest was whether either training had improved conditional reasoning scores. Rules 
training involved training on the matenal conditional therefore this training specifically 
should improve perfon-nance on these problems. Table 5.10 illustrates the total conditional 
reasoning scores and the mean number of logically correct inferences made relating to 
modus ponens, affin-nation of the consequent, denial of the antecendent and modus tollens. 
There was some improvement after both types of training. A2x2x3 (training condition x 
pretest/posttest x inferences) ANOVA was perforined to observe whether training had an 
impact on any of the inferences. The modus ponens inference was not included in the 
analysis due to ceiling effects pre and post both types of training. There was no effect of 
training condition (F(l, 58) = 0.16, MSE = 0.22. p>. 1) but there was a difference between 
pre and post scores overall (F(l, 58) = 6.36, MSE = 2.02, p<. 02). The interaction between 
condition and the differencc pre to post scores failed to reach significance (F(l, 58) = 0.01, 
01 
MSE = 0.002, p. >. ]). In other words there was a significant increase in logically correct 
responding on the conditional reasoning problems under both training conditions. 
Obligation training Rules training 
pre post pre post 
MP 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.97 
AC 0.77 0.97 0.67 0.8- 
DA 0.73 0.87 0.60 0.80 
MT 1.33 1.43 1.40 1.47 
Total 4.83 5.27 4.67 5.10 
Table 5.10 Mean inference rates for each problem type 
A main effect of inference type was obtained (F(2,116) = 13.60, MSE = 15.76, p<. 001) 
and a Tukey HSD follow up revealed that participants achieved more logically correct 
responses on modus tollens inferences than either affinnation of the consequent or denial 
of the antecedent (p<. 001 for each). No interaction between training condition and 
inference type was obtained (F(2,116) = 0.19, MSE = 0.22, p>. I), and no interaction 
between inference type and pre to post training scores (F(2,116) = 0.26, MSE = 0.11, 
p>. 1). The three way interaction between training condition, inference type and pre to post 
training scores also failed to reach significance (F(2,116) = 0.05, MSE = 0.02, p>. I). In 
summary It can be concluded that both types of training increase scores on all the 
inferences, apart from MP, which had a ceiling effect prior to training. Participants achieve 
more logically correct responses on the valid MP and NIT inferences than the invalid AC 
and DA inferences. 
5.4 Discussion -Experiment 4 
In summary, the results of Experiment 4 demonstrated that obligation schema training 
facilitated reasoning perfonnance on both arbitrary and deontic selection tasks. including 
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problems designed to elicit both obligation and permission schemas. The training ser,, ed to 
reduce p only responses on both the arbitrary and deontic tasks. Abstract trainin-(-, in rules 
of logic facilitated reasoning performance on arbitrary selection task problems only. No 
transfer occurred from the rules training to either of the deontic problem types. P/q 
responses were reduced on the arbitrary tasks under this training procedure. Both training 
procedures resulted in an increase in logical perfon-nance on the conditional reasoning 
problems, including blocking the invited inferences of AC and DA. 
These findings are not quite as predicted for either rules training or obligation schema 
training. It was predicted that training in an abstract rule would transfer to arbitrary and 
deontic problems; however there was no transfer to obligation or pen-nission schema 
problems, only to other arbitrary problems. According to dual process theory training in a 
domain-specific rule such as an obligation schema should transfer only to other obligation 
schema problems; however transfer occurred to obligation, pennission and arbitrary 
problems therefore lending support to Cheng et al. 's original findings. The question is why 
are these conflicting results obtained? 
Let's look at the rules training first. Cheng et al. reported transfer to all problem types after 
this training (apart from biconditionals). The main difference between their study and this 
one is that the training examples were changed from consisting of thematic content to 
arbitrary. It is possible then that by changing the examples, facilitation of transfer to 
deontic problems has disappeared altogether. This finding is in contrast with Klaczynski 
and Laipple (1993) who proposed that the rules are relatively general when giving abstract 
training therefore there is no concrete knowledge base on to which the rules can be 
mapped. Once the domain-general rule is induced, transfer occurs across different problem 
tý-pes. This vicw is consistent with dual process theories, which would argue that training 
in a dornain-general rule should transfcr across domains. 
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Obligation schema training on the other hand, did transfer to problems from other domains. 
This is inconsistent with the predictions discussed here which would predict transfer to 
problems from the same domain only. This finding does support the original findings of 
Cheng et al. who found transfer to two of their arbitrary problems although it was 
questionable whether their test problems were entirely abstract. The design of this 
experiment addressed this directly by ensuring the test problems used were completely 
arbitrary when compared to Cheng et al. 's. Examples were also used as part of the training 
procedure to make the training more equal in length and structure to the rules training 
which may also have had an influence. 
This finding is in contrast to Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) who consistently found no 
transfer of training from Permission schema problems to arbitrary problems. They argued 
that when training assimilates to pre-existing domain-specific rules (as in permission or 
obligation schemas), the induction of a general rule is less likely to occur. They suggest 
that the induction of a domain-independent rule during the training occurs readily when 
training contradicts the problem-solvers' incorrect strategies for solving the problems and 
forces people to develop a new rule to accommodate the information presented. It could be 
that the obligation schema training procedure itself allows the induction of a domain- 
independent rule. Cheng et al. proposed that participants in their study were provided with 
infonnation as to which cases constituted violations as well as orienting them toward 
checking violations, which may have facilitated performance on the abstract problems. As 
these are consistent with the material conditional they can also be applied to arbitrary 
problems. 
So what do the correlations between performance on the selections tasks and ability tell us? 
Stanovich (1998a; 1999) proposed that higher ability participants are able to override the 
heuristic p/q response and reason analytically on the arbitrary selection task. However, no 
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correlations were present prior to training with either arbitrary or deontIc problems. After 
both types of training, associations were found with ability. After obligation training there 
was a significant correlation between performance on the arbitrary tasks and ability and 
after rules training, performance on both problem types was associated with ability. This 
may be best explained in dual process terms. System 2 is sensitive to instruction and 
training. It is also related to intelligence therefore if people are applying the rule they have 
been taught then these people may have more cognitive resources in which to do so. In 
other words, the correlation is an indicator of System 2 involvement in the task. The more 
resources they have available, the more effective the training. 
Returning to the training effects found in this experiment, obligation training transferred to 
both deontic and arbitrary tasks. Therefore it seems that this training was more effective 
for higher ability participants when solving arbitrary problems. However, the training 
facilitated improved reasoning on deontic problems also which could indicate that the 
schema-based training was more easily transferable to further tasks designed to elicit a 
pragmatic reasoning schema, regardless of ability levels. This finding is inconsistent with 
those of Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) who claimed that intelligence is related to the 
ability to transfer between domain-specific schema problems. Only individuals of higher 
ability are able to identify the structural similarities between the problems. 
The rules training transferred to arbitrary tasks only. However perfon-nance on both types 
of task was related to ability after training. Again if we look at the correlations as being an 
index of System 2 engagement then we can suggest that this training was most effective for 
performance on both types of problem for individuals with more cognitive resources 
available. This finding is again in contrast with Klaczynski and Laipple who proposed that 
only weak relationships with ability would be found when transferring from domain- 
independent problems as the rule may be more easily applied to target problems. It could 
206 
be argued that it was the high ability participants in this experiment who firstly understood 
the training and were then able to apply it to arbitrary and deontic tasks. Ho%N ever. for 
individuals of lower ability the rules tral II understand may have been too difficult to 
resulting in no transfer at all, and in fact may even have confused them leading to changes 
from correct to incorrect responding on the deontic tasks. 
On inspection of individual responses it appears that several participants do change from a 
predominantly incorrect response to a predominantly correct (p/not q) response after the 
rules training but this is offset by several participants who change from the correct 
response prior to training to an incorrect response. The mean ability score for those 
participants who changed to a correct response after training was 105.86 compared to a 
mean ability score of 99.33 for participants who changed from a correct to an incorrect 
response. This is a possible indication that the rules training only facilitates transfer across 
domains in participants of higher ability whereas participants of lower ability are perhaps 
conftised or misunderstand the training therefore resulting in incorrect choices. 
The findings discussed here are completely inconsistent with the findings related to 
Klaczynski et al. 's training studies, both in the direction of transfer after training and the 
relationships with ability. However Klaczynski et al. 's training was very different to Cheng 
et al. 's. It didn't involve any explanations of the rules or schema being used. The training 
involved presenting participants with problems followed by explanations of the correct and 
incorrect choices. The two types of training explored here so far, rules of the material 
conditional and obligation schema, resulted in the reduction of different types of responses 
on different problerns. Rules training reduced the heuristic p/q response on arbitrary 
problems significantly whilst obligation training reduced p only responses on both 
arbitrary and deontic problems. That in itself illustrates the different nature of the training 
techniqucs. It appears that ruics training engagcs an individual's analytic reasoning system 
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but only those of higher ability and enables them to override the heuristically cued pq 
response on arbitrary tasks. Obligation training on the other hand, alerts participants as to 
which card falsifies or violates the rule on both arbitrary and deontic tasks (see Evans & 
Over, 1996). The higher ability participants in this experiment are able to transfer this 
knowledge to arbitrary tasks from deontic explanations. 
In Experiment 5 the aim was to replicate the findings of Experiment 4 but in addition to 
compare Cheng et al. 's training to Klaczynski et al. 's in order to investigate whether the 
different findings could be explained by the training procedures themselves. A brief 
introduction to Experiment 5 will follow including further details of Klaczynski et al. 's 
training procedures. 
5.5 Experiment 5 
5.5.1 Introduction and rationale for Experiment 5 
Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989) conducted a series of experiments to understand 
the conditions under which reasoning transfers between problems on the selection task. 
They tested the effects of problem explanations and verbalization instructions on transfer 
from arbitrary or thematic problems to another set of arbitrary problems. Participants were 
given either five arbitrary problems or five thematic problems initially. In the explanation 
conditions, participants were read in-depth explanations of the correct and incorrect 
selections immediately after they completed each of the first five problems (see Chapter 2 
for training examples). Klaczynski et al. found that transfer occurred from the initial 
arbitrary problems to a final set of arbitrary problems but no transfer occurred from 
thematic to arbitrary problems. The results were discussed in terms of a 'contextual 
similarity hypothesis'. That is, the more shared elements a problem has, the greater the 
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similanty. Therefore, the more likely that reasoning on one problem will be transferred to 
the next problem. 
An alternative explanation of the pattern of results -ývas offered following their next 
experiment, using Cheng et al. 's (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Olivcr, 1986; Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985) hypothesis that participants are able to fon-nulate a general prob1cm 
solving rule or schema from explanations on arbitrary problems which they can 
subsequently use when presented with further arbitrary problems. New arbitrary problems 
are mapped onto the pre-existing schema and are then solvable. Thematic problems are tied 
to experiences and contexts and any problem solving rule that is formed from explanations 
is therefore limited in generality. Ansburg and Shields (2003) proposed that the problem- 
specific feedback emphasised the surface structure of the permission problems rather than 
deep structure which explained the lack of transfer from the permission problems. 
Due to the conflicting findings of Experiment 4 with Klaczynski et al. (Klaczynski, 
Gelfand, & Reese, 1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993), the aim of Expenment 5 was to 
replicate the results of Experiment 4, whilst at the same time drawing direct compansons 
with Klaczynski's training procedures. No changes were made to the training procedures 
presented in Experiment 4 but two training conditions were added, Permission schema 
training (Klaczynski and Laipple, 1993) and Abstract training (Klaczynski, Gelfand, & 
Reese, 1989). These two conditions were different from the Rules and Obligation training 
in that they didn't have training in abstract principles followed by the examples. 
Klaczynski et al. 's training consisted of four problems within a certain domain, permission 
or arbitrary, dependent on which condition the participant was in. These four source 
problems wcre each followcd by an explanation of the correct and incorrect selections, 
which were read out to the participants. For each explanation, participants were first told 
the correct answer and were given the reasons for selecting both the p and not q cards. 
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Participants were also told why the two incorrect cards (not p and q) should also not be 
selected. The form of the training explanations was identical across the problem types (See 
Appendix A5.1 and A5.2 for the Permission and Abstract training). They reported transfer 
to other problem types from abstract training examples but only transfer to problems of the 
same type for permission schema training examples. These training procedures were not 
compared in the same study. By including them together plus the rules and obligation 
training, transfer effects may be investigated on the same set of test problems. 
It was predicted that the findings from Experiment 4 would be replicated. Rules training 
will transfer to only arbitrary selection task problems. Obligation schema training will 
facilitate reasoning on selection tasks consisting of both arbitrary and deontic content. In 
tenns of Klaczynski et al. 's training, it was predicted that Pen-nission training would 
facilitate transfer to other problems that could be translated in terms of the permission 
schema only, whereas the Abstract training would allow for the induction of more general 
problem-solving rules therefore resulting in transfer to all types of selection task problems. 
We also included, once again, measures of ability to examine the extent to which ability 
mediates the effectiveness of the different training procedures. 
5.6 Method 
Design 
The experiment consisted of a between-subjects design involving four conditions. Two of 
the conditions were the same as in Experiment 4, Rules plus examples training and 
Obligation schema training (Cheng et al., 1986). Two further conditions were added, 
Permission schema training (Klaczynski and Laipple, 1993) and Abstract training 
(Klaczynski, Gelfand & Reese, 1989). The dependent variables were the eight selection 
task problems from Experiment 3 plus two extra selection tasks designed to elicit the 
i causal' schema (see Table 5.11). 
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Participants 
One hundred and twenty participants were randomly allocated to one of the four training 
conditions (obligation group, rules group, pennission 
_group 
and abstract group). Total 
mean age of the sample was 20.65 years (st. d. = 4.96). All were students and postgraduates 
from the University of Plymouth but none had participated in any form of logic training 
before. 
Materials 
Rules plus Examples Training 
30 participants were presented with the rules plus examples training (Cheng et al., 1986; 
exp. 1) used in Experiment 4. 
Obligation Schema plus Examples Training 
30 participants were given obligation schema training plus examples as used in Experiment 
4. 
Permission Schema Training 
This training condition was adapted from Klaczynski and Laipple (1993, Experiment 2). 
Participants were given four permission problems to complete (if one is to take Action A, 
then one must first satisfy Precondition P), each followed by an explanation detailing the 
correct and incorrect responses. In Klaczynski and Laipple's study these explanations were 
read out to the participants immediately after each problem but for this experiment a 
written explanation was given (see Appendix A5.1). 
For each explanation, participants were first told the correct answer and were given the 
reasons for selecting both the p and not q cards. In the final part of each explanation, 
participants were told why the two incorrect cards i. e. not p and q, should not be selected. 
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Because a common mistake on the four-card task involves selection of the q card and 
because selection of the not p card is rare, the rationale for not selecting q was particularly 
emphasised. 
Abstract Training 
This training procedure was the same as the Permission schema training but instead of 
problems designed to evoke the permission schema, arbitrary selection task problems were 
used. The form of the training explanations was identical across the two training problem 
types (permission and abstract), the only difference being the explanations given for the 
two types of problem were the specific instantiations of the four cards presented in the 
problems (p, q, not p, and not q). See Appendix A5.2 for the abstract training condition 
examples and explanations. 
Cognitive ability 
the AI-14-Group test of General Intelligence was administered (Heim, 1967) as used in 
Experiments I and 4. The test consists of two parts, each containing 65 items. Part one is 
comprised of both verbal and numerical problems, part two is composed of problems in 
diagrammatic form. Each section is timed and must be completed in 10 minutes. 
Selection task problems 
As in Experiment 4, half of the problems were used as a pre-test and half as a post-test. 
The sixteen problems described in Experiment 4 were used plus four new ones which were 
designed to invoke the 'causal schema'. The new problems were adapted from Klaczynski 
and Laipple (1993). They contained rules describing a causal relationship between the 
antecedent and consequent (see Table 5.11). Presentation of the problems was balanced so 
that the problems that were presented as a pre-test for half the participants became the 
post-test for the other half and vice versa. T-tests performed on the two fonns showed no 
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difference between form I and 2 on the arbitrary problems at t(I 18) = 0.68, p=. 50 but a 
significant difference between the two deontic forms at t(I 18) = -2.00, p<. 05. 
Form Conditional statement Response 
Form I "if a person exercises frequently, then that person will be in good shape. " Exercises frequently (p) 
Rarely exercises (not p) 
Good shape (q) 
Poorshape(notq) 
"if a person eats excessively, then that person will gain weight. " Eats excessively (p) 
Always dieting (not p) 
Gained weight (q) 
Lost weight (not q) 
Form 2 "If a patient has high cholesterol, then that patient will have high blood High cholesterol (p) 
pressure" Low cholesterol (not p) 
High blood pressure (q) 
Low blood pressure (not q) 
"if a person drinks heavily, then that person will become intoxicated. " Ten pints of beer (p) 
Two lemonades (not p) 
Customer drunk (q) 
Customer not drunk (not q) 
Table 5.11 Causal Conditional statements and their responses 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to eight. Each session took between one hour and 
a quarter to one hour and a half to complete the study. Participants were each given a 
booklet which contained all the test materials and training to work through. Each 
participant was randomly allocated to one of the conditions. First they completed the two 
subtests of the AH4. They were then asked to complete the ten selection task problems that 
made up the pre-test part of the experiment before undergoing the training section. 
Participants were asked to read and complete the Training section carefully and to make 
sure they understood what they were being trained to do. When they reached the end of 
that section they were to wait for other members of the group to reach the same point 
before progressing on to the post-test selection tasks. 
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5.7 Results 
5.7.1 Selection task responding under each training condition 
The selection task problems were scored as the number correct within each type. two 
obligation, two pen-nission, two causal and four arbitrary tasks. The mean proportion of 
correct responses for each type was then calculated and these scores were used for all 
analyses. Table 5.12 presents the mean proportion of correct responses for each type ot 
selection task under each condition, pre and post training. 
Cheng's Training Klaczynski's Training 
Obligation training Rules training Permission training Abstract training 
Problem pre post pre post pre post pre post 
type 
obligation . 
47 
. 
70 
. 
40 . 
38 
. 
33 
. 
72 . 50 . 77 
permission . 
63 . 71 . 
45 
. 
43 
. 
53 
. 
85 
. 65 . 
88 
arbitrary . 
05 
. 
15 . 
03 
. 
15 
. 
04 
. 
22 
. 
02 
. 
74 
causal . 13 . 
27 
. 
08 
. 
30 
. 
07 
. 
27 . 
03 
. 65 
Table 5.12 Mean proportion of correct responses for each type of selection task 
under each condition, pre and post training (N=30 per training condition). 
Table 5.12 illustrates that prior to training mean scores on the obligation and permission 
tasks were higher than arbitrary or causal task scores. A repeated measures ANOVA 
perfon-ned on the pre-training scores collapsed across the training conditions show that 
there is a significant difference in correct responses dependent on problem type (F(3,357) 
= 107.35, MSE = 8.09, p<. 001). Further analyses provided evidence for Cheng et al. 's 
reasoning schema hypothesis and findings in the selection task literature as problems 
designed to evoke the permission schema yielded the highest number of correct responses 
compared to obligation. causal and arbitrary problems (p < . 001 
for each). Obligation 
problems yielded the ncxt highest (p< . 001 compared to arbitrary and causal) providing 
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evidence for an obligation schema. Arbitrary and causal problem scores were not 
significantly different from each other (p = . 24) as expected. 
As both types of training in experiment 4 impacted on the problems designed to evoke 
obligation and permission schemas in the same way, for the following analyis they were 
collapsed into one variable, deontic problems. Performance scores on the causal problems 
were collapsed with the arbitrary tasks. The aim of the first analysis performed on the data 
was to investigate the effects of the two different types of schema-based training and the 
two different types of abstract training. This way we can examine the transfer effects of 
Klaczynski et al. 's training directly with Cheng et al. 's training. 
A2x2 between (deontic/abstract training x Cheng/Klaczynski training) x2 within 
(problem type) ANOVA was performed on the data. There was no difference on scores 
overall dependent on whether the training was schema-based or abstract (F(l, 116) = 0.40, 
MSE = 0.07, p>. 1), however there was a difference dependent on whether the training was 
Cheng et al. 's or Klaczynski et al. 's (F(I, l 16) = 10.81, MSE = 1.99, p<. 01). Participants in 
Klaczynski et al. 's training conditions performed better overall than in Cheng et al. 's 
training groups. The ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between the training and pre 
and post training scores which is illustrated in Figure 5.4 ((F(I, l 16) = 23.75, MSE = 2.12, 
P<. 001). 
Figure 5.4 illustrates that prior to both types of training, perfonnance on the selection tasks 
was the same. However, after training perfon-nance was improved under both conditions 
but more so after Klaczynski's training ((F(I, 116) = 6.8, MSE = 0.6, p<. 05 for Cheng's; 
(F(I, 116) = 90.27, MSE = 8.07, p<. 001 for Klaczynski's). The difference between post- 
training scores under the two conditions was also significant (F(l, 116) = 23.4 1, MSE = 
4.11, p<. 001). In other words, Klaczynski's training was far more effective at improving 
215 
reasoning then Cheng's training. Due to the differences in Klaczynski and Cheng's 
training, for the following analysis they were investigated separately. 
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Figure 5.4 Interaction between Cheng and Klaczynski's training and performance 
scores pre and post training. 
5.7.1.1 Cheng et al. 's obligation schema and rules training 
First a2x2x2 (Condition X Problem Type X Pre-Post Training scores) ANOVA was 
perfort-ned to observe any differences in correct responding (using proportion of correct 
scores) pre to post training on the selection tasks dependent on the Obligation and Rules 
training conditions. The difference between scores dependent on training just failed to 
reach significance (F(l, 58) = 3.64, MSE = 0.73, p=. 06) with higher scores attained under 
the obligation training group, but there was a main effect of pre and post training scores 
(F(l, 58) = 7.73, MSE = 0.61, p<0.01) and problem type (F(l, 58) = 95.25, MSE = 9.30, 
p< 0.001) with deontic problems yielding the highest number of correct scores. 
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Of particular interest were the interactions between the problems, training and pre and post 
scores. A 2-way interaction between training and pre and post scores failed to reach 
I icance (F(l, 58) = 0.88, MSE = 0.07, p>. 
-I). 
Another 2 s gnifi -way interaction between 
Training and the different selection task problems was significant (F(l, 58) = 6.40, MSE = 
0.62, p< . 05), however the interaction between problem types and pre to post scores was 
not (F(l, 58) = 1.64, MSE = 0.05, p>. I. The significant 3-way interaction between training, 
problem type and pre to post scores is illustrated in Figure 5.5 (F(l, 58) = 5.25, MSE - 
0.17, p<. 05). 
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Figure 5.5 3-Way interaction between Training, Problem Types and pre and post 
training scores under Cheng et al. 's Obligation and Rules training. 
There was an increase in scores after Obligation training on the deontic, (F(1,58) = 5.77. 
MSE = 0.38, p<. 05) and arbitrary problems (F(1,58) = 3.99, MSE = 0.18, p=. 05). After 
rules training there is only an increase on the arbitrary problerns (F(l, 58) = 7.29, MSE= 
0.34, p<. 01). Rules training did not impact on the deontic problems (F(l, 58) = 0.06, 
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MSE= 0.004, p>. I). In other words, there were transfer of training effects after obliption 
schema training on deontic problems and arbitrary problems, however performance after 
rules. training was facilitated on arbitrary problems only. These findinus replicate those of 
Experiment 4 although the impact on arbitrary problems after both t%, pes of training is not 
as strong. 
5.7.1.2 Klaczynski's permission schema and abstract training 
The same 2x2x2 (training x problem type x pre/post scores) ANOVA was performed on 
the Pen-nission and Abstract training groups. The ANOVA yielded a main effect of training 
(F(l, 58) = 9.13, MSE = 1.53, p<. Ol) with scores on the tasks being higher in the abstract 
training group; a main effect of pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 80.69, MSE = 8.07, p<. 001, 
and a main effect of problem type (F(l, 58) = 133.56, MSE = 9.53, p<. 001) with deontic 
problems yielding higher scores than arbitrary problems. Significant interactions between 
training and pre to post scores were obtained (F(l, 58) = 6.00, MSE = 0.60, p<. 05) and 
problem type and training (F(l, 58) = 3.89, MSE = 0.28, p=. 05). Another 2-way interaction 
was obtained between problem type and pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 6.47, MSE = 0.27, 
p<. 05). The ANOVA also yielded a significant 3-way interaction between training, 
problem type and pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 32.76, MSE = 1.35, p<. 001 -, see Figure 5.6 
for the graph of the interaction). 
On examination of the pre and post-training scores under Pen-nission training for all the 
problem types it appears that transfer has occurred to all of them. Further analysis provides 
or the deontic tasks evidence in that the difference pre-post training scores is significant f 
(F(l, 58) = 22.55, MSE = 1.84, p<. 001) and the arbitrary tasks (F(l, 58) = 8.44, MSE = 
0.50, p< . 01). This contradicts the 
findings of Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese who t'()und 
little transfer from thematic problems to abstract problems. 
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Finally, the largest effects appear to be under Abstract training. Pnor to training, 
participants achieved higher scores on the deontic problems than arbitrary problems, but 
after Abstract training the differences between the scores on each problem type was 
decreased as well as performance enhanced for all problems. The difference in pre to post- 
training scores was significant for deontic problems (F(l, 58) = 11.51, MSE = 0.94, 
p--. 001) and arbitrary problems (F(l, 58) = 117.28, MSE = 7.00, p<. 001). This finding is 
consistent with Klaczynski, Gelfand and Reese who suggest the abstract training facilitates 
the fori-nation of a more general problem-solving schema which may be used to solve 
subsequent problems. In summary, permission and abstract training improved performance 
on the selection tasks within the same domain of training the most, suggesting a degree of 
domain specificity, but also transferred to problems in different domains. 
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Figure 5.6 3-Way interaction bet-sveen Training, Problem Types and pre and post 
training scores under Klaczynski's Permission schenia and Abstract training. 
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5.7.2 Changes in response patterns 
As in experiment 4 an investigation into changes in response patterns dependent on tlic 
training condition was conducted. Again, due to the differences in tral I wation nin-u. the obli- i 
and rules training was looked at separately to the permission and abstract training. Table 
5.13 illustrates p only and p/q responses under each training condition. 
5.7.2.1 Cheng et al. 's obligation schema and rules training 
A2x2x2 (training x problem type x pre/post scores) ANOVA was conducted on p on] v 
responses under obligation and rules training. No effect of training was obtained (at F(I, 
58) = 0.01, MSE = 0.002, p>. 1), and no effect of pre to post training scores (at F(l, 58) = 
0.20, MSE = 0.02, p>. I). There was an effect of problem type (at F(l, 58) = 7.81, MS1' = 
0.27, p<. Ol) with more p only responding on the arbitrary tasks overall. The ANOVA also 
failed to obtain any significant interactions between training and problem type (at F(l, 58) 
= 0.01, MSE = 0.000, p>. ]), training and pre to post scores (at F(l, 58) = 0.68, MSE = 
0.06, p>. 1), or problem type and pre to post scores (at F(l, 58) = 0.34, MSE = 0.000, p>. 1). 
The 3-way interaction also failed to reach significance (at F(l, 58) = 0.61, MSE = 0.007, 
p>. 1). In Experiment 4 there was a significant decrease in p responding after obligation 
training but this effect is not present in this experiment. However on looking at the scores 
in Table 5.13 there is still the same trend in this expenment. 
Cheng's Training 
Obligation Rules 
Pre Post Pre Post 
Klaczynski's Training 
Pennission Abstract 
Pre Post Pre Post 
P Deontic 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.04 
response 
Arbitrary 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.03 
P Deontic 0.22 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.10 0.26 0.06 
response 
arbitarv 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.36 0.66 0.45 0.73 0.11 
Table 5.13 Mean p and p/q responses before and after each training conditimi. 
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The same 2x2x2 ANOVA was performed but looking at p/q responding before and after 
Obligation and Rules training. There was no main effect of training (at F(l, 58) = 0.03, 
MSE = 0.01, p>. I) but there was a main effect of problem type (at F(l, 58) = 49.53, MSE 
= 4.40, p-. 001) with higher rates of p/q responding on the arbitrary tasks. The ANOVA 
also yielded a main effect of pre to post scores (at F(l, 58) = 5.17, MSE = 0.53, p<. O-S) 
with a decrease in p/q responding after training. 
There were no significant interactions between training and problem type (at F(l, 58) = 
2.08, MSE = 0.18, p>. 1), training and pre to post scores (at F(l, 58) = 1.07, MSE = 0.11, 
p>. 1), or problem type and pre to post scores (at F(l, 58) = 3.12, MSE = 0.12, p>. 05). The 
ANOVA did yield a significant 3-way interaction between training, problem type and pre 
to post scores however (F(l, 58) = 4.17, MSE = 0.16, p<. 05. See Figure 5.7 for the graph 
of the interaction). 
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Figure 5.7 3-Way Interaction bet-vveen Training, Problem Types and pre and post 
Training p/q scores under Cheng et al. 's Obligation and Rules training. 
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Figure 5.7 illustrates a drop in p/q responding on both deontic and arbitrarv problems after 
obligation and rules training. A series of planned comparisons revealed that under 
obligation training the decrease in p/q responding was not significant for either deontic 
tasks (F(l, 58) = 0.82, MSE = 0.05, p>. I) or arbitrary tasks (F(l, 58) = 0.37, MSE = 0.03, 
p>. I). After rules training the decrease in p/q responding on the deontic problems was not 
significant (F(l, 58) = 0.42, MSE = 0.03, p>. 1) however the decrease on the arbitrary 
problems was (F(l, 58) = 10.30, MSE = 0.82, p<0.01). In summary, the findings in this 
experiment replicate those of Experiment 4. P/q responding on the arbitrary tasks was 
significantly reduced after training in the material conditional rule system. 
5.7.2.2 Klaczynski's permission schema and abstract training 
A2x2x2 (training x problem type x pre/post p responding scores) ANOVA was 
perfon-ned on the data from participants in the permission and abstract training groups. A 
main effect of training was obtained F(l, 58) = 4.87, MSE = 0.53, p<. 05) with more p 
only responding under the permission group. There was no effect of problem type (F(l, 58) 
= 1.16, MSE = 0.03, p>. 1) but there was an effect of pre to post training scores (F(l, 58) = 
4.02, MSE = 0.26, p<. 05) with a decrease in p only responding after training. 
No 2-way interactions were obtained between training and problem type (F(l, 58) = 0.07, 
MSE = 0.002, p>. 1), training and pre to post training scores (F(l, 58) = 1.98, MSE = 0.13, 
p>. 1) or problem type and pre to post training scores (F(l, 58) = 0.17, MSE = 0.003, p>. I). 
The ANOVA also failed to yield a significant 3-way interaction between training, problem 
type and pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 3.05, MSE = 0.05, p>. 05). In sum, Klaczynskl's 
training did produce a decrease in p responding on both deontic and arbitrary tasks. 
Another 2x2x2 (training x problem type x pre/post p/q responding) ANOVA was 
performed on the data under the permission and abstract training groups. There was no 
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effect of training (F(l, 58) = 2.23, MSE = 0.31, p>. I) but there was a main effect ot 
problem type (F(l, 58) = 91.09, MSE = 6.36, p<. 001) and pre to post training scores on pq 
responding (F(l, 58) = 47.75, MSE = 5.03, p<. 001). In other words, arbitrary problems 
yield a higher number of p/q responses overall and training decreases the amount of pq 
responding. 
The 2-way interaction between training and problem type was marginally significant (F(l, 
58) = 3.90, MSE = 0.27, p=. 05) and the interactions between training and pre to post scores 
and problem type and pre to post scores were also significant (F(l, 58) = 8.41, MSE = 
0.89, p<. Ol and F(l, 58) = 22.75, MSE = 0.97, p<. 001 respectively). There was also a 3- 
way interaction between training, problem type and pre to post scores (F(l, 58) = 9.95, 
MSE = 0.42, p<. 01). 
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Figure 5.8 illustrates the 3-way interaction. A series of planned comparisons revealed that 
under permission training, p/q responding decreases significantly on arbitrary tasks (F(I. 
58) = 7.94, MSE = 0.67, p<_. Ol) but fails to reduce significant] -v on deontic tasks (F(l, 58) 
= 3.68, MSE = 0.23, p<. 05). Under abstract training, pq responding decreases on both 
deontic and arbitrary tasks (F(l, 58) = 9.41, MSE = 0.60, p<. Ol and F(l, 58) = 68-1);,. MSE 
= 5.81, p-. 001 respectively). The interaction is caused by the large reduction of p'q 
responses on arbitrary problems under abstract training. 
5.7.3 Cognitive ability and performance under Cheng et al. 's Obligation and Rules 
training conditions 
Table 5.14 shows the correlations between performance on the selection tasks and 
cognitive ability under Obligation schema training and Rules training. Looking at the 
correlations under obligation and rules training initially, it appears that the results are 
inconsistent with the findings of Experiment 4. There is now a correlation between 
perfon-nance on the deontic selection tasks and cognitive ability prior to obligation training 
(. 49, p<. O I, two-tailed) although this still increases post training (. 66, p<. 001, two-tailed). 
Obligation training Rules training 
AH4 A114 
Pre Post Pre Post 
Deontic 
. 
49** . 
36 . 
17 
Arbitrary 
. 
13 
. 
26 . 
11 . 
12 
*p< 
. 
05, **p- 
. 01, 
***p<. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 5.14 Correlations between intelligence and performance on the tasks under 
Cheng et al. 's Obligation Schema Training and Rules Training 
Therc is also no association between perforinance on the arbitrary tasks and ability after 
obligation training which was found previously. Under rules training the pattern of 
correlations afici- training had also disappeared indicating no associations with ability 
cither beforc or after training on either type of task. One possible explanation for these 
findings is that the groups of participants in Experiments 4 and 5 differ in ablllt\ Icvc1s. A, ý 
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illustrated in Table 5.15 the mean ability scores under Obligation and Rules training in 
Experiments 4 and 5 do differ with lower scores being attained in Experiment 5. An 
independent t. -test was perfon-ned which showed a significant difference between the two 
groups (t(I 18) = 3.60, p<. 001) with higher ability participants in Experiment 4. We will 
return to this finding in the next section. 
Training AH4 TOTAL MEAN 
Experiment 4 Experiment 5 
Obligation 101.10 92.77 
Rules 102.00 93.10 
Table 5.15. Mean AH4 scores under Obligation and Rules training for Experiments 4 
and 5. 
5.7.4 Comparisons between performance in Experiments 4 and 5 under Cheng et 
al. 's Rules and Obligation training 
Due to the differences in ability levels between participants in the two experiments a 
further analysis was conducted to investigate whether training was more effectiý, c in 
Experiment 4 compared to Experiment 5. A2x2x2x2 (Experiment x Training x 
pre/post scores x problem type) ANOVA was perfon-ned. The main effect of Expenment 
was approaching significance (F(l, 116) = 3.26, MSE = 0.77, p=. 07) illustrating that higher 
reasoning scores were obtained in Experiment 4 overall. The other finding Of interest was a 
highly significant interaction between training, problem type and pre/post scores (F(l, 116) 
= 14.32, MSE = 0.53, p<. 001). This did not interact with Experiment suggesting that the 3- 
way interaction is a robust effect (F(l, 116) = 0.54, MSE = 0.02, p=. 46). 
In surnmary, the main effect of experiment suggests that participants in Experiment 4 
performed generally better than in Experiment 5. This is consistent with the AH4 data and 
sm"gcsts ability differences between the groups and less System 2 invokernent amongst 
tile participants in Experiment 5. This would also explain the absence of cori-clations 
bct%N-ccii abilitv and perforniance in Experiment 5. The presence of a correlation bct%N, een 
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performance on the deontic problems and ability prior to training i I is consistent wi 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, and Farrelly (2004) with a low ability group. The fact 
that the participants in this_ experiment are lower in ability than in Experiment 4. plus the 
absence of the correlations that were found previously and the smaller training effects 
leads us to the conclusion that participants in Expenment 5 were less likely to acquire the 
rule and thus less likely to apply it on further selection tasks. If ability is a marker of 
System 2 involvement then training in this experiment is not as effective in engaging 
System 2's analytic reasoning processes. 
5.7.5 Cognitive ability and performance under Klaczynski's Permission and Abstract 
Training conditions 
Table 5.16 illustrates the correlations between performance on the reasoning tasks and 
ability under Permission training and Abstract training. Under the Permission training 
group there was a moderate correlation between perfon-nance on the deontic tasks prior to 
training and ability (. 45, p<. 05, two-tailed) but after training this increased (. 70, p<. 001, 
two-tailed). A similar but weaker pattem was observed with arbitrary tasks also (. 43, 
p<. 05, two-tailed). Under the Abstract training group there were no significant correlations 
prior to training but after perfonnance on both deontic and arbitrary tasks there was an 
association with intelligence (. 43 and . 47 respectively, both p<. 05, two-tailed). Using 
ability as an indicator of System 2 involvement we may conclude that both types of 
training effectively engage analytic reasoning on deontic and arbitrary tasks in individuals 
with higher ability. 
Pernussion training 
AE4 
Pre Post 
Abstract training 
AE4 
Pre Post 
Deolltlc 
.45* . 
70*** 
. 
12 . 
43* 
Arbitrary . 
33 
. 43* . 
10 
. 
47* 
*p, 
. 
0s. **p< 
. 
01, ***p<. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table 5.16 Correlations betiveen intelligence and performance on the tasks under 
Klaczynski'% Permission training and Abstract training 
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5.8 Discussion -Experiment 5 
Consistent with the findings in Experiment 4. Obligation schema training facilitated 
reasoning on both deontic and arbitrary problems, and Rules training facilitated reasoning 
on arbitrary problems only. The comparison between Cheng et al. 's training and 
Klaczynski's demonstrated that Klaczynski's training procedures were far more effecti\ e 
in improving reasoning responses. Reasoning perfon-nance was increased dramaticallly on 
both deontic and arbitrary selection tasks after both of Klaczynski's training procedures, 
although the effects were greater to problems within the same domain of training than 
across domains. In other words, Pen-nission training increased correct responding more on 
further deontic tasks than arbitrary, and Abstract training increased correct responding 
more on the arbitrary tasks than deontic. 
The replication of the transfer effects after Obligation and Rules training in this 
experiment, casts doubt on the original work of Cheng et al. Cheng et al. claimed that the 
Obligation training transferred to obligation schema problems and arbitrary problems that 
may be interpreted as obligations. The abstract test items they used in their study were 
thematic and it was thought that they might have affected the transfer. However, in these 
two experiments we have demonstrated that training in obligations transfers to purely 
arbitrary problems. The items have been used before in previous experiments and have 
been shown to elicit patterns of responses consistent with abstract selection tasks. The 
addition of two obligation schema examples to the training procedure may have caused 
these transfer effects however further discussion of this will be saved for the general 
discussion at the end of this chapter. 
The findings in relation to Rules training are inconsistent with the findings of Cheng et al. 
Thcv found that the training improved reasoning on a variety of problem types. however ,, 
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neither of the experiments reported here did Rules training facilitate reasoning on any other 
problems other than ones consisting of arbitrary content. The most likely explanation for 
this lack of transfer is that the examples used as part of the training in the two experiments 
reported here were changed from consisting of thematic content to arbitrary. We propose 
that the thematic examples employed by Cheng et al. facilitated the transfer to other 
problems involving thematic content. The question is why the abstract training only 
transferred to abstract problems. It was predicted that abstract rules training would transfer 
to both arbitrary and deontic problems. Further discussion of this will be presented in the 
general discussion. 
Overall the smaller facilitation effects resulting from these two training conditions in 
Experiment 5 lead us to conclude that the training procedures were less effective. The 
absence of the correlations with ability that were present in Experiment 4 along with the 
finding that the participants were of lower ability indicate that the training was less 
effective because participants did not have the cognitive resources available to acquire and 
apply the rules being taught. Also in comparing the experiments, perfon-nance overall in 
Experiment 5 was worse than Experiment 4 which is consistent with the notion that 
training facilitates System 2 thinking and is generally less effective the less resources are 
available. 
Klaczynski et al. 's Abstract training facilitated performance on all problem types as 
expected. This contrasts with the effects found after Cheng et al. 's training. P only and p/q 
responses were significantly reduced on all tasks after training. In other words, the 
matching bias response was inhibited by the training procedure. Permission training on the 
other hand also resulted in improved performance on both deontic and arbitrary problems 
which was inconsistent with Klaczynski and Laipple. The training reduced p responding on 
both problem types however p/q responding was reduced for arbitrary problems only. This 
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could be partly due to the low number of p/q responses on the deontic tasks prior to 
training in the first place. Overall, the larger effects of training to problems xvithin the same 
domain as training i. e. from pennissio-n to deontic and from abstract to arbitrary, suggests 
some domain-dependence of training. 
The pattern of correlations with ability after training was also inconsistent with Klaczynsk-i 
et al. 's findings. Klaczynski and Laipple found that transferrmg from an abstract rule was 
not related to ability but transferring from a permission schema was. In Experiment 5, 
ability was related to both problem types after both training conditions. Again this can be 
viewed as an indicator of System 2 involvement on the tasks, with some increased 
involvement after training. 
Interestingly, the absence of correlations between perfonnance on arbitrary tasks and 
ability in both Experiments 4 and 5 prior to training is inconsistent with the findings 
reported in Chapter 3 (Experiment 1) and those reported by Stanovich (1998a; 1998b; 
1999). Stanovich consistently finds associations between correct responding on the task 
and cognitive ability. He proposes that it is the higher ability participants who are able to 
clecontextualise the problem from the items named in the rule (the heuristic p/q response); 
therefore resulting in the correct response. 
Why is there such a big difference in training effects between Cheng et al. 's training and 
Klaczynski et al. 's training? Cheng et al. 's training procedures both involve lengthy 
explanations of the rule that participants are to learn prior to the presentation of cxamples. 
Klaczynski et al. 's training on the other hand involves the presentation of examples 
followed by explanations of how to solve the problems. In sum this procedure is a great 
deal simpler to follow and does not require participants to apply a set of leamt rules. 
Participants are pro\ ided with the strategics that they can then utillse on sub,, cquent 
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selection tasks, regardless of content. Again further discussion of this will be saved for the 
general discussion. 
In Experiment 6 we will attempt to replicate the findings in relation to Klaczysnki ct al. 's 
training. Klaczynski and Laipple found no transfer of training to problems in other 
domains than the permission problems after pennission schema training. It is possible that 
the pretest/posttest design that is used here may have cued participants' responses. Prior to 
training in Experiment 5 participants completed both arbitrary and deontic selection task 
problems. Therefore when the participants were presented with either Abstract or 
Permission training, they were already aware of content variation within the tasks. The 
pretest was hence not used for this experiment. Another possible reason for conflicting 
results was order of presentation of the posttest selection tasks. In Expenment 5, the 
selection tasks were presented in random order, which may have affected individuals' 
responses in some way. That is receiving a mixed order of abstract and deontic tasks may 
have facilitated the recognition of the similarities between the rules in terms of underlying 
structure. Therefore to ensure that this did not affect reasoning performance, in the 
following experiment presentation of the tasks will be controlled. 
With these effects controlled for, it will be possible to test Klaczynski's hypothesis that the 
Permission training will facilitate transfer to other problems that may be translated in terms 
of the pennission schema only against the findings of Expenment 5 that permission 
schema training results in positive transfer to problems in other domains. 
5.9 Aims for Experiment 6 
The aim of Fxpenment 6 Nvas to follow up the findings of Experiment -5 in relation to 
Penilission training, whilst controlling the order of problem presentation and ornitting, the 
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pre-test. Performance after Permission training was compared to a control group. Within 
each condition there were three groups therefore resulting in six groups altogether %%, hich 
differed. in order of test items. Group One were presented with four arbitrary selection 
tasks followed by the permission problems. Group Two were presented with four 
permission problems followed by the arbitrary problems and Group Three ývere presented 
with all eight selection task problems in random order. 
With these experimental variables controlled for, it would be possible to explore whether 
the Permission training would facilitate transfer to other problems that could be translated 
in terms of the permission schema and problems involving arbitrary content or, in 
accordance with dual process theories, Permission training would transfer to only problems 
consisting of deontic content. 
5.10 Method 
Design 
The experiment involved a between subjects design with two conditions. The training 
condition was the same as used in Expenment 5, Klaczynski and Laipple's (1993) 
Permission training. The second condition was a Control group who received no training. 
The dependent variables were eight selection task problems, four designed to elicit the 
pen-nission schema and four arbitrary tasks. 
Participants 
One hundred and forty four participants were randomly allocated to one of the six 
conditions resulting in 24 participants per experimental group. Total mean age of the 
sample was 20.35 st. dev. 4.91 (control = 19.53, st. dev. 3.29; training = 21.18, st. dev. 6.03). 
231 
All were I" year Psychology undergraduates from the University of Plymouth participating 
as part of a points scheme. None had taken part in any form of logic training beforehand. 
Materials 
Perinission Training 
Klaczynski's Permission training was used as in Experiment 5. 
Selection Task Problems 
Four problems designed to elicit the permission schema and four arbitrary selection tasks 
were taken from Experiments 4 and 5 (see Table 5.17). 
Tasks Conditional statement Response 
Arbitrary "if the letter A is on one side of a card, then the number 7 must be on A (p) 
the other side of the card. " D (not p) 
7 (q) 
3 (not q) 
"if Triangle is on one side of a card, then Dog must be on the other Triangle (p) 
side of the card. " square (not p) 
dog (q) 
cat (not q) 
"If Yellow is on one side of a card, then Oak must be on the other yellow (p) 
side. " green (not p) 
oak (q) 
beech (not q) 
"if Coffee is on one side of a card, then Goldfish must be on the other coffee (p) 
side of the card. " tea (not p) 
goldfish (q) 
hamster (not q) 
Permission "If a person is travelling to the United States of America, then that United States of America (p) 
person must have a visa. " France (not p) 
Passport and a Visa (q) 
Passport and no Visa (not q) 
"If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be at least 18 Drinking beer (p) 
years old. " Drinking Coke (not p) 
18 years of age (q) 
16 years of age (not q) 
"If a student is withdrawing books from the library, then they must Books on loan (p) 
have a valid Identity card" Books not on loan (not p) 
Valid Identity card (q) 
Invalid Identity card (not q) 
"if a person purchases cigarettes or tabacco, then they must be 16 Bought cigarettes (p) 
years or over in age. " Didn't buy cigarettes (not p) 
17 years of age (q) 
15 vears of age (not q) 
Table 5.17. Arbitrary and Permission Problems used in Experiment 6. 
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Cognitive Ability 
The AI-14-Group test of General Intelligence was administered (Helm, 1967) as used in 
Experiment 1,4 and 5. The test consists of two parts, each containing 65 items. Each 
section is timed and must be completed in 10 minutes. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of two to eight. Testing sessions took apprommatelly 30 
minutes for the control Group and 45 minutes for the permission training group. 
Participants under the training condition worked through their training booklet first. They 
were instructed to read and complete the training section carefully and to make sure they 
understood the explanations of the correct responses presented after each problem. They 
then completed the two subtests of the AH4 before being presented with the test booklet 
containing the selection task problems. Participants who received no training completed 
the AH4 subtests followed by the selection tasks. 
On completion of the study, participants were thanked and given an explanation of the 
study they had just taken part in. 
5.11 Results - Experiment 6 
5.11.1 Training effects on deontic and arbitrary selection task performance 
The selection task problems were scored as the number correct within each type, four 
arbitrary problems and four deontic tasks designed to elicit the pen-nission schema. Table 
S. 18 presents the proportion of correct responses for each type of selection task under each 
condition, the control group and Pennission training group. It can be seen that arbitrarv 
tasks Nicld the lowest number of correct responses compared to deontic tasks as expected. 
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Participants in the training condition achieved higher rates of correct responding on hoth 
types of task but further analysis is required to observe whether this is significant. 
Control Permission Training 
Mean St. Dev Mean ', -, t. De%, 
Arbitrary . 
03 
. 14 . 
12 
. 
2() 
Deontic . 
70 
. 
36 
. 
81 
. 
32 
Table 5.18 Proportion of correct responses for each q'pe of selection task under 
each condition, Control and Permission training (N=72 per condition) 
A2 Condition (control or training) x3 Order (task presentation) x2 Problem Type 
(arbitrary or deontic) ANOVA was perfon-ned on the data to observe any significant 
differences. A main effect of condition (F(l, 138) = 7.87, MSE = 0.68, p<. 01) showed that 
training increases the amount of correct responding on the selection tasks. No effect of 
order was found (F(2,138) = 1.18, MSE = 0.10, p>. 1), therefore it appears that there arc no 
carry over effects between different types of tasks. The interaction between Condition and 
Order of tasks did also not reach significance (F(2,138) = . 379, MSE = 0.03, p>. 
1) which 
illustrates that regardless of order, responses increased the same for all the participants 
under the training condition. 
A main effect of Problem Type was found, (F(1,138) = 402.35, MSE = 33.69, p<. 001), 
with Deontic tasks yielding much higher number correct scores than Arbitrary tasks as 
expected. There were no significant interactions between Problem type and Condition (F(l, 
138) = 0.09, MSE = 0.01, p>. I, which would indicate that Permission schema training 
increases correct responding on Pen-nission problems but also transfers to arbitrary 
problems as found in expenment 5 (sec Figure 6). There wcre no significant interactions 
bctNN-ccn Problem t,, I)c and Order (F(2.138) = 0.215, MSE = 0.02, p->. 1). or Problem t\])c. 
Condition and Order (F(2. I 3S) -- 0-41), MSE = 0,04, p_-. 1). 
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5.11.2 Differences in response 
There was no pre-test in this experiment therefore responses after training were compared 
to participants in the control condition who received no training (see Table 5.19 for p only 
and p/q responses under each condition). A2x2 (condition x problem type) ANOVA 
performed on p only responses yielded a significant main effect of condition (F(l, 142) = 
13.53, MSE=15.12, p<. 001) with p only responses being lower after Permission training. 
There was also a significant effect of problem type (F(l, 142) = 13.80, MSE=8.68, p<. 001) 
illustrating more p responses on arbitrary problems than deontic. The ANOVA also yielded 
a significant interaction (F(l, 142) = 6.38, MSE = 4.01, p<. 01). Planned comparisons 
revealed that in the control condition p only responses were much higher for the arbitrary 
tasks than the deontic tasks (F(l, 142) = 19.48, MSE = 12.25, p<. 001) however after 
Permission training, p only responses had decreased for both problem types but much more 
for the arbitrary tasks resulting in little difference between the two problem types (F(l, 
142) = 0.7 1, MSE = 0.44, p>. 1). See Figure 5.9 for the graph of the interaction. 
Problem Type Control group Pern-iission training 
P response Deontic 0.29 0.07 
arbitrary 0.87 0.18 
P/q response Deontic 0.47 0.43 
arbitrarv 2.57 2.86 
Table 5.19 Mean p and p/q responses under each condition (score out of 4) 
A2x2 (condition x problem type) ANOVA was performed on p/q responses which failed 
to find an effect of condition (F(l, 142) = 0.58, MSE = 1.12, p>. 1) but did find an effect of 
problem type (F(l, 142) = 213.02, MSE = 369.01, p<. 001). In other words there was no 
difference in p/q responding after training but there was more p/q responding on the 
arbitrary tasks than deontic. No significant interaction was obtained (F(l, 142) = 1.15, 
MSE = 2.00, p>. 1). 
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Figure 5.9 Interaction between condition and problem type for p responding 
5.11.3 Cognitive ability 
Table 5.20 displays the correlations between ability and perfon-nance on both types of 
selection task under each condition. In Expenment 5 there were strong correlations 
between perfon-nance on the deontic and arbitrary problems and ability under Pen-nission 
training but in Expenment 6 this pattern was absent. In the control condition there was a 
significant correlation between ability and performance on the deontic problems (. 34, 
p<. 05 two tailed) which was present in Experiment 5 prior to Obligation schema training 
with a lower ability group of participants. 
Control Pernussion training 
AH4 
Deontic 
. 
34* . 
22 
Arbitrarv 
*= p-. 05 **p<. Ol (two-tailed) 
Table 5.20 Correlations between Ability and performance on the Selection Tasks. 
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The pattern of correlations with deontic tasks again suggests that the participants in this 
study may be of lower general ability (Newstead et al., 2004). The absence of correlations 
with ability may reflect low System 2 involvement amongst most participants in applying 
the training. An independent Mest was performed to compare ability levels of participants 
in the Pen-nission training group in Experiment 6 with those in the same condition in 
Experiment 5 and it did attain significance (t(100) = 2.25, p<. 05) with participants in 
Experiment 6 being of lower ability (88.75 compared to 96.4). 
Consistent with the explanation put forward for the weaker transfer effects found after 
Rules and Obligation schema training in Experiment 5, we can propose that due to the 
lower ability levels of the participants in Experiment 6, the Permission training was less 
effective than in Experiment 5. 
5.12 Summary -Experiment 6 
With carry over effects and order of presentation effects controlled for, the findings in 
Experiment 6 support the previous findings that Permission schema training transfers to 
problems outside the domain of training. However the training effects are weaker than 
found in Experiment 5. The lower ability levels of the participants in this study and the 
absence of the correlations between performance on the tasks and ability again lead us to 
the conclusion that training was not as effective in engaging System 2. These findings will 
now be discussed as part of the general discussion in this chapter. 
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5.13 General Discussion - Chapter 5 
There were two- general predictions made at. the beginning of this chapter in relation to 
performance after abstract training. Evans (1989) has argued that it is doubtful that verbal 
instruction in relation to underlying logical principles can remove biases as they are 
implicit and few people get past a relevance judgement on the selection task. In contrast 
and consistent with Cheng et al. 's and Klaczynski et al. 's (1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 
1993) findings in relation to abstract rules training, it was predicted that a domain- 
independent rule would be induced ftom the training which would then be applied to both 
arbitrary and deontic problems. 
In terms of schema-based training there are two contrasting claims in the literature. 
Consistent with Cheng et al. 's original findings, it was predicted that schema training 
would transfer to different problem types. However, in accordance with Klaczynski et al. 's 
dual process account, the training would improve reasoning on problems designed to elicit 
the schema only. 
The pattern of results was not entirely consistent with the previous findings. In 
Experiments 4 and 5 two training procedures were tested, originally used by Cheng et al. 
(1986) to investigate transfer effects after training in the logic of the material conditional 
rule system and after training in a pragmatic reasoning schema. Cheng et al. found that the 
logic training transferred to selection tasks involving arbitrary and thematic content. 
Howcvcr their training involved the use of thematic training examples, which it is 
proposed, may havc facilitated the solution of subsequent thematic problems. They also 
reported that training in the obligation schema transferred to selection task problems 
consisting of obligation schema content, but also transferred to two arbitrary problems 
which they explained may have been interpreted as obligations after training. The Mo 
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arbitrary problems that may ha-ve been interpreted as obligations in Cheng et al. 's study 
were highly thematic. 
In Expenments 4 and 5, after the logical rules training the pattern of' results was entirely 
inconsistent with those predicted by Cheng et al. and Klaczynski et al. who ha% e proposed 
that training in an abstract rule system would transfer to problems in other domains. In 
these studies, participants were able to transfer the knowledge to arbitrary problems onlý. 
The main effect of training was to reduce p/q responding on the arbitrary tasks. The most 
obvious explanation for the conflicting results is the change of content in the examples 
used as part of the training. The transfer that Cheng et al. reported must havc at least partly 
been due to the thematic content of their examples because in both the experiments 
reported here, this facilitation was absent. 
The findings in relation to obligation schema training are consistent with Cheng et al. 's 
original (1986) study. Transfer occurred to deontic and arbitrary problems though the 
effects were weaker in Experiment 5. Arguably this finding is entirely inconsistent with 
dual process theories and Klaczynski et al. 's view that domain-specific training does not 
transfer outside the domain of training because the infori-nation is tied to contexts and 
experiences and so it cannot be generalised. However it could be argued that the training is 
not domain-specific any more than the rules training is domain-general. The correlations 
between intelligence and post-training perfonnance leads us to conclude that explicit 
training serves to engage System 2 thinking and participants applied the analytic strategies 
that they have been taught. Individuals were able to decontextual, se the key elements of 
the problem and transfer them to different problems regardless of content. 
In Fxpenmcnts 5 and 6 the training effects using Klaczynski et al. 's (Klaczý-nski, Gelfand 
& Reese. 1989; Klaczynski & Laipple. 1993) Abstract and Pennission scherna training 
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were examined. Again the findings were inconsistent with previous research. Massivc 
facilitation of reasoning responses was found after the examples-based training procedures. 
The Abstract training transferred to both deontic and arbitrary problems as expected. 
However the Permission schema training also transferred to both types of selection task, 
albeit a weaker effect of cross-domain transfer in Experiment 6. In Experiment 5, transfer 
effects under both training conditions were greater within the same domain as training but 
large facilitation of correct responding was achieved on the problems from outside the 
domain also. 
There are three key questions to address following the findings reported in this chapter. 
Firstly why do the findings in relation to Cheng et al. 's rules and obligation schema 
training conflict with dual process predictions and previous research; secondly why did we 
find a greater facilitation effect using Klaczynski et al. 's pen-nission schema and abstract 
training than they did; and thirdly why was Klaczynski et al. 's training so much more 
effective than Cheng et al. 's? I will address the conflicting findings using Cheng et al. 's 
training first. 
The lack of transfer from the Rules training to deontic problems was not expected. 
Participants are being taught an abstract rule which has no contextual infort-nation which 
may influence responding or may be mapped onto a specific domain. The general 
prediction is that participants should be able to map the elements easily onto other 
problems regardless of content. However both Experiments 4 and 5 found that transfer did 
not occur. One explanation for this is that the Rules training is difficult and involves 
reading and understanding quite a complex logical rule system. If we consider the 
relationships between performance on the tasks after training and cognitive ability into 
account it is highly likely that only higher ability individuals are able to follow it and then 
apply it even to problems in the same domain. This is consistent with Sloman's view that 
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individuals of higher ability are more likely to learn the rules (personal communication: 
22 nd Sept. 2004). Of course it is also possible that the difference in training effects found 
here compared to Cheng et al. 's original study is due 
_to 
ability levels. Cheng et al. 's 
participants may have been higher in ability thus resulting in more positive transfer rates. 
Cheng et al. argued that the material conditional was not an intult've rule system because 
neither their rules nor examples training alone facilitated reasoning performance. Only 
when the two procedures were used together was reasoning performance enhanced. The 
findings reported here support this notion as it would be expected that if the material 
conditional was intuitive, then after being taught the rule, participants would be able to 
utilise it on further selection tasks involving both arbitrary and deontic content. The lack of 
transfer effects in Experiments 4 and 5 casts further doubt on whether the conditional is 
really material. 
In terms of the Obligation training effects in Experiments 4 and 5, transfer occurred to both 
deontic and arbitrary problems. Consistent with Cheng et al. 's view, participants were able 
to interpret arbitrary selection tasks as obligation schemas, thus resulting in the correct 
solution of the task. The difference between Cheng et al. 's training and the training in the 
experiments reported here is that we included two obligation schema example problems. 
These may have facilitated solution rates on the arbitrary and deontic test items, or the 
transfer effects could be due to the provision of the checking procedures as Cheng et al. 
suggested. Two ways that they suggested that schema training could improve perforinance 
were firstly by providing participants with more general mapping rules for interpreting 
situations in terms of the obligation schema and secondly by providing checking 
procedures consistent with the material conditional that may be applied to other problem 
types such as those involving arbitrary content. 
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Consistent with the Rules training, there were relationships between abilit", and 
performance on the arbitrary tasks only after Obligation schema training. Therefore it 
seems that this training was more effect_ive for higher ability participants when solving 
arbitrary problems. However, the training facilitated improved reasoning on deontic 
problems also which could indicate that the schema-based training was more easily 
transferable to further tasks designed to elicit a pragmatic reasoning schema, regardless of 
ability levels. This finding is inconsistent with those of Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) who 
claimed that intelligence is related to the ability to transfer between domain-specific 
schema problems. Only individuals of higher ability are able to identify the structural 
similarities between the problems. 
In Experiment 5 the Rules and the Obligation schema training were less effective. The 
explanation put forward for this is that due to the lower ability levels of the participants in 
Experiment 5 the training was not as effective. The lack of association between 
perfon-nance and ability after both types of training in Experiment 5 and the poorer overall 
perfon-nance indicates that there was less System 2 involvement. Thus, participants in 
Experiment 4 had a better understanding of the training and could apply it whereas 
participants in Experiment 5 could not. 
Turning now to the massive facilitation effects resulting from Klaczynski et al. 's training 
procedures, why is Klaczynski et al. 's training procedures more effective in Increasing 
correct solution rates on the selection tasks than Cheng et al. 's? Klaczynski et al. 's training 
involved presenting participants with four examples followed by in-depth explanation of 
the correct and incorrect choices. We propose that it is the examples plus feedback 
themselves that facilitate most of the transfer effects found under all training conditions. In 
addition, there were only two example problems for each of Cheng et al. 's Rules and 
Obligation training whereas under Klaczynski's Abstract and Permission training, 
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participants had four problems to acquire the solutions to be used on subsequent selection 
tasks. All participants had to do in these conditions was recognise that each problem had 
the same solution regardless of content, understand how the problems were solved and then 
map the key elements on to the test items. Both the Obligation schema training and the 
Rules training had complicated explanations of the rule that participants were requested to 
learn prior to the examples. These explanations are difficult even for higher ability 
participants to follow and actually may even distract from the goal of the instruction. 
Klaczynski's training conditions are more effective without these training procedures 
included. 
The effects we found using Klaczynski et al. 's training procedures were inconsistent with 
the ones they originally reported. The only explanation for this could possibly be that the 
feedback participants were given during training in Klaczynski et al's studies was 
presented verbally. Participants in the studies reported here were presented with written 
explanations of the correct and incorrect card choices, albeit in exactly the same format as 
Klaczynski et al. used. We propose that the written presentation allowed participants to 
take in the information and understand it, thus resulting in more transfer from permission 
to arbitrary problems. 
In tenns of ability, Klaczynski and Laipple argued that there would be no associations 
between performance and ability after abstract training as a general problem-solving rule 
would be acquired to solve subsequent problems. It would be easy to map the rules onto 
other problems as there would be no content to separate from the key elements in the 
training. In the Abstract training condition in Experiment 5 associations were found 
between both deontic and arbitrary tasks and ability after the training, which would 
indicate that only higher ability participants are correctly learning the rules and applying 
them. 
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Klaczynski and Laipple argued that permission training would only improve reasonin&, on 
problems from the same domain and individuals that successfully transfer the infori-nation 
would be higher in ability. In contrast with Klaczynski and Laipple, training in a 
pen-nission schema resulted in improved performance on both deontic and abstract 
problems. High ability was associated with perfon-nance on both types of problems in 
Experiment 5 which again would indicate that it is higher ability individuals that are able 
to separate the rule from its context, learn the rule and then apply it to subsequent problems 
from other domains. 
The transfer effects after Permission training found in Experiment 5 were replicated in 
Experiment 6. Again the participants were lower in ability than the previous group, which 
would account for the reduced transfer effects. The same explanation can be put forward as 
for the findings in relation to the reduced transfer effects found after Rules and Obligation 
schema training in Experiment 5. The Permission schema training was not as effective due 
to the lower ability group of participants in Experiment 6. The absence of an association 
between ability and performance after training is consistent with the notion that training is 
not effectively engaging System 2. 
5.14 Conclusion -Chapter 5 
The findings from the three experiments reported in this chapter are complex. The simple 
predictions derived from dual process theories were not supported. For instance it was 
predicted that no transfer would occur from schema-based training to arbitrary tasks. 
However, transfer occurred from both Cheng et al. 's and Klaczynski's schema-based 
training procedures. There are a number of explanations why this might be the case as we 
have discussed. Further discussion of these finding will be returned to in Chapter 6 which 
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will provide a general discussion of the findings reported in Chapters 3.4 and 5 of this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this experimental programme was to investigate the extent to which 
heuristic and analytic processes affect performance in human thinking, using instruction 
and training procedures designed to improve reasoning competence. One study examined 
the performance patterns on a variety of reasoning and decision-making tasks that are 
documented in the literature for the elicitation of differential responses according to 
heuristic and analytic processes. The remaining five studies reported have presented 
evidence to demonstrate that analytic reasoning and decision-making performance can bc 
improved by different training techniques. The aim of Chapter 6 is to discuss the findings 
of Experiments I to 6 and their implications. First we will begin with a summary of the 
three experimental chapters in relation to their aims and results. Then the implications of 
the findings will be discussed in terms of the theoretical issues presented in Chapter 1. This 
will be followed by a consideration of ftiture directions for this research before the final 
concluding comments. 
6.2 Summary of Experimental Findings 
In Chapter 3 an individual differences experiment was presented which had three main 
aims. Firstly, to examine the relationships between statistical and deductive reasoning in 
order to explore Stanovich's (Stanovich & West, 1998b; Stanovich, 1999) proposal that 
normativc responding on the different problems is related. Secondly. to invcstigate the 
relationships between performance on the tasks and individual differences measures of 
copiltivc ability and thinking dispositions. Stanovich (1998a; 1998b) argued that 
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decontextualised reasoning was related to ability whereas Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth 
(1997) proposed that this skill was associated with thinking dispositions. In their view, 
ability predicted the sophistication of analytic reasoning responses only. Finally, the third 
aim of the experiment was to develop the law of large numbers and selection task materials 
for the training experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
All the tasks chosen for Experiment I were documented in the literature for their elicitation 
of differential responding according to analytic and heuristic processes. Both the law of 
large numbers reasoning and experiment evaluation problems involving manipulations of 
belief had been shown to elicit two different types of responding cued by logic and belief 
(Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; ). 
Performance patterns on both the arbitrary and deontic selection tasks had been interpreted 
using the two processes, supported by individual differences in cognitive ability and 
thinking dispositions (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Stanovich & 
West, 1998a; 1998b). Findings in relation to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning and 
perforinance on Stanovich and West's (1997) Argument Evaluation Test had also provided 
evidence for the existence of the two independent systems. 
According to Stanovich and West (I 998b; 1999) the ability to decontextualise on a variety 
of reasoning tasks is linked which indicates that it is a domain-general dispositional trait 
related to the ability to reason independently of prior beliefs. Participants in their study 
were presented with a range of reasoning problems including selection tasks, syllogisms, 
statistical reasoning and Stanovich and West's (1997) Argument Evaluation Test. All the 
tasks, under a dual process account, are proposed to induce conflict between the two 
systems of logic and belief They found that all the tasks correlated with each other which 
indicated that those participants who respond nonnatively on one type of task tended to 
respond normatively on the other. 
247 
Experiment I replicated and extended on the work of Stanovich and West by introducing 
the belief-motivated critical reasoning problems as used by Klaczynski, Gordon. and Fauth 
(1997). Overall, the pattern of correlations indicated that normative responding on the tasks 
was related. However more associations were predicted than actually obtained. We 
proposed that the absence of a correlation was not conclusive due to the low number of 
participants in the study. This was more likely to be a function of statistical power. 
It was also predicted that biases elicited on the tasks would be associated with each other. 
However, no associations between the biases elicited on the different tasks were found. In 
addition to low power we suggested that it was because biased responses are cued by 
System I processes. These processes are highly contextualised and domain-specific, 
therefore it would not be expected that bias on different tasks was related. Each task would 
elicit bias from different domains. One aspect of dual process accounts of the kind 
Stanovich and Evans and Over proposed is that System I maps on to a single cognitive 
mechanism but of course System I effects include such things as matching bias which 
could be argued as an attentional effect, and belief bias which is a highly contextualised 
pragmatic effect associated with accessing information in long-term memory. Just because 
something is labelled as System I bias does not mean the same cognitive mechanism 
produces it. In recognition of this Stanovich has recently referred to System I as The 
Automomous Set of Systems (TASS: Stanovich, 2004). Consequently this lack of 
correlations between diverse measures of bias is not surprising. 
Under a dual process account of reasoning, decontextualised. reasoning is an ability 
associated with System 2's analytical thinking strategies. Stanovich and West (1998b) and 
Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth (1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997) have opposing views on 
which individual differences factors facilitate this higher level reasoning skill. Stanovich 
and West argue that cognitive ability is the strongest predictor, in contrast Klaczynski et a] - 
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argued that thinking styles are a better predictor of bias in thinking tasks. Cognitive ability 
predicts the sophistication of reasoning responses only. We tested these opposing views in 
Experiment I by utilising the same tasks and individual differences measures as both 
Stanovich and West, and Klaczysnki et a]. Namely, the Thinking Dispositions 
Questionnaire (Stanovich & West, 1998b) and the Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996). 
Cognitive ability was associated with performance on the experiment evaluation problems 
and selection task performance, which is consistent with both Stanovich and Klaczynski's 
findings. Stanovich (1999) proposed that it is the higher ability participants that are able to 
resist the heuristic (p/q) response on the arbitrary tasks. Klaczynski et al. found that ability 
was related to performance on experiment evaluation problems. There was also an 
association between ability and deontic reasoning which is in accord with findings of both 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, and Farrelly (2004) and Klaczynski (2001). No 
further relationships were obtained. 
Several associations were found between the thinking styles measures and performance on 
the tasks, in support of both Stanovich's and Klaczynski's views. For example, the 
Thinking Disposition Composite score was related to arbitrary selection task responding 
and objective performance when responding on the Argument Evaluation Test, as would 
be predicted by Stanovich. It was also found that more open-minded participants were less 
biased when evaluating strength and persuasiveness of everyday critical reasoning 
arguments, which is consistent with Klaczynski's (1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth, 
1997) findings. Again the lack of relationships found could be a function of low statistical 
power. Several studies have provided evidence for the validity of these thinking styles 
measures, e. g. Pacini and Epstein (1994). However, no associations have yet been found 
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between perfon-nance on reasoning tasks and the experiential subscale of the REI. We 
propose that you cannot measure implicit System I processes using a self-report measure. 
In tenns of replicating the findings in the literature in relation to analytic and heuristic 
responding on the tasks, we were quite successful even with a relatively low number of 
participants. Experiment I provided support for the reliability and validity of Stanovich 
and West's (1997) Argument Evaluation Test, which provides support for their proposal 
that the AET is a measure of the ability to reason in situations in which prior beliefs may 
be interfering. The task successfully identified two different groups of participants. One 
group relied more on objective argument quality for argument evaluation decisions and the 
other relied more on their prior beliefs. However, no associations were found between 
objective argument quality and ability as Stanovich and West have reported. 
In syllogistic reasoning the typical belief bias effects were found. More valid conclusions 
were endorsed than invalid and more believable conclusions were endorsed than 
unbelievable, irrespective of their logical validity (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; 
Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). The pattern of results in relation to selection 
task responding was also consistent with previous findings in the literature. Problems 
consisting of deontic content yielded a higher number of correct solutions than problems 
involving arbitrary content. 
The findings in relation to the belief-motivated critical reasoning problems were not as 
strong as expected. Participants changed their strategies dependent on whether the 
conclusion presented was enhancing, threatening or neutral to an individual's occupational 
goal. More sophisticated reasoning strategies were utilised on problems involving goal- 
threatening conclusions than goal-enhancing or neutral conclusions but the effects were 
either very small or not significant. We proposed that the occupational goal manipulation 
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was less effective for our population than for the American population in KlaczNmski's 
studies because the occupational goal that participants had indicated was not a strongly 
held desire. Therefore participants were not motivated to defend their beliefs. 
In Chapter 4, two experiments were reported which were designed to investigate the effects 
of training in statistical principles on law of large numbers reasoning and bias. This 
research was inspired by the statistical training studies conducted by Fong, Krantz, and 
Nisbett (1986) and the work on individual differences in critical reasoning performed by 
Klaczynski and associates (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski, 
Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997). 
Fong et al. found that training participants on the law of large numbers rule improved 
statistical reasoning performance on a variety of everyday reasoning problems. These 
effects had been replicated using more tightly defined domains although some domain- 
specificity of the training effects was found with a two-week delay between training and 
testing (Fong & Nisbett, 1991). In their individual differences research, Klaczynski et al. 
found that individuals utilise different reasoning strategies dependent on whether the 
conclusions were congruent or incongruent with their prior beliefs. When the conclusion is 
belief-congruent, people tend to process the information with little effort and tend to agree 
with the inforination. However when the conclusion is belief-incongruent, they tend to 
utilise more sophisticated reasoning strategies in order to discredit the evidence. 
The primary aim of the research presented in Chapter 4 was to examine whether training or 
instruction procedures would have any impact on belief-based responding. In dual process 
terms, would training on the explicit system have any effect on the heuristic responses 
cued by System I? The results were surprising. It was predicted that at most biased 
responding would be reduced, but not eliminated by training. Evidence in the belief bias 
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literature indicates that instruction may attenuate but not eliminate belief-based responses. 
However, the effect of statistical training was to Increase the sophistication of statistical 
reasoning responses on all problem types, whether they were belief-congruent or belief- 
incongruent. Bias in individuals' responses was eliminated in people's wntten evaluations 
of the arguments. 
However, this effect was not reflected in the rating scales. These scales required 
participants to indicate on two nine-point scales how strong they thought the conclusion 
was based on the evidence presented, and how convinced they were by the argument. After 
the training, even though participants were able to utilise statistical principles in their 
written justifications of why the arguments were strong or weak, they still rated them in 
accordance with their beliefs. That is when the argument was belief-consistent, it was rated 
as strong and more convincing. When the argument was belief-inconsistent, it was rated as 
weak and unconvincing. This demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and heuristic 
responding and we will consider this further in a later section. 
In Experiment 3 the findings from Experiment 2 were replicated. An instruction technique 
was included, based on the ones used in the syllogistic reasoning literature, to examine 
whether participants could disengage from their beliefs when asked to. Participants were 
instructed to base their evaluations on the content of the arguments, not what they believed 
to be true. This resulted in no increase in analytic responding at all. It appears that people 
require more than motivational instructions to separate prior beliefs from the logic of the 
problem. As discussed previously, being presented with one piece of evidence that is 
inconsistent with your belief will have a minimal impact in terms of changing that belief 
according to Bayes theorem. However there were indications that System 2 was being 
engaged in some way. Participants rated the evidence as stronger and more convincing 
after instruction which may indicate that they are interpreting the instructions as a reason 
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not to evaluate the evidence strength as low. Perhaps the instruction to assume the 
information was true caused participants to have more faith in the veracity of the evidence 
and hence conclude that the arguments must be stronger. Again this will be discussed 
further later in this chapter. 
In Chapter 5, a series of three experiments were reported which investigated the effects of 
training on the selection task. Experiment 4 was designed to extend on the work of Cheng, 
Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986). They proposed that training on the logic of the 
material conditional improved reasoning on selection task problems involving arbitrary and 
thematic content, but only when examples were given as part of the training. Cheng et al. 
also found that training in the obligation schema (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) facilitated 
reasoning perfon-nance on subsequent selection tasks involving both arbitrary and 
obligation schema content. 
It is important to know whether there is transfer or not from the different training 
procedures because according to the dual process theorist Klaczynski, abstract rule training 
would transfer to problems involving thematic content. However domain-specific training 
such as obligation schema training would not transfer to problems outside of that domain. 
There were confounds in their research that we needed to address first in order to be able to 
make claims about the effects of explicit training on the analytic and heuristic processes 
that cue responses on the selection tasks. Firstly, the examples that were used as part of 
their rules training were thematic which may have facilitated the transfer to further 
thematic problems. These were changed to tasks consisting of arbitrary content. Secondly, 
Cheng et al. found that their obligation schema training improved reasoning on two 
arbitrary problems which they suggested may have been interpreted as obligations after the 
training. The two test items that they identified were also thematic which may have 
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facilitated their solution. Participants in Experiment 4 were presented with either abstract 
rules plus examples training or obligation schema training. They were all given the same 
four deontic and four arbitrary selection task problems for the test. We found that the 
abstract rules training transferred only to problems consisting of arbitrary content, and the 
obligation schema training transferred to both arbitrary and deontic tasks, in both 
Expenments 4 and 5. 
These findings are inconsistent with Cheng et al. and with a simple interpretation of dual 
process theories. Under a dual process account, training or instruction in a System 2 
domain-independent rule, such as the rules of logic, should transfer to problems from other 
domains. In contrast, domain-specific training i. e. obligation schema training, should only 
facilitate reasoning on tasks from the same domain. Due to the conflicting findings, Cheng 
et al. 's training procedures were directly compared to Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese's 
(1989; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993) training procedures, whose findings had previously 
been interpreted under dual process accounts. However, we found conflicting results using 
Klaczynski et al. 's training also. Consistent with dual processes, large effects were found 
with their abstract training on both arbitrary and deontic problems. However, we found 
their permission schema training transferred to both types of problem, arbitrary and 
deontic, also. 
The complexity of the different training procedures was the explanation put forward for the 
large differences between Cheng et al. 's and Klaczynski's transfer effects. Cheng et al. 's 
abstract rules and obligation schema training commenced with detailed descriptions of the 
rules they were to learn. In contrast, Klaczynski's training involved the presentation of four 
individual selection task problems followed by explanations of the correct and incorrect 
choices to be made. All participants had to do was repeat the strategies on further selection 
tasks. There were some domain-specificity effects of training i. e. participants in the 
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au I abstract training condition performed better on the arbitrary test Id participants tems an in 
the permission group performed better on the deontic items. 
Findings in relation to individual differences, specifically cognitiN, e ability were 
particularly interesting in this series of studies. The difference in ability levels between the 
groups of participants appeared to reflect the effectiveness of the training procedures. In 
Experiment 5 the rules and obligation training effects were not so large with a lower ability 
group compared to Experiment 4, and in Experiment 6 the permission training effects were 
small compared to Experiment 5, again with a lower ability group of participants. In 
addition, associations between performance on the selection tasks after training and ability 
were absent with lower ability participants. It was suggested one way of interpreting 
correlations between ability and performance is as an indicator of System 2 involvement in 
a task. The absence of correlations and the weaker training effects, led us to the conclusion 
that System 2 was not as engaged by the training for the lower ability groups. Training was 
more effective for higher ability participants as they had more cognitive resources to draw 
upon. Further discussion of these findings will be presented in the next section of this 
chapter. 
6.3 Theoretical Implications 
In this section we will consider the theoretical implications of the findings from this thesis 
in relation to three main themes. Firstly, what the findings say about the effectiveness of 
training, secondly the implications of the findings for dual process theories, and thirdly the 
implications of the findings for other theories of reasoning. 
In Chapter I of this thesis, several questions were posed in relation to the effectiveness of 
different training techniques. Firstly would it be possible to improve people's critical 
255 
thinking skills, and if so which training would be the most effecti\'e in doing so? SecondIN., 
is it possible to debias people's thinking, or reduce their blased responding? Final]\-, if 
individuals are taught a skill or a strategy on one type of problem, can this then be 
transferred to other types of problems consisting of different content than the one the 
individual was taught in? These questions have all been addressed in this programme of 
research. 
6.4 The Effectiveness of Training 
6.4.1 Can critical thinking be improved? 
Earlier training research provided evidence to show that, in accordance with Plato's 
formalist tradition, quality of reasoning can be improved by the teaching of general 
inferential rules (Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988; Lehman & Nisbett, 1990). These 
rules can then be utilised on other types of problems outside the domain of training. 
However, a problem with this research was that it was too general. Participants were 
recruited from different courses and then their ability measured on different types of 
reasoning: statistical, methodological and conditional. Lehman et al. 's conclusions were 
based on the rules that supposedly were taught implicitly by the courses involved. But 
there is no way of controlling for the precise factors which facilitated this improvement, or 
being sure of the rules that are being taught. The findings in the current research extend on 
this by being far more specific about the rules and strategies being taught. In this way we 
can also be far more specific about our conclusions. 
All the training procedures reported here were found to improve critical reasoning skills in 
the short term. Training on the law of large numbers increased analytic reasoning 
performance on a variety of everyday reasoning problems, and the schema-based training 
facilitated reasoning on the selection task. Logic training also increased correct responding 
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on selection task problems although the effects were not so strong as the other training 
procedures. The results indicate that given the appropriate rules and strategies for the task, 
reasoning perfon-nance on that task will be enhanced. 
There are indications though from the selection task studies reported in Chapter 5 that 
ability is a key factor when looking at receptiveness to different training techniques. The 
findings demonstrate that participants of higher ability appear to be more able to 
understand and apply the rules and strategies being taught. Training was not as effectivc 
for participants of lower ability. Whether this would be the same for other týpes of 
reasoning and training procedures it is difficult to say. Further investigation is required 
before generalisations of the findings reported here could be made. 
6.4.2 Can training debias? 
Can we conclude that training is effective in removing bias? Apart from in this programme 
of research, the only research performed that has demonstrated the positive effects of 
instruction on bias is the syllogistic reasoning literature (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & 
Pollard, 1994; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992), the findings of which have been 
the source of many of the predictions made for the experiments reported here. It was found 
that belief bias could be reduced but not eliminated. The findings reported here in relation 
to the law of large numbers were far more dramatic. Bias was eliminated on the written 
evaluations in Expenments 2 and 3. Klaczynski has suggested that the training may not 
even transfer to problems involving manipulations of belief (personal communication. 
Nov. 2004). Sloman suggested that the training would not transfer to problems very 
different from the training ones (Sloman, personal communication, September 2004). The 
findings here demonstrate that given the training on the law of large numbers. people arc 
able to utilisc the rule effectively, therefore ovemcling their belief-based rcsponse. 
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However, the training did not decrease bias in ratings of the arguments, therefore 
demonstrating the pervasiveness of beliefs. But why was the bias still present on the rating 
scales? Participants had received the statistical training and were able to utilise the LLN 
rule as evidenced in their written justifications. One explanation is the amount of effort the 
participants were required to use on the different response formats. When responding on a 
rating scale, participants may provide a quick response. In contrast a written evaluation 
requires more effort and elaboration of why the arguments are strong/weak or 
convincing/unconvincing. The two types of response can be mapped onto the different 
responses cued by the two systems in terms of dual process accounts. When no effort is 
required the influence of System I belief-based reasoning is observed in the ratings. In this 
case, if a person has a high degree of belief in a claim, one piece of evidence that 
contradicts this belief will not have much impact. Thus bias is still present in the ratings. 
However, when a written justification is requested, participants expend more effort and 
utilise analytic System 2 strategies leading to the inhibition of System I responses. Thus a 
dissociation between the responses cued by the two systems is observed. 
The selection task studies support this conjecture. The heuristic response on arbitrary 
selection tasks is not due to belief as in the LLN problems. However Evans (1989) argued 
that few people get past a relevance judgement on this task and the cards are selected pre- 
attentionally. Training served to engage analytic reasoning and provided participants with 
the strategies to utilise on the tasks, thus resulting in a decrease of heuristic responses. 
Overall, training is successful in reducing biased responding on both LLN problems and 
the selection tasks, specifically when the strategies for the correct response are provided. 
Instruction to dissociate from beliefs had no effect on biased responding on law of large 
numbers problems. Again this demonstrates the pervasive influence of belief on reasoning. 
Klaczynski and Gordon (1996) also found no effect of motivational instruction on bias. 
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This illustrates yet again that people need to be provided with the strate&, ý or rule so that 
they can deal with the problem analytically. Sloman (personal communication, Septenibcr 
2004) proposed that people need to be cued to use a rule and that traInIng wIll be effectIve 
in reducing bias to the extent that the cue IIIII is effective. The findings from both the statistical 
and selection task studies demonstrate that critical reasoning can be improved and bias 
reduced or eliminated provided the appropriate rules and strategies are taught. Participants 
are responding to the instructions, albeit in a different way to what was expected, as they 
rated the evidence as stronger and more persuasive. This is possibly because thcy are 
assuming that the inforination is true (as told to in the instructional set) and thus more 
reliable, which leads participants to provide a more positive evaluation of the e\'Idence. 
To summarize, the training is effective in reducing bias and in the case of LLN reasoning, 
the effect is quite dramatic. It appears that providing people with the strategies enables 
them to utillse them on different problems, which subsequently impacts on the biased 
responses. The extent to which the bias is reduced is probably due to the complexity of the 
strategy (or rule) that they have to learn. It would be very interesting to provide 
participants in a study of belief bias, training on how to successfully follow the logic of 
syllogistic reasoning. We would predict from the findings reported here, that given the 
strategies participants would be able to transfer the knowledge on to other problems 
consisting of belief-based content. Thus resulting in an elimination of bias, rather than 
reduction. 
6.4.3 Can the skills be transferred? 
All the training procedures employed in this thesis resulted in an improvement in reasoning 
perfonnance. Howe-N, cr they vaned in the extent to which the skills taught could be 
transferred to other problems. Training in statistical principles improved reasoning across 
domains, but transfer after selection task training was highly dependent on the týjie of 
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instruction received. Transfer across domains occurred after Klacz), nskl' i ing. is abstract train' - 
the permission schema training, and Cheng et al. 's obligation schema training. In contrast. 
participants were able to utillse Cheng et al. 's logical rules training on further arbitrary 
problems only. This was the only training procedure that people were not able to transfer to 
a different type of problem. 
What was it about the rules training that was different ftom the rest'? All the training 
procedures involved examples as part of the training. One explanation we propose is that 
use of examples facilitated reasoning on subsequent problems (for LLN and selection 
tasks). In accordance with Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989) people were able to 
recognise the key elements of the problems, and transfer them to other problems. However, 
rules training consisted of two abstract training examples also. According to all the 
predictions it should have been possible to map the elements on to subsequent tasks easily, 
whatever the problem content. However it is possible that the explanation of the rules of 
the material conditional was just too difficult for participants to understand. Cheng et al. 
originally suggested that the material conditional is not an intuitive rule based on their 
findings that participants' reasoning perfon-nance was not improved after rules training 
alone. If the rules training does not map on to an intuitive rule then it would be like 
teaching participants the laws of physics or a new artificial language. Participants may 
have been able to utilise some of the elements on further arbitrary tasks but not generalise 
them to thematic ones. Supporting evidence for this view can be found in recent work on 
conditionals that claims the material conditional is not the way that people naturally 
interpret conditional sentences (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003). 
Klaczynski's abstract training resulted in large effects of training on both abstract and 
deontic problems yet it only differed from Cheng et al. 's in that it consisted of four 
exampIcs rather than two. and (lid not involve the logIcal rulcs cxplanatlon. It appears that 
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people are much more able to understand examples and practise the procedures, therelore 
learning by experience, when the rule or strategy is not intuitive. 
It could be argued that Fong et al. 's LLN training involved the same procedural t'ormat ,, -et 
resulted in cross-domain transfer. However the LLN rules training is in contrast much 
simpler to follow. In addition it is proposed that the law of large numbers is an intuitive 
rule. The fact that reasoning performance is improved by rules training alone (Fong et al. 
1986), and people are able to utilise the rule without training if the context of the problem 
cues it, suggests that people already have a rough version of the rule intult, \-clv. In contrast 
to the rules training in the selection task studies, the LLN rules explanation is context- 
bound and involves a demonstration which clarifies the rule being taught for the 
participants. They are not just learning an abstract rule. All participants have to remember 
is "the larger the sample, the better" and then they can use this on any problem. The logical 
rules training is a great deal more complicated which is probably why Fong et al. and 
Cheng et al. 's original training studies resulted in such conflicting findings. Statistical 
reasoning in Fong et al. 's study was found to be improved after either the LLN rules or the 
examples training, whereas selection task reasoning was only improved after the two 
techniques together in Cheng et al. 's. 
Obligation and pen-nission schema training were both successful in cross-domain transfer 
cvcn though they were not expected to be. Klaczynski et al. argued that transfer would 
only be unidirectional, from abstract to deontic, not the other way round. Again, the only 
conclusion can be that the examples facilitated the transfer. With retrospect it would havc 
been a lot more infori-nativc if examples had not been included as part of the obligation 
schema training in Fxpennients 3 and 4. Then it would have been possible to examine 
whether Cheng et al. 's onginal training procedure did result in the transfer to arbitrary 
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problems. By including them we can only suggest that the examples facilitated this transfer 
due to the findings in relation to Klaczynski's permission schema training. 
Even though most of the training procedures resulted in positive transfer to other problem 
types, there were some domain-specificity effects in the selection task studies, i. e. abstract 
transferred more to further abstract tasks, deontic more to deontic. According to 
Klaczynski et al., domain-specific training coincides with the domain's pre-existing rules. 
Thus transfer occurs to other domain-specific problems but inhibits transfer to arbitrary 
problems. They found no transfer from permission schema training to arbitrary problems at 
all. One explanation for the results reported here could be that participants are acquiring 
the rule in a specific context, therefore when giving the problem in a different context, it is 
a little harder to decontextualise the key elements and transfer them. In summary, training 
in reasoning is effective. If people are provided with the strategies they can successfully 
utilise them on further problems, even in different contexts. 
6.5 Implications for Dual Process Theories 
Dual process theory has been used as a theoretical framework throughout this thesis. Many 
of the findings here appear inconsistent with dual process theories. Generally, it was 
predicted that training would impact on System 2 processes, not System 1. More 
specifically, in accordance with the belief bias findings, bias may be reduced but not 
eliminated (Stanovich, personal communication, October 2004; Evans et A 1994). 
The LLN training studies demonstrate how the effects of bias can be eliminated when 
participants are asked for written analysis of the arguments. Participants were able to 
utilise the LLN strategies competently in their justifications of why the arguments were 
strong or weak, and convincing or unconvincing. However simply being asked to indicate 
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their thoughts on a scale led to responses that were influenced by beliefs. When the 
evidence was consistent with beliefs, participants rated it as stronger and more convincing, 
but when it was inconsistent with beliefs participants rated the evidence as weaker and less 
convincing. Thus people appeared to consciously inhibit beliefs in their NN, ntten 
justifications. However the ratings reflect the highly pervasive nature of System 
responses. Importantly for dual process theories, these findings demonstrate a dissociation 
between responses cued by the two systems, where System 2 engagement appears greatest 
when participants are asked to externalise their reasoning. 
The selection task training also resulted in a decrease of heuristic responding. Even the 
domain-specific schema training increased analytic responding. According to Klaczynski's 
dual process theory, one might expect that training in a domain-specific schema would not 
transfer to problems from other domains (Klaczynski, Gelfand, & Reese, 1989; Klaczynski 
& Laipple, 1993). However the schema training did transfer to other domains. This is not 
all bad news for dual process theorists. According to dual process theories training serves 
to engage System 2 thinking. Whether the training is abstract or tied to a specific domain, 
people are able to utilise the rule or strategy on other problems. It may be more difficult to 
transfer across domains judging by the domain-specificity effects noted from the training, 
but people are able to do so resulting in a reduction of System I responses. As Evans and 
Over (1996) proposed, training increased rationality 2. In doing so, System I responses 
were therefore inhibited or overridden. 
The findings in relation to ability demonstrate how System 2 processes mediate the 
effectiveness of training. According to Stanovich (1999; Stanovich & West, 1998b) higher 
ability individuals are able to decontextualise from the context of a problem and respond 
normatively. We have found some evidence to support this in Experiment 1. Also, the 
selection task studies reported in Chapter 5, indicate that higher ability participants are 
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more receptive to the training. Sloman (personal comm. September 2004) proposed that 
higher ability individuals are more likely to learn the rule whereas Klaczynski (personal 
comm. November 2004) suggested that higher ability individuals would acquire the rule 
more rapidly. We propose that training impacts on System 2, and any associations found 
after instructional training between performance and ability are an index of System 2 
engagement. Those individuals with more cognitive resources are more able to draw on 
those resources and use them to apply the strategies on further problems. Thus the training 
is more effective for those individuals. 
The findings in this thesis in relation to thinking styles are difficult to interpret. Stanovich 
suggests that thinking dispositions and ability determine how well someone 
decontextualises. In contrast Klaczynski, Gordon, and Fauth argue that disposition is the 
key factor in predicting this skill. No firm conclusions can be made from the findings here. 
There were no clear interpretable relationships between either of the thinking dispositions 
measures and reasoning performance or bias. Further research is required before either 
position can be supported. 
One thing that is apparent in relation to the simple predictions made from Klaczynski's 
dual process accounts is that they are not sufficient to account for the findings reported in 
this thesis. Clearer predictions need to be developed. The question of how training interacts 
with System I and System 2 processes is a great deal more complicated than what has been 
proposed so far. The statistical training studies demonstrate that different response formats 
change the types of influences on responses. Written explanations elicited analytic System 
2 responses, whereas rating scales allow belief-based System I influences on responses. 
The selection task studies resulted in completely inconsistent findings to what was 
expected. Logical rules training did not transfer whereas training in a pragmatic reasoning 
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schema did. The one consolation for dual process theories is that System 2 is sensitive to 
instruction techniques. There is still a great deal of work to be done in this area. 
6.6 Implications for other Theories of Reasoning 
What implications do the findings reported here have for other theories of reasoning" The 
findings in relation to the selection task are consistent with domain-specific theorics such 
as pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) or social contracts (Cosmides, 
1989). People perform better overall (in the absence of training) when the problems are 
contextuallsed. However it would be expected that domain-specific training would not 
transfer to other domains. The training would improve reasoning on problems that could be 
interpreted within the same domain only. The findings reported in Chapter 5 demonstrate 
that schema-based training does transfer outside of the training domain. There was some 
domain-specificity of training noted which indicates that people find cross-domain transfer 
a little more difficult, but the improvement was still considerable. This has implications of 
how people acquire domain-specific knowledge in the first place and whether these 
domains are so tightly defined. 
The finding that training in the rule of the material conditional only impacts on arbitrary 
reasoning problems may have implications for mental models theones. Mental models has 
been the most popular theory of how people represent conditionals for a long time 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Findings discussed in terrns of mental models are based 
on the material conditional as the logical rule system that reasoning behaviour is compared 
to. Cheng et al. proposed that the material conditional was not a naturally occurring rule 
system becausc people Nvere not able to use it after the rules training. If it was an intuitivc 
rule then participants should be able to use it after an cxplanation of it as %Nith the LI-\ 
rule. Wc find support for this here, as participants were not able to acquirc and transfer the 
-) (I Z, 
abstract rule to other problem types. As suggested earlier in this discussion, participants 
found the rule difficult to learn as to them it was a completely novel rule, like attempting to 
learn an artificial language. We propose that from the findings reported here and in 
addition to Cheng et al., the material conditional does not represent the logic of the 
conditional in everyday language. 
In Chapter 1, as part of the introduction to this thesis we discussed how reasoning research 
for a long time has been comparing performance against the wrong normative systems of 
logic. Mental models theory may still be using the wrong logical system. Current research 
is now looking at alternative logical rule systems which may be more representative of 
how people reason about conditionals (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, Over, & Handley, in 
press). 
6.7 Future Directions and Conclusions 
The training studies reported here have been very successful in increasing analytic 
reasoning performance and reducing biased responding. We have considered our findings 
in the context of a dual process framework, namely the impact of instruction techniques on 
Systems I and 2. Training has successfully increased analytic processing by providing the 
strategies and cues necessary to engage it. In turn this has led to a decrease in biased 
responding. 
Ability has been found to have a role in mediating the effectiveness of training. Training 
was more effective for higher ability participants. We propose that the associations found 
between ability and performance on the tasks after training is an index of System 2 
engagement. Those of higher ability are more able to understand and apply the principles 
that they have been taught. Thus training is more effective for these individuals. However 
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we still do not know anything about the actual processing which takes place within the two 
systems, either the analytic processing or the intuitive. 
Further training and instruction studies are required to investigate the different procedures 
that facilitate transfer on different types of reasoning problems. The findings from this 
programme of research indicate that by providing people with the right strategies, 
reasoning performance can be improved which leads to a reduction in bias. We need to 
examine whether these results can be generalised to other reasoning and decision making 
tasks, and if so, what type of training and how long will the effects last. 
In terms of dual process accounts it is necessary to understand how different 
manipulations impact on the two systems, and how the systems interact with each other. 
By conducting further training studies using different tasks and materials we may gain 
more insight into the specific processes utilised. One way of investigating the two 
reasoning systems ftirther using instructional techniques would be an extension of the LLN 
training studies presented here. By ascertaining participants' beliefs in the conclusions 
prior to training, and employing individual differences measures it would be possible to 
investigate the extent to which ability can facilitate decontextualised reasoning and training 
effectiveness, dependent on the extent to which the beliefs are strongly held. This would 
provide more information about how the two systems interact with each other in everyday 
critical reasoning. 
There has been a complete shift in the last 30 years in how reasoning and decision-making 
performance is studied. Research using the deduction paradigm as discussed at the 
beginning of this thesis, is being replaced by studies which consider the contextual factors 
which may facilitate or inhibit responding, complemented by research which has an 
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emphasis on individual differences. Errors and biases in judgement are viewed as 
infon-native in addition to the nonnative responses. 
The important finding from this programme of research is that critical reasoning can be 
improved, and the extent of that improvement is due to the specific rules and strategies 
being taught, relevant to the type of reasoning or decision making task. Dual processes are 
becoming increasingly popular as a way of conceptualising experimental findings 
concerning the influence of instruction on training. However this thesis shows that more 
work is needed before they can be used to make clear and reliable predictions. It is 
necessary to go beyond a simple alignment of tasks to different processing mechanisms 
and a simple interpretation of the way in which dual processes may guide reasoning with 
different types of materials. As this thesis shows, predictions derived from dual process 
theories concerning the influence of training on thinking are often not borne out by the 
data. 
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APPENDIX ALI 
Experiment 1: The Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) 
presented to all participants. 
Following are a number of statements about feelings, beliefs, and behaviours. Read each statement and then 
circle the response from I to 5 that most applies to you. For example; 
1 2 3 4 5 
Definitely Mostly Equally Mostly Definitely 
not true not true true and false true true 
1. I'm not that good at working out complicated problems. 
2. Knowing the answer without having to understand the 
reasoning behind it is good enough for me. 
3.1 try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth 
about something. 
4.1 don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
5.1 am much better at working things out logically than 
most people. 
6.1 like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
7.1 am not very good at solving problems that require 
careful logical analysis. 
8.1 enjoy intellectual challenges. 
9.1 usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
10. Using my "gut-feelings" usually works well for me in 
working out problems in my life. 
11. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives 
me little satisfaction. 
12. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 
13. Using logic usually works well for me in working out 
problems in my life. 
14.1 can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even 
if I can't explain how I know. 
15.1 often go by my instincts when deciding on a course 
of action. 
16. My snap judgements are probably not as good as most 
people's. 
17.1 enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
18.1 don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 
19.1 prefer complex to simple problems. 
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20.1 suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they 
are accurate. 
21.1 think there are times when one should rely on 
one's intuition. 
22.1 don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
23.1 think it is foolish to make important decisions based 
on feelings. 
24.1 trust my initial feelings about people. 
25.1 don't reason well under pressure. 
26.1 don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition 
for important decisions. 
27.1 have a logical mind. 
28.1 generally don't depend on my feelings to help me 
make decisions. 
29.1 enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
30.1 would not want to depend on anyone who described 
himself or herself as intuitive. 
31.1 am not a very analytical thinker. 
32.1 tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
33. Leaming new ways to think would be very appealing to me. 
34.1 believe in trusting my hunches. 
35.1 have no problem in thinking things through carefully. 
36. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on 
my gut feelings. 
37. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 
38. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my 
strong points. 
39. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often 
make mistakes. 
40.1 hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest 
"gut- feelings" to find an answer. 
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Experiment 1: The Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire (Stanovich & West, 1998a) 
presented to all participants. 
Following are a number of statements about various topics. Read each statement and then circle the response 
from I to 5 that most applies to you. For example; 
2345 
Strongly Slightly Neither Slightly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Agree/Disagree Agree Agree 
1. It is better to simply believe in a religion than to be 
confused by doubts about it. 
2. Even if my environment (family, neighbourhood, schools) 
had been different, I probably would have the same 
religious views. 
3. Opening an umbrella indoors will increase one's chances 
of misfortune in the near future. 
4. A professor's job is to communicate the facts to his or 
her students. 
5. Right and wrong never change. 
6. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. 
7. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about 
the problem, rather than through waiting for good fortune. 
8. It is bad luck to have a black cat cross your path. 
9. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. 
10. Considering too many different opinions often leads 
to bad decisions. 
11. It is advisable to consult your horoscope daily. 
12.1 can't enjoy the company of people who don't share 
my moral values. 
13. People should always take into consideration evidence 
that goes against their beliefs. 
14. Once a person decides on an occupation, his or her 
professional behaviour is mostly set. 
15. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. 
16. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about 
many issues. 
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17. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had 
- been raised by a different set of pýrents. 
18. The number 13 is unlucky. 
19. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the 
important things in life. 
20. Good teachers never let you leave the classroom with 
doubts about the subject matter. 
2 1. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to 
solve it. 
22. A person of good character usually does what he or she 
is told to do. 
23. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who 
are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 
24. Of all the different philosophies, which exist in the world, 
there is probably only one which is correct. 
25. In most situations requiring a decision, it is better to listen to 
someone who knows what they are doing. 
26. The best courses emphasise practical rather than 
theoretical matters. 
27. Astrology can be useful in making personality 
judgements. 
28. A person should always consider new possibilities. 
29. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile 
goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom 
of certain political groups. 
30.1 have personal possessions that bring me luck at times. 
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Experiment 1: The Argument Evaluation Test (Stanovich & West, 1997) modified for 
a British population and presented to all participants. 
Part One consists of 25 items to which participants indicate their degree of belief. 
Opinions 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following beliefs. Answer each iteni 
in order and do not return to items. There is no right or wrong answer, just go with N Vur first 
impressions. 
123 
Strongly Neutral 
Disagree 
45 
Stronglý 
Agree 
1. It is more dangerous to travel by air than by car. 
2. Seventeen year olds should have the legal right to 
drink alcoholic beverages. 
3. The relative ease with which handguns can be 
obtained has resulted in an unnecessarily high 
murder rate in America. 
4. Interviews should be given a higher weighting 
in university admissions than A levels or 
Access courses. 
5. The present state pension scheme is unfair to 
people who are now retired. 
6. Computers cannot think. 
7. The social security system should be drastically 
reduced in size. 
8. Women should stay home and take care of the 
children while they are young. 
9. Judges should sentence more young offenders to 
pnson for their crimes. 
10. Taxes in the England are too high. 
11. The speed limit should be 80mph on the motorways. 
1. Seatbelts should always be wom when travelling 
by car. 
13. The tax on petrol should not be raised significantly. 
14. The death penalty should be brought back as an 
ultimate punishment. 
15. Students should have a stronger voice than the 
general public in setting university policies. 
. 2.8 7 
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16. The legal voting age should not be raised from 
18 years to 21 years. 
17. The national debt should be reduced by cutting 
MP's salaries. 
18. Today's footballers are grossly overpaid. 
19. Labour unions should be eradicated because 
they are a major cause of the downfall of 
the British economy. 
20. Capital punishment should be outlawed in America. 
2 1. Smoking should be banned in all enclosed public 
places. 
22. It is unfair for a new insurance policy holder to 
collect a huge insurance payment soon after 
obtaining the insurance policy. 
23. Children who play computer games will 
become anti-social adults. 
24. The government's plan to get single parents 
back to work should be continued. 
25. The governments plan to give flOOO to every 
new bom baby is a waste of financial resources. 
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Part Two. Participants are then required to evaluate the arguments in a second 
testing session. 
Evaluation of Counter-Arguments Questionnaire 
Instructions: We are interested in your ability to evaluate counter-arguments. First, you will be presented 
with a belief held by an individual named James. Following this, you will be presented w1th James's premise 
or justification for holding this particular belief A Critic will then offer a counter-argument to James's 
justification for the belief (Assume that the Critic's statement is factually correct. ) Finally, James will offer a 
rebuttal to the Critic's counter-argument. (Assume that James's rebuttal is also factually correct. ) You are to 
evaluate the strength of James's rebuttal to the Critic's counter-argument, regardless of your feeling about the 
original belief or James's premise. 
James's belief: It is more dangerous to travel by air than by car. 
James's premise or justification for belief. It is more dangerous to travel by alr than by car because air 
accidents are more likely to involve fatalities. 
Critic's counter-araument: Passengers are 3 times more likely to be killed per mile travelled in a car as 
compared to a plane (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Because reckless or drunk drivers cause the great majority of 
all automobile accidents (assume statement factually correct), car travel is at least safer than air travel for 
people who wear safety belts and travel with sober and careful drivers. 
Indicate the strength ofJames's rebuttal to the Critic's counter-argument: 
Very Weak =I Weak =2 Neither =3 Strong =4 Very Strong =5 
James's belief: Seventeen year olds should have the legal right to drink alcoholic beverages. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Seventeen year olds are just as responsible as eighteen year olds, 
so they ought to be granted the same drinking rights as other adults. 
Critic's counter-argument: Seventeen year olds; are 3 times more likely to be involved in an automobile 
accident while under the influence of alcohol than eighteen year olds (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Seventeen year olds will drink no matter what the law says 
(assume statement factually correct), so it is useless to try to legislate that they not drink. 
James's belief: The relative ease with which handguns can be obtained has resulted in an unnecessarily 
high murder rate in America. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Countries that strictly limit handgun ownership have far fewer 
murders. 
Critic's counter-argument: People without handguns will use knives or other weapons instead (assume 
statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Since handguns are particularly lethal and most violent attacks 
are impulsive acts (assume statement factually correct), attacks with handguns are more likely to result in 
death. 
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James's belief: Interviews should be given a higher weighting in university admissions than A leN-els or Access courses. 
James's premise or justification for belief. in e Weighting i terviews, higher than A lev Is or Acc course-, will 
result in better people being admitted to universities. 
Critic's counter-ariaumen : Both A levels and Access courses are much better predictors of success in 
universities than interviews (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Interviews sometimes uncover important personal Information 
that would be missed by an impersonal process that relies heavily on grades and courses (assume statement 
factually correct). 
James's belief: The present state pension scheme is unfair to people who are now retired 
James's premise or justification for belief The present state pension scheme is unfair to retired people 
because these people get far too little money. 
Critic's counter-argumen : Currently, pensioners are drawing from the pension scheme over four times what 
they contributed to the system before they die (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: These figures don't take into account the fact that pensioners 
are being paid in pounds that have been greatly eroded over the years due to inflation (assume statement 
factually correct). 
James's belief: Computers cannot think. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Computers cannot think because computers do not produce 
anything that is original (i. e. anything that human's haven't already produced). 
Critic's counter-argumen :A computer has produced a proof of one of Euclid's geometry theorems that no 
human had produced before (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: The computer that produced that proof was built by humans 
(assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: The social security system should be drastically reduced in size. 
James's premise or Justification for belief The social security system should be drastically reduced in size 
because social security recipients take advantage of the system and buy unnecessary luxuries With their dole 
money. 
Critic's counter-argumen : Ninety-five percent of social security recipients use their dole money to obtain the 
bare essentials for their families (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Many people who are on social security are lazy and don't 
want to work for a living (assume statement factually correct). 
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James's belief: Women should stay at home and take care of the chfldren while they are ., loung. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Only d mother can provide the quality of ýare young children both 
need and deserve. 
Critic's counter-amumen : Women who are in self-fulfilling careers are confident parents who spend as much 
quality time with their young children as nonworking women (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Most women work out of necessity, not because they find their 
employment fulfilling (assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: Judges should sentence more young offenders to prison for their crimes 
James's premise or justification for belief. More young offenders should be sentenced to prison because 
severe punishment will act as a deterrent to future criminal activities. 
Critic's counter-argument: Youths who are sent to prison for relatively minor infiractions have a greater 
likelihood of becoming adult criminals than youths who are placed on parole in a community rehabilitation 
programme (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Youths who commit even relatively minor infractions are more 
likely to engage in criminal activities as adults than young non-offenders (assume statement factually 
correct). 
James's belief- Taxes in England are too high. 
James's premise or iustification for belief: British industry is at a competitive disadvantage because our taxes 
are too high. 
Critic's counter-arp-ument: Taxes in England are among the very lowest in the industrial world (assume 
statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Politicians waste millions of dollars on useless pet projects 
(assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: The speed limit should be 80mph on the motorways. 
James's premise or justification for belief Because the motorway system was designed for high speed traffic, 
it is safe to drive at 80mph. 
Critic's counter-amument: You are more likely to die as a result of an accident if you are travelling at 80mph 
than you are if you are travelling at 70mph (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argumen : Many people will drive at 80mph whether or not the legal limit 
is 70 (assume statement factually correct). 
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James's belief: Seatbelts should always be worn when travelling in a car. 
James's premise or justificat16n for belief. Seatbelts should always be worn to make travelling by cat safer. 
Critic's counter-amumen : There are times when your life may be saved by your being thrown free of a car during an accident (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-arizument: You are several times more likely to be killed if you are 
thrown from a car (assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: The tax on petrol should not be raised significantly. 
James's premise or justification for belief. The tax on petrol should not be raised significantly because the 
economy will be hurt by higher taxes. 
Critic's counter-argumen : Taxes could always be lowered in other areas to compensate for the increased tax 
in petrol, and raising the cost of petrol will encourage conservation which would be good for the economy in 
the long run (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-araument: Increased tax on petrol would hit lower and middle income 
people harder than wealthier people (assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: The death penalty should be brought back as an ultimate punishment. 
James's premise or justification for belief. The judicial system should reinstate the death penalty because fear 
of capital punishment will serve as a strong deterrent for potential murderers. 
Critic's counter-argument: Evidence strongly suggests that murderers either kill impulsively or else they 
assume that they will never get caught (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argurrigint: If murderers get the death penalty, they get what they deserve 
(assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: Students should have a stronger voice than the general public in setting university 
policies. 
James's premise or iustification for belief. Because students are the ones who must ultimately pay the costs 
of running the university through tuition, they should have a stronger voice in setting university policies. 
Critic's counter-arp-ument: Tuition covers less than one half the cost of an education at most universities 
(assume statement factually correct), so the taxpayers should have a stronger say in the policies. 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Because it is the students who are directly influenced by 
university policies (assume statement factually correct), they are the ones who should have the stronger 
voice. 
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James's belief: The legal voting age should not be raised from 18 years to 21 years 
James's prýmise or justification for belief Thý legal voting age should not be raikd because. when it comes 
to voting, 18 year olds are as responsible as 21 year olds. 
Critic's counter-argument: Eighteen year olds do not generally take their voting responsibilities seriously, 
since they rarely vote and have been repeatedly demonstrated to have little knowledge of current events 
(assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argumen : Those eighteen year olds who do vote are relatively wIII 
informed and take their responsibilities seriously (assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: The national debt should be reduced by cutting MP's salaries. 
James's premise or justification for belief MP's salaries are very high, and cutting them would make a 
significant step towards paying off the huge national debt. 
Critic's counter-arp-ument: The national debt is so large that totally eliminating all MP's salaries would still 
hardly make a dent in it (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-arRument: Members of Parliament, whose actions are to a considerable 
extent responsible for the huge national debt, earn salaries several times higher than the national average 
(assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: Todays footballers are grossly overpaid. 
James's premise or justification for belief It is unfair for fans to have to pay the high ticket prices required to 
meet the extremely high salary demands of footballers. 
Critic's counter-argument: Because many fans will only support teams with celebrities and winning records 
(assume statement factually correct), footballers earn their money. 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-amument: The footballers of yesteryear are at least as good as those of 
today, yet they didn't earn millions of pounds a year (assume statement factually correct). 
James's belief: Labour unions should be eradicated because they are a major cause of the downfall of 
the British economy. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Labour unions are a major cause of the downfall of the British 
economy because they force management to pay extravagantly high wages, which corporations simply 
cannot bear if they intend to remain competitive on the world market. 
Critic's counter-argument: Labour unions keep management from abusing and taking advantage of workers 
(assume statement factually correct), so they are necessary. 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Most of the abuses that took place in the past are now 
prevented by law (assume statement factually correct); thus, unions are no longer needed for that purpose. 
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James's belief: Capital punishment should be outlawed in America 
James's premise or justificdtion for belief. Capital punishment' should be outlawed because killing IS NMng and the moral costs of sentencing an innocent person to death are too great. 
Critic's counter-argument: The prison system is very overcrowded, and it costs the country over $25,000 per 
prisoner each year to maintain each prisoner (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-arizument: The cost to the state of processing a capital punishment case 
through to completion averages about ten-million dollars in court and legal costs for each case (assume 
statement factually correct). 
James's belief: Smoking should be banned in all enclosed public places. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Smoking should be banned in all enclosed public places because 
even second hand smoke poses a significant health risk to non-smokers. 
Critic's counter-araument: Since many smokers already refrain from smoking in places where their second 
hand smoke poses a health risk to others (assume statement factually correct), It is unnecessary to severely 
restrict smoking locations. 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: While it may be true that many smokers are considerate, it is 
equally true that many smokers are not so considerate (assume statement factually correct). Banning smoking 
would be an effective way to ensure that many of us won't be subjected to the risks posed by second hand 
smoke 
James's belief: It is unfair for a new insurance policy holder to collect a huge insurance payment soon 
after obtaining the insurance policy. 
James's premise or justification for belief It is unfair for a new insurance policy holder to collect a huge 
insurance payment soon after obtaining the insurance policy because the total amount they would have 
contributed to the insurance fund would not come close to covering the cost of the payment. 
Critic's counter-argument: Because only a small fraction of all new insurance policy holders have a need to 
collect on their policies, the large sums paid to the few new policy holders who need payment are covered by 
the insurance payments of the remaining new policy holders (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-arizurnent: Individuals who have been insured with a company for a long 
period of time have contributed much more to the insurance fund than new policy holders (assume statement 
factually correct). 
James's belief: Children who play computer games will become anti-social adults. 
James's premise or justification for belief. Children who play computer games will become anti-social adults 
because they won't have learned the social skills necessary for them to interact with other adults. 
Critic's counter-arRument: Computer games are a modem trend and are no different socially from reading a 
book (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Eighty percent of children who play computer games spend at 
least 3 hrs a day on them, whilst children who prefer to read, read for much less than 3 hours a day (assume 
statement factually correct). 
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James's belief: The government's plan to get single parents back to work should be continued. 
James's gremise or justification for belief. Gbtting single parents back to work \ý, 111 give them a sense of "elf- 
worth and an aim in life. 
Critic's counter-argument: Most working people still have no sense of self-worth (assume statement factually 
correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: Seventy-five percent of single parent families that have 
returned to work, have reported being much happier in their home life (assume statement factually correct),. 
James's belief: The government's plan to give LIOOO to every new born baby is a waste of financial 
resources. 
James's premise or justification for belief. The government's plan to give f 1000 to every new bom baby is a 
waste of financial resources because it will encourage people to have babies for the wrong reasons. 
Critic's counter-argument: Most parents say that they will use the money to invest in their child's future 
education (assume statement factually correct). 
James's rebuttal to Critic's counter-argument: The government would get a better return investing aII the 
money into education now (assume statement factually correct),. 
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Experiment 1: Four full-time members of staff at the University of PIN-mouth. all 
highly qualified in the field of human reasoning and decision making, one philosopher 
and the principle researcher rated the arguments on the AET. The table belo%N 
displays the correlations between the six expert raters. The median correlation 
between the six experts was 0.65. 
Rater I Rater 2 Rater 3 Rater 4 Rater 5 
Rater I 
Rater 2 . 
70*** 
Rater 3 . 75*** . 
54*** 
Rater 4 . 
65*** . 
79*** 
. 
58*** 
Rater 5 . 
75*** . 
64*** 
. 63*** . 
75*** 
Rater 6 . 
71 . 
72*** . 64*** 
***p-. 001 (two-tailed) 
Table of correlations of the ratings of the arguments on the AET 
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Experiment 1: Instructions followed by the nine Law of Large Numbers problems, 
three belief-consistent, three belief-inconsistent and three belief-neutral (KlaczN-nski, 
Gordon, & Fauth, 1997) 
Instructions 
On the following pages you will find nine arguments based on different professions. Please 
read through them carefully and answer the questions which follow each one. Attempt 
them in the order in which they are presented and when finished do not turn back. 
Following each argument could you please rate the strength of the conclusion (I ý 
extremely weak; 9= extremely strong) and how persuaded you are by the argument (I = 
extremely unconvinced; 9= extremely convinced). Space is also provided under each 
argument for you to write an explanation of why you believe the conclusion to be weak or 
strong and the argument to be unconvincing or convincing. 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. 
Belief-Consistent 
Structure 1: 
Karen is a secretary for Dr. T., a respected custodian at his office. During the time she has 
worked for him, Dr. T. has always been polite, never told any "dirty" jokes, never made 
any "passes" at her, and never done anything that even looked like sexual harassment. All 
of his behaviors have made Karen very comfortable; she is hoping to keep her current job 
as long as possible. Her friend Helen is thinking about taking a job as secretary for a 
different custodian. In giving Helen advice about whether to take the job, Karen said the 
following: 
Karen: I've never been so comfortable in my life! He just never does anything wrong or 
anything that makes me feel uncomfortable. He never pulls any of that "male-macho" 
stuff. I'd love to keep working in his office forever, but if I can't, you can bet I'll look for 
another job with a custodian. Dr. T. is so NON-sexist, that it's unbelieveable! Before you 
make any hasty decisions about working in the office of anybody other than a custodian, 
I'd think carefully. If you want a bunch of men constantly touching you, hitting on you, 
and groping you, then take those jobs. Look: I've had experience with a custodian and it 
was great. I really recommend it. 
Based on the evidence used, how weak or strong do you think the conclusion is? 
Afler reading the argument, how convinced are vou? 
Use the space below to answer the following question. Pleasc comment on the 
A, you think tile conclusion. In no morc than 2 or 3 sentences, explain jyh 
conclusion is good or bad: 
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Structure 2: 
Dr. S. Hernstem is psychologist who has spend several years determining ýý-hether people 
in certain occupations make better parents than people in other occupations. In a recent 
study, he compared approximately 500 custodians to approximately 500 en ineers. In tlie 91 
report he published, Dr. Hernstein found that: 
"It is clear from these results that custodians make somewhat worse parents than 
engineers. Custodians physically abuse their children, pay less attention to their childrcii's 
schoolwork, and participate in fewer activities than engineers. Also, custodialls, on the 
average, report that they have less fun with their children than engineers and are morc 
likely to wish that they had never had any children than engineers. " 
In response to his paper, Dr. R. Thomas, also a respected psychologist, wrote a paper in 
which he attempted to discredit Dr. Hernstein's argument. Dr. Thomas wrote: 
I have difficulty believing Dr. Hernstein's study for two reasons. First, in my 
laboratory, I work with a custodian who loves his children very much. Second, talking 
about the 'average' behavior of custodians doesn't tell me anything about how any one 
custodian will act. On this basis, I feel we can effectively dismiss Hernstein's argument. " 
Structure 3: 
Ed G. did his thesis in psychology on the subject of conformity to authority in different 
occupational groups. In his study, 3 engineers, 3 custodians, and 3 local Politicians 
participated. Below is a summary of Ed's study. 
When they came into the psychology laboratory, Ed commanded each subject to do 
several menial tasks, such as grading undergraduate papers, making copies of class 
assignments, and taking notes during a meaningless lecture. As signs of conformity, Ed 
measured the following: How quickly the subjects responded to his demands, whether they 
ever questioned his orders, and whether they actually followed his demands. He then 
constructed a scale like that below; the results of his study are to the right of the scale: 
I= Very conforming; 
2= Somewhat conforming; 
3= Moderate conforming; 
4= Somewhat Nonconfon-ning; 
5= Very Nonconforming 
Results 
I engineer, 2 politicians 
I engineer, 
I engineer, I politician 
I custodian 
2 custodians 
Because these data showed that custodians were either very nonconforming or somewhat 
nonconforming and because the other two groups usually obeyed his orders. Ed concluded 
that custodians are much less conforming than either engineers or politicians. 
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Belief- Inconsistent 
Structure 1: 
An editorial in a local newspaper recently criticised the profession of being a custodian. 
The journalist's argument was: 
I've got a friend who's a custodian, and I wouldn't kvant my children to be 
influenced by him. I went to visit him at work the other day, just to say "H1. " What did I 
find? The custodian wasn't exactly working--he was in the lounge taking a nap! Friends 
of mine tell me he's always sleeping or loafing or messing around! What am I supposed to 
think? My conclusion: I don't think there's a lazier group of people than custodians! 
Structure 2: 
Lisa and Roy are having an argument over whether custodians are more likely to gct 
divorced than other people. Roy claims the marriages of custodians are much more 
satisfying than those of other people, but Lisa believes that custodians' marriages arc very 
unhappy and frequently end in divorce. 
Roy: 
I've been working as a lawyer for over 15 years, and handle people's divorces all the time. 
During all that time, I've seen hundreds of couples in bad marriages that wind up in divorce 
and they've been from just about every occupation you can imagine, but by far fewer of 
those divorces have involved custodians than any other occupation. I've seen enough to 
know that a marriage is pretty likely be happy, satisfying, and to stay together when a 
custodian's involved. 
Lisa: 
You're wrong and you know it! Two of my sisters are custodians, remember? I talk to 
them every day and they're always talking about problems with their marriages. In tact, I 
know several people who are custodians and they have the least satisfying marriages I've 
know of I've seen it for myself, you haven't! If you've seen the custodians I've seen, it's 
pretty easy to figure out that custodians are a good bet to be unhappy in their marriages. 
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Structure 3: 
John works for a London testing company. His company has been hired to measure the 
lQs or intelligence of Ministry of Defence employees. John himself has been asked to give 
an IQ test to 10 people who are MOD employees. Two people were secretaries, two were doctors, 2 were custodians, 2 were architects, and 2 were dentists. He uses the best IQ test 
available, one that is respected across the country. After he had tested each person once, 
he put his findings in a table: 
Person: Q: 
Secretaries 98 and 101 
Custodians 90 and 97 
Doctors 115 and 117 
Architects 106 and III 
Dentists 102 and 108 
Because a person with average intelligence should have an IQ of around 100 and because 
IQs below are low, especially for most professions, John concludes that custodians are 
much less intelligent than the other groups of people he tested. 
Belief-Neutral 
Structure 1: 
Amy is thinking about being a chemist, and her friend Jill is trying to talk her into it. Jill's 
argument is, "Look, my father was a chemist, and after 20 years of being a chemist, he's 
still energetic, trying to do his best, and is very happy. It's a great job to do. You can just 
take one look at my dad and you'l I know that he's got a great job. " 
Structure 2: 
Ken and Toni are arguing over whether chemists have more psychological problems than 
other people. 
Ken's argument is, "Of course chemists have fewer problems! All that academic and 
school work keeps their minds in good psychological health! Remember the chemists that 
we've known? Mr. Cross was the happiest guy I knew and never had any problems and 
Mrs. Davis was always helping other people solve their own problems! How can you 
argue with that? " 
Toni's argument is, I don't think you're right. I just read a newspaper article that 
compared hundreds of chemists with hundreds of other people. That study showed that 
chemists are much more likely to have psychological problems than other people. " 
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Structure 3: 
Fran works for an employment agency. As part of her job. she has to interview people from a huge number of professions. Recently, she inteniewed a young chemist who was looking for a job in the county. During the interview, the chemist was verý' calm, had 
complete control of herself, and expressed herself very clearly. Fran was very impressed. 
In fact, it was the best interview Fran had ever seen. From this experience, Fran has 
concluded that chemists have great self-confidence and that in their training as chemists 
they learn how to stay cool under pressure. 
The rating scales following each problem: 
Based on the evidence used, how weak or strong do you think the conclusion is? 
123456789 
Extremely Somewhat Average: Neither Somewhat Extremely 
Weak Weak Weak nor Strong Strong Strong 
After reading the argument, how convinced are you? 
123456789 
Extremely Somewhat Not Somewhat Extremely 
Unconvinced Unconvinced Sure Convinced Convinced 
Use the space below to answer the following question. Please comment on the 
conclusion. In no more than 2 or 3 sentences, explain MLh_y you think the 
conclusion is good or bad: 
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Experiment 1: Instructions followed by the nine Experiment Evaluation problems. 
three belief-consistent, three belief-inconsistent and three belief-neutral (Klac/N. nski, 
Gordon, & Fauth, 1997) 
Instructions 
On the following pages you will be presented with several summaries of actual 
psychological and sociological research. The research Involves participants from several 
dozen occupations, one of which may be your intended occupation. Maný' of the filldings 
that pertained to other occupations have been deleted from the summaries and on1v 
information relevant to your occupation and a few other randomly selected occupations 
will be presented. 
Following each problem could you please rate the strength of the researcher's conclusion 
(I = extremely weak; 9= extremely strong) and the validity of the experiment i. e. does the 
experiment measure what the researcher suggests it measures (I = extremely invalid; 9 
extremely valid). Space is also provided under each problem for you to write an 
explanation of why you believe the researcher's conclusion to be weak or strong and the 
experiment to be valid or invalid. 
Belief-Consistent 
Structure 1: 
A famous sociologist conducted a study looking at the effects of a person's occupation on 
their stress levels. He was particularly interested in the stress factors that may be more 
apparent in the workplace for some professions over others. Large groups of accountants, 
engineers and nurses were recruited to take part in the study. Each occupational group was 
asked to attend the lab for an afternoon of testing on different days. Once at the lab, the 
participants were split into smaller groups of eight. Video-taped focus groups wcre led by 
expenenced research assistants who introduced stress inducing topics for discussion. The 
groups consisting of engineers and nurses were led into discussion about salaries, 
shiftwork and management issues. The groups consisting of accountants were led into 
discussion about salaries and holidays. After the focus group which lasted halt' an hour, 
participants were required to complete a self-report inventory to ascertain their stress 
levels. The results showed that accountants had lower self-reported stress levels than either 
nurses or engineers after the focus groups and on watching the videotapes the sociologist 
concluded that the focus groups consisting of accountants included less stress-filled 
discussion. His reported findings indicate that accountancy as an occupation leads to lower 
stress levels than either engineering or nursing. 
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Structure 2: 
Professor A. recently ran a large scale study looking at positive and negative personalitv 
traits in individuals from different occupations. positive personality traits observed tI or 
example were cheerfulness, patience, honesty and open-mindedness, whereas examples of 
negative personality traits observed were distrust of others. pessimism, overbearing 
behaviours and laziness. With the aid of trained researchers, seventy-five accountant.,; 
randomly selected from all over the country were followed and observed over a period of 
six months going about their work and any personality traits were monitored. Seventy-five 
engineers were also observed for six months but as their work generally involves a &Ireat 
deal of travelling, they were pre-selected ftom half a dozen factones in the Midlands. 
Along with being observed, participants were requested to complete a monthly 
questionnaire, designed to elicit certain responses dependent on the individual's 
personality. At the end of six months it was found that the researchers had monitored more 
positive personality traits than negative ones in accountants whereas the reverse was found 
for engineers. Also, the completion rate for the self-report personality scale ýý-as 
significantly higher for accountants than engineers and more positive responses were made 
by the accountants. Professor A. concluded from these results that accountants have more 
positive personality traits than engineers. 
Structure 3: 
A leading psychologist from a University Hospital conducted a study to look at overall 
satisfaction with life in individuals from different occupations. For the research she 
compared teachers, nurses, secretaries, accountants and wai ters/wai tresses. Sixty people 
were recruited from each occupation and for a fortnight they were each required to note 
down in a diary each positive thought that they had, day or night. At the end of the study 
period the results were collated and it was found that overall teachers had an average of 7 
positive thoughts a day, nurses and waiters/wai tresses had an average of 6 positive 
thoughts a day, secretanes had an average of 4.3 positive thoughts a day and accountants 
had an average of 11.8 positive thoughts a day. From these results the psychologist noted 
that accountants had significantly more positive thoughts each day than teachers, nurses, 
secretaries or wai ters/wai tresses. She concluded that this indicated that accountants were 
overall much more satisfied with their lives than individuals from any of the other 
occupations. 
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Belief- Inconsistent 
Structure 1: 
Dr. H. is a researcher who is interested in finding out how capable people in different 
occupations are of holding pleasant conversations with strangers. Dr. H. Is especially 
interested in finding out how skilled accountants, teachers, and lawyers are in dealing with 
strangers because people in these professions must deal with strangers on a daily basis. To 
observe their conversations, Dr. H. watched a large number of teachers and la-wyers in 
conversations with Amy, an attractive young female who is one of Dr. H's laboratory 
assistants. Next, Dr. H. observed a large number of accountants having a conversation with 
Jim, another one of Dr. H's laboratory assistants. The results of her study showed that 
teachers and lawyers had longer and more pleasant conversations and had much more eye 
contact than the accountants. On the basis of these findings, Dr. H. concluded that 
accountants are less socially skilled and less capable of having conversations with 
strangers than either teachers or lawyers. 
Structure 2: 
Two well-known researchers have conducted several studies on the relationship between 
one's occupation and the tendency to conform to authority. The occupations of being a 
teacher and being an accountant were compared in one study. In this study, 50 accountants 
were contacted at local businesses and agreed to be in the study. At the time of the study, 
teachers were hard to locate and contact. Thus, the researchers recruited 50 teachers from a 
conference on leadership that was taking place in a nearby city. Next, each person was 
brought to the researchers' laboratory. At the laboratory, both the accountants and the 
teachers were given several orders to complete menial tasks. For example, they were 
ordered to grade the papers of several dozen undergraduates. At the completion of the 
experiment, the researchers found that the accountants were far more likely to obey the 
commands than were the teachers. The teachers were much more likely to question the 
commands and to refuse. The researchers concluded that the experience of being a teacher 
results in a greater sense of independence and of inner strength than does being an 
accountant. 
Structure 3: 
Dr. Bill R. is a psychologist interested in determining whether sexual harassment is more 
likely to occur in some occupations than in others. To conduct his research, he included in 
his study accountants, architects, biologists, and salespersons. In each occupational group, 
he asked 80 people to be in the study. To measure sexual harassment, Bill observed people 
in each group at work and counted the number of times each person told jokes with sexual 
content. At the end of his study, Bill found that the average accountant told 6.5 sexual 
jokes per month. Members of the other occupations, on the other hand, told an avcrage of 
only 2.0 sexual jokes per month. Therefore, accountants told more than three times as 
many sexual jokes than people in other occupations. Based on this, Dr. R. concluded that 
accountants are involved in more sexual harassment than are people who are members of 
other occupations. 
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Belief-Neutral 
Structure 1: 
Professor Y. wanted to find out whether individuals who worked in any one occupation 
were more or less socially skilled than individuals who worked in another. She randomly 
selected 40 dentists, 40 doctors and 40 teachers from all over the United Kingdom and 
invited them to a conference and dinner together. The teachers couldn't make it on the 
same day therefore their conference/dinner was held two weeks later. At the conferciiccs 
and dinners, individuals were watched by trained researchers to observe their behaviours. 
For example, introducing themselves and introducing others. On collation of all the data, 
Professor Y. found that dentists showed the most social behaviours, closely followed by 
doctors, but with significantly less social behaviours were the teachers. In reporting her 
findings, Professor Y. concluded that dentists are more socially skilled individuals than 
doctors or teachers. 
Structure 2: 
Dr. S. and Dr. A. designed a study to ascertain whether there were differences ill how 
people think dependent on their occupation. They were particularly interested in how 
biased people from different occupations were. Forty nurses and engineers were randomly 
selected from throughout Devon and Cornwall to participate in the study. Forty dentists 
were also recruited from an 'holistic approach to patient care' conference being held 
locally. The study took 45-60 minutes to complete and participants were required to read 
20 scenarios depicting problems faced by fictitious people. They then had to rate on a scale 
of 1-10 whether they thought the problem was caused by the person involved themselvcs 
or by circumstances, and then describe ways that the problems could be solved and by 
whom. Dr. S. and Dr. A. found that the nurses and engineers were more likely to blame the 
fictitious individual for their problem and more likely to present only one solution to the 
problem - usually the individual having to change something about themselves. Dentists 
on the other hand would tackle the problem from different angles and offer many solutions. 
They concluded in their report that dentists are less 'person-blaming and more open to 
considering alternatives than either nurses or engineers. 
Structure 3: 
Ire Dr. Wendy P. had a very strong interest in group work and specifically g oup coh sion. 
She wanted to find out whether people who worked in certain occupations were more able 
to work together as a group , N,, hen tackling a problem than people 
from other occupations. 
Dentists, teachers and electricians were included in the study. 20 in each group. Each 
group was taken into the lab at different times and split Into smaller groups of four. Each 
group of 4 was then given a task to complete in 30 minutes which was to design a 
recruitment poster advertising their profession to school leaN'crs. She found that dentists 
overall produced the most eye-catching a informative posters. Dr. NN'ciidy P. concluded 
from these results that dentists are more able to , N, ork as a group, and therefore exhibit 
more group cohesion than either teachers or electricians. 
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The rating scales following each problem: 
Could you please rate the strength of the researchers conclusion on the following scale. 
123456789 
Extremely Somewhat Average: Neither Somewhat Extremely 
Weak Weak Weak nor Strong Strong Strong 
Could you please rate the validity of the experiment on the following scale. 
123456789 
Extremely Somewhat Not Somewhat Extremely 
Invalid Invalid Sure Valid Valid 
Use the space below to answer the following question.: Based on the experiment above 
please could you explain why you think the researcher's conclusion was weak/strong 
and why you think the experiment was valid/invalid. 
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APPENDIX A1.7 
Experiment 1: The sixteen syllogistic reasoning problems, eight involving definitional 
content and eight consisting of empirical content. 
Definitional: 
No dogs are unhappy, 
Some mammals are unhappy, 
Therefore, 
Some mammals are not dogs. 
No birds are loving, 
Some robins are loving, 
Therefore, 
Some robins are not birds. 
No reptiles are fun-loving, 
Some lizards are fun-loving, 
Therefore, 
Some reptiles are not lizards. 
No trout are grumpy, 
Some fish are grumpy, 
Therefore, 
Some trout are not fish. 
Some mice are timid, 
No tigers are timid, 
Therefore, 
Some mice are not tigers. 
Some sheep are ferocious, 
No four-legged animals are ferocious, 
Therefore, 
Some sheep are not four-legged animals. 
Some alsatians are shy, 
No dogs are shy, 
Therefore, 
Some dogs are not alsatians. 
Some crustaceans are mean-tempered, 
No crabs are iliean-tempered, 
Therefore, 
Some crabs are not crustaceans. 
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Empirical: 
No police dogs are vicious, 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious, 
Therefore, 
Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs. 
No nutritional things are inexpensive, 
Some vitamins are inexpensive, 
Therefore, 
Some vitamin tablets are not nutritional. 
No addictive things are inexpensive, 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive, 
Therefore, 
Some addictive things are not Cigarettes. 
No millionaires are hard workers, 
Some rich people are hard workers, 
Therefore, 
Some millionaires are not rich people. 
Some priests are healthy, 
No religious people are healthy, 
Therefore, 
Some religious people are not priests. 
Some healthy people are unhappy, 
No astronauts are unhappy, 
Therefore, 
Some astronauts are not healthy people. 
Some good swimmers are smokers, 
No deep sea divers are smokers, 
Therefore, 
Some good swimmers are not deep sea divers. 
Some J udges are accountants, 
No xvell educated people are accountants, 
Therefore, 
Some judges are not well educated people. 
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APPENDIX A1.8 
Experiment 1: Four selection task problems, two arbitrary and two deontic versions. 
Arbitrary Versions 
PROBLEM 1: The Wason Selection Task 
Each of the boxes below represents a card lying on a table. Each one of the cards has a letter on one side and 
a number on the other side. 
The rule is: "If a card has an A on its letter side, then it has an 8 on its number side. " 
As you can see, two of the cards are letter-side up, and two of the cards are number-side up. Your task is to 
decide which card or cards must be turned over in order to find out whether the rule is true or false. 
Please indicate your choice or choices by circling either the 'a' (turn) or 'b' (not turn) below each card. 
D A 8 3 
PROBLEM 2: The Destination Problem 
Each of the tickets below has a destination on one side and a mode of travel on the other side. 
The rule is: "If 'Glasgow' is on one side of the ticket, then 'train' is on the other side of the ticket. " 
As you can see, two of the tickets are destination-side up, and two of the tickets are mode of travel-side up. 
Your task is to decide which ticket or tickets you would need to turn over in order to find out whether the rule 
is true or false. 
Please indicate your choice or choices by circling either the 'a' (turn) or 'b' (not turn) below each ticket. 
Glasgow Edinburgh Train 
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Deontic Versions 
PROBLEM 3: The Sears (Debenhams) Problem 
Suppose that you are the assistant manager at Debenhams, and it is your job to check sales receipts to make 
sure they are properly filled out according to a rule. 
The rule is: "Any sale over L30 must be approved by the section manager, Mr. Jones. " 
The amount of the sale is on one side of each receipt, and the space for the approval signature is on the other 
side. Which of the sales receipts shown below would you need to turn over in order to find out whether or not 
the rule is being violated? 
Please indicate your choice or choices by circling either the 'a' (turn) or V (not turn) below each sales 
receipt. 
E70 E22 Approved Not 
Approved 
PROBLEM 2: The Drinking Age Problem 
Imagine that you are a police officer on duty, walking through a local bar. it is your job to ensure that the 
drinking laws are in effect in this bar. When you see a person engaging in certain activities, the laws specify 
that certain conditions must first be met. 
One such law is "if a person is drinking beer then the person must be over 18 years of age. " 
Each of the boxes below represents a card lying on a table. There are two pieces of information about a 
person on each card. Whether or not the person is drinking beer is on one side of the card and the person's 
age is on the other side. For two of the people, you can see their age, but you cannot see what they are 
drinking. For the other two people, you can see what they are drinking, but you cannot see their age. Your 
task is to decide whether or not this law is being broken in the bar. Circle the card or cards you would 
definitely need to turn over to decide whether or not the law is being broken. You may select any or all of the 
cards. 
Please indicate your choice or choices by circling either the 'a' (turn) or V (not turn) below each card. 
Drinking 
Beer 
16 years Drinking 
Beer 
19 years 
310 
APPENDIX A2.1 Inventory to determine typical. /untypical traits (Lxp. 2 Pilot stuclý 
Occupations Inventorý 
Below you will find a list of thirty-four different professions/occupations. Next to each one is a list of 
six character traits or behaviours. Could you please indicate on the scale bN I each one, hoý% typical the 
traits/behaviours are for persons in each professionloccupation from I to 5 (1 = very unt. %pical, 2 
quite untypical, 3= neither typical nor untypical, 4= quite typical, 15 = very typical). 
Very Vm 
Untypical Tý pical 
1 
1. Nurses are caring 
aggressive 
thoughtful 
intelligent 
laz-,, 
healthy 
2. Boxers are aggressive 
quiet 
talkative 
healthy 
demonstrative 
shy 
3. Firemen are brave 
intelligent 
lazy 
cowardlý 
athletic 
selfish 
4. Teachers are clever 
artistic 
extrovert 
child hitters 
boring 
scientific 
5. Politicians are trustworthý 
good with children 
good public speakers 
analytical 
fun loving 
very intuitive 
6. Doctors are logical 
clever 
caring 
intuitive 
health,, - 
trust, worthý 
APPENDIX A2.1 cont. 
7. Dentists are healthy 
caring 
artistic 
talkative 
happy 
quiet 
8. Writers are pragmatic 
intelligent 
creative 
disorganised 
analytical 
introverted 
9. Artists are loners 
imaginative 
logical 
hard , -*-orking 
lazy 
egocentric 
10. Shop assistants are good with moncy 
talkative 
polite 
quiet 
smarth, dressed 
snobby 
11. Paramedics are courageous 
healthy 
caring 
fast thinkers 
good drivers 
team workers 
12. Musicians are disorganised 
creative 
clever 
logical 
introvert 
egocentric 
13. Managers are organised 
conforming 
creative 
leaders 
honest 
overweight 
14. I. T. Consultants are analytical 
creative 
intelligent 
strong 
wealthy 
intuitive 
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15. Telephone operators are polite 
talkative 
caring 
happy 
wealthy 
organised 
16. Taxidrivers are safe drivers 
drinkers 
imaginative 
happy 
slow drivers 
helpful 
17. Waiters are polite 
intelligent 
caring 
extrovert 
organised 
snobby 
18. Nannies are aggressive 
domineering 
caring 
healthy 
child lovers 
creative 
19. Librarians are extrovert 
organised 
short-sighted 
healthy 
book lovers 
quiet 
20. Bus drivers are polite 
aggressive 
creative 
pragmatic 
caring 
good at maths 
21. Soldiers are brave 
intelligent 
power crazy 
cowardly 
flirtatious 
healthy 
22. Hairdressers are conceited 
creative 
funny 
analytical 
boring 
intelligent 
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23. Plumbers are Social1v skilled 
reliable 
practical 
brave 
wealthy 
hard working 
24. Electricians are lazy 
socially skilled 
problem solvers 
reliable 
hard working 
creative thinkers 
25. Engineers are analytical 
laz%, 
good at group work 
creative 
hard working 
intelligent 
26. Ski instructors are flirtatious 
extroverted 
fun loving 
reliable 
boring 
shv 
27. Aerobic instructors are healthv 
energetic 
vain 
extroverted 
unhealthy 
sun-lovers 
28. Secretaries are good organisers 
gossips 
helpful 
common 
intelligent 
caring 
29. Acroplane pilots are intelligent 
posh 
brave 
rational 
intuitive 
drinkers 
30. Carpenters are creative 
artistic 
religious 
strong 
problem solNers 
analytical 
14 
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31. Builders are bullies 
sexist 
extroverts 
common 
rich 
politicallý correct 
32. Solicitors are snobby 
elitist 
pragmatic 
honest 
down to earth 
impractical 
33. Salespersons are common 
talkative 
socially skilled 
money grabbing 
quiet 
generous 
34. Accountants are good %vith numbers 
happy 
boring 
socially skilled 
really interesting 
extroverts 
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APPENDIX A2.2 Descriptive statistics for traits related to occupations (highest mean 
first) 
Valid N Mean. Min Max Std. Dev. 
ACCOUNTI 18 4.833333 4 5 0.383482 
LIB5 18 4.777778 4 5 0.427793 
NURSESI 18 4.722222 4 5 0.460889 
ARTIST2 18 4.722222 4 5 0.460889 
FIREMENI 18 4.666667 4 5 0.485071 
WRITERS3 18 4.666667 4 5 0.485071 
AEROBICI 18 4.611111 4 5 0.501631 
AEROBIC2 18 4.611111 4 5 0.501631 
NANNIE5 18 4.611111 3 5 0.607685 
DOCTORS2 18 4.555556 4 5 0.51131 
MUSIC2 18 4.5 4 5 0.514496 
PLUMBER3 18 4.5 4 5 0.514496 
POLITIC3 18 4.444444 3 5 0.615699 
AEROPI 18 4.444444 3 5 0.615699 
BOXERSI 18 4.388889 2 5 0.777544 
NANNIE3 18 4.388889 3 5 0.607685 
SOLDIERI 18 4.388889 3 5 0.607685 
ENGINI 18 4.388889 3 5 0.607685 
PARA6 18 4.333333 3 5 0.594089 
SECRETI 18 4.333333 3 5 0.594089 
ITI 18 4.277778 3 5 0.669113 
PARA3 18 4.277778 3 5 0.574513 
LIB2 18 4.277778 3 5 0.574513 
SALES2 18 4.277778 4 5 0.460889 
MANAGE4 18 4.222222 3 5 0.732084 
ENGIN6 18 4.222222 3 5 0.548319 
PARAI 18 4.166667 3 5 0.707107 
PARA4 18 4.166667 2 5 0.857493 
LIB6 18 4.111111 3 5 0.758395 
AEROP4 18 4.111111 3 5 0.471405 
PARA5 18 4.055556 3 5 0.639137 
IT3 18 4.055556 3 5 0.639137 
SKI 1 18 4.055556 3 5 0.725358 
SK13 18 4.055556 3 5 0.539305 
SALES3 18 4.055556 3 5 0.639137 
SK12 18 4 3 5 0.685994 
FIREMEN5 18 3.944444 3 5 0.639137 
MANAGEI 18 3.944444 2 5 0.802366 
AEROBIC4 18 3.944444 3 5 0.539305 
BOXERS4 18 3.888889 1 5 0.963382 
TEACHERS 18 3.888889 2 5 0.832352 
WRITERS2 18 3.888889 3 5 0.471405 
WAITERI 18 3.888889 3 5 0.6764 
SOLDIER6 18 3.888889 1 5 1.131833 
BUILD2 18 3.888889 3 5 0.758395 
SOLIC2 18 3.888889 1 5 0.963382 
DOCTORSI 18 3.888889 2 5 0.832352 
ELEC3 18 3.888889 2 5 0.582983 
IT5 18 3.833333 2 5 1.043185 
ARTISTI 18 3.833333 3 5 0.707107 
TELEI 18 3.833333 3 5 0.785905 
CARPI 18 3.833333 2 5 0.923548 
HAIR2 18 3.722222 2 5 0.751904 
BUILD4 18 3.722222 3 5 0.669113 
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DOCTORS6 18 3.722222 2 5 0.826442 
SHOP2 18 3.722222 2 5 0.826442 
MUSIC6 18 3.666667 3 5 0.594089 
TELE2 18 3.666667 3 5 0.685994 
ENGIN5 18 3.666667 3 4 0.485071 
CARP4 18 3.666667 3- 4 0.485071 
SALES4 18 3.666667 1 5 1.084652 
ARTIST6 18 3.666667 1 5 0.970143 
SOLIC 1 18 3.666667 1 5 0.907485 
ACCOUNT3 18 3.611111 1 5 1.036901 
NURSES3 18 3.611111 3 5 0.697802 
AEROBIC3 18 3.611111 3 5 0.607685 
SECRET2 18 3.611111 3 5 0.697802 
CARP5 18 3.611111 3 5 0.607685 
BUILD3 18 3.555556 3 5 0.615699 
SHOP5 18 3.5 3 5 0.618347 
SOLDIER5 18 3.5 2 5 0.707107 
AEROBIC6 18 3.5 3 5 0.618347 
CARP2 18 3.5 2 5 0.857493 
NURSES4 18 3.444444 3 4 0.51131 
WRITERS4 18 3.444444 1 5 0.921777 
MUSIC3 18 3.444444 3 4 0.51131 
BOXERS5 18 3.388889 1 5 1.036901 
TEACHERS 18 3.388889 2 5 0.697802 
POLITIC4 18 3.388889 2 4 0.777544 
DENTISTS 18 3.388889 2 4 0.607685 
MANAGE2 18 3.388889 2 5 0.697802 
IT6 18 3.388889 2 4 0.607685 
WAITER5 18 3.388889 2 4 0.697802 
ENGIN3 18 3.388889 2 5 0.697802 
SECRET3 18 3.388889 1 4 0.777544 
AEROP3 18 3.388889 2 5 0.777544 
AEROP5 18 3.388889 2 4 0.777544 
CARP6 18 3.388889 2 4 0.607685 
DOCTORS3 18 3.388889 1 5 0.978528 
SHOPI 18 3.333333 2 5 0.685994 
SOLDIER3 18 3.333333 2 5 0.766965 
ELEC5 18 3.333333 2 4 0.685994 
PLUMBER6 18 3.333333 1 5 0.970143 
AEROP2 18 3.333333 1 5 0.907485 
SHOP3 18 3.277778 1 5 0.95828 
TELE6 18 3.277778 2 4 0.574513 
WAITER4 18 3.277778 1 4 0.751904 
TEACHERS 18 3.277778 3 4 0.460889 
ENGIN4 18 3.277778 1 5 1.017815 
SOLIC3 18 3.277778 1 4 0.826442 
WRITERS6 18 3.222222 2 4 0.808452 
FIREMEN2 18 3.166667 2 4 0.707107 
TEACHERS 18 3.166667 2 5 0.618347 
DENTISTS 18 3.166667 2 5 0.857493 
SHOP6 18 3.166667 2 4 0.707107 
PARA2 18 3.166667 2 4 0.514496 
BUSI 18 3.166667 1 5 0.985184 
SALESI 18 3.166667 2 4 0.514496 
DOCTORS4 18 3.166667 1 4 0.785905 
IT2 18 3.166667 1 5 0.923548 
NANNIE6 18 3.111111 1 5 0.900254 
PLUMBER5 18 3.111111 2 5 0.900254 
TEACHERS 18 3.111111 2 4 0.6764 
NANNIE4 18 3.111111 2 4 0.471405 
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SECRETS 18 3.111111 1 4 0.900254 
BUILD] 18 3.111111 1 5 0.963382 
DOCTORS5 18 3.055556 2 4 0.639137 
DENTISTS 18 3.055556 2 5 0.639137 
musici 18 3.055556 2 4 0.639137 
MANAGE6 18 3.055556 1 5 0.725358 
BOXERS3 18 3 2 4 0.594089 
WRITERS5 18 3 1 5 0.907485 
ARTISTS 18 3 2 4 0.685994 
TAX14 18 3 1 4 1.084652 
TAX16 18 3 1 5 1.236694 
WAITER6 18 3 1 4 0.840168 
NANNIE2 18 3 1 5 1.028992 
LIB3 18 3 1 5 0.766965 
BUS4 18 3 1 4 0.840168 
HAIR3 18 3 1 4 0.766965 
HAIRS 18 3 2 5 0.840168 
SECRET6 18 3 1 4 0.685994 
BUILDS 18 3 1 5 0.907485 
NURSES6 18 2.944444 1 5 0.872604 
WRITERSI 18 2.944444 1 4 0.937595 
HAIRI 18 2.944444 1 4 0.725358 
TELE4 18 2.944444 1 5 0.872604 
BUS2 18 2.944444 2 4 0.802366 
DENTISTS 18 2.888889 1 4 0.6764 
ARTIST4 18 2.888889 2 4 0.832352 
BUSS 18 2.888889 1 4 0.900254 
DENTISTS 18 2.888889 2 4 0.6764 
MANAGES 18 2.888889 1 4 0.758395 
SECRET4 18 2.888889 2 5 0.758395 
TAXII 18 2.833333 1 5 1.294786 
TAX12 18 2.833333 1 4 0.857493 
MUSIC4 18 2.777778 1 4 0.808452 
LIB4 18 2.777778 1 3 0.548319 
ELEC2 18 2.777778 1 4 0.646762 
SOLIC6 18 2.777778 1 4 0.732084 
WAITER2 18 2.722222 1 3 0.574513 
BUS6 18 2.722222 1 4 0.751904 
ACCOUNT4 18 2.722222 2 4 0.669113 
MUSICS 18 2.666667 2 4 0.594089 
MANAGE3 18 2.666667 2 4 0.594089 
SK14 18 2.666667 2 4 0.594089 
WAITER3 18 2.666667 1 4 0.766965 
POLITIC6 18 2.611111 1 4 0.916444 
ENGIN2 18 2.611111 2 4 0.607685 
ACCOUNT2 18 2.611111 2 3 0.501631 
SHOP4 18 2.611111 1 3 0.607685 
PLUMBERI 18 2.611111 1 4 0.697802 
ELECI 18 2.611111 1 4 0.697802 
POLITIC2 18 2.555556 1 4 0.704792 
ELEC4 18 2.555556 1 4 0.783823 
CARP3 18 2.555556 1 3 0.783823 
DENTISTS 18 2.5 1 4 0.857493 
TELE3 18 2.5 1 3 0.618347 
BUS3 18 2.5 1 3 0.618347 
SOLDIER2 18 2.5 1 4 0.785905 
ELEC6 18 2.5 1 4 0.857493 
POLITICS 18 2.444444 1 3 0.615699 
TAX13 18 2.444444 1 4 0.855585 
PLUMBER4 18 2.444444 1 3 0.783823 
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ACCOUNT6 18 2.444444 1 3 0.615699 
IT4 18 2.388889 1 4 0.849837 
AEROP6 18 2.388889 1 4 0.849837 
SK15 18 2.388889 2 3 0.501631 
BOXERS2 18 2.333333 1 4 0.970143 
SOLIC4 18 2.333333 1- 4 1.028992 
SALES6 18 2.333333 1 3 0.840168 
ARTIST3 18 2.277778 1 3 0.669113 
HAIR6 18 2.222222 1 3 0.878204 
BOXERS6 18 2.166667 1 4 0.923548 
FIREMEN3 18 2.166667 1 4 0.857493 
FIREMEN6 18 2.166667 1 3 0.707107 
TELE5 18 2.111111 1 3 0.758395 
SOLIC5 18 2.111111 1 3 0.758395 
NURSES5 18 2.055556 1 5 1.258955 
SOLDIER4 18 2.055556 1 3 0.639137 
HAIR4 18 2.055556 1 3 0.802366 
SALES5 18 2 1 4 0.766965 
ACCOUNT5 18 2 1 3 0.766965 
PLUMBER2 18 1.944444 1 3 0.802366 
LIB 1 18 1.888889 1 3 0.832352 
POLITICI 18 1.888889 1 4 0.963382 
TAX15 18 1.833333 1 3 0.785905 
SK16 18 1.833333 1 3 0.707107 
NANNIEI 18 1.777778 1 4 0.942809 
NURSES2 18 1.722222 1 4 0.95828 
BUILD6 18 1.722222 1 3 0.751904 
FIREMEN4 18 1.611111 1 5 0.978528 
AEROBIC5 18 1.611111 1 3 0.697802 
TEACHERS 18 1.5 1 3 0.707107 
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APPENDIX A2.3 Descriptive statistics of q, pical/unt), pical/neutral traits 
Table 1. Means and Standard- deviations of Typical character- traits for occupations to be used in 
Experiment 2 (N=18). 
Occupation/ 
trait 
Mean Minimum Nlaximum Std. Deviation 
Accountant-Good 4.83 4 5 0.38 
with Numeracy 
Librarian-Book 4.78 4 5 0.43 
lovers 
Nurses-Caring 4.72 4 5 0.46 
Artists- 4.72 4 5 0.46 
Imaginative 
Firemen-Brave 4.67 4 5 048 
Writers-Creative 4.67 4 5 0.48 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Untypical character traits for occupations to be used in 
Experiment 2 (N=18). 
Occupation/ 
trait 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deý iation 
Teachers-Ifit 1.5 13 0.71 
children 
Aerobic 1.61 13 0.70 
Instructors- 
Unhealthy 
Firemen- 1.61 15 0.98 
Cowardly 
Builders- 1.72 13 0.75 
Politically Correct 
Nurses- 1.72 14 0.96 
Aggressive 
Ski Instructors- 1.83 13 0.71 
Shy 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Neutral character traits for occupations to be used in 
Experiment 2 (N=18). 
Occupation/ 
trait 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Devlation 
Boxers -Talkative 3 24 
0.59 
Artists-Lazy 3 24 0.68 
TaxI-Dn\ ers- 3 15 1.24 
Helpftil 
Nannies- 3 15 1.03 
Domineering 
Librarians- 3 15 0.77 
Shortsighted 
Secretanes- 3 14 0.69 
Caring 
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APPENDIX 2.4 Law of Large Numbers Training 
Law of Large Numbers Written Explanation 
We are very interested in studying how people go about explaining and predicting events under conditions of 
very limited information about the events. It seems to us to be important to study how people explain and 
predict under these conditions because they occur very frequently in the real world. Indeed, we often have to 
make important decisions based on such explanations and predictions, either because there is too little time to 
get additional information or because it is simply unavailable. 
Experts that study human inference have found that some common-sense principles are helpful in explaining 
and predicting events, especially under conditions of limited information. One such principle of probability 
that is particularly helpful is called the Law of Large Numbers. In this study, we will teach you the Law of 
Large Numbers by introducing you to the probabilistic terms and ideas associated with this principle, and 
then provide examples to illustrate how the Law of Large Numbers can be used to explain and predict events 
in the real world. 
Imagine an urn that is filled with gumballs. Let's say that the urn contains a very large number of gumballs - 
thousands, millions, or larger. The gumballs in this urn are known collectively as the populatio . 
Let's say that there are two types of gumballs in the urn - red gumballs and white gumballs. When we do this, 
we can now say that the population has two categories or groups, namely - red gumballs and white gumballs. 
Now let's say that in this population of red and white gumballs there are 70% white gumballs and 30% red 
gumballs. If that is the case, then we know more than that the population has two groups (red and white): we 
now know the proportion of the gumballs in the white group (70%) and the proportion of the gumballs in the 
red group (30%). This is known as the population distribution (other examples of distributions are 60% red 
and 40% white, or 85% white and 15% red, etc., but in every distribution, the sum of the proportions must be 
100%. 
Let's summarise what we've covered so far: 
-A population is the entire set of objects we are interested in (all of the gumballs in the um). 
- Groups refer to the types of objects in the population (red and white). 
- Distribution refers to the proportion of objects in each group (70% white and 30% red in this example. 
One of the major goals of statistics is to find out something about a population. More specifically, we want to 
find out what the population distribution is. One way that we might do this would be to actually examine all 
of the objects in the population and count up the number of objects in each group. In our example, we would 
empty the entire um and count the number of red gumballs and the number of white gumballs. Using this 
method, we could firid out exactly what the population distribution of red and white gumballs was. But, there 
is a very serious problem with counting all of the objects in the population: populations, in general, are very 
large. If we were to count all of the objects in our gumball population, it would take more time and effort 
than would be practical (imagine counting a million gumballs! ) 
OK - so counting the entire population is impractical. What do we do instead to find out what the population 
distribution is? 
What we do instead is to take a sample of the population. A sample is a subset of the population. We can take 
a sample of any size - if we pick 5 gumballs, we say that the sample size is 5; if we take 
60 gumballs for our 
sample, we say that the sample size is 60, and so on. 
When we take a sample from the population, we will get a saMple distribution. The sample distribution is the 
proportion of objects in each group for the sample, just as the population distribution is the proportion of 
objects in each group for the population. For example, if we take a sample of 10 gumballs, we might get 6 
reds and 4 whites. In this case, our sample distribution would be 60% red and 40% white. We also might 
have happened to get 9 whites and I red, in which case the sample distribution would be 90% white and 10% 
red. The important point here is that samples are estimates of populations. Since it is often impractical or 
sometimes impossible to examine the entire population, we instead have to draw sample to estimate what the 
population is like. 
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Some samples will have sample distributions that are closer to the population distribution than others. For instance, in our gumball example, a sample of 9 reds and I white would be a very poor estimate of the 
population, while a sample of 8 whites and 2 reds would be a pretty good estimate of the populafion. The 
critical question is: "at determines how likely it is that samples will gil, e good estimates of the population'? The answer is simple: if the samples are chosen haphazardly, or randomly (by, for example, mixing the urn 
and reaching into the urn blindfolded and scooping out the needed number of gumballs OR by mixing the 
contents of a gumball machine and letting the gumballs out one by one), then there is only one factor - sample size. 
This brings us to the Law of Large Numbers: as the size of a random sample increases, the sample distribution is more and more likely to get closer and closer to the population distribution. In other words, the larger the sample, the better it is as an estimate of the population. 
Verbal presentation of the Law of Large Numbers 
Now that you have all read the written explanation of the Law of Large Numbers, I thought it would be nice 
to demonstrate, before your eyes, that the Law of Large Numbers really does work. 
So I have here (pick up jar) a genuine jar, filled with genuine red and white beads. And as in the written 
explanation, there happen to be 70% white and 30% red beads in this jar. 
A major purpose of statistics is to find out about a population from a sample of that population. Suppose it is 
your job to find out what proportion of the beads in this jar are white and what proportion of the beads are 
red. You could dump out all of the beads and count all of them, but that would take quite a long time and 
wouldn't be worth the effort. For the sake of demonstration, this jar isn't very large, but if we had a very large 
jar filled with millions of beads, it's easy to see how time-consuming and impractical it would be to count the 
entire population of beads in the jar. 
What you would probably do instead to find out what the composition of the jar was like would be to take a 
sample from the jar because the sample you chose would tell you something about the population; that is, the 
sample would be an estimate of the population. 
According to the Law of Large Numbers, when you choose your sample randomly like this (reach into jar 
without looking, mix them up, and draw out a handfid), the larger the sample, the better the sample is in 
estimating the population. To repeat - the larger the sample is that you draw, the better that sample is in 
estimating the population. 
Well, what I'm going to do now is to demonstrate the Law of Large Numbers (reveal blackboard/whiteboard 
with summary chart). I will pick samples of size 1,4, and 25 (gestures to the three sections of the board as 
you say the numbers) to show that as the sample size increases, the sample becomes a better estimate of the 
population. 
For each sample that I draw, I will write down on the board the number of whites in the sample, the number 
of reds in the sample, the percent white in the sample, and the deviation or difference between the sample 
distribution and the population distribution (as you are saying the various categories, point to them on the 
board). 
Now recall that the population distribution for this jar is 70% white, 30% red. Therefore, for example, if the 
sample I draw happens to be 85% white, the deviation of that sample will be 85 minus 70 or 15%, and I'll 
enter that number here (point to the deviation column). 
I will draw a draw a few samples of size 1,4, and 25. After I'm done with drawing samples of each size I \%ill 
calculate the average deviation of the samples from the population (point to all three 'Average Deviation' 
boxes). The Law of Large Numbers states that as the sample size increases, the sample becomes a better 
estimate of the population. In other words the average deviation of the sample from the population \%, III 
decrease as the sample size increases. So this number (point to 'Average Deviation' box) should go down as 
sample size (point to top of chart: 'Sample Size ='goes up. 
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So first I will draw samples of size 1. (take scooper out of jar). I will mix up the beads like this (mix beads 
while talking) and use this scooper to pick my sample (put scooper in, get some beads). 
OK, the first gumball to come out of the scoop will be my sample. In this sample, I ha,. -e 0 whites and I red 
(for example). (Go to the board and verbalise as you're writing down the results of the sample) That means 
that percent white in the sample was 0%. 0 minus 70 equals 70% deviation. 
(go back to jar. Put the sample back and repeat the procedure three times) 
(after you've finished, compute the average deviation) So the average deviation for samples of size I is 
Now I'll pick a few samples of size 4. (Follow the same procedure as above - mix contents of jar, scoop out 
four beads, summarise, put sample back in the jar and repeat three more times before computing the a%-erage 
deviation. ) The average deviation for samples of size 4 is - 
%. 
(do the same with samples of size 25. Three should be enough. With samples of size 25 you can't hold 25 
beads in one hand, you will have to shake a few beads into your hand at a time. Use two glass bowls and 
when you shake a few out, separate the whites and reds and put them into different bowls. Keep track of how 
many you've already drawn so that you end up with 25. ) 
(Example) With this sample of 25 1 have 18 whites and 7 reds (write results on board). That is 72% white and 
the deviation is 2%. 
(if you have small deviations, you can quit at 3 samples of 25) 
(compute average deviation for samples of size 25) 
(it is possible, but not likely, that samples of size 25 will give larger deviations than samples of size 4, 
especially if size 4 gave you all 3-1 sample splits (average deviation = 5%) 
Two ways to guard against this; 
1. If you've drawn 4 samples of size 4 and they're all 3-1, pick more samples until you have some other 
sample distribution. 
2. If you've drawn 3 samples of size 25 and you think your average deviation might be too close to the 
average deviation for samples of size 4, draw one or two more. 
Summary 
The Law of Large Numbers states that as the size of your sample increases, the sample becomes a better 
estimate of the population. This is shown here: as the samples increased in size from I to 4 to 25 (gesture to 
the top of the chart). 
I'd like to tell you something else about the Law of Large Numbers. That is, with small samples, sometimes 
you can't even correctly answer the simplest questions about the population. 
For example, suppose you were asked to say whether there were more white beads in the 
jar or more red 
beads. If you happened to draw this sample (point to a very bad sample of size 1: 0 white, I red. 
If there isn't 
one, then go to the samples of size 4 and point to aI white, 4 red or 2 white, 2 red) you would say' 
Well, 
from my sample, I think there are more reds than whites' or 'I can't tell at all' and you would 
be wrong. But 
look at the larger sample of size 25: you can always correctly answer at least the most 
basic question - 'Are 
there more whites or more redsT With smaller samples, that is not always possible. 
So I've demonstrated the Law of Large Numbers - as the sample increases in size, the sample 
becomes a 
better estimate of the population. 
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Examples training 
One reason that the Law of Large Numbers is important to learn is that it applies not only to ums and 
gumballs. The basic principles involved in the law of large numbers apply whenever you make a 
generalisation or an inference from observing a sample of objects, actions or behaviours. 
To give you an idea of how broad the law of large numbers is, we have, in this packet, presented three 
situations in which the law of large numbers applies. Each situation is analysed in terms of the law of large 
numbers. 
Please read each problem and consider it for a while before turning the page to read the Law of Large 
Numbers answer. 
Structure 1: Generalising from a small sample 
A major London law firm had a history of hiring only graduates of large, prestigious law schools. One of the 
senior partners decided to try hiring some graduates of smaller, less prestigious law schools. Two such people 
were hired. Their grades and general record were similar to those of people from the prestigious schools hired 
by the firm. Although their manners and 'style' were not as polished and sophisticated as those of the 
predominantly Cambridge junior members of the firm, their objective performance was excellent. At the end 
of 3 years, both of them were well above average in the number of cases won and in the volume of law 
business handled. The senior partner who had hired them argued to colleagues in the firm that, "This 
experience indicates that graduates of less prestigious schools are at least as ambitious and talented as 
graduates of the major law schools. The chief difference between the two types of graduates is in their social 
class background, not in their legal ability, which is what counts. " 
Comment on the thinking that went into this senior partner's conclusion. Is the argument basically sound? 
Does it have weaknesses? (Disregard your own initial opinion, if you had one about graduates of 
nonprestigious law schools, and concentrate on the thinking that the senior partner used). 
Analysis 
The senior partner is trying to draw a conclusion about a certain population. We can think of the members of 
this populatio as newly graduated solicitors, from nonprestigious law schools, who otherwise meet the law 
firm's hiring standards. If we divide the members of this population into two groups, 'excellent' and 'mediocre 
or worse' we can think of the population distribution as the percentage in each group. The senior partner has 
concluded that the percentage in the 'excellent' group is very high, or anyway, just as high as in another 
population, involving graduates of prestigious law schools. This conclusion was based on observing a saiLriple 
of size = 2, in which the sample distribution was 100% 'excellent', 0%'mediocre or worse'. 
Apart from any other considerations, however, the sample distribution for size 2 is apt to be quite different 
from the population distribution: the latter could be only 60 or 50% or even perhaps as low as 40% 
'excellent', and a 2-0 sample split would not be so unusual; just as one would not be at all amazed to draw 
two out of two red gumballs from an urn with only 40% reds. So the senior partner's attitude is quite 
unwarranted: a larger sample is needed. 
Structure 2: Regression 
Susan is the artistic director for a ballet company. One of her jobs is auditioning and selecting new members 
of the company. She says the following of her experience: "Every year we hire 10-20 young people on a I- 
year contract on the basis of their performance at the audition. Usually we're extremely excited about the 
potential of 2 or 3 of these young people -a young woman who does a brilliant series of turns or a young 
man who does several leaps that make you hold your breath. Unfortunately, most of these young people turn 
out to be only somewhat better than the rest. I believe many of these extraordinarily talented young people 
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are frightened of success. They get into the company and see the tremendous effort and anxiety involved in becoming a star and they get cold feet. They'd rather lead a less demanding life as an ordinary member of the 
corps de 6allet. " 
Comment on Susan's reasoning. Why do you suppose that Susan usually has to revise downward her opinion 
of dancers that she initially thought were brilliant? 
Analysis 
We can analyse this problem using the laws of large numbers by thinking of each ballet dancer as possessing 
a population of ballet movements. Susan is interested in excellence, so we can divide the members of each 
population into two categories: 'brilliant movements' and 'nonbrilliant, or other movements'. We can think of 
the population distribution as the percentage or proportion in each category. For many dancers, the 
population distribution is actually 0% brilliant and 100% other; these dancers simply lack the talent to 
perform brilliant movement. For many other dancers, there is a small or moderate percentage of 'brilliant 
movement' gumballs in their urn. A true ballet star would therefore have a population distribution with a 
greater percentage of 'brilliant' movements than an ordinary member of the corps de ballet. 
By conducting auditions, Susan is observing samples of each dancer's population distribution. An audition, 
however, is a very small sample of a dancer's movements. We know from the law of large numbers that small 
samples are very unreliable estimates of the population. When a dancer performs some brilliant moves during 
an audition, it is often because the dancer has happened to draw a couple of the 'lucky gumballs' that day: it 
does not prove that the population distribution for that dancer consists of a large percentage of 'brilliant 
movements'. It is reasonable to think that there are really very few dancers that have population distributions 
with a large percentage of brilliant movements; and so when Susan sees a dancer performing brilliantly at 
audition, the chances are it is just a lucky draw firom a dancer who is capable of performing some, but not 
necessarily a great number of 'brilliant movements'. Therefore, when Susan hires such dancers and evaluates 
them after seeing a much larger sample of their movements, it is not surprising that she finds that many of 
these dancers that were brilliant at audition turn out to be only somewhat better than the rest. 
Structure 3: Large sample vs. theory without supporting data 
Kevin, a graduate student in sociology, decided to do a research project on 'factors affecting performance of 
I" division football players', in which he gathered a great amount of demographic data on birthplace, 
education, marital status, etc. to see if any demographic factors were related to the performance of I" division 
football players (e. g. goal scoring average, penalties). Kevin was unable to use data for all the I" division 
teams because information for some of the players was unavailable, but he was able to obtain data for some 
200 players in the I" division. 
One finding that interested Kevin concerned the 110 married players. About 68% of these players improved 
their performance after getting married, while the remainder had equal or poorer performance. He concluded 
that marriage is beneficial to a football player's performance. At a social hour sponsored by the Football 
Association, he happened to mention his finding to a staff member of the office. The staff member listened to 
Kevin's results and then said, 'Your study is interesting but I don't believe it. I'm sure that football 
performance is worse after a marriage because the football player suddenly has to take on enormous 
responsibilities: taking care of his spouse and children. Plus the factor of being stressed by having to be on 
the road so much of the time and therefore away from the family. The player will no longer be able to devote 
as much time to football as before he was married. Because of this he will lose that competitive quality that is 
necessary for good performance in football. 
What do you think of the staff member's argument? Is It a sound one or not'? Explain your reasoning. 
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Analysis 
Kevin is trying to find oift how performance in I' division football is affected by being married. To do this. 
he obtained data for 200 players in the premier league and discovered that out of the I 10 that had gotten 
married, 68% had improved performance after the wedding (and 32% had equal or poorer performance). 
According to the law of large numbers, which states that the larger the sample, the better it is in estimating 
the population, there is substantial evidence that marriage is beneficial to football players' performance. 
Recall that in the gumball demonstration, samples of size 25 were very good estimates of the population: 
these samples did not differ much from population. Extending the argument, samples of size I 10 are 
extremely accurate estimates of the population. Thus, it can be concluded that, in general, marriage is 
beneficial to football players' performance. 
What about the staff member's theory that football performance is worse after a marriage because the player 
assumes enormous responsibilities and will no longer be able to devote as much time to football as before? 
Although this argument may have some intuitive appeal, it should be discounted because it is not supported 
by any data and is, in fact contradicted by Kevin's large sample of I 10 players. 
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Instructions 
On the pages that follow, there are a number of arguments that i%e would like you to consider. As ýou 
will see, they represent a wide range of real-life situations. We would like you to think carefullý about 
each argument, and then write down answers that are sensible to you. 
Following each argument could you please rate the strength of the conclusion (I=extremel% ý%Cak; 9=extremely strong) and how persuaded you are by the argument (1=extremel 
.y unconvinced; 9=extremely convinced). Space is provided under each argument for you to write ý our explanations. In 
many of the arguments, you may find that the Law of Large Numbers is helpful. 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. 
Structure 1: 
Neutral Problems 
John and Louise are having an argument about what occupation John should take up when he leaves 
school. Louise says, 'Listen if you want to earn loads of money you should go into the building trade! 
My Dad and my Uncle are both builders and they're rolling in it! They've both been doing it for quite 
a while now and look at them. New big houses, two holidays a year, flash cars ...... ! If your goal is to 
make lots of money then become a builder. 
Structure 2: 
Fiona and Simon are arguing over -whether Librarians have more eyesight problems than other people. 
Fiona's argument is, "Librarians don't have more eye-sight problems than people from aný other 
profession. I visit the library at least once a week and there are no more people ivearing glasses than 
anywhere else! Do you know Mrs Travis? She's worked in the local library for years and she doesn't 
wear glasses". 
Simon's argument is, "Well I was reading this article the other day that stated that people ýsho had to 
read a lot as part of their job were very likely to become short-sighted. As part of the article a large 
study on thousands on people from a variety of occupations was conducted which showed spccificallý 
that Librarians as well as some other professions, were more likely to be shortsighted. 
Structure 3: 
Suzi is looking for a Nanny to look after her one-year-old son while she is at work. She has shortlisted 
the applicants down to two and they are to each have an interview followed by an hour's plaý with her 
son so that Suzi can observe how they interact with him. 
At the interviews, Suzi made notes on how each prospective Nanny interacted iNith her son. Nannv I 
had been very jolly and had helped him decide what to wear that day and then organised , -, hat game% 
to play. Nanny 2 had fed Suzi's son his dinner and encouraged him to feed himself his pudding. 
Suzi concluded at the end of the interviews that she wasn't sure about returning to work after all, or 
maybe a creche iN ould be better as Nannies have very domineering personalities. 
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Vntypical Problems 
Structure 1: 
An editorial in a local newspaper recently criticised the occupation of being an Aerobics instructor. 
The journalist's argument was: 
I've got a friend who's an aerobic instructor and I wouldn't want anyone I kno%s to copý her lifestyle. 
She is so unhealthy. She drinks and smokes and actually never takes any real exercise herself, she just 
tells others how to do so! I know her flatmates and they say she never stops eating as well, not health%- 
food either, fry ups and chocolate are normal. Nly conclusion? I don't think there's a more unhealthy 
group of people than Aerobics instructors' 
Structure 2: 
James and Kim are having an argument over whether Teachers are more likely to hit children than 
other people. James claims that the children of Teachers are more unhappy than other children and 
frequently have unexplainable bruises, but Kim believes that Teacher's children are more happy and 
well adjusted than other children. 
Kim: 
I've been working as a developmental psychologist for fifteen years and handle child abuse cases all the 
time. I've seen hundreds of children who have been beaten by their mother or father who have -, N, orked 
in all kinds of professions, but very few indeed have been children of Teachers. I've seen enough to 
know that a child is very likely to be happy and secure if at least one of their parents is a Teacher. 
James: 
You're wrong and you know it! Two people who live in our road are teachers and they regularly beat 
their children. They are always covered in bruises. In fact I know some other teachers who hit their 
children much more than they should, itd disgusting. You see, I've seen it for myself. If you'd seen 
what I've seen you would agree that people who are Teachers are more likely to hit children. 
Structure 3: 
David did his thesis in sociology on the subject of bravery in the face of danger in different 
occupational groups. In his study, 3 engineers, 3 firemen and 3 ambulance men participated. BeloN% is a 
summary of David's study. 
When they first came into the laboratory, each of the participants had to complete a questionnaire 
asking them what risks they would take to help others in a variety of different situations where their 
life could be put in danger if they tried to save them. Then they were asked to complete a range of 
cognitive tasks during which alarms would ring without warning. At the same time the participants' 
heart rates were being monitored to observe physiological reactions. The results were as folio,, %, %: 
Overall, the 3 engineers had the highest score for the risk-taking questionnaire and the lowest mean 
heart rate when the alarms sounded. The firemen on the other hand had the lowest mean score for 
risk-taking and the highest mean heart rate score when compared to the other two professimis. David 
concluded in his thesis that firemen are much more cowardly than either engineers or ambulance men. 
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Typical Problems 
Structure 1: 
Paul is discussing relationships with his sister Kate. His girlfriend at the moment is a Nurse and he 
likes her a lot. She is great fun to be with and Paul thinks she is ver'y caring. 
Paul: I've never been so happy in my life! She is never snappy or abrupt, she alwaN Is asks hovt I ant 
and really listens to what I have to say. The other night she new I was going to be home late so she 
brought round a meal all ready cooked so I just had to heat it up. If you could find %-ourself a male 
nurse I would because I have never known such a caring person to have a relationship iNith! I reallý 
recommend it. Nurses are really caring. 
Structure 2: 
Dr Avon is a psychologist who has spent several years determining whether people in cer(ain 
occupations are more imaginative than people in other occupations. In a recent studN, he compared 
approximately 500 artists to approximately 500 sales persons. In the report he published, Dr Avon 
found that: 
"it is clear from these results that artists are much less imaginative than sales persons. Artists have 
very fixed ideals, are narrow minded and have very strict boundaries within which they allow 
themselves to work. On the other hand, salespersons are very imaginative, using different methods and 
strategies to perform in their role. " 
In response to his paper, Dr Bing, also a respected psychologist, wrote a paper in which he attempted 
to discredit Dr Avon's argument. Dr Bing wrote: 
"I have difficulty believing Dr Avon's study for two reasons. First, I share my house with an artist who 
has a very vivid imagination. Second, talking about the 'average' behaviour of artists doesn't tell me 
anything about how any one artist is. On this basis, I feel we can effectively dismiss Avon's study. " 
Structure 3: 
Laura works for a London testing company. Her company has been hired to measure the Cognitive 
Abilities of Ministry of Defence employees. Laura herself has been asked to administer the tests to 10 
people who are MOD employees. Two people were secretaries, two Nvere doctors, two were 
accountants, two were dentists and two were architects. A significant section of the test was on 
Numeracy and she used the best, one that is the most respected across the country. After each person 
was tested, she put the findings in a table: 
Person Numeraev Score 
Secretaries 56 and 63 
Doctors 69 and 72 
Accountants 89 and 95 
Dentists 65 and 70 
Architects 75 and 79 
Because a person with average cognitive ability should have a Numeracy score of around 80 and 
because below that is considered low, Laura concluded that Accountants are much better -, %orking Nvith 
numbers than the other groups of people she tested. 
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Instructions 
On the following pages you will be presented with several summaries of actual psychological and 
sociological research involving participants from several dozen occupations. 
Following each problem could you please rate the strength of the researcher's conclusion Wextreme1v 
weak; 9=extremely strong) and the validitý I of the experiment i. e. does the experiment measure "-ha*t 
the researcher suggests it measures (1=extremely invalid; 9=extremely valid). Space is also provided 
under each problem for you to write an explanation of why you believe the researcher's conclusion to 
be weak or strong and the experiment to be valid or invalid. 
If you have any questions please ask the experimenter. 
Neutral Problems 
Structure 1: 
Professor Y. wanted to find out whether individuals who worked in any one occupation/profession 
were more or less talkative and had different social skills than individuals who worked in another. She 
randomly selected 200 dentists, boxers, door bouncers and actors from all over the United Kingdom 
and invited them to a conference and dinner together. The Boxers couldn't make it on the same day 
therefore their conference/dinner was held two weeks later. At the conferences and dinners, 
individuals were watched by trained researchers to observe their behaviours. For example, number of 
times they initiated conversation, length of utterances and number of utterances. On collation of all the 
data, Professor Y. found that the boxers showed the most talkative behaviours, closely followed by 
dentists, then bouncers and then actors. In reporting her findings, Professor Y. concluded that boxers 
are much more talkative than dentists, bouncers and actors. 
Structure 2: 
Dr. S. and Dr. A. designed a study to ascertain whether there were differences in people's activity 
levels dependent on their occupation. They were particularly interested in people's health and fitness 
levels. Three hundred nurses, writers and teachers were randomly selected from throughout Devon 
and Cornwall to participate in the study. Three hundred artists were also recruited from a local 
country retreat. All participants were required to fill in an attitudes to health and fitness questionnaire 
followed by an hour of different activities such as swimming, running and cycling whilst haNing pulse 
rate and oxygen levels in the blood monitored. Dr. S. and Dr. A. found that the artists had the most 
negative attitudes towards all aspects of health and fitness and the worst physiological reactions to 
exercise when compared to the other groups. They concluded in their report that their findings clearIN 
demonstrated that artists are lazv. 
Structure 3: 
Dr. Wendy had a very strong interest in emotions and more specifically emotional behaviours. She 
wanted to find out whether people who worked in certain occupations were more able to express their 
emotions more than others were. Dentists, Teachers and Secretaries were included in the %tudv, 150 of 
each. Each participant in turn was asked to watch a 15-ntinute film involving scenes of a disturbing 
nature, people being hurt, animals in danger and an earthquake. Reactions to the film %%ere measured 
two waNs, through a one-N%, a% mirror as they were watching the film and bN responses on a 
questionnaire immediately after the film. It became evident that the majoritN of the secretaries needed 
to leave the room at least once during the film, compared to the Dentists and Teachers who didn't feel 
the need to lea%e. Also. in the questionnaire, the secretaries reported higher stress scores overall after 
watching the film. Dr. Wendý concluded from these finding% that Secretaries are more caring 
compared to Dentists and Teachers. 
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Untypical 
Stucture 1: 
Dr. 11. is a researcher who is interested in finding out how capable people in different occupations are 
of holding pleasant conversations with strangers. Dr. H. is especially interested in finding out hoN% 
builders, teachers, solicitors and shop assistants are in dealing with strangers because people in these 
professions must deal with strangers on a daily basis. To observe their conversations, Dr. H. ý% atched a 
large number of builders having a conversation with Jim, one of Dr. H's laboratorv assistants. Next he 
watched the teachers, solicitors and shop assistants having a conversation NNith Amy, another one of his 
research assistants. Dr. H. noted that teachers, solicitors and shop assistants overall made more 
inappropriate hand gestures, more body contact with the other person and more wandering eye 
movements than the builders. He concluded as part of his journal article that builders were niore 
politically correct than any of the other participants from other occupations. 
Structure 2: 
Two well-known researchers have conducted several studies on the relationship between one's 
occupation and stress-related behaviours. The occupations of being a teacher and a nurse mvere 
compared in one study. In this study, 300 teachers were contacted at local schools and agreed to be in 
the study. At the time, nurses were more difficult to recruit. Thus, the researchers recruited 300 nurses 
from a seminar on self-defence that was taking place in a nearby city. Next, each participant *%-as 
brought into the lab. where they were asked to complete a battery of tests including cognitive abilitý 
and stress tests. Participants were then asked to complete a circuit training course ý%hilst blindfolded 
under the direction of another participant from the same occupation. The two researchers noted that 
while there wasn't a significant difference between the two groups on the measures of cognitive abifitý 
and stress tests, whilst completing circuits, nurses demonstrated many clearly aggressive behaviours. 
The researchers concluded that nurses are more aggressive. 
Structure 3: 
Dr. Bill is a psychologist interested in whether people who suffer from shyness are more likely to work 
in certain occupations. To conduct his research, he included in his study teachers, salespersons, and 
ski-instructors. 1000 subjects participated in each group. To measure shyness, Dr. Bill attached a 
microphone to each participant's belt, which the participant wore for 24 hours. The microphone 
recorded the number of utterances made by the participant in the 24-hour period. At the end of his 
study, Dr. Bill found that the average teacher spoke 1389 times a day, salespersons spoke a staggering 
1520 whilst ski-instructors spoke on average only 250 times a day. Therefore, ski-instructors spoke 
about 6 times less than people did from the other occupations. Based on this, Dr. Bill concluded that 
ski-instructors are much shyer than people from other occupations are. 
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Typical Problems 
Structure 1: 
A famous sociologist conducted a study looking at personality factors related to people's chosen 
occupations. lie was particularIN I interested in aspects of some people's personalities that may be more 
apparent in the workplace for some professions more than others. Large groups of librarians, teachers 
and nurses were recruited to take part in the study. Each occupational group was asked to attend the 
lab for an afternoon of testing on different days. Once at the lab, the participants were split into 
smaller groups of eight. Experienced research assistants who introduced the different topics for 
discussion led videotaped focus groups. The groups consisting of teachers and nurses %, *-ere led into 
discussion about normal working days, recreational activities and stress. The librarians were led into 
discussion about their normal working day and leisure time also. The researchers noted that the 
librarians spent a great deal of their time at work and at home with books. The sociologist wrote in his 
report that librarians love books more than any of the other occupations tested. 
Structure 2: 
Professor A. recently ran a large-scale study looking at thinking styles in individuals from different 
occupations. For instance, analytical, pragmatic, deep and shallow thinking styles haNe all been 
explored in previous research. With the aid of trained researchers, one hundred and sevent-'-five 
writers who were selected from a writing course in the Midlands, and one hundred and sevent ' -five teachers who were selected from ten large inner city schools in London, were observed for a period of 
six months going about their work. All participants were also required to keep a diary for the time 
period of the study, in which they had to write at least one entry per day, describing thoughts that they 
had had. At the end of the six months the results were collated and generally it seemed to be that 
writers wrote 50% more entries in their diary than the teachers did and the content , vas much higher 
in quality. Practices that the writers had in their daily routine at work also led Professor A. to 
conclude that writers are very creative in their style of thinking. 
Structure 3: 
A leading psychologist from a University Hospital conducted a study looking at bravery in the 
workplace. For the research she compared teachers, nurses, secretaries and firemen. 250 participants 
were recruited from each occupation and for a fortnight they carried a Dictaphone and a diary and 
whenever possible they had to describe what they were thinking about. At the end of the study period 
the results were collated and it was found that overall teachers had an average of 34 brave thoughts a 
day, nurses an average of 12 brave thoughts a day, secretaries 6 brave thoughts a day and firemen a 
staggering 72 brave thoughts a day. From these results, the psychologist noted that firemen had 
significantly more brave thoughts each day than teachers, nurses or secretaries. She concluded that 
this indicated that firemen were overall much braver individuals than people in other occupations 
is-ere. 
332 
APPENDIX A2.7 Everyday reasoning problems (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986) 
Probabilistic-Structure 1 
At Plymouth University, the Housing Office determines which of the 10,000 students enrolled ýsill be 
allowed to live on campus the following year. At Plymouth, the dormitorv facilities are excellent. so 
there is always great demand for on-campus housing. Unfortunately, there are only enough on-campu% 
spaces for 5000 students. The Housing Office determines who will get to live on campus by having a Housing Draw every year: every student picks a number out of a box over a 3-day period. These 
numbers range from 1 to 10,000. If the number is 5000 or under, the student gets to live on campus. If 
the number is over 5000, the student will not be able to live on campus. 
On the first day of the draw, Joe talks to five people who have picked a number. Of these, four people 
got low numbers. Because of this, Joe suspects that the numbers in the box were not properly mixed, 
and that the early numbers are more favourable. lie rushes over to the Housing Draw and picks a 
number. lie gets a low number. He later talks to four people who drew their numbers on the second or 
third day of the draw. Three got high numbers. Joe says to himself, "I'm glad that I picked when I did, 
because it looks like I was right that the numbers were not properly mixed. " 
What do you think of Joe's reasoning? Explain. 
Probabilistic - Structure 3 
Bert 11. has a job checking the results of an X-ray scanner of pipeline welds in a pipe factory. Overall, 
the X-ray scanner shows that the welding machine makes a perfect weld about 80% of the time. Of 900 
welds each day, usually about 680 to 740 are perfect. Bert has noticed that on some days, all of the first 
10 welds were perfect. However, Bert has also noticed that on such days, the overall number of perfect 
welds is usually not much better for the day as a whole than on days when the first 10 welds show some 
imperfections. 
Why do you suppose the number of perfect welds is usually not much better on days where the first 
batch of welds was perfect than on other days? 
Probabilistic - Structure 5 
An auditor for the Inland Revenue wants to study the nature of arithmetic errors on income tax 
returns. She selects 4000 Social Security numbers by using random digits generated by an 'Electronic 
Mastermind' calculator. And for each selected social security number she checks the 1978 Tax returns 
thoroughly for arithmetic errors. She finds errors on a large percentage of the tax returns, often 2 to 6 
errors on a single tax return. Tabulating the effect of each error separately, she finds that there are 
virtually the same number of errors in favour of the taxpayer as in favour of the government. Her boss 
objects vigorously to her assertions, saying that it is fairly obvious that people notice and correct 
errors in favour of the government, but will 'overlook' errors in their own favour. Even if her figures 
are correct, he says, looking at a lot more returns will bear out his point. 
Comment on the auditor's reasoning and her boss's contrary stand. 
APPENDIX A2.7 cont. 
Objective - Structure I 
A talent scout for a professional football team attends two local games with the intention of observing 
carefully the talent and skill of a particular player. The plaýer looks generalIN excellent. He repeatedlý 
makes tackles worthy of the best professional players. However, in one of the games, %Nith his team 
behind by 2 goals, the player is fouled while attempting to score and has the opportunity to score on a 
penalty free kick. The player however misses by far. The other team then goes on to score another goal 
and therefore wins by 3 to nil. 
The scout reports that the player in question "has excellent skills, and should be recruited. lie has a 
tendency to misplay under extreme pressure, but this will probabl-, I disappear N%ith more experience 
and better coaching. " 
Comment on the thinking embodied in the scout's opinion that the player (a) "excellent skills" and 
that the player has (b) "a tendency to misplay under extreme pressure. " Does the thinking behind 
either conclusion have any weaknesses? 
Objective - Structure 3 
Howard was a teacher in a secondary school in a community known for truancy and delinquencN 
problems among its youth. Howard says of his experiences: "Usually, in a class of 35 or so kids, 2 or 3 
will pull some pretty bad stunts in the first week - they'll skip a day of class, get into a scuffle with 
another kid, or some such thing. When that kind of thing happens, I play it down ant trý, to avoid 
calling the class' attention to it. Usually, these kids turn out to be no worse than the others. By the end 
of the term you'll find they haven't pulled any more stunts than the others have. " Howard reason% as 
follows: "Some of these kids are headed toward a delinquent pattern of behaviour. When theý, find out 
nobody is very impressed, they tend to settle down. " 
(a) Do you agree that it is likely that the students who pull a "pretty bad stunt in the first week" are 
headed toward a delinquent pattern of behaviour? 
(b) Do you agree that it is likely that the students who initially pull a "pretty bad stunt" turn out to be 
no worse than the others because they find no one is impressed N-,, ith their behaviour? 
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Objective - Structure 5 
The local education authority was urging the school board to make an expensive curriculum shift to a 
"back-to-basics" stress on fundamental learning skills and aN%a,, I from the electives and intensi%e 
immersion in specialised arts and social studies topics that had recentiv characterised the secondar-, 
schools in the district. He cited a study of 120 schools systems that had recently begun to emphasise the 
basics and 120 school systems that had a curriculum similar to the district's current one. The "back-to- 
basics" school systems, he said, were producing students who scored half-a-year ahead of the students 
in the other systems on objective tests of reading, mathematics, and science. Of the 120 "back-to- 
basics" school systems, 85 had shown improved skills for students in the system vs only 40 with 
improved skills in the 120 systems which had not changed. One of the school board members took the 
floor to argue against the change. In her opinion, she said, there was no compelling reason to attribute 
the improved student skills in the "back-to-basics" system to the specific curriculum change for two 
reasons: (1) School systems that make curriculum changes probably have more energetic, ad%, enturous 
administrators and faculty and thus the students would learn more in those school %ýstems no matter 
what the curriculum was. (2) Any change in curriculum could be expected to produce improvement in 
student performance because of increased faculty interest and commitment. 
Comment on the reasoning of both the local education authority and the board member. On the basis 
of the evidence and arguments offered, do you think it is likely that the "back-to-basics" curriculum is 
intrinsically superior to the district's current curriculum? 
Subjective- Structure I 
Gerald NI. had a 3-year-old son, Timmy. lie told a friend: "You know, I've never been much for 
sports, and I think Timmy will turn out the same. A couple of weeks ago, an older neighbour boy , %, as 
tossing a ball to him, and he could catch it and throw it all right, but he just didn't seem interested in 
it. Then the other day, some kids his age were kicking a little soccer ball around. Timmy could do it as 
well as the other, but he lost interest very quickly and started playing with some toy cars while the 
other kids went on kicking the ball around for another 20 or 30 minutes. " 
Do you agree ivith Gerald's reasoning that Timmy is likely not to care much for sports? Why or NNhN 
not? 
Subjective - Structure 3 
Janice is a head nurse in a home for the aged. She says the following of her experiences: "There i% a 
big 
turn over of the nursing staff here, and each year we hire 15-20 new nurses. Some of these people shoNN 
themselves to be unusually %varm and compassionate in the first few days. One might staý on past 
quitting time with a patient who's having a difficult night. Another might be obviouslý shaken 
bý the 
distress of a patient who has just lost a spouse. I find though that over the long haul, the-, (- women turn 
out to be not much more concerned and caring than the others. What happens to them, 
I think is that 
they can't remain open and vulnerable without paying a heavy emotional price. They usuallý continue 
to be considerate and effective but they build up a shell. " 
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Comment on 'Janice's reasoning. Do you think it is likely that she correctiv identifies the nurse% who 
are unusuall-v warm and compassionate? Do you agree it is likely that most of the ones ý%ho are 
unusually warm at first later build up a shell to protect themselves emotionallý ? 
Subjective - Structure 5 
Two New Yorkers were discussing restaurants. Jane said to Ellen, "You know, most people seem to he 
crazy about Chinese food, but I'm not. I've been to about 20 different Chinese Restaurants. across the 
whole price range, and everything from bland Cantonese to spicy Szechwan and I'm realIN not %ery 
fond of any of it. " "Oh, " said Ellen, "don't jump to conclusions. I'll bet youve usually gone m6th a 
crowd of people, right? " "Yes, " admitted Jane, "that's true, I usually go with half a dozen people or 
more from work, " "Well, people that may be it! " said Ellen, "people usually go to Chinese restaurants 
with a crowd of people they hardly know. I know you, you're often tense and a little shy and vou're 
not likely to be able to relax and savour the food under those circumstances. Try going to a Chinese 
restaurant with just one good friend. I'll bet you'll like the food. " 
Comment on Ellen's reasoning. Do you think there is a good chance that if Jane went to a Chinese 
restaurant with one friend, she'd like the food? Why or why not? 
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APPENDIX A4.1 Training on the logic of the material conditional (Cheng, Holyoak. 
Krantz, & Nisbett (1986) 
Training 
In this study we are interested in how people interpret and reason about a very important type of logical 
statement, called the conditional. Even though conditional statements are really very simple, people often 
make errors in dealing with them. These instructions are intended to help you understand conditional 
statements. Read through these instructions carefully; they should help you solve some reasoning problems 
you will receive afterward. 
A conditional statement consists of two component statements which are often joined by the 
conjunctions "if ... then. " The conditional statement can be expressed in the standard form ((a)); 
If p, then q 
where it is understood that the letters "p" and "q- each represent a statement. Statement (a) means "if 
statement p is true, then statement q is also true. " For example, let p stand for "it is raining, " and let q stand 
for "The pavement is wet. " Then (a) says "If it is raining, then the pavement is wet. " 
Statement (a) can be expressed in a variety of ways. We will use a horizontal bar before a letter to indicate 
that a statement is not true. For example, "-p " means "not p. " One way of reformulating (a) then, is ((b)); 
If -q, then-p. 
This means "if statement q is false, then statement p is also false. Rephrasing the above example into form 
(b) gives, "If the pavement is not wet, then it is not raining" 
People often don't realise at first that statements (a) and (b) are equivalent (identical to each other). To 
understand the equivalence of statements (a) and (b), consider the circumstances under which (a) is true. The 
truth of "If p, then q" depends on the truth of p and q. The table below lists the truth values of various 
statements. Reading across and down the table, we see that when p is true and q is also true, then (a) is true 
(first line). When p is true and q is false, then (a) is false (second line), since (a) says that p implies q. So in 
order for (a) to be true when q is false, p cannot be true (comparing the second and third lines). In other 
words, (a) implies "If -q, then -p". 
pq (a): Ifp, then q 
TTT 
TFF 
FFT 
To check your understanding of the conditional statement, please answer the question on the next 
page. 
Statement (a). "Ifp, then q, " can be rephrased without changing its basic meaning. Which of the following is 
a correct rephrasing of (a)? Put a check next to the correct rephrasing(s) before checking the answer on the 
next page. 
) 1. If q, then p. 
)2. If -p, then -q. 
)2. If -q, then -p. 
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Only 3 is a correct rephrasing. You should note that statement (a) "Ifp, then q, " does not imply ((c)); 
If q, then p. 
It is a common error to assume that (a) implies (c). Rephrasing the example on Page I into form (c) 
gives "If the pavement is wet, then it is raining. " The pavement may get wet from lawn sprinklers 
nearby, for instance. 
It is also a common error to assume that "Ifp, then q" implies ((d)); 
If -p, then -q. 
Rephrasing the example on Page I into form (d) gives "If it is not raining, then the pavement is not wet, " 
which again does not follow from "If it is raining, then the pavement is wet, " for the same reason mentioned 
earlier (e. g. a lawn sprinkler might have made the pavement wet even though it isn't raining). 
To sum up, these are the most important facts you need to know about the conditional statement. First, 
statement (a) is equivalent to statement (b): "Ifp, then q" implies "If -q, then -p. " Second, statement (a) is 
not equivalent to either statement (c) or statement (d): "If p, then q- does not imply either "If q, then p- or "If 
-p, then -q. " 
Rephrasing Exercise 
This exercise will check your understanding of the conditional statement. Which of the statement(s) below 
follow logically from the statement, "If the tablecloth is brown, then the wall is white? " Please put a check 
next to the correct statement(s) below before checking the answer on the next page. 
) 1. If the tablecloth is not brown, then the wall Is not white. 
)2, If the wall is not white, then the tablecloth is not brown. 
)3. If the wall is white, then the tablecloth is brown. 
Only 2 is correct. To see this, we can reformulate the statement into the form "Ifp, then q" by substituting p 
for "the tablecloth is brown" and q for "the wall is white. " Then we see that 2 is in the form "If -q, then -p, " 
which we saw earlier is equivalent to "If p, then q. " But I is in the form "If -p, then -q, " which does not 
follow firom "Ifp, then q. " And 3 is in the form "If q, then p, " which likewise does not follow from "Ifp, then 
q. " 
Below are two more rephrasing problems. When you are done, check the answer on the next page. 
Statement: If the cube is plastic, then the sphere is metallic. 
) 1. If the sphere is metallic, then the cube is plastic. 
)2. If the cube is not plastic, then the sphere is not metallic 
)3. If the sphere is not metallic, then the cube is not plastic. 
Statement: If the beach is white, then the music is slow. 
)1. If the beach is not white, then the music is not slow. 
)2. If the music is slow, then the beach is white. 
)3. If the music is not slow, then the beach is not white. 
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Answer to rephrasing problems: Only 3 is correct in the above two problems. 
Following are two examples that illustrate how the conditional statement is used to solve problems. 
Please think carefully and solve the problems before checking the answers beneath them. 
Example I 
You have a set of four stamps with either a red or blue star, or a red or blue triangle on it. You are told that if 
there is a blue star on one side, then there is a red triangle on the other. Each of the stamps are laid side by 
side face upwards. Which card/cards would you need to turn over to check that the rule is true? 
Red Blue 
Star 
Star 
(c) 
Red 
Triangle 
(d) 
Blue 
Triangle 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Answer to Example One 
To reformulate the rule into the form "Ifp, then q, " we substitute p for "if there is a blue star on one side, " 
and q for "there is a red triangle on the other. " Since alternative (b) corresponds to p, we clearly have to 
check whether q follows. Since (d) corresponds to -q and "If -q, then -p" is equivalent to "Ifp, then q, " we 
have to check whether -p follows. 
But we need not turn over stamp (a) which corresponds to -p, and as said earlier "If p, then q" does not 
imply "If -p, then -q. " Nor do we need to turn over stamp (c), which translated into q. As you learned 
earlier, "Ifp, then q" is not equivalent to "If q, then p" accordingly, the other side of stamp (c) is irrelevant to 
the truth of the rule. 
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Example 2 
You have four postcards. If there is a picture of a beach on one side then there is a ball on the other. Each of 
the cards are face-up on a table. )Which postcard(s) would you turn over to check that the rule is true'. ) 
(a) (b) (C) (d) 
Ball 
Frisbee I 
Beach 
Hills 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Answer to Example Two 
To reformulate the above conditional statement into the form "Ifp, then q, - we substitute p for - If there is a 
picture of a beach, " and q for "there is a ball. " Since card (c) translates into p, we clearly have to check 
whether q follows. And since card (b) translates into -q, and "If -q, then -p " is equivalent to "Ifp, then q, 
we have to check whether -p follows. 
But we need not turn over card (a), since it corresponds to q, and "If q, then p" does not follow from "Ifp, 
then q. " Similarly, we need not turn over card (d), which corresponds to -p, a condition whose implications 
are irrelevant to the truth of "Ifp, then q. " 
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Training 
As you know, an obligation arises whenever it is the case that certain circumstances or situations create an 
obligation to perform some action. Obligations can often be stated in an "If... then " form. For example, the following regulation specifies an obligation: "If a student is a psychology major, then the student must take 
an introductory psychology course. " More generally, if we call the initial situation I and the action C, an 
obligation has the form, "If I arises, then C must be done. " In our first example, I is - being a psychology 
major, " and C is "taking an introductory psychology course. " 
In order to assess whether an obligation is being satisfied, we need to consider the four possible situations 
that might arise. These are 
1.1 occurs. 
2.1 doesn't occur. 
3. C is done. 
4. C is not done. 
Corresponding to each of these possible situations is a rule related to the fulfillment of the obligation. These 
rules are the following: 
If I occurs, then it is obligatory to do C. Clearly, if I arises then failure to take the required action would 
constitute a violation of the obligation. To use our example, if a student is a psychology major, then that 
student must take an introductory psychology course. 
2. If I does not occur, then the obligation does not arise. Consequently, C need not be done, although the 
person may do C anyway. For example, if a student is not a psychology major the student is not obliged 
to take an introductory psychology course. It may be permissible, however, for an English major to take 
an introductory psychology course. But in any case, the basic obligation is simply irrelevant if the 
student is not a psychology major. 
3. If C is done, then the obligation is certainly not violated, regardless of whether or not I has occurred. If I 
did occur, then the obligation is satisfied. If I didn't occur, then the obligation didn't even arise (Rule 2). 
For example, if we know a student has taken an introductory psychology course, we can be sure the 
obligation has not been violated: Either the student was a psychology major, and hence fulfilled the 
obligation, or the student was not a psychology major, in which case the obligation didn't arise. 
4. If C has not been done, then I must not have occurred. This is because if I had occurred, then the failure 
to do C would constitute a violation of the obligation. Thus, if a student has not taken an introductory 
psychology course, the student must not be a psychology major, or else the obligation will have been 
violated. 
If you understand the above four rules, you should find it very easy to assess whether or not an obligation is 
being met. Note that there are only two situations in which it is possible for an obligation to be violated: 
When I occurs (and C is not done) (Rule 1), and when C is not done (and I occurs) (Rule 4). In the other two 
situations the obligation can't be violated. These are the cases in which I doesn't occur (in which case the 
obligation doesn't arise) (Rule 2), and in which C is done (in which case the obligation will have been met if 
it arose) (Rule 3). 
Following are two examples that illustrate how these rules may be used to solve problems. Please think 
carefully and solve the problems before checking the answers on the following pages. 
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Example I 
lmaginý you are a parent asking your child to help you tidy up around the house. You have leamt that just 
asking nicely doesn't always get the desired response therefore you have set some rules. One such rule Is: 
"Ifyou want to watch television, then you must tidy your roomfirst. " 
This rule may or may not be in effect. You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. The four cards 
below represent information about whether your child tidies up and whether they watch television. Each card 
has two pieces of information on it. On one side of the card there is information about the room being tidied 
or not, and on the other there is information about television watching. For two of the cards you can see 
whether or not your child tidies their room, but not whether they watched television, and on the other two 
you can see whether or not they get to watch television, but not whether they tidied their room. Your task is 
to determine whether or not your child is following this rule. Indicate which card(s) you would need to turn 
over to decide whether or not the rule is being broken. 
(a) 
Tidies up 
(b) 
Doesn't 
tidy up 
(c) 
Does 
watch 
television 
(d) 
Does not 
watch 
television 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Answer to Example I 
The correct answer is to circle the 'Watches television' and the 'Doesn't tidy up' cards (c and 
b). The rule 
states that if the child is to 'watch television', then they must 'tidy their room first'. That is, if I occurs, then it 
is obligatory to do C, therefore the 'Watches television' card is turned to check that 'Tidies up' 
is on the other 
side. If 'watching television' arises with 'Doesn't tidy up' on the other side then this would constitute a 
violation of the obligation. The 'Doesn't tidy up' card is also turned to check that 'Doesn't watch television' 
is 
on the other side. In other words, if C has not been done, then I must not have occurred. 
If 'Watches 
television' is on the other side then this again would be a violation of the obligation. 
It is not necessary to look on the other sides of the 'Tidies up' card (a) or the 'Doesn't watch television' cards 
(d). If the child 'Tidies up' the obligation has not been violated whether they watch television or not. 
Also if 
the child 'Doesn't watch television, then the obligation doesn't anse anyway, they 
don't have to tidy their 
room. 
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Example 2 
As a teacher at a secondary school it is your job to make sure all assignments for your subject are in before 
the end of term. One of the rules you have set is; 
"Ifyou want to go to the school dance, then you must complete all your assignments. " 
This rule may or may not be in effect. You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. There are four 
cards below, each depicting a pupil at the school. Each card shows two pieces of information. On one side 
whether or not they have completed their assignments and on the other side whether they went to the school 
dance or not. For two of the pupils you can see if they completed their assignments. but not whether they 
went to the school dance, and for the other two you can see whether they attended the dance, but not whether 
they completed their assignments. 
You have to determine whether or not the rule above is being broken. Indicate which card(s) you would need 
to turn over to decide whether or not the rule is being broken. 
(a) 
No School 
dance 
(b) 
Essays 
complete 
(c) 
School 
dance 
(d) 
Essays 
not 
Complete 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Answer to Example 2 
The corrects answer is to indicate the 'School dance' and the 'Essays not complete' cards (c and d). The rule 
states that if the pupils go to the 'School dance' then they must 'complete their essays', therefore the 'school 
dance' card is turned to check that this has been done. If the required action has not been taken then this 
would constitute a violation of the obligation (If I occurs, then it is obligatory to do C. ). The 'Essays not 
complete' card is also turned to check that this pupil has not gone to the school dance. In other words, if C 
has not been done, then I must not have occurred, if it has (e. g. pupil attended school dance) then again this 
would be a violation of the obligation. 
There is no point turning the No school dance' card (a) as it is irrelevant whether they completed their 
assignments or not (If I does not occur, then the obligation does not arise). It is also unnecessary to turn the 
'Essays complete' card (b) as the obligation can not be violated, whether or not the pupil attends the school 
dance. 
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Instructions 
For this booklet of logical problems your task is to decide NN hich of the three conclusions that follow the 
premises are valid, i. e. those which logically have to follow given that the premises are true. 
Each problem consists of two statements. An example of one of the problems is shown below: - 
If there is a tree, then there is a balloon. 
There is a tree. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid" 
(a) There is a balloon 
(b) There is not a balloon 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a balloon. 
Ifyou think the logica conclusion is that there is a balloon, then circle (a). 
You should assume that the information is true. Your task is to decide which of the conclusions follow 
logically from the statements. Please respond with just one option per problem. 
Please do not turn back and forth from one problem to another once you have started. You must not make 
notes or draw diagrams of any kind to help you in this task. 
If there is a 7, then there is a D. 
There is a 7. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is aD 
(b) There is not aD 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a D. 
If there is a 4, then there is a P. 
There is a P. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a4 
(b) There is not a4 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a 4. 
If there is a 9, then there is T. 
There is not a 9. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is aT 
(b) There is not aT 
(c) It if uncertain \% hether or not there is a T. 
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If there is an 8, then there is a K. 
There is not a K. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is an 8 
(b) There is not an 8 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is an 8. 
If there is a square, then there is a circle. 
There is a square. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a circle 
(b) There is not a circle 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a circle 
If there is a rectangle, then there is a triangle. 
There is a triangle. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a rectangle 
(b) There is not a rectangle 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a rectangle. 
If there is a triangle, then there is a square. 
There is not a triangle. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a square 
(b) There is not a square 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a square 
If there is a circle, then there is a rectangle. 
There is not a rectangle. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a circle 
(b) There is not a circle 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a circle. 
If there is a hammer, then there is a wrench. 
There is a hammer. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a wrench 
(b) There is not a wrench 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a wrench. 
If there is a chisel, then there is a saw. 
There is a saxv. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a chisel 
(b) There is not a chisel 
(c) It Is uncertain \N-liether or not there is a chisel. 
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If there is a screwdriver, then there is a mallet. 
There is not a screwdriver. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a mallet 
(b) There is not a mallet 
(c) It is uncertain whether there is a mallet or not. 
If there is a drill, then there is a shovel. 
There is not a shovel. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a dnll 
(b) There is not a drill 
(c) It is uncertain whether there is a drill or not. 
If there is an apple, then there is a banana. 
There is an apple. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a banana 
(b) There is not a banana 
(c) It is uncertain whether there is a banana or not. 
If there is a grapefruit, then there is a pineapple. 
There is a pineapple. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a grapefruit 
(b) There is not a grapefruit 
(c) It is uncertain whether there is a grapefruit or not. 
If there is an orange, then there is a peach. 
There is not an orange. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid? 
(a) There is a peach 
(b) There is not a peach 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a peach. 
If there is a plum, then there is a cherry. 
There is not a cherry. 
Which of the following conclusions is valid'? 
(a) There is a plum 
(b) There is not a plum 
(c) It is uncertain whether or not there is a plum. 
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Imagine you work in the Faculty of Science. Part of your job involves collating all the information required 
about students who are graduating each year. You have to make sure that students who want to graduate in 
the December have completed their course by September, and certain rules have to be followed to ensure a 
student is eligible. One of these rules is: 
"If a student graduates, then that student must have completed all their modules. " 
You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. The four cards below represent students at your 
college. Each card has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card has whether a student has 
graduated and on the other side whether they completed their modules. For two of the cards you can see 
whether they graduated, but you cannot see if they completed their modules. For the other two cards, you can 
see whether they completed all their modules, but you cannot see whether they graduated. Indicate which 
card(s) you would need to turn over to decide whether or not the rule is being, iolated. 
(a) 
Not 
Graduate 
tum () 
Explanation 
(b) 
Graduate 
tum () 
(c) 
Modules 
not 
Complete 
tum () 
(d) 
Modules 
Complete 
tum () 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Graduated' and the 'Modules not Completed' cards. 
The rule states 
that if a student graduates, then that student must have completed all their modules. 
The 'Graduated' card must be turned over because whether or not the rule is being followed 
is deten-nined by 
whether or not that student has completed all their modules. if it states that the student 
has not completed all 
their modules then the rule is being violated. Likewise, the 'Modules not Completed' card must 
be turned over 
because, according to the rule, this student must not have graduated. If a student 
has not completed all their 
modules but has graduated then the rule is being violated. In order to see if a student 
has graduated without 
completing all their modules, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Not Graduated' card does not have to be turned over because whether or not the student completed 
their 
modules could be on the other side of the card and the rule would still 
be followed; that is, whether or not a 
student completed all their modules, if they didn't graduate it doesn't affect the rule, so the 
information on the 
other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Modules Completed' card does not 
have to be turned over either. 
Because the rule is not reversible, a student who has completed all their modules 
does not have to graduate; 
either Graduated or Not Graduated could be on the other side of this card and the rule would 
still be 
followed. 
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Imagine you work as a Receptionist in a Doctor's surgery. Part of your job involves making sure all the 
patients are up to date with their vaccinations. You also have to make sure that patients who go abroad t'or 
their holidays are receiving the inoculations they require for the destinations they are travelling to. The 
Doctor has given you a set of guidelines and rules that should be adhered to. One of these rules i,,,: 
"If a patient is travelling to Africa, then that patient must be vaccinated against Yelloit-Fever. " 
You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. The four cards below represent patients from the 
surgery. Each card has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card is whether a patient has been 
to Africa and on the other side whether they have been vaccinated. For two of the cards you can see whether 
they travelled to Africa, but you cannot see if they were vaccinated. For the other two cards, you can see 
whether they were vaccinated, but you cannot see whether they travelled to Africa. Indicate which card(s) 
you would need to turn over to decide whether or not the rule is being violated. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Spain Africa Vaccinated Not 
Vaccinated 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Affica' and the Not vaccinated' cards. The rule states that if a 
patient travels to Africa, then that patient must be vaccinated against Yellow Fever. 
The 'Africa' card must be turned over because whether or not the rule is being followed is 
determined by 
whether or not that patient has been vaccinated. If it states that the patient has not been vaccinated then the 
rule is being violated. Likewise, the 'Not vaccinated' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, 
this patient must not have travelled to Affica. If a patient has not received their vaccination 
but has travelled 
to Affica then the rule is being violated. In order to see if a patient has travelled to Africa without receiving 
their vaccination, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Spain' card does not have to be turned over because whether or not the patient was vaccinated could 
be 
on the other side of the card and the rule would still be followed; that is, whether or not a patient received 
their vaccination, if they didn't travel to Africa it doesn't affect the rule, so the 
information on the other side 
of this card is irrelevant. The 'Vaccinated' card does not have to be turned over either. 
Because the rule is not 
reversible, a patient who has received their vaccination does not have to travel to 
Africa; either Africa or 
Spain could be on the other side of this card and the rule would still be followed. 
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Imagine you are a parent asking your child to help you tidy up around the house. You have leamt that just 
asking nicely doesn't always get the desired response, therefore you have set some rules. One of these rules is: 
"Ifyou want to watch television, then you must tidy your room first. " 
You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. The four cards below represent information about 
whether your child tidies up or not and whether or not they watch television. Each card has two pieces of 
information on it. On one side of each card you can see whether or not your child tidies their room, and on 
the other whether they watched television. For two of the cards you can see whether they watched television, 
but you cannot see whether they tidied their room. For the other two cards, you can see whether they tidied 
their room but not whether they watched television. Indicate which card(s) you would need to turn over to 
decide whether or not the rule is being violated. 
Tidies up 
tum 
Ext)lanation 
Doesn't 
tidy up 
tum( ) 
(C) 
Watches 
television 
tum () 
(d) 
Doesn't 
watch 
television 
tum () 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Watches televisioW and the 'Doesn't tidy up' cards. The rule states 
that if the child wants to watch television, then the child must tidy their room first. 
The 'Watches television' card must be turned over because whether or not the rule is being followed is 
determined by whether or not the child tidies their room. If it states that the child doesn't tidy their room then 
the rule is being violated. Likewise, the 'Doesn't tidy up' card must be turned over because, according to the 
rule, the child must not have watched television. If the child has not tidied their room but has watched 
television then the rule is being violated. In order to see if the child has watched television without tidying 
their bedroom, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Doesn't watch television' card does not have to be turned over because whether or not the child tidied 
their room could be on the other side of the card and the rule would still be followed; that is, whether or not 
the child tidied their room, if they didret watch television it doesn't affect the rule, so the information on the 
other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Tidies up' card does not have to be turned over either. Because the 
rule is not reversible, a child who has tidied their room does not have to watch television; either watches 
television or doesn't watch television could be on the other side of this card and the rule would still be 
followed. 
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Imagine you are the captain of the England Athletics team. It is your 'ob to decide who represents England in different competitions. You want ihe decisions to be fair and everyon-e to have a chance on being in the team. but you don't want complaints of unfairness after the decisions have been made, therefore you have set some 
rules. One of these rules is: 
"If an athlete is to represent England, then they must win all the heatsfirst. " 
You have to make sure that this rule is being followed. The four cards below represent athletes competing for 
places on the team. Each card has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card is whether an 
athlete has represented England and on the other side whether they won all their heats. For two of the cards 
you can see whether they represented England but you cannot see if they won all their heats. For the other 
two cards, you can see whether they won all their heats but you cannot see whether they represented England. 
Indicate which card(s) you would need to turn over to decide whether or not the rule is being violated. 
(a) 
Represents 
England 
tum 
Explanation 
Won all 
Heats 
tum () 
(C) 
Didn't Win 
all Heats 
tum () 
(d) 
Didn't 
represent 
England 
tum () 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Represents England' and the 'Didn't win all heats' cards. The rule 
states that if an athlete is to represent England, then they must win all the heats first. 
The 'Represents England' card must be turned over because whether or not the rule is being followed is 
determined by whether or not the athlete wins the heats first. If it states that the athlete doesn't win the heats 
then the rule is being violated. Likewise, the 'Didn't win all heats' card must be turned over because, 
according to the rule, the athlete must not have represented England. If the athlete has not won all the heats 
but has represented England then the rule is being violated. In order to see if the athlete has represented 
England without winning all the heats, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Didn't represent England' card does not have to be turned over because whether or not the athlete won 
all the heats could be on the other side of the card and the rule would still be followed; that is, whether or not 
the athlete won all the heats, if they didn't represent England it doesn't affect the rule, so the information on 
the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Won all heats' card does not have to be turned over either. 
Because the rule is not reversible, an athlete who has won all the heats does not have to represent England; 
either represents England or didn't represent England could be on the other side of this card and the rule 
would still be followed. 
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The boxes below represent four cards lying on a table. Each card has two pieces of information on it. On one 
side of each card, there is a fraction, and on the other side of each card, there is a chemical element. For two 
of these cards, * you can see the fraction that is oln one side of that card, but you ciinnot see the chemical 
element that is on the other side of that card. For the other two cards, you can see the chemical element that is 
on one side of the card, but you cannot see the fraction that is on the other side. Your fi7iend tells you that the 
following rule applies to the cards: 
"If 112 is on one side ofa card, then Helium must be on the other side of the card. " 
Your task is to indicate the card or cards you would need to turn over to see whether this rule is true or false. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
3/4 1/2 Helium Oxygen 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the '1 /2' and the 'Oxygen' cards. The rule states that if there is a 1/2 on 
one side of a card, then Helium must be on the other side of that card. 
The'l/2' card must be turned over because the truth of the rule is determined by the chemical element on the 
other side of this card. If the element on the other side of this card is any element other than helium, then the 
rule cannot be true. Likewise, the 'Oxygen' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, Oxygen 
cannot be on the other side of a card that has 1/2 on it. If a card with Oxygen on one side has 1/2 on the other 
side of it, the rule cannot be true. In order to see if the 'Oxygen' card has 1/2 on the other side of it, one must 
turn this card over. 
The '3/4' card does not have to be turned over because any chemical could be on the other side of this card 
and the rule could still be true; that is, the chemical that appears on the other side of this card 
does not affect 
the truth of the rule, so the information on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Helium' card 
does not 
have to be turned over either. Because the rule is not reversible, a card with Helium on one side 
does not 
have to have 1/2 on the other side of it; either 1/2 or 3/4 could be on the other side of this card and the rule 
could still be true. 
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The boxes below represent four cards lying on a table. Each card has two pieces of information on it. On one side of each card, there is an oc . cupation, and on the other side of each card, there is a hair colour. For-two of these cards, you can see the occupation that is on one side of that card, but you cannot see the hair colour that is on the other side of that card. For the other two cards, you can see the hair colour that is on one side ofthe 
card, but you cannot see the occupation that is on the other side. Your ffiend tells you that the following rule 
applies to the cards: 
"IfDoctor is on one side of a card, then Blonde must be on the other side of the card. " 
Your task is to indicate the card or cards you would need to turn over to see whether this rule is true or false. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Brunette Blonde Postman Doctor 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Doctor' and the 'Brunette' cards. The rule states that is there is a 
Doctor on one side of a card, then Blonde must be on the other side of that card. 
The 'Doctor' card must be turned over because the truth of the rule is determined by the hair colour on the 
other side of this card. If the hair colour on the other side of this card is any colour other than blonde, then the 
rule cannot be true. Likewise, the 'Brunette' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, brunette 
cannot be on the other side of a card that has Doctor on it. If a card with brunette on one side has Doctor on 
the other side of it, the rule cannot be true. In order to see if the 'Brunette' card has Doctor on the other side of 
it, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Postman' card does not have to be turned over because any hair colour could be on the other side of this 
card and the rule could still be true; that is, the hair colour that appears on the other side of this card does not 
affect the truth of the rule, so the information on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Blonde' card 
does not have to be turned over either. Because the rule is not reversible, a card with Blonde on one side does 
not have to have Doctor on the other side of it; either Doctor or Postman could be on the other side of this 
card and the rule could still be true. 
352 
APPENDIX A5.2 cont. 
The boxes below represent four cards lying on a table. Each card has two pieces of inforination on it. On one 
side of each* card, there is a colour, and on the other side of each card there is a -religion. For two of these 
cards, you can see the colour that is on one side of that card, but you cannot see the religion that is on the 
other side of the card. For the other two cards, you can see the religion that is on one side of the card, but you 
cannot see the colour that is on the other side. Your friend tells you that the following rule applies to the 
cards: 
"IfPink is on one side of a card, then Protestant must be on the other side. " 
Your task is to indicate the card or cards you would need to turn over to see whether this rule is true or false. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Catholic Purple Pink Protestant 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'pink' and the 'Catholic' cards. The rule states that if there is a pink 
on one side of a card, then Protestant must be on the other side of that card. 
The 'pink! card must be turned over because the truth of the rule is determined by the religion on the other 
side of this card. If the religion on the other side of this card is any religion other than Protestant, then the 
rule cannot be true. Likewise, the 'Catholic' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, Catholic 
cannot be on the other side of a card that has pink on it. If a card with Catholic on one side has pink on the 
other side of it, the rule cannot be true. In order to see if the 'Catholic' card has pink on the other side of it, 
one must turn this card over. 
The 'Purple' card does not have to be turned over because any religion could be on the other side of this card 
and the rule could still be true; that is, the religion that appears on the other side of this card does not affect 
the truth of the rule, so the information on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 'Protestant' card does 
not have to be turned over either. Because the rule is not reversible, a card with Protestant on one side does 
not have to have pink on the other side of it; either pink or purple could be on the other side of this card and 
the rule could still be true. 
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The boxes below represent four cards lying on a table. Each card has two pieces of inforination on it. On one side of each card, there is a season, and on the other side of each-card, there is a type of aeroplane. For two of these cards, you can see the season that is on one side of that card, but you cannot see the type of aeroplane on the other side of that card. For the other two cards, you can see the type of aeroplane that 's on one s de of the card, but you cannot see the season that is on the other side. Your firiend tells you that the following rule applies to the cards: 
"If Winter is on one side of a card, then Jet must be on the other side of the card. " 
Your task is to indicate the card or cards you would need to turn over to see whether this rule is true or false. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Biplane Winter Jet Spring 
tum () tum () tum () tum () 
Explanation 
The correct answer is to turn over both the 'Winter' and the 'Biplane' cards. The rule states that if there is a 
Winter on one side of a card, then Jet must be on the other side of that card. 
The 'Winter' card must be turned over because the truth of the rule is determined by the type of aeroplane on 
the other side of this card. If the aeroplane on the other side of this card is any aeroplane other than Jet, then 
the rule cannot be true. Likewise, the 'Biplane' card must be turned over because, according to the rule, 
Biplane cannot be on the other side of a card that has Winter on it. If a card with Biplane on one side has 
Winter on the other side of it, the rule cannot be true. In order to see if the 'Biplane' card has Winter on the 
other side of it, one must turn this card over. 
The 'Spring' card does not have to be turned over because any type of aeroplane could be on the other side of 
this card and the rule could still be true; that is, the type of aeroplane that appears on the other side of this 
card does not affect the truth of the rule, so the information on the other side of this card is irrelevant. The 
'Jet' card does not have to be turned over either. Because the rule is not reversible, a card with Jet on one side 
does not have to have Winter on the other side of it; either Winter or Spring could be on the other side of this 
card and the rule could still be true. 
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Table 1.1 Repeated measures ANOVA to test for differences dependent on problem 
type in statistical reasoning 
SS Degr. of NIS F 
Intercept 682.6667 1 682.6667 300.4551 0.000000 
Error 111.3333 49 2.2721 
Problem type 7.4533 2 3.7267 3.0296 0.0 
Error 120.5467 98 1.2301 
Table 1.2 Post-hoe comparison 
RI neutral untypical 
_tv, 
pical 
1 Neutral 
2 inconsistent 0.016724 
3 consistent 0.128548 0.369456 
Table 1.3 Repeated measures ANOVA to test for differences dependent on problems 
type in experiment evaluation reasoning 
SS Degr. of MS Fp 
Intercept 1003.627 1 1003.627 219.1780 0.000000 
Error 224.373 49 4.579 
Problem type 6.813 2 3.407 2.2378 0.112115 
Error 149.187 98 1.522 
Table 1.4 2x2 (Logic x Belief) ANOVA performed on sN, Ilogistic reasoning 
SS Deg. of NIS Fp 
Intercept 1479.680 1 1479.680 1009.528 0.000000 
Error 71.820 49 1.466 
LOGIC 60.500 1 60.500 39.007 0.000000 
Error 76.000 49 1.551 
BELIEF 16.820 1 16.820 17.286 0.000129 
Error 47.680 49 0.973 
LOCIC*BELIEF 25.920 1 25.920 30.545 0.000001 
Error 41.580 49 0.849 
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Table 1.5 T-test to. test difference between deontic and arbitrary selection task 
responding 
Mean Std. D,.,. N Diff. Std. Dv. t df p 
arbitrary 1.420000 1.715357 
deontic 2.900000 1.432138 50 -1.48000 1.681108 -6.22517 49 0.000000 
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Table 2.1 ANOVA performed on the statistical reasoning problems dependent on 
condition 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 1095.200 1 1095.200 421 4-, ')-' 0.000000 
Condition 102.756 1 102.756 39.5447 0.000000 
Error 150.711 58 2.598 
Problem Type 13.233 2 6.617 6.9425 0.001420 
Prob type x Condition 7.544 2 3.772 3.9580 0.02173,6 
Error 110.556 116 0.953 
Table 2.2 Follow up LSD test performed on problem type 
R1 neutral consistent inconsistent 
I Neutral 
2 Consistent 0.925661 
3 Inconsistent 0.001894 0.001403 
Table 2.3 Planned comparisons for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
control condition - Neutral and Consistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean F p 
M11.06667 1 1.066667 1.286655 0.261332 
Error 48.08333 58 0.829023 
Table 2.4 Planned comparisons for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
control condition - Neutral and Inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean F p 
M1 17.06667 1 17.06667 17.71838 0.000090 
Error 55-86667 58 0.96322 
Table 2.5 Planned comparisons for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
control condition - Consistent and Inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
Nil 9.60000 1 9.600000 8.997576 0.0039-1) 
Error 61.88333 58 1.066954 
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Table 2.6 Planned 
, comparisons 
for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
training condition - Neutral and Consistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
M11.35000 1 1.350000 1.62X423 0.207008 
Error 48.08333 58 0.829023 
Table 2.7 Planned comparisons for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
training condition - Neutral and Inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
MI 0.06667 1 0.066667 0.069212 0.793419 
Error 55.86667 58 0.963218 
Table 2.8 Planned comparisons for the interaction in statistical reasoning under the 
training condition - Consistent and Inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
MI 2.01667 1 2.016667 1.890116 0,174477 
Error 61.88333 58 1.066954 
Table 2.9 ANOVA performed on the evidence evaluation scale ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS Fp 
Intercept 26523.47 1 26523.47 1304.224 0.000000 
Condition 20.67 1 20.67 1.017 0.317538 
Error 1179.52 58 20.34 
Problem type 842.41 2 421.21 54.399 0.000000 
Problem type x Condition 50.74 2 25.37 3.277 0.041270 
Error 898.18 116 7.74 
Table 2.10 Post-hoe analysis on evidence evaluation ratings dependent on problem 
type 
PROBTYPE neutral consistent incon%istent 
I neutral 0.600654 0.000000 
2 consistent 0.600654 0.000000 
3 inconsistent 0.000000 0.000000 
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Table 2.11 ANOVA performed on persuasiveness ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 23324.45 1 23324.45 1733.271 0.000000 
Condition 6.05 1 6.05 0.450 0.505194 
Error 780.50 58 13.46 
Problem type 863.63 2 431.82 53.692 0.000000 
Problem type x Condition 35.43 2 17.72 2.203 0.115087 
Error 932.93 116 8.04 
Table 2.12 Post-hoc analysis performed on problem type 
Problem type neutral consistent inconsistent 
1 Neutral 
2 Consistent 0.320419 
3 Inconsistent 0.000000 0.000000 
Table 2.13 ANOVA performed on Experiment Evaluation reasoning 
SS Degr. of MS F p 
Intercept 1065.800 1 1065.800 301.4454 0.000000 
Condition 1.800 1 1.800 0.5091 0.478389 
Error 205.067 58 3.536 
Problem type 196.300 2 98.150 68.1217 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 7.900 2 3.950 2.7415 0.068652 
Error 167.133 116 1.441 
Table 2.14 Post-hoc analysis on problem type for experiment evaluation reasoning 
PROB neutral consistent inconsistent 
I neutral 
2 consistent 0.000000 
3 inconsistent 0.000002 0.000000 
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2.15 ANOVA performed on the evidence e-, -aluation ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 27232.20 1 27232.20 660.8835 0.000000 
Condition 115.20 1 115.20 2 0.099901 
Error 2389.93 58 41.21 
Problem type 790.83 2 395.42 44.3 1 -2 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 30.83 2 15.42 1.7279 0.182205 
Error 1035.00 116 8.92 
2.16 Post-hoe analysis on evidence evaluation ratings 
PROB neutral consistent inconsistent 
1 Neutral 
2 consistent 0.000000 
3 inconsistent 0.000629 0.000000 
2.17 ANOVA performed on the experiment validity ratings 
SS Degr. of 'N IS F p 
Intercept 25872.02 1 25872.02 874.3151 0.000000 
Condition 341.69 1 341.69 11.5470 0.001232 
Error 1716.29 58 29.59 
Problem type 568.68 2 284.34 47.2285 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 46.94 2 23.47 3.8987 0.022977 
Error 698.38 116 6.02 
2.18 Post-hoe analysis on validity ratings 
RI neutral consistent inconsistent 
I neutral 0.000001 0.000016 
2 consistent 0.000001 
0.000000 
3 inconsistent 0.000016 0.000000 
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2.19 ANOVA performed on the Fong et al. problems 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 605.0000 1 605.0000 213.6450 0.000000 
Condition 74.7556 1 74.7556 26.3986 
Error 164.2444 58 2.8318 
Problem type 104.6333 2 52.3167 39.9200 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 3.3444 2 1.6722 1.2760 0.283045 
Error 152.0222 116 1.3105 
2.20 Post-hoc analysis on problem type 
Problem type objective probabilistic subjective 
I Objective 
2 Probabilistic 0.000000 
3 Subjective 0.012019 0.000000 
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Table 3.1 ANOVA performed on the LLN problems 
SS Degr. of NIS Fp 
Intercept 2430.000 1 2430.000 546.5615 0.000000 
Condition 319.200 2 159.600 35.8976 0.000000 
Error 386.800 87 4.446 
Problem type 37.956 2 18.978 13.0899 0.00000S 
Problem type x condition 17.778 4 4.444 3.0655 0.01_()X() 
Error 252.267 174 1.450 
Table 3.2 Post-hoc analysis on Condition 
Condition control instruction training 
I control 
2 instruction 0.526260 
3 training 0.000000 0.000000 
Table 3.3 Post-hoc analysis on Problem type 
Problem type consistent inconsistent neutral 
I consistent 
2 inconsistent 0.002293 
3 neutral 0.049180 0.000001 
Table 3.4 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition and 
problem type under the control group - consistent and inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
Mi 19.2667 1 19.26667 11.97571 0.000837 
Error 139.9667 87 1.60881 
Table 3.5 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition and 
problem type under the control group - consistent and neutral 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
MI 1.6667 1 1.666667 1.195712 0.277199 
Error 121.2667 87 1.393870 
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Table 3.6 Planned comparis-ons performed on the interaction bemeen condition and 
problem type under the control group - inconsistent and neutral 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 32.2667 1 32.26667 23.95903 O. OOOCn4 
Error 117.1667 87 1.34674 
Table 3.7 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction bet-, -,, een condition and 
problem type under the instruction group - inconsistent and consistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
Mi 7.3500 1 7.350000 4.568588 0.035369 
Error 139.9667 87 1.608812 
Table 3.8 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition aiid 
problem type under the instruction group - neutral and consistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
mi 2.4000 1 2.400000 1.721825 0.192910 
Error 121.2667 87 1.393870 
Table 3.9 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition and 
problem type under the instruction group - neutral and inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
Mi 18.1500 1 18.15000 13.47696 0.000416 
Error 117.1667 87 1.14674 
Table 3.10 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition and 
problem type under the training group - consistent and inconsistent 
Suni of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 0.4167 1 0.416667 0.258990 0.612103 
Error 139.9667 87 1.608812 
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Table 3.11 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction between condition and 
problem type under the training group - neutral and consistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
MI 1.6667 1 1.666667 1.195712 0.21-1199 
Error 121.2667 87 1.393870 
Table 3.12 Planned comparisons performed on the interaction bet-ween condition and 
problem type under the training group - neutral and inconsistent 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
MI 0.4167 1 0.416667 0.309388 0.571)484 
Error 117.1667 87 1.346743 
Table 3.12 ANOVA performed on the evidence evaluation ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS Fp 
Intercept 40872.90 1 40872.90 1596.901 0.000000 
Condition 697.65 2 348.83 13.629 0.000007 
Error 2226.78 87 25.60 
Problem type 1432.45 2 716.23 74.534 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 76-19 4 19.05 1.982 0.099267 
Error 1672.02 174 9.61 
Table 3.13 Post-hoc analysis on condition 
Condition control instruction training 
I control 
2 instruction 0.006050 
3 training 0.018459 0.000001 
Table 3.14 Post-hoc analysis on problem type 
PROBTYP consistent inconsistent neutral 
I Consistent 
2 Inconsistent 0.000000 
3 neutral 0.00954- 0.000000 
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Table 3.15 ANOVA performed on the persuasiveness ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 35984.03 1 35984.03 1418.090 0.000000 
Condition 404.96 2 202.48 8.317 
Error 2118.01 87 24.34 
Problem type 1464.87 2 732.43 80.293 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 61.91 4 15.48 1.697 0.152849 
Error 1587.22 174 9.12 
Table 3.16 Post-hoc analysis on condition 
Condition control instruction training 
I Control 0.004515 0.314285 
2 Instruction 0.004515 0.000171 
3 training 0.314285 0.000171 
Table 3.17 Post-hoe analysis on problem type 
Problem type consistent inconsistent neutral 
I consistent 
2 inconsistent 0.000000 
3 neutral 0.000219 0.000000 
Table 3.18 ANOVA performed on Experiment Evaluation reasoning 
ss Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 1925.337 1 1925.337 405.4159 0.000000 
Condition 12.496 2 6.248 1.3157 0.273580 
Error 413.167 87 4.749 
Problem type 168.941 2 84.470 58.7444 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 4.859 4 1.215 0.8448 
0.498529 
Error 250.200 174 1.438 
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Table 3.19 Post-hoe analysis on problem type 
Problem type consistent inconsistent neutral 
I Consistent 0.000000 0.000000 
2 Inconsistent 0.000000 0.000004 
3 neutral 0.000000 0.000004 
Table 3.20 ANOVA performed on evidence evaluation ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 45916.45 1 45916.45 1360.042 0.000000 
Condition 215.34 2 107.67 3.189 
Error 2937.21 87 33.76 
Problem type 1381.56 2 690.78 79.704 0.000000 
Problem type x condit ion 64.41 4 16.10 1.858 0.119933 
Error 1508.02 174 8.67 
Table 3.21 Post-hoe analysis on condition 
Condition control instruction training 
I Control 
2 Instruction 0.031901 
3 training 0.030933 0.989794 
Table 3.22 Post-hoe analysis on problem type 
Problem type consistent inconsistent neutral 
I Consistent 
2 Inconsistent 0.00 
3 neutral 0.00 0.007983 
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Table 3.23 ANOVA performed on the argument validit- .y ratings 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 40627.20 1 40627.20 1415.160 0.000000 
Condition 273.16 2 136.58 4.757 0.010946 
Error 2497.64 87 28.71 
Problem type 1250.02 2 625.01 76.93 5 0.000000 
Problem type x condition 28.42 4 7.11 O., ý 7 0.480300 
Error 1413.56 174 8.12 
Table 3.24 Post-hoe analysis on condition 
Condition control instruction training 
I Control 
2 Instruction 0.234812 
3 training 0.002939 0.065684 
Table 3.25 Post-hoc analysis on problem type 
Problem type 11) (2) 131 
1 Consistent 0.000000 0.000000 
2 Inconsistent 0.000000 0.000011 
3 neutral 0.000000 0.000011 
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Table 4.1. T-test for difference between obligation and permission problems pre- 
training 
Mean Std. Dv. N' Diff. ')td. Dv. t df p 
Obligation 0.491667 0.426770 
permission 0.625000 0.428092 60 -0.133333 0.366692 -2.81652 f, 9 0.006,;, )-' 
Table 4.2 T-test for difference between obligation and arbitrary problems pre- 
training 
Mean Std. Dv. N Diff. Std. D%,. t df p 
Obligation 0.491667 0.426770 
arbitrary 0.100000 0.265215 60 0.391667 0.417739 7.262523 59 0.000000 
Table 4.3 T-test for difference between permission and arbitrary problems pre- 
training 
Mean Std. Dv. N Diff. Std. D, *,. t df p 
Permission 0.625000 0.428092 
arbitrary 0.100000 0.265215 60 0.525000 0.450282 9.031294 59 0.000000 
Table 4.4 ANOVA (2 condition x3 problem type x2 prepost scores) on selection task 
responding 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 80.98767 1 80.98767 183.2963 0.000000 
Training 0.14601 1 0.14601 0.3305 0.567616 
Error 25.62674 58 0.44184 
Pre/post 1.70156 1 1.70156 8.8476 0.004272 
Pre/post x training 0.23767 1 0.23767 1.2358 0.270863 
Error 11.15451 58 0.19232 
Problem type 13.88993 2 6.94497 68.1082 0.000000 
Problem x Training 1.17743 2 0.58872 5.7734 0()1)4071 
Error 11.82847 116 0.10197 
Pre/post x problem type 0.28438 2 0.14219 2.4433 0.091336 
Pre/post x problem type x training 0.52743 2 0.26372 4.5315 0.012737 
Error 6.75069 116 0.05820 
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Table 4.5 Follow-up analysis on the 3-way interact-ion under the obligation training - 
pre to post scores on the obligation problems 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
Mi 1.066667 1 1.066667 6.649351 0.012479 
Error 9.304167 58 0.160417 
Table 4.6 Follow-up analysis on the 3--, vay interaction under the obligation training 
- pre to post scores on the permission problems 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 0.337500 1 0.337500 4.440454 0.039431 
Error 4.408333 58 0.076006 
Table 4.7 Follow-up analysis on the 3-ivay interaction under the obligation training 
- pre to post scores on the arbitrary problems 
Sum of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 0.337500 1 0.337500 4.668820 0.034858 
Error 4.192708 58 0.072288 
Table 4.8 Follow-up analysis on the 3--, vay interaction under the rules training - pre 
to post scores on the obligation problems 
Suni of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 0.004167 1 0.004167 0.025974 0.872524 
Error 9.304167 58 0.160417 
Table 4.9 Follow-up analysis on the 3-vvay interaction under the rules training - pre 
to post scores on the permission problems 
Suni of Degr. of Mean FP 
MI 0.004167 1 0.004167 0.054820 0.815703 
Error 4.408333 58 0.076006 
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Table 4.10 Follow-up analysis on the 3-way in teraction under the rules training - 
pre to post scores on the arbitrary problems 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
Mi 1.001042 1 1.001042 13.84795 0.000450 
Error 4.192708 58 0.072288 
Table 4.11 ANOVA performed on changes in p only response patterns after training 
SS Degr. of MS Fp 
Intercept 116.2042 1 116.2042 32.90269 0.000000 
TRAINING 11.7042 1 11.7042 3.31398 0.073853 
Error 204.8417 58 3.5318 
PROBLEM TYPE 14.5042 1 14.5042 8.80497 0.004359 
PROBLEM TYPE X TRAINING 5.7042 1 5.7042 3.46280 0.067835 
Error 95.5417 58 1.6473 
PRE/POST 1.2042 1 1.2042 0.90186 0.346224 
PRE/POST X TRAINING 5.1042 1 5.1042 3.82277 0.055385 
Error 77.4417 58 1.3352 
PROBLEM TYPE X PRE/POST 0.3375 1 0.3375 0.71945 0.399812 
PROBLEM TYPE X PREPOST X TRAINING 1.2042 1 1.2042 2.56692 0.114553 
Error 27.2083 58 0.4691 
Table 4.12 ANOVA performed on changes in p/q response patterns after training 
SS Degr. of MS F p 
Intercept 273.0667 1 273.0667 60.01086 0.000000 
TRAINING 6.0167 1 6.0167 1.32226 0.254906 
Error 263.9167 58 4.5503 
PROBLEM TYPE 81.6667 1 81.6667 38.41060 0.000000 
PROBLEM TYPE X TRAINING 6.0167 1 6.0167 2.82984 0.097904 
Error 123.3167 58 2.1261 
PRE/POST 8.0667 1 8.0667 7.80862 0.007036 
PRE/POST X TRAINING 6.0167 1 6.0167 5.82420 0.018987 
Error 59.9167 58 1.0330 
PROBLEM TYPE X PREPOST 4.2667 1 4.2667 7.51797 
0.008110 
PROBLEM TYPE X PREPOST X TRAINING 2.8167 1 2.8167 4.96304 
0.029788 
Error 32.9167 58 0.5675 
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Table 5.1 ANOVA performed on problem types pre-training 
ss Degr. of 'N IsFp 
Intercept 36.85208 1 36.85208 181.1368 0.00 
Error 24.21042 119 0.20345 
PROBLEM TYPE 24.27708 3 8.09236 107.3552 0.00 
Error 26.91042 357 0.07538 
Table 5.2 ANOVA performed to examine difference bet-ween Cheng et al. 's and 
Klaczynski et al. 's training 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 73.17710 1 73.17-10 31). 3518 0.000000 
JI)deontic/abstract training 0.07293 1 0.07293 0.3960 0.530391 
(2)Klacz/Cheng training 1.99133 1 1.99133 10.81214 0.001335 
D/A training x K/C training 2.18925 1 2.18925 11.8876 0.000788 
Error 21.36279 116 OAS-416 
13) Pre/post 6.55279 1 6.55279 73.3316 0.000000 
Prepost*D/Atraining 0.13057 1 0.13057 1 -4012 0.229198 
Prepost * K/C training 2.12224 1 2.12224 23.7497 0.000004 
Prepost*D/Atrain*K/Ctraining 0.53890 1 0.53890 6.0308 0.015541 
Error 10.36557 116 0.08936 
14)Problem type 18.83508 1 18.83508 222.8446 0.000000 
Problem type x D/Atraining 0.86942 1 0. ý'6 S-4 2 10.2746 0.001743 
Problem type x K/Ctraining 0.00071 1 0.00071 0.0084 0.927188 
Problem type x D/Atrain x K/Ctrain 0.03474 1 0.03474 0.4110 0.522736 
Error 9.80446 116 0.08452 
Prepost x Problem type 0.27953 1 0.27953 7.5671 
0.006899 
Prepost x Problem type x D/Atrain 1.24203 1 1.24203 
33.6231 0.000000 
Prepost x Problem type x K/Ctrain 0.04064 1 0.04064 
1.1002 0.20412 
3*4*1*2 0.27953 1 0.27953 7.5671 0.006899 
Error 4.28501 116 0.036Q4 
Table 5.3 Planned comparison of pre to post traini ng scores after Cheng et al. 
's 
training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean F p 
, NI 1 0.60836 
1 0.608362 6.808120 0.010270 
Error 10.36557 116 0.089358 
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Table 5.4 Planned comparison of-pre to post training scores after Kiacz-, -nski et al. 's training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
mi 8.06667 1 8.066667 90.2"324 0.000000 
Error 10.36557 116 0.089358 
Table 5.5 ANOVA performed on pre/post training scores for problem type under 
rules and obligation training 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 25.51276 1 25.51276 127.1319 0.000000 
TRAINING 0.73151 1 0.73151 3.6452 0.061183 
Error 11.63941 58 0.20068 
PREPOST SCORES 0.60836 1 0.60836 7.7262 0.007325 
PREPOST X TRAINING 0.06947 1 0.06947 0.8823 0.351466 
Error 4.56696 58 0.07874 
PROBLEM TYPE 9.30234 1 9.30234 95.2502 0.000000 
PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.62526 1 0.62526 6.4023 0.014114 
Error 5.66441 58 0.09766 
PREPOST X PROBLEM 0.05350 1 0.05350 1.6377 0.205732 
PREPOST X PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.17156 1 0.17156 5.2516 0.025577 
Error 1.89473 58 0.03267 
Table 5.6 Planned comparison on deontic problems pre to post scores under 
obligation training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean F p 
Mi 0.376042 1 0.376042 5.776000 0.019465 
Error 3.776042 58 0.065104 
Table 5.7 Planned comparison on arbitrary problems pre to post scores under 
obligation training 
Suni of Degr. of Nlean F p 
Nil 0.185185 1 0.185185 3.999310 0. 050210 
Error 2.685648 58 0.046304 
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Table 5.8 Planned- comparison on deontic problems pre to post scores under rules 
training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean F p 
, N] 1 0.004167 1 0.004167 0.064000 0.801176 
Error 3.776042 58 0.065104 
Table 5.9 Planned comparison on arbitrary problems pre to post scores under rules 
training 
Sum of Degr. Of Mean F p 
Mi 0.337500 1 0.337500 7.288743 0.009078 
Error 2.685648 58 0.046304 
Table 5.10 ANOVA performed on pre/post training scores for problem type under 
permission and abstract training 
IS S, Degr. of NIS Fp 
Intercept 49.65567 1 49.65567 296.1963 0.000000 
TRAINING 1.53067 1 1.53067 9.1305 0.003737 
Error 9.72338 58 0.16764 
PREPOST SCORES 8.06667 1 8.06667 80.6860 0.000000 
PREPOST X TRAINING 0.60000 1 0.60000 6.0014 0.017334 
Error 5.79861 58 0.09998 
PROBLEM TYPE 9.53345 1 9.53345 133.5589 0.000000 
PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.27789 1 0.27789 3.8932 0.053255 
Error 4.14005 58 0.07138 
PREPOST X PROBLEM 0.26667 1 0.26667 6.4707 0.013654 
PREPOST X PROBLEM X TRAINING 1.35000 1 1.35000 32.7577 0.000000 
Error 2.39028 58 0.04121 
Table 5.11 Planned comparison of pre to post scores on deontic problems under 
permission training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
NII 1.837500 1 1.837500 22.55556 0.000014 
Error 4.725000 58 0.081466 
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Table 5.12 Planned comparison of pre to post scores on arbitrary problems under 
permission training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
mi 0.504167 1 0.504167 8.441860 0.005183 
Error 3.463889 58 0.059722 
Table 5.13 Planned comparison of pre to post scores on deontic problems under 
abstract training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
mi 0.937500 1 0.937500 11.50794 0.001254 
Error 4.725000 58 0.081466 
Table 5.14 Planned comparison of pre to post scores on arbitrary problems under 
abstract training 
Sum of Degr. of Mean Fp 
mi 7.004167 1 7.004167 117.2791 0.000000 
Error 3.463889 58 0.059722 
Table 5.15 ANOVA performed on changes in p only response patterns under 
obligation and rules training 
SS Degr. of MS F P 
Intercept 4.004167 1 4.004167 24.79755 0.000006 
TRAINING 0.001852 1 0.001852 0.01147 0.915087 
Error 9.365509 58 0.161474 
PROBLEM TYPE 0.266667 1 0.266667 7.81382 0.007019 
PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.000463 1 0.000463 0.01357 0.907681 
Error 1.979398 58 0.034128 
PRE/POST 0.016667 1 0.016667 0.20291 0.654065 
PRE/POST X TRAINING 0.056019 1 0.056019 0.68199 0.412287 
Error 4.764120 58 0.082140 
PROBLEM X PREPOST 0.004167 1 0.004167 0.34512 0.559167 
PROB*PREPOST*TRAINING 0.007407 1 0.007407 0.61355 0.436640 
Error 0.700231 58 0.012073 
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Table 5.16 ANOYA performed on changes in p/q response patterns under obligation 
and rules training 
ss Degr. of MS F p 
Intercept 31-90104 1 31.90104 112.7213 0.000000 
TRAINING 0.00741 1 0.00741 0.0262 0.872039 
Error 16.41447 58 0.28301 
PROBLEM TYPE 4.40104 1 4.40104 49.5328 0.000000 
PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.18519 1 0.18519 2.0842 0.154208 
Error 5.15336 58 0.08885 
PREPOST 0.53519 1 0.53519 5.1710 0.026685 
PREPOST X TRAINING 0.11123 1 0.11123 1.0747 0.304195 
Error 6.00289 58 0.10350 
PROBLEM X PRIEPOST 0.11852 1 0.11852 3.1165 0.082765 
PROB*PREPOST*TRAININ 
G 0.15845 1 0.15845 4.1666 0.045788 
Error 2.20567 58 0.03803 
Table 5.17 ANOVA performed on changes in p only response patterns under 
permission and abstract training 
ss Degr. of MS F P 
Intercept 2.140741 1 2.140741 19.47301 0.000045 
TRAINING 0.535185 1 0.535185 4.86825 0.031329 
Error 6.376157 58 0.109934 
PROBLEM TYPE 0.029630 1 0.029630 1.16200 0.285515 
PROBLEM X TRAINING 0.001852 1 0.001852 0.07262 0.788509 
Error 1.478935 58 0.025499 
PREPOST 0.255671 1 0.255671 4.02494 0.049503 
PRIEPOST X TRAINING 0.126042 1 0.126042 1.98423 0.164284 
Error 3.684259 58 0.063522 
PROBLEM X PRIEPOST 0.002894 1 0.002894 0.17295 0.679039 
PROB*PREPOST*TRAINING 0.051042 1 0.051042 3.05081 0.085991 
Error 0.970370 58 0.016731 
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Table 5.18 ANOVA performed on changes in p/q response patterns under permission 
and abstract training 
ss Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 25.07989 1 25.07989 182.5356 0.000000 
TRAINING 0.30697 1 0.30697 2.2342 0.140407 
Error 7.96904 58 0.13740 
PROB 6.36461 1 6.36461 91.0942 0.000000 
PROB*TRAINING 0.27225 1 0.27225 3.8966 0.053153 
Error 4.05237 58 0.06987 
PREPOST 5.03151 1 5.03151 47.7477 0.000000 
PREPOST*TRAINING 0.88614 1 0.88614 8.4092 0.005265 
Error 6.11186 58 0.10538 
PROB*PREPOST 0.96901 1 0.96901 22.7523 0.000013 
PROB*PREPOST*TRAIN ING 0.42364 1 0.42364 9.9470 0.002552 
Error 2.47020 58 0.04259 
Table 5.19 T-test performed to investigate difference in ability between participants 
in Exps. 4 and 5 under obligation and rules training conditions 
t-value 
_df 
p F-ratio p 
Cognitive ability -3.59750 118 0.000471 1.072548 0.788840 
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Table 5.20 ANQVA performed to investigafe effectiveness of training between Exps. 
4 and 5 for obligation and rules training 
ss Degr. of NIS F p- 
Intercept 64.35013 1 64.35013 272.0709 0-000000 
(1)TRAINING 0.36576 1 0.36576 1.5464 0.216174 
(2)EXPERIMENT 0.77201 1 0.77201 3.2640 0.073408 
TRAINING*EXPERIMENT 0.36576 1 0.36576 1.5464 0.216174 
Error 27.43628 116 0.23652 
(3)PREPOST 1.94863 1 1.94863 19.7464 0.000020 
PREPOST*TRAINING 0.10453 1 0.10453 1.0592 0.305530 
PREPOST*EXPERIMENT 0.08578 1 0.08578 0.8692 0.353103 
PREPOST*TRAINING*EXPERIMENT 0.00245 1 0.00245 0.0248 0.875198 
Error 11.44716 116 0.09868 
(4)PROBLEM TYPE 19.30013 1 19.30013 186.5221 0.000000 
PROBLEM*TRAINING 1.49076 1 1.49076 14.4071 0.000236 
PROBLEM *EXPERIMENT 0.00638 1 0.00638 0.0617 0.804330 
PROBLEM*TRAINING*EXPERIMENT 0.01055 1 0.01055 0.1019 0.750102 
Error 12.00295 116 0.10347 
PREPOST*PROBLEM 0.19133 1 0.19133 5.1918 0.024523 
PRIEPOST*PROBLEM*TRAIN ING 0.52779 1 0.52779 14.3216 0.000245 
PREPOST*PROBLEM*EXPERIMENT 0.01217 1 0.01217 0.3302 0.566680 
3*4*1*2 0.01981 1 0.01981 0.5374 0.464976 
Error 4.27494 116 0.03685 
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Table 6.1 ANOVA to investigate differences in responding dependent on proble; n 
type, training and order of task presentation 
_ 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 800.0000 1 800.0000 578.6416 0.000000 
condition 10.8889 1 10.8889 7.8760 0.005735 
order 3.2708 2 1.6354 1.1829 0.309476 
condition*order 1.0486 2 0.5243 0.3792 0.685098 
Error 190.7917 138 1.3825 
Problem type 539.0139 1 539.0139 402.3471 0.000000 
Problem*condition 0.1250 1 0.1250 0.0933 0.760476 
problem*order 0.6736 2 0.3368 0.2514 0.778060 
prob*condition*order 1.3125 2 0.6562 0.4899 0.613775 
Error 184.8750 138 1.3397 
Table 6.2 ANOVA to investigate effects of training on p only response patterns 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 36.1250 1 36.12500 32.31339 0.000000 
condition 15.1250 1 15.12500 13.52913 0.000333 
Error 158.7500 142 1.11796 
PROBLEM 8.6806 1 8.68056 13.80249 0.000291 
PROBLEM*condition 4.0139 1 4.01389 6.38227 0.012623 
Error 89.3056 142 0.62891 
Table 6.3 ANOVA to investigate effects of training on p/q response patterns 
SS Degr. of NIS F p 
Intercept 722.0000 1 722.0000 374.3460 0.000000 
condition 1.1250 1 1.1250 0.5833 0.446291 
Error 273.8750 142 1.9287 
PROBLEM 369.0139 1 369.0139 213.0200 0.000000 
PROBLEM*condition 2.0000 1 2.0000 1.1545 0.284424 
Error 245.9861 142 1.7323 
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